The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Bonn Climate Change Conference took place in Bonn, Germany, from 31 August-4 September 2015. The meeting brought together over 2,000 participants, representing governments, observer organizations and the media.
The Bonn Conference was the penultimate of several meetings under the UNFCCC in preparation for the Paris Climate Change Conference scheduled to take place in France in November-December 2015. The Paris Conference is mandated to adopt “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties,” which is to come into force in 2020. The body tasked with developing the Paris agreement is the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). In Bonn, the ADP held the tenth part of its second session (ADP 2-10).
In December 2014, the 20th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 20) to the UNFCCC requested the ADP to intensify its work, with a view to presenting a negotiating text for a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties before May 2015. In February 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland, the ADP adopted the Geneva negotiating text (GNT) (FCCC/ADP/2015/1), which serves as the basis for the negotiations of the 2015 agreement. The GNT is a compilation of options and proposals by parties, and is 90 pages long.
In their scenario note (ADP.2015.4.InformalNote) of 24 July 2015, ADP Co-Chairs Ahmed Djoghlaf (Algeria) and Daniel Reifsnyder (US) identified the objective of the Bonn session as the production of a clearer understanding and articulation of the elements of the “Paris package” with regard to workstream 1 (2015 agreement) and workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition), including by the development of bridging proposals and the crystallization of options for further negotiation.
To guide the work at ADP 2-10, the ADP Co-Chairs produced, at the request of parties at ADP 2-9, a “Tool,” annexed to their 24 July 2015 scenario note. This Tool is based on the streamlined and consolidated text of 11 June that is the product of the efforts of parties at ADP 2-9 to streamline the GNT. The Tool also reorganizes the GNT without omitting or deleting any option or position of parties. The Co-Chairs also released a document (ADP.2015.5.InformalNote) containing elements for a draft decision on ADP workstream 2 (pre-2020 ambition).
At ADP 2-10, delegates worked throughout the week on the various parts of the Tool in facilitated groups and “spin-offs,” or informal meetings of the facilitated groups, addressing the sections on: preamble; general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; timeframes; implementation and compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. The groups considered placement of paragraphs in the Tool, engaged in conceptual discussions on key issues, and, in some cases, started developing textual proposals.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNFCCC AND THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out a legal framework for stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 196 parties. In December 1997, delegates to the third session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in Kyoto, Japan, agreed to a protocol to the UNFCCC that committed industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve emissions reduction targets. These countries, known as Annex I parties under the UNFCCC, agreed to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (the first commitment period), with specific targets varying from country to country. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and now has 192 parties.
LONG-TERM NEGOTIATIONS, 2005-2009: Convening in Montreal, Canada, in 2005, the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP) decided to establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Annex I Parties’ Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) in accordance with Protocol Article 3.9, which mandated consideration of Annex I parties’ further commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period. In December 2007, COP 13 and CMP 3 in Bali, Indonesia, resulted in agreement on the Bali Roadmap on long-term issues. COP 13 adopted the Bali Action Plan and established the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), with a mandate to focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, capacity building and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. Negotiations on Annex I parties’ further commitments continued under the AWG-KP. The deadline for concluding the two-track negotiations was in 2009 in Copenhagen.
COPENHAGEN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, took place in December 2009. The high-profile event was marked by disputes over transparency and process. Late in the evening of 18 December, these talks resulted in a political agreement, the “Copenhagen Accord,” which was then presented to the COP plenary for adoption. After 13 hours of debate, delegates ultimately agreed to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord, and to extend the mandates of the negotiating groups until COP 16 and CMP 6 in 2010. In 2010, over 140 countries indicated support for the Accord. More than 80 countries also provided information on their national mitigation targets or actions, as called for in the Accord.
CANCUN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Cancun, Mexico, took place in December 2010, where parties finalized the Cancun Agreements and extended the mandates of the two AWGs for another year. Under the Convention track, Decision 1/CP.16 recognized the need for deep cuts in global emissions in order to limit the global average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. Parties agreed to consider the adequacy of the global long-term goal during a 2013-2015 review, which would also consider strengthening the long-term global goal, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5°C. Decision 1/CP.16 also addressed other aspects of mitigation, such as: measuring, reporting and verification (MRV); and reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+). The Cancun Agreements also established several new institutions and processes, including the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the Adaptation Committee and the Technology Mechanism, which includes the Technology Executive Committee and the Climate Technology Centre and Network. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) was created and designated as an operating entity of the Convention’s financial mechanism. Under the Protocol track, the CMP urged Annex I parties to raise the level of ambition of their emission reductions, and adopted Decision 2/CMP.6 on land use, land-use change and forestry.
DURBAN: The UN Climate Change Conference in Durban, South Africa, took place in November and December 2011. The Durban outcomes covered a wide range of topics, notably the agreement to establish a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol beginning in 2013, a decision on long-term cooperative action under the Convention and agreement on the operationalization of the GCF. Parties also agreed to launch the ADP with a mandate “to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.” The ADP is scheduled to complete these negotiations no later than 2015, with the new instrument entering into force in 2020. In addition, the ADP was mandated to explore actions to close the pre-2020 ambition gap in relation to the 2°C target.
DOHA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Doha, Qatar, took place in November and December 2012. The conference resulted in a package of decisions, referred to as the “Doha Climate Gateway.” These included amendments to the Kyoto Protocol to establish its second commitment period (2013-2020) and agreement to terminate the AWG-KP’s work. Parties also agreed to terminate the AWG-LCA and negotiations under the Bali Action Plan. A number of issues requiring further consideration were forwarded to the Subsidiary Bodies, such as: the 2013-2015 review of the global goal; developed and developing country mitigation; the Kyoto Protocol’s flexibility mechanisms; national adaptation plans; MRV; market and non-market mechanisms; and REDD+.
WARSAW: The UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw, Poland, took place in November 2013. Negotiations focused on the implementation of agreements reached at previous meetings, including pursuing the work of the ADP. The meeting adopted an ADP decision that, inter alia, invites parties to initiate or intensify domestic preparations for their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). Parties also adopted a decision establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism on Loss and Damage (WIM), and the Warsaw REDD+ Framework, comprised of seven decisions on REDD+ finance, institutional arrangements and methodological issues.
LIMA: The UN Climate Change Conference in Lima, Peru, took place in December 2014. Negotiations in Lima focused on outcomes under the ADP necessary to advance toward an agreement at COP 21 in Paris in 2015, including elaboration of the information and process for submission of INDCs as early as possible in 2015, and progress on elements of a draft negotiating text. Following lengthy negotiations, COP 20 adopted the “Lima Call for Climate Action,” which sets in motion the negotiations towards a 2015 agreement, including the process for submitting and reviewing INDCs. The decision also addresses enhancing pre-2020 ambition. Parties also adopted 19 decisions, 17 under the COP and two under the CMP that, inter alia: help operationalize the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage; establish the Lima work programme on gender; and adopt the Lima Ministerial Declaration on Education and Awareness-raising. The Lima Climate Change Conference was able to lay the groundwork for Paris by capturing progress made in elaborating the elements of a draft negotiating text for the 2015 agreement and adopting a decision on INDCs, including their scope, upfront information, and steps to be taken by the Secretariat after their submission.
ADP 2-8: ADP 2-8 took place in February 2015, in Geneva, Switzerland. The objective of the session, as mandated by COP 20, was to develop the negotiating text based on the elements for a draft negotiating text annexed to Decision 1/CP.20 (Lima Call for Climate Action). The GNT adopted at ADP 2-8 serves as the basis for the negotiations of the 2015 agreement.
ADP 2-9: ADP 2-9 convened in June 2015 in Bonn and undertook streamlining and consolidation, clustering and conceptual discussions of the GNT, including on: preamble; general/objective; mitigation; adaptation and loss and damage; finance; technology development and transfer; capacity building; transparency; timeframes; implementation and compliance; and procedural and institutional provisions. The ADP also discussed workstream 2, in particular its mandate, and proposed elements that could comprise a decision on workstream 2. Also under workstream 2, Technical Expert Meetings (TEMs) on energy efficiency in urban environments and renewable energy supply convened.
ADP 2-10 REPORT
After a brief opening plenary on Monday, 31 August, delegates met throughout the week in facilitated groups and, from Tuesday until Friday, in informal meetings or “spin-offs,” of the facilitated groups on the various sections of the GNT. Their work was based on the Co-Chairs’ Tool, which starts placing the paragraphs of the GNT into three parts: part 1 contains provisions appropriate by their nature for inclusion in the Paris agreement; part 2 contains provisions appropriate by their nature for inclusion in a decision; and part 3 contains provisions whose placement requires further clarity among parties. The input provided by the Co-Facilitators to the groups varied, from lists of guiding questions, tables or summaries of discussions. Throughout the week, the ADP Co-Chairs met on a daily basis with the Co-Facilitators to be informed of their progress and to ensure consistency among the groups.
On Tuesday and Wednesday, debates in various facilitated and spin-off groups emerged over the mode of work, the mandate of the spin-off groups, or other procedural matters. An ADP stocktaking session was held on Wednesday evening at the request of some parties in an attempt to clarify the mode of work and the way forward. During the stocktaking, all parties agreed on the need to urgently accelerate work. Many called for clarity on the intended outcome of the session, and for a clear mandate for the Co-Facilitators.
Co-Chair Djoghlaf pointed to the ADP Co-Chairs’ scenario note and their document on further clarification on the mode of work released on 30 August 2015 as already providing clarity on the objective of the session. He also indicated that the Co-Chairs would hold bilateral meetings before the end of the meeting to discuss the mode of work of the October session.
On Thursday and Friday, there was a slight change in the pace of negotiations, with a number of textual proposals being put forward by parties or groups of parties, and areas of convergence emerging in a few others.
Discussions on specific sections of the Tool undertaken by the facilitated groups are summarized below, followed by the final output of these groups to the ADP Co-Chairs. For a more detailed summary of some of the facilitated group discussions, see: http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12640e.html; http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12641e.html; http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12642e.html; and http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12643e.html
On Monday, 31 August 2015, ADP Co-Chair Reifsnyder opened the meeting, stressing the urgency of beginning substantive negotiations.
UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres reported a €1.2 million deficit in the Trust Fund for Participation in the Convention process.
Antonio García Revilla, COP 20/CMP 10 Presidency, stated that 2015 provides an opportunity to bring together climate and development goals.
Laurence Tubiana, COP 21/CMP 11 Presidency, reported on the July 2015 informal ministerial consultations.
ADP CONTACT GROUP
On Monday, South Africa for the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China), Australia for the Umbrella Group, Dominica for the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), Guatemala for the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), Sudan for the African Group, and El Salvador for the Central American Integration System (SICA), delivered general statements. Other groups noted their statements would be on the UNFCCC website. A summary of the general statements orally delivered is available at: http://enb.iisd.org/vol12/enb12640e.html
FACILITATED GROUPS: Preamble: The group on section A (Preamble), which was co-facilitated by George Wamukoya (Kenya) and Aya Yoshida (Japan), met on Monday, Thursday and Friday.
Parties agreed on the importance of the agreement’s preamble and on the need for it to be concise. They expressed views on which concepts from part 3 of the Tool to include in the agreement’s preamble.
Guatemala for AILAC, Saudi Arabia for the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), Switzerland, Angola for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Liechtenstein, Norway, Australia, and Turkey called for the inclusion of gender equality and intergenerational equity. The LMDCs supported referring to historical and current emissions, means of implementation (MOI), and sustainable social and economic development.
Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela supported referring to the integrity of Mother Earth and the right to development. Sudan for the African Group, the LDCs, and Turkey called for mentioning how science guides the agreement.
The European Union (EU), the US, Norway, Japan, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, opposed by others, suggested discussing the preamble later, once substantive sections have taken shape.
In an informal meeting held on Wednesday, parties identified five concepts they would like to include in the preamble: reference to the Convention; science; the sustainable development agenda; integrity; and issues related to small island developing states (SIDS) and LDCs.
In the facilitated group on Thursday, Co-Facilitator Wamukoya recalled that, at the conclusion of the Wednesday spin-off, he had encouraged parties to engage informally on the five concepts. Reporting on such informal discussions, Botswana said a group of parties was unable to agree on the mode of work and had not engaged in substantive discussions. Bolivia and Guatemala reported that some parties agreed on a list of concepts for possible inclusion in the preamble. After a procedural discussion, parties presented their views on the concept of integrity.
Co-Facilitators Wamukoya and Yoshida circulated a non-paper on the possible elements of a draft preamble of the agreement on Thursday evening. The non-paper includes paragraphs on: the need to be guided by the provisions of the Convention; the outcomes of the Rio+20 Conference and the goals of sustainable social and economic development; the need to take into account environmental integrity, the integrity of ecosystems and other rights; and the specific needs and special situations of LDCs and SIDS arising from adverse impacts of climate change.
On Friday, Co-Facilitator Wamukoya explained that the Co-Facilitators’ non-paper aimed to recall the five concepts parties had discussed, noting that it does not imply it will provide the basis for discussions at ADP 2-11. He underlined that it is for the ADP Co-Chairs, depending on the mandate given by the parties, to elaborate on the discussions held at this session on the preamble.
Various parties, including Saudi Arabia for the LMDCs, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines, expressed concerns over the Co-Facilitators’ non-paper, pointed to missing elements, and asked for clarification on its status going forward. Australia underscored that both the COP Paris decision and the agreement itself will contain preambular language, whereas the non-paper only includes elements for the agreement’s preamble.
Guatemala, for AILAC, said the non-paper reflects most of the concepts discussed during the week. Various parties mentioned issues missing in the non-paper. Panama, for the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, called for mentioning the fight against deforestation and forest degradation in the preamble, and recognizing the role of REDD+. The LMDCs, Venezuela and China referred to historical emissions, MOI and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR). Canada pointed to non-state actors. Sudan, for the African Group, and Venezuela mentioned the right to economic development. Antigua and Barbuda, for the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), urged further clarification of the reference to human rights.
The EU, Australia, New Zealand and Brazil said the non-paper is not sufficiently concise. The EU added that the non-paper can be forwarded to the Co-Chairs. Norway preferred not submitting it to the Co-Chairs.
The US underlined the lack of consensus on the five concepts identified in the non-paper.
Parties agreed that the Co-Facilitators’ summary of discussions, comments received from parties, and submissions from parties would constitute the Co-Facilitators’ inputs to the ADP Co-Chairs on the preamble.
Definitions: Section B (Definitions) was not taken up during this negotiating session.
General/Objective: The group on section C (General/Objective), which was co-facilitated by Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda) and Artur Runge-Metzger (EU), met on Monday and Thursday.
The US, supported by several developed countries, and opposed by many developing countries and the EU, called for a reference to the objective in the preamble rather than creating a separate section.
Turkey, Norway, the EU, Sudan for the African Group, Angola for the LDCs, Malaysia and Kuwait supported reference to Convention Article 2 (Objective) in this section.
Brazil, with the EU, the LDCs, Norway, Argentina, Indonesia, Malaysia, Ecuador and Colombia, called for the inclusion of a temperature goal. Singapore, for AOSIS, and Bolivia supported reference to a 1.5°C goal.
AOSIS stressed recognition of the specific circumstances of particularly vulnerable countries, and inclusion of loss and damage. Saudi Arabia, for the LMDCs, with Jordan, called for reflecting CBDR and equity.
Guatemala for AILAC, Mexico for the Environmental Integrity Group, the EU, the Philippines, Bangladesh, the Dominican Republic, Viet Nam, Venezuela, and Sudan for the African Group, stressed including gender equality, with some parties variously calling for reference to human rights, intergenerational equity, and the rights of indigenous peoples.
Norway said human rights should be referenced in the preamble. Saudi Arabia called for replacing gender equality with “gender responsiveness” and opposed inclusion of human rights without qualification.
Ecuador advocated, with Argentina, reference to sustainable development, poverty eradication and food security, and, with Bolivia, adding protection of the integrity of Mother Earth.
Indonesia called for financial support, capacity building and technology transfer to be addressed in the objective, pointing to the comprehensive nature of the agreement. AILAC was encouraged by the references to long-term approaches, involving climate-resilient development and the achievement of net-zero GHG emissions.
Bolivia, Argentina, Cuba, Jordan, India, Kuwait, the Russian Federation, Sudan and Jordan opposed including issues that are not in the Convention, such as net-zero emissions and climate-resilient development. Colombia noted that the objective of the Paris Agreement is to build on the Convention and that these concepts should be seen in a broader context rather than as being applicable to all parties.
Many countries emphasized keeping the objective short, simple and concise, with New Zealand pointing out that principles are being addressed in the preamble.
The Co-Facilitators captured the discussions in a working document to be forwarded to the Co-Chairs. The document reflects two options: Option I, which includes proposed elements for specific articles on the objective of the agreement; and Option II, which captures the view that this could be addressed in preambular provisions.
The document also includes suggestions from the Co-Facilitators on the placement of these elements either in decision or agreement text. The Co-Facilitators said they would submit the document to the Co-Chairs with parties’ submissions attached.
Mitigation: The group on section D (Mitigation), which was co-facilitated by Franz Perrez (Switzerland) and Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore), met from Monday through Friday. Discussions first addressed elements of the agreement to be included in this section on Monday, then addressed collective efforts (in paragraph 3 of part 1) on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, and finally looked at individual efforts (in paragraph 4 of part 1) on Friday. A Co-Facilitators’ table on mitigation issues contained in the Tool was presented on Wednesday, to further enable discussions, with Saint Lucia requesting time to discuss the annexes to the agreement.
On Monday, three spin-off groups were established: clarifying provisions on non-market-based mechanisms, led by Bolivia; addressing how differentiation could be formulated under individual efforts, led by South Africa; and narrowing the joint implementation concept, led by Brazil.
On Tuesday, South Africa reported on the spin-off group on differentiation, noting interest in the debate and the diversity of views. Bolivia reported on the spin-off group on non-market issues, noting lack of agreement on this issue.
Most of the session on Tuesday was spent discussing parties’ diverging views on how to proceed, including on the utility of spin-off groups.
On Wednesday, Brazil reported on the spin-off group on joint implementation, presenting two draft paragraphs on the preparation, communication and implementation of INDCs by parties, and on arrangements for INDCs. Reporting on the spin-off on differentiation, South Africa noted agreement that differentiation is at the core of the negotiations and will only be solved by a political decision. Three additional spin-off groups were established on: response measures, led by the United Arab Emirates; market mechanisms, led by Colombia; and land use and REDD+, led by the United Kingdom.
On Friday, the spin-off groups reported back to the facilitated group. On differentiation, South Africa presented a new table distilling differentiation options. On non-market issues, Bolivia reported that views remain divided. On response measures, the United Arab Emirates presented a series of options ranging from no text to items for the agreement and/or decisions. On markets, Colombia noted a diversity of terms, including economic mechanisms, market mechanisms, flexible mechanisms and cooperative mechanisms. On land use and REDD+, the United Kingdom reported some concerns with singling out specific sectors in the agreement and a call by some to balance REDD+ with other approaches.
During discussions on elements for the mitigation section of the agreement on Monday, parties debated inclusion of a variety of issues: operationalization of the long-term goal, progression, accounting rules, market mechanisms, international transport, joint implementation, a registry or annex, joint mitigation and adaptation actions, differentiation, sector-specific actions, non-market-based mechanisms, and response measures.
On Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, parties discussed collective efforts, addressing issues including: reference to the temperature goal and its operationalization; quantified emissions reductions; placement of language relating to the temperature goal, whether in Mitigation (section D), General/Objective (section C), or Preamble (section A); and how to include differentiation in the section.
On Friday, parties began consideration of individual efforts (paragraph 4 of part 1 of the Tool). China emphasized that several of the options do not refer specifically to mitigation and should be placed in section C (General/Objective). China, India and the LMDCs said this paragraph should “capture differentiated aspects of countries’ actions.”
The Arab Group emphasized capturing the concepts of developed and developing, stressing equity and opposing a mitigation-centric agreement. Brazil noted that the section on General/Objective should include individual commitments related to all thematic areas, while the section on mitigation should provide detail on mitigation-specific elements of individual commitments.
The EU, the US, New Zealand and AILAC said parties should communicate and maintain commitments, calling for inclusion of implementation. Mexico called for an obligation to update and maintain commitments and report on them.
Japan emphasized reporting and review. With Australia, the US, Mexico, Japan and New Zealand, the EU called for capturing quantifiability.
The EU and the US supported reference to upfront information, with Australia saying modalities for upfront information could be set out by the governing body.
The EU, with the US and New Zealand, emphasized that each country should make at least part of their commitment unconditional. Mexico stressed that not all countries would be able to make unconditional commitments. Ethiopia, for the LDCs, and AOSIS called for recognizing the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS.
The EU, Mexico, Japan and New Zealand called for referencing markets. Australia called for referencing time frames. Canada recommended capturing the concepts of progression and ambition. AILAC stressed including the five-year cycle and the concept of no-backsliding. The Russian Federation cautioned against harming implementation with constant adjustments.
Parties agreed the Co-Facilitators would summarize discussions held during the week, including submissions, as captured in part by the “Working document [Section D - Mitigation] Version of 4 September 2015@01:00,” which reflects: elements with broad support; elements whose inclusion requires further consideration; issues benefiting from further discussion to deepen understanding; and an overview of discussions.
Adaptation and Loss and Damage: The group on section E (Adaptation and Loss and Damage), which was co-facilitated by Georg Børsting (Norway) and Andrea Guerrero (Colombia), met from Monday to Friday.
On Monday, parties held a conceptual discussion on major issues. On individual efforts, parties considered: the relationship between collective and individual efforts; the link between INDCs and MOI; and the need to integrate adaptation into national development planning.
On institutions, views converged on the need to enhance existing institutions, but differed on how to do so. The G-77/China and the LDCs lamented the limited treatment of loss and damage in the agreement. The US and the EU said the question was not “whether” but “how” to include it. Chile, for AILAC, stressed the importance of using existing communication channels. Tuvalu, for the LDCs, noted the need to avoid additional reporting burdens.
Co-Facilitator Guerrero proposed seven clarifying questions for parties’ consideration at the subsequent meetings of the group.
On Tuesday morning, the Marshall Islands, for AOSIS, noted lack of convergence on how best to address loss and damage. Parties also raised various issues such as: the need for a long-term vision that reflects the Convention’s principles; funding for adaptation and MRV of support; linkage between the temperature goal and adaptation; and joint mitigation and adaptation approaches.
Parties agreed to split the discussions between adaptation and loss and damage.
On Tuesday afternoon, parties responded to the questions circulated by the Co-Facilitators on Monday. On adaptation, parties discussed, inter alia: the relationship between collective and individual efforts; the difference between a goal/vision and collective effort; and concerns about linking adaptation finance and the level of mitigation achieved globally.
On loss and damage, the G-77/China urged moving beyond “recognition” of the issue and called for institutional arrangements. The LDCs discussed their proposed institutional arrangements, including a displacement facility and a technical panel. The US proposed addressing loss and damage through COP decisions, adding that she did not foresee that the Warsaw International Mechanism would “sunset.”
Spin-offs on long-term vision, goal and collective effort, and loss and damage were created.
On Thursday, reporting back from the spin-off on loss and damage, Grenada highlighted two proposals: from the G-77/China, placing a loss and damage mechanism with a climate displacement coordination facility in the agreement, noting that this mechanism would replace the WIM after 2020; and from the US, the EU, Switzerland and Australia, addressing loss and damage through COP decisions, and capturing the WIM’s permanence. These proposals were further discussed informally.
On Wednesday, parties deliberated on various aspects of adaptation, including: using the best available science; linkages between adaptation and support; country-driven approaches to monitoring and evaluation; concerns with the term “mainstreaming”; avoiding prescriptive language on adaptation communications; and gender-sensitive and human rights based approaches.
On Thursday, Co-Facilitator Guerrero summarized the adaptation spin-off group’s discussions, including: the possibility of a long-term global goal or vision to reduce vulnerability and increase adaptive capacity; and potential means to achieve such a vision, including sharing knowledge, MOI, and improving science.
On Friday, Chile reported on the spin-off on individual efforts. He highlighted areas of convergence, including the need for national adaptation action to be country-driven, and an emphasis on flexibility and consideration of national circumstances.
Germany reported on discussions on adaptation support, where negotiators from the finance group had been invited. He highlighted discussions on the uniqueness of adaptation support and convergence of views on using existing channels of finance.
Co-Facilitator Guerrero then displayed a table of the existing institutions on adaptation and asked how the agreement could strengthen these institutions. The G-77/China, with Jamaica, for AOSIS, asked for loss and damage to be reflected in the table. New Zealand and the US stressed the need to review existing institutional arrangements via COP decisions. The LDCs opposed, noting value in creating new institutions, such as on loss and damage and on knowledge generation.
The US presented a joint bridging proposal by Canada, Switzerland, Norway, Japan and New Zealand on loss and damage. The proposal, among others, notes that the WIM shall serve the new agreement after 2020. The EU expressed general support for this proposal, noting that it needed further consideration. Bolivia, for the G-77/China, said the proposal did not really “bridge” to their group’s position.
Co-Facilitator Guerrero encouraged parties to continue to submit bridging proposals and noted that they would be forwarded to the Co-Chairs.
On Friday evening, the Co-Facilitators issued a working document that summarizes their reflections of the work that took place during the week. Points of convergence identified in the document include the need for: national adaptation actions to be nationally-determined and country-driven; flexibility in the vehicle of communications; harnessing co-benefits and mitigation-adaptation synergies; and a country-driven and flexible MRV system.
Finance: Co-facilitated by Georg Børsting (Norway) and Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda), the group on section F (Finance) met from Tuesday to Friday.
On Tuesday, Co-Facilitator Børsting invited general reactions to the ADP Co-Chairs’ Tool. Bolivia, for the G-77/China, outlined its vision of the building blocks for this section: obligations and commitments; scale of resources; sources; and MRV. Ecuador, for the LMDCs, expressed concern that scale and sources were missing. Several parties noted the need to clarify institutional arrangements between existing funds and the new agreement.
Parties established a spin-off group on institutional arrangements, co-led by Canada and Bolivia.
On Tuesday, Canada reported back from the spin-off group and highlighted: parties’ desire to continue using existing operating entities of the financial mechanism under the Convention and provide them with guidance as necessary; and the continued relevance of the Standing Committee on Finance. Bolivia, for the G-77/China, expressed willingness to provide textual proposals on institutional arrangements.
On Wednesday, spin-off groups took place throughout the day, and two facilitated group sessions heard reports back from those groups. On scaling up finance, Ecuador highlighted discussions regarding, inter alia: imbalance between INDC actions and support for those actions; and differentiation among parties. On commitments/obligations/actions, Sweden noted: the need for new commitments/obligations/actions in the agreement; and the importance of enabling environments and associated concerns surrounding national sovereignty.
On Thursday, parties heard reports back from spin-off discussions and discussed proposals. Regarding scale, Ecuador noted difficulty in disentangling cross-cutting issues. On sources, Switzerland said sources could not be limited to a single option.
Parties then proceeded to discuss four proposals on institutional arrangements from the G-77/China, the Republic of Korea, the EU, and a joint proposal by the US, Japan and Canada. Parties discussed: commonalities across proposals, such as having the financial mechanism under Convention Article 11 (Financial Mechanism) serve as the financial mechanism of the new agreement; issues surrounding designating the GCF as the “main” operating entity; and the need for the COP to retain authority to provide guidance.
On Friday, informal discussions in the morning focused on, inter alia, thematic funding and its linkage with the finance section of the agreement, and dynamism of climate finance including responsibilities and sources.
On Friday afternoon, Co-Facilitator Børsting summarized discussions from the spin-off group on objective/commitments moderated by South Africa. He noted, inter alia: questions surrounding the objective of climate finance, such as its purpose, areas, context, and to what end.
Parties then discussed several submissions. Bolivia, for the G-77/China, introduced its submission on objective/commitment of finance for the core agreement, noting provisions on: limiting temperature increase as the main objective; and the necessity for developed country parties to provide new, additional, and scalable resources.
The EU introduced its proposal on objective/commitments that consisted of two paragraphs: the need for a transformation of investments; and the importance of all parties to mobilize and/or facilitate financial flows.
The G-77/China also presented its proposal on scale and scaling up of resources. She highlighted the need for: a floor of US$100 billion by 2020 with a clear burden-sharing formula; and recognition of the principles of the Convention.
The EU presented a conceptual note on enabling environments to be placed in the core agreement that urges, inter alia, all parties to improve their enabling environments and policy frameworks, including to “climate-proof” all investments.
Canada presented a joint proposal with Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the US on enabling environments that emphasizes the need for parties to cooperate to improve enabling environments to allow better access to finance by developing countries.
The US presented its building blocks proposal for this section, including: mobilization of finance from a variety of sources; prioritization for countries most in need; integration of climate considerations into development assistance; and scaling down international support for high-carbon investments.
Bolivia, for the G-77/China, introduced a text proposal for the core agreement that emphasizes the need for adequate support to be available for an international mechanism on loss and damage.
Co-Facilitator Børsting indicated that discussions held during the week would be reflected in a working document and transmitted to the ADP Co-Chairs, along with the submissions.
Technology Transfer and Development: The group on section G (Technology Transfer and Development), which was co-facilitated by Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Artur Runge-Metzger (EU), met on Monday and Wednesday through Friday. Parties also met in spin-off groups.
In the facilitated group, parties first engaged in procedural debates before moving to more substantive items. Discussions focused on areas of convergence, the framework for enhanced action, and institutions. Several developing countries called for establishing a link between the technology section and MOI. The US noted ongoing discussions under the COP on the linkages between the financial and technology mechanisms.
On areas of convergence, the United Arab Emirates proposed “higher-level categories” that could guide discussions: recognizing the importance of technology; developing and strengthening institutions and mechanisms; reviewing and updating over time; including commitments for developed countries to help developing countries to address barriers; and including commitments by countries to enhance and facilitate the deployment of technology.
Japan highlighted convergence on the importance of technology development and transfer and on recognition of existing mechanisms. The US envisioned parts of this section, including: recognition of positive developments; cooperative action; and institutional arrangements.
On Thursday, Canada reported back from the spin-off group held on Wednesday. She highlighted concepts parties envisioned in the agreement, underlining that this list did not reflect consensus: objectives/purpose/goal; role and importance of technology; plan to capture gaps and the framework for enhanced action; cooperative action; anchoring institutions and the framework; strengthening institutions and the framework; review and updating over time; and restating commitments to address barriers and commitments to enhance deployment of technology.
On the framework, Swaziland, for the African Group, clarified that their proposal for a framework for enhanced action does not create new institutions, but gives medium- and long-term guidance to, and reviews, existing institutions. She drew attention to a COP 7 decision that establishes a framework, and the revisions to the framework that occurred at COP 13 and COP 16.
With the clarification that the framework would not create new institutions, the EU supported further discussions on the framework. The G-77/China called the framework a “foundation” that could include MRV and barriers to technology development and transfer.
Japan called for the framework for enhanced action to be in a COP decision. India underlined that the agreement could be the “final reinforcement” of the framework and reflect its durability. The United Arab Emirates said the framework could feature in both the agreement and a COP decision, the former explaining “the what” and the latter “the how.”
On institutions, Swaziland, for the African Group, suggested further work on periodic assessments of institutional arrangements through COP decisions. The EU stated that a COP decision could strengthen institutions, while Iran preferred doing so in the agreement.
On Friday in the facilitated group, Belize reported from the spin-off session. He indicated that parties further discussed access and innovation and the global goal for technology. He also reported that parties exchanged views on each, but could not find convergence or draft text.
In the spin-off session on Friday, parties drafted text on the framework for enhanced action, cooperative action, and institutions. Parties drafted text for the framework and for institutions, but disagreed on the level of detail to include in the agreement as opposed to COP decisions. For cooperative action, parties drafted options.
The Co-Facilitators stated they would provide the Co-Chairs with a summary of the discussions and outputs of the group. In their working document, the Co-Facilitators reflect that parties, inter alia:
- recognized the importance of technology in the draft agreement and that the section could be strengthened;
- agreed cooperative action is key to facilitate and promote technology, with some parties noting that the current text could be enhanced to include other aspects;
- viewed institutional arrangements as important in the agreement, but expressed different views on how to strengthen the institutional arrangements; and
- discussed the framework for enhanced action, clarifying that the framework is not intended to create new institutions and would provide direction and overarching guidance to the work of existing institutions in the medium and long-terms and strengthen them.
On textual proposals, the working paper also notes: on cooperative actions, there was not agreement on which proposal would be used as the way to move forward with textual work; on anchoring institutional arrangements, parties did not have the opportunity to discuss the second textual proposal due to time constraints; and on the framework for enhanced action, some parties expressed the view that they could not agree on the placement of this issue in the agreement.
Capacity Building: The group on section H (Capacity Building), which was co-facilitated by Artur Runge-Metzger (EU) and Tosi Mpanu-Mpanu (Democratic Republic of the Congo), met Tuesday through Friday.
On Tuesday morning, parties exchanged views on the placement of text in the Tool and missing elements. Many parties emphasized the importance of enhancing capacity building, including in the pre-2020 period, which could be done through COP decisions. Many developing countries called for the agreement to establish a new capacity-building mechanism, stressing the need for coordination and coherence of capacity-building efforts. Many developed countries opposed creating a new mechanism, with the US suggesting the Durban Forum on Capacity-building could be enhanced instead.
Co-Facilitator Runge-Metzger requested that Swaziland facilitate a spin-off group on Tuesday afternoon on the elements for COP decisions on a pre-2020 functional capacity-building work programme.
On Wednesday afternoon, Swaziland reported from the pre-2020 spin-off. Parties noted convergence on the need for enhanced capacity building and started to engage on the question of “how.” Parties agreed the pre-2020 spin-off would convene again on Thursday morning, and would be led by Saudi Arabia.
The EU proposed strengthening institutional arrangements through COP decisions based on the outcomes of the third comprehensive review of the capacity-building framework. China, for the G-77/China, asked for assurance that the proposal for a new capacity-building mechanism would be moved from part 3 to part 1 of the Tool in order to start negotiations with a balanced text.
On Wednesday afternoon, a spin-off led by Japan addressed enhancement of institutional capacity-building arrangements.
On Thursday afternoon, both spin-off groups reported that they had not reached the “bridging” stage. Some countries called for a specific discussion on which existing institutions could be strengthened and how, with many developing countries questioning whether the Durban Forum on Capacity-building could address existing gaps.
Parties agreed the Co-Facilitators would capture the discussion in text and gather parties’ reactions on Friday.
On Friday afternoon, Co-Facilitator Runge-Metzger presented the Co-Facilitators’ working paper, which he stressed had no status. He explained that the paper attempts to capture the focus of the negotiations on two options: enhancing and intensifying the capacity-building work of the institutional arrangements established under the Convention; and/or establishing an international capacity-building mechanism.
The working paper also offers the Co-Facilitators’ reflection of discussions around a pre-2020 capacity-building work programme in the form of a textual proposal. The proposed text, inter alia: invites parties to assess their capacity-building needs for the implementation of all elements of the agreement, taking into account a long-term perspective; decides that the work programme will address current and emerging gaps and needs, as well as enhancement of coordination and coherence in the provision of capacity building, including within existing institutional arrangements; and creates a means of considering additional activities and modalities of the work programme, taking into account the outcome of the third comprehensive review and the summary reports of the Durban Forum on Capacity-building.
Mexico stressed that regardless of whether the institution is new or old, its ability to meet the capacity-building needs of developing countries will be defined by its work programme. Several parties suggested insertions or deletions, with the G-77/China adding that the work programme should end in 2020, when a new institution would take its place.
Co-Facilitator Runge-Metzger said the working paper would be updated to reflect these initial reactions, stressing that the Co-Chairs would be informed that parties did not have time to fully discuss it.
Transparency: The group on section I (Transparency), which was co-facilitated by Fook Seng Kwok (Singapore) and Franz Perrez (Switzerland), met Monday through Thursday.
On Monday, reacting to the Co-Chairs’ Tool, parties stressed the importance of discussing: accountability of actions; support for developing country parties to participate in the MRV regime; linkage between transparency of action and support and other sections; and accounting issues, including those on markets and land use. Some parties also raised concerns about the placement of issues in the Tool.
On Tuesday, the Co-Facilitators identified three areas where textual work could progress: differentiation and/or flexibility in the post-2020 framework that recognizes varying capacities; evolution of the transparency framework based on existing arrangements; and the need for MRV of action and support to be enhanced along with support for developing countries to participate in an MRV system. Many developing countries supported reorganizing the decision text in the Tool in a “logical” order: transparency of mitigation action; transparency of adaptation action; MRV of support; reporting of support; verification of support; and information on support provided and received.
On Wednesday, parties focused on support to developing countries to allow effective participation in the transparency framework, one of the three areas identified by the Co-Facilitators, and considered ways to improve language in the Tool on this issue. Many countries supported the idea that developing countries require additional support to participate effectively in the MRV system. Several developed countries emphasized the need for a “unified system” that allows for various approaches, builds capacity and continuously improves.
Parties also agreed to form two spin-off groups on differentiation/flexibility, and accounting/accountability.
On Thursday, discussions continued with a few parties presenting textual proposals. Singapore, for AOSIS, presented a framing paragraph for this section of the agreement, conveying that developed countries shall provide adequate support for effective participation. China, for the LMDCs, presented a proposal reflecting that the extent to which developing countries can implement MRV arrangements will depend on financial support from developed countries. The EU noted that these proposals did not adequately engage with existing positions of other parties.
Parties also heard reports back from spin-off groups. The US reported that the differentiation/flexibility spin-off had considered, inter alia: the need to build on existing systems; flexibility in aspects of transparency versus separate tracks for different groups of countries; support; and an evolving approach.
The EU reported that the accounting/accountability spin-off group had identified various ways accounting can be used, and different, though not necessarily contradictory, perspectives on accountability.
Parties agreed to hold a final informal meeting to hear suggestions on elements for various parts of the Tool.
At the informal meeting, parties agreed that the Co-Facilitators would produce a report of the facilitated group’s work as input to the ADP Co-Chairs. The working document developed by the Co-Facilitators addresses: the recognition that developing countries will continue to require support to participate in the post-2020 framework; the importance of flexibility to accommodate different capacities and national circumstances; the need to anchor purpose, principles and scope of MRV of support in the agreement; and the lack of symmetry between MRV of adaptation and support. The working document also notes diverging views on the placement of transparency elements in the agreement, with some calling for a package of transparency elements, and others preferring integration of transparency elements with thematic issues such as mitigation, adaptation and support.
Timeframes: The group on section J (Timeframes), which was co-facilitated by Roberto Dondisch (Mexico) and George Wamukoya (Kenya), met from Tuesday through Friday. This issue was also discussed in informal meetings and a joint spin-off group with section L (Procedural and Institutional Provisions) on the issue of housing of commitments, led by the Marshall Islands and Norway.
Reacting to the Co-Chairs’ Tool on Tuesday and Wednesday, parties focused on issues of scope, timing, communication of commitments/contributions/actions, stocktaking, and housing.
On scope, Japan viewed timeframes as being mostly related to mitigation, and called for a common cycle for submitting and updating mitigation contributions. Australia suggested that processes for mitigation and adaptation may differ. The US emphasized that adaptation and mitigation can be treated separately while maintaining their equal importance. Singapore said the section should refer to mitigation, adaptation, and support. The EU recognized the need to capture the evolving nature of mitigation, adaption and finance, and to tailor a system for each.
Tuvalu, for the LDCs, stated that modalities for mitigation and MOI may differ, and that parties should individually and collectively increase ambition. Colombia, for AILAC, noted the issue of collective or individual commitments with regard to finance is being addressed in the finance section. Sudan, for the African Group, called for discussing adequacy, explaining that the legal force of its members’ undertakings would depend on developed countries’ delivery of finance.
On communication and adjustment of commitments/contributions/actions, Canada said provisions on upfront information should be captured in decision text. The US supported successive contributions every five years and proposed a simple consultative period for the consideration of INDCs without a top-down review. AILAC emphasized the principles of progression and no backsliding. Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, stressed that many developing countries base their INDCs on the delivery of MOI. Noting the need for flexibility in the communication provision, the African Group called for defining both individual efforts and information to be provided to ensure transparency, clarity and effective aggregate consideration.
On the housing of commitments, many parties, including AILAC and the EU, said housing is not a timeframe issue. China suggested provisions on housing be addressed in the section on Procedural and Institutional Matters and captured in decision text. Sudan noted linkages with the section on Procedural and Institutional Matters, in particular with inscription and entry into force. Brazil opposed an annex to house contributions.
On stocktaking/review, New Zealand supported a review of collective efforts including an assessment of past actions and future commitments/contributions. Brazil emphasized that the aggregate evaluation aims to enable parties to reflect on and update their own contributions. Malaysia, for the LMDCs, called for a comprehensive aggregate review. With China, he emphasized that a review of support is key to increasing ambition. India stated the review could be a reference tool but should not prescribe individual efforts.
China cautioned against “a naming and shaming approach.” He proposed identifying implementation gaps, sharing best practices and including cooperative efforts. The US said an aggregate review could include: what parties collectively implemented; types of challenges; and opportunities for enhanced international cooperation and support in light of enabling environments.
On timing, the Marshall Islands stressed the importance of a common timeframe on mitigation contributions. In the context of mitigation, he proposed four steps: communication of proposed commitments; a 12-month ex ante process to assess aggregate effect; a process for inscription; and stocktaking of commitments. Several parties supported a five-year cycle for a global review of mitigation contributions. The LMDCs suggested parties decide for themselves on either five- or ten-year timeframes of individual contributions. Singapore questioned whether linking the collective review to a common cycle for reporting would be realistic.
Observing the linkages among sections, delegates agreed to invite Co-Facilitators from other groups and consider joint spin-offs.
On Thursday, delegates heard from the Co-Facilitators on adaptation and finance about discussions relating to timeframes in their groups. Parties also established a joint spin-off group with the section on Procedural and Institutional Provisions on the issue of housing of commitments, moderated by the Marshall Islands and Norway.
Many supported including a general stocktaking of global progress in the agreement. Brazil suggested the agreement establish a process for stocktaking, with output timed at least one year before parties submit revised nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The EU suggested a synthesis report as the “output” of the stocktaking and that the latest science be among its “inputs.”
On adjustments of NDCs, several parties emphasized the voluntary nature of adjustments to NDCs, with the EU underlining this should be compatible with progress towards a long-term goal in the agreement.
Zimbabwe, for the African Group, called for an article defining communication of the different types of undertakings, with flexibility for parties with limited capacity. Tuvalu, for the LDCs, suggested that: the term “NDCs” refers to mitigation; the term “contributions” does not apply to adaptation; and a parallel timing process for MOI is needed.
On Friday, the Marshall Islands reported back to the group that discussions in the joint spin-off group focused on different options for housing, including annexes to the agreement, schedules, registries, contribution documents, attachments as well as their potential legal, political and practical implications. Saint Lucia requested the Co-Facilitators to take note of its proposal for an Annex III to house parties’ nationally determined mitigation commitments.
Co-Facilitator Dondisch then presented, and delegates commented on, a list of key elements for the section on Timeframes with summary points reflecting discussions of the group on the issues of: stocktaking/review; maintenance of commitments/contributions/actions; upgrading of successive commitments/contributions/actions; and adjustment to NDCs. The list also notes: ambition, progression, positive collective process, transparency, dynamism, and differentiation as issues to be taken into consideration; as well as initial INDCs and housing as issues where more clarity is needed.
Parties expressed their preference to use language from the Co-Chairs’ Tool. The Co-Facilitators agreed to provide the list of key elements for this section, with parties’ comments, to the ADP Co-Chairs.
Implementation and Compliance: The group on section K (Facilitating Implementation and Compliance), which was co-facilitated by Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Aya Yoshida (Japan), met on Monday and Thursday.
On Monday, many parties underlined the need for the new agreement to include provisions on the establishment of arrangements on implementation and compliance. Various countries suggested some modalities for a compliance mechanism be included in the agreement, while China, for the LMDCs, suggested a work plan for a body to develop the modalities.
On differentiation and compliance, Tuvalu, for the LDCs, called for an enforcement branch for countries with national, economy-wide targets and a facilitative branch for those without. The LMDCs proposed that the enforcement branch be for developed countries and the facilitative branch for developing countries. Developed countries called for a mechanism that is applicable to all.
Parties also discussed the nature and purpose of the compliance mechanism. Various developed countries said the agreement should be primarily facilitative, while Bolivia suggested a tribunal.
Parties requested that the Co-Facilitators develop questions on differentiation and scope. A spin-off group discussed the establishment of a compliance mechanism. The Co-Facilitators circulated a working document summarizing these discussions on Monday night.
On Thursday morning, the US drew attention to her proposal for a multilateral consultative process. Colombia, for AILAC, referred to the facilitative nature of the Basel Convention’s Implementation and Compliance Committee. Australia warned that a non-compliance regime that provides for alternative avenues to access financial support could create adverse incentives.
The EU called for a mechanism that looks into parties’ performance and has adequate triggers. She noted the link to transparency and the MRV system. The Bahamas suggested the facilitative method include an assessment of both past and future efforts.
On Thursday afternoon, the Co-Facilitators circulated an updated version of their summary of discussions, which contains sections on: establishment clause and related elements; facilitative nature and purpose of the compliance mechanism; transparency and compliance; and differentiation and compliance. It notes that due to the lack of time, parties began but did not complete their exchange of views on these issues. On the next steps, the Co-Facilitators’ summary outlines various views on the way forward and reports that parties acknowledged the usefulness of further informal conversations on this matter in preparing for discussions at ADP 2-11.
The Co-Facilitators’ input to the Co-Chairs consists of the summary of discussions.
Procedural and Institutional Provisions: The group on section L (Procedural and Institutional Provisions), which was co-facilitated by Sarah Baashan (Saudi Arabia) and Roberto Dondisch (Mexico), met on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Wednesday, parties established a joint spin-off group with section J (Timeframes), which met on Thursday and was led by the Marshall Islands and Norway, to discuss the issue of housing of contributions. The discussions in the joint spin-off group are summarized under the section on Timeframes (see page 10).
On the governing body of the new agreement, several parties agreed that the paragraphs in part 1 of the Tool are a sufficient basis to serve the new agreement. Colombia for AILAC, Norway and Canada specified that countries that do not ratify the agreement should not take part in decision making under the governing body.
On rules of procedure, Sudan, for the African Group, suggested discussing the rules of procedure and the interval of meetings of the governing body. India, for the LMDCs, said details could be determined at a later stage. Saudi Arabia stated that the rules of procedure of the COP should apply under the new agreement. The EU suggested that the agreement develop its own rules of procedure. AILAC suggested this be discussed in the context of the paragraph in part 1 of the Tool on voting.
On anchoring institutions, the US, AILAC, Australia and others preferred identifying existing institutions that would serve the new agreement on a case-by-case basis in the relevant sections of the agreement.
Norway, India for the LMDCs, and the African Group supported a general anchoring provision. Jamaica, for AOSIS, noted new institutional arrangements for strengthened institutions may be required. Brazil said a general anchoring provision avoids duplication of existing institutions.
On whether provisional application should be the subject of an explicit provision in the agreement or be left for the decision adopting the agreement, Australia, Norway, Canada and AILAC supported the latter. India and New Zealand proposed deleting the text on provisional application. The African Group inquired, and the Secretariat provided background, on the legal differences between entry into force and provisional application.
On duration of the agreement, AILAC, the EU, AOSIS, the US, Australia, Canada, Indonesia, Angola, New Zealand and Japan did not see a need for an end date of the agreement. The LMDCs, Saudi Arabia and China supported including a provision on duration, considering a period of 10 to 20 years beginning in 2021.
On annexes, several parties supported using common language used in multilateral environmental agreements. Saint Lucia presented its proposal for an Annex III to the agreement to house NDCs.
On voting, most parties supported standard language, while AILAC encouraged parties to build on lessons learned. On participation and decision making, Malaysia and India opposed a mitigation-centric provision that links participation to parties’ current mitigation commitments. He noted that if developed countries failed to provide MOI to developing countries, the latter would fail to fulfill their mitigation commitments and be prevented from participating.
Mexico, supported by the US, Norway and Australia, and opposed by the African Group and Saint Lucia, suggested replacing “commitments” with “INDCs.” AILAC supported deletion of the paragraph, noting contributions from parties are already required for ratification. Saint Lucia underlined that in her country, adaptation is not a matter of contribution but rather necessity. Australia, the EU, and the US shared the idea that parties had to “bring something to the table” to take part in the decision-making process.
On the depository, several parties opposed an option for reservations in the agreement and supported including provisions describing the procedure for withdrawal.
Parties agreed that the Co-Facilitators would inform the ADP Co-Chairs of parties’ views expressed during the week. The Co-Facilitators circulated a document on 4 September summarizing the discussions.
Workstream 2: The group on workstream 2, which was co-facilitated by Aya Yoshida (Japan) and George Wamukoya (Kenya), met Monday through Thursday. Two spin-off groups on implementation and on the Technical Examination Process (TEP) deepened parties’ discussions of the main points of contention.
On Monday, Peru and France, respectively, for the COP 20 and incoming COP 21 Presidencies, addressed negotiators, linking workstream 2 with the Lima-Paris Action Agenda and posing questions for delegates to consider in relation to a decision on workstream 2.
Discussions in the facilitated group were based on the Co-Chairs’ elements for a draft decision, which were developed based on discussions held at ADP 2-9. The Co-Facilitators captured the views expressed at ADP 2-10 in working documents issued daily.
Many parties noted consensus on the general need to enhance ambition and close the mitigation gap, calling for discussion on “how” to achieve this aim. Mali for the G-77/China, Saudi Arabia for the LMDCs, China and Brazil noted the draft elements lacked specific actions, calling on parties to go beyond general requests for “enhanced” action.
Proposing the appointment of three co-champions to raise political visibility, Maldives, for AOSIS, suggested three steps: connecting technical work and political cooperation; scaling up the work of the Convention bodies; and continuing the work undertaken by the COP Presidency.
While recognizing the importance of high-level engagement, Mexico cautioned that it alone would not catalyze the action sought.
China and Kuwait, for the Arab Group, recalled earlier COP decisions that call on workstream 2 to address issues outside mitigation, such as adaptation and MOI. India urged parties to think of the pre-2020 gap in terms of all these elements.
The EU welcomed the paragraphs focusing on mitigation in the draft elements, such as the call to ratify the Doha Amendment. With the US and Australia, he clarified that while the issues other than mitigation are important, they should be addressed in the right fora by the relevant experts.
Many developed countries supported confining the scope of the draft to mitigation, with limited references to adaptation, such as adaptation co-benefits of mitigation actions. They stressed using existing adaptation entities and experts to address adaptation.
New Zealand and Switzerland urged “fixing” other bodies if deemed inadequate before creating new institutions.
The LMDCs and AOSIS stressed the need to prioritize trust-building. Brazil, China and Iran highlighted that workstream 2 is as important as, and complements, workstream 1, noting that agreement on workstream 2 underpins an effective Paris agreement.
On implementation, the G-77/China expressed disappointment that its proposal for an accelerated implementation process had not been included in the draft. Several developed country parties and Colombia, for AILAC, welcomed the emphasis on the role of non-state actors.
Reporting from the spin-off on implementation led by the Co-Facilitators, Mexico indicated that several textual proposals had been submitted on, inter alia: pledges/commitments; voluntary actions and co-benefits; finance; Nationally-Appropriate Mitigation Actions; and elimination of paragraphs viewed as outside workstream 2’s scope.
On the TEP, some developing countries lamented that the TEP is confined to mitigation. The LMDCs and the G-77/China called for an adaptation TEP, underlining that the pre-2020 mitigation gap had left a pre-2020 adaptation gap. India called for expanding the TEP to include technology and finance TEMs. AILAC suggested regional TEMs.
Bangladesh, for the LDCs, and South Africa called for transforming the outputs of the TEMs into implementation actions. The EU called for clear links between the TEP, high-level stakeholders, and actors implementing projects on the ground.
Japan, pointing to current work on adaptation and many existing reporting tools and requirements, warned against duplicating work in taking up adaptation TEMs and accelerated implementation. Saudi Arabia acknowledged the disagreement over workstream 2’s mandate, but asked for the rationale against an adaptation TEP.
South Africa reported on the TEP spin-off, highlighting discussions related to the scope, institutional arrangements and governance of the TEP. He said areas of emerging convergence included the need to: continue the mitigation TEP; improve connections with non-state actors; increase political momentum; and strengthen participation of developing countries. Divergence remained over institutional arrangements, including a proposed accelerated implementation forum, and an expanded scope. The group recommended a meeting of adaptation experts to discuss whether existing adaptation institutional arrangements can address the need for an adaptation TEP or whether some adaptation topics should be addressed by workstream 2.
Following a debate over which submissions, working documents, questions and interventions should inform the Co-Facilitators’ input to the Co-Chairs, parties agreed that the Co-Facilitators would assist the Co-Chairs in producing a new text ahead of ADP 2-11, taking into account all inputs made, regardless of form.
ADP CONTACT GROUP: On Friday afternoon, ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaf opened the closing session of the contact group. Parties agreed that the Co-Chairs would prepare, with the assistance of the Co-Facilitators and the Secretariat, a non-paper constituting negotiating text, taking into consideration the views and positions of parties as the basis for work for ADP 2-11 in October. Co-Chair Djoghlaf indicated that during the first week of October, the Co-Chairs will circulate the non-paper and a scenario note, which will propose a new mode of work. He explained that negotiations will take place in an open-ended drafting group with spin-offs as necessary.
South Africa, for the G-77/China, called for learning lessons related to fragmentation, noting the strain numerous spin-offs place on small delegations and emphasizing that cross-cutting issues should be addressed in a centralized space. She emphasized capturing progress, including proposals by parties, “bridging text,” and discussions.
Co-Chair Djoghlaf underlined that the establishment of a single open-ended drafting group at ADP 2-11 responds to the concerns raised by some countries over the fragmentation of the negotiations, and aims to better address cross-cutting issues. He clarified that the bilaterals to be held prior to ADP 2-11 aim to be preparatory meetings.
CLOSING PLENARY: The closing plenary immediately followed the closure of the ADP contact group. Co-Chair Djoghlaf recalled that the Secretariat had informed of a deficit in the Trust Fund for Participation in the Convention process. Executive Secretary Figueres reported that thanks to contributions made by parties during the week, full participation of all developing countries for ADP 2-11 and COP 21 will be funded.
Co-Chair Djoghlaf thanked small delegations for their flexibility, noting that 174 facilitated and spin-off group meetings had taken place during the week.
Jorge Voto-Bernales, COP 20 Presidency, Peru, echoed the recognition by parties for the need to move to a more centralized mode of comprehensive negotiations. He informed that, together with the incoming COP 21 French Presidency, the COP 20 Presidency would carry out consultations with heads of delegations during ADP 2-11.
Describing the plans for October under the motto “one team, one goal,” Laurence Tubiana, COP 21 Presidency, France, welcomed the common understanding on the type of document needed for the upcoming October ADP session to “effectively organize our work.”
ADP Rapporteur Yang Liu (China) presented, and parties adopted, the report of the session (FCCC/ADP/2015/L.3). Co-Chair Ahmed Djoghlaf suspended ADP 2-10 at 4:39 pm.
A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF ADP 2-10
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times…
-Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities
The road to Paris is now a tale of two cities―Bonn and Paris―and the tenth part of the second session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP 2-10) revealed that road to be steep, but navigable. It is also a tale of three levels of negotiations taking place simultaneously yet separately, and how to vertically integrate this pyramid. In a broader political process, heads of state are engaging at the top of the pyramid to generate political will and vision, and ministers are unlocking sticky political issues, such as differentiation and finance. The base of the pyramid comprises the technical negotiations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change that are expected to provide the bulk of the Paris agreement and crystalize options for decisions at the political level. Although progress at this meeting was, in the words of the COP 20 Presidency, “insufficient and uneven,” there was enough forward movement to mandate the Co-Chairs to draft a new negotiating text, a particularly important outcome given upcoming political negotiations.
This brief analysis compares the reality of ADP 2-10 with the great expectations many held beforehand. It also explores the deeper divisions among parties on the emerging Paris package and the limits, in the eyes of many negotiators, of technical negotiations when disconnected from the broader political process.
A TALE OF BRIDGES
…it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity…
Before ADP 2-10, there was general agreement on the urgent need for progress in order to reach an agreement in Paris in December. Expectations varied, from those who envisioned leaving Bonn with a concise draft text, to those who were cautiously hopeful for clarified positions and areas of convergence. The Co-Chairs sought middle ground, calling on parties to accelerate negotiations and “to develop bridging proposals, and, where required, narrow and crystallize options for further negotiations.”
If the barometer for progress is rising to the Co-Chairs’ call for bridging proposals and crystallizing options, the reality of ADP 2-10 shows evident, albeit uneven and incremental, progress among the facilitated groups on the sections of the negotiating text. Overall, bridging proposals were “rare unicorns,” and one delegate opined that many proposals did not bridge, but rather unified positions among those that already held similar views.
In several sections, parties drafted textual proposals, clarified their positions and found ways to accommodate others. In the adaptation, finance and capacity-building groups, several delegates were pleased that options and positions crystallized on some issues. Through considerable outreach, the African Group managed to convince, or at least intrigue, the EU and others on the idea of a framework for enhanced action on technology development and transfer. Other facilitated groups, such as those on mitigation and timeframes, took small steps, for instance developing bridging text on joint implementation in mitigation. The facilitated group on timeframes sought engagement with other facilitated groups and their Co-Facilitators on cross-cutting issues. The sections on preamble and general/objective remain stymied, although some felt it was premature to negotiate the preamble at this stage without knowing what the text of the agreement would contain.
ADP 2-10 moved in what many felt was the right direction, “making progress on the headings, if not the text,” in what one NGO termed a “fragile progress.” Two trends contributed to the uneven and incremental progress observed at ADP 2-10: the technical negotiations reveal deeper divides on parties’ visions for the Paris package, and the disconnect between the technical negotiations within the UNFCCC from the political processes happening outside the UNFCCC.
A TALE OF TWELVE SECTIONS
…we had everything before us, we had nothing before us…
At the start of ADP 2-10, parties had the building blocks of the Paris package before them―a compilation text including all parties’ views and a Co-Chairs’ Tool categorizing the text into three parts. Part 1 contained provisions for the 2015 agreement; part 2 housed provisions for COP decisions; and part 3 listed the provisions whose placement required further clarity. Many initially lauded the Tool, which was prepared at parties’ request. Yet by the end of the meeting, the Tool became ill-fitted for the task at hand, because it could not resolve deep differences among parties on the elements of the Paris package, the structure of the agreement, and how to address cross-cutting issues.
In reality, the Tool was only supposed to be a complement to the Geneva Negotiating Text, however, parties disagreed on how to use it. Parties spent considerable time during the first two days of the meeting debating whether to: place issues from part 3 of the Tool (provisions requiring further clarity) into the sections for the agreement or decisions; address issues thematically; move paragraph-by-paragraph through the text; or use spin-off groups to deepen understanding. In particular, the placement of items in part 3 of the Tool (provisions requiring further clarity) stirred fears that these more controversial issues would end up in “dustbins.” This led to calls for re-categorizing elements in part 3, which a delegate termed “resorting to re-sorting.” Others wished to focus on part 1 (agreement) to find traction and clear space for more difficult issues. The lack of clarity on the overall strategy of how to use the Tool caused procedural delays in the first two days of the meeting―precious time that parties could not recover. As an observer visualized, “it is like trying to mold a sculpture from rigid, fixed blocks, with no new material.”
The debates over placement of text reflect deep and unresolved divides among parties on the overall vision of the Paris package. Pointing to the difficulty of amending an international agreement, developed countries prefer a brief agreement establishing institutions and key provisions, with the operational details left to COP decisions, which are easier to modify over time. Developing countries have different criteria. They believe that important elements should be in the agreement, reflecting concerns that COP decisions are more ephemeral and lower profile. Furthermore, since the final days in Paris will likely be hectic, developing countries expressed concern that COP decisions could be put off until the next COP. One delegate explained how this complicates agreeing to a package: “if the what is in the agreement and the how is in the decisions, how can we agree to the what without knowing the how?”
Such sequencing issues were complicated by the section-specific method of work and disagreements on how to structure the 2015 agreement. For example, many countries prefer a comprehensive General/Objective section, with leaner, more specific thematic sections. Others seek a concise or even no General/Objective section with the bulk of the provisions in their respective thematic sections.
In addition, many issues emerged as cross-cutting, confounding parties on how to address them in the issue-specific facilitated groups. The timeframes group tried to refer housing of commitments to the procedural and institutions group, which identified housing as a timeframes issue. Adaptation finance emerged as a strategic, cross-cutting issue, slowing discussions in both the finance and the adaptation discussions. During the final meeting of the contact group, the Co-Chairs’ announcement that all parties would, together, read through the new text in October came as a welcome development for many, frustrated with shuffling issues around the sections.
Changing the modalities of work for the technical negotiations, which form the foundation of the pyramid of processes currently underway, hold promise to work on cross-cutting issues and clarify the elements of the Paris package among parties. These rather mechanical fixes to the technical negotiations are one way to help accelerate negotiations to the necessary pace. Yet the political processes underway are also essential elements to facilitate a successful outcome in Paris.
A TALE OF THREE PROCESSES
…it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness…
Many recognized that the technical negotiations forming the shape of any Paris agreement are insufficient to deliver a final deal without higher political guidance. Several seasoned observers described a pyramid comprising processes inside and outside the UNFCCC at the heads of state, ministerial and technical levels. Along these lines, ministers are expected to agree on a “finance package” on the margins of the Lima meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank on 7 October.
In light of the different levels of negotiators working toward agreement in Paris, many arriving in Bonn welcomed reports from the informal ministerial meetings held in Paris in July. Guidance on some sticky issues, including on differentiation and level of ambition, could be found in the Aide-Mémoire from the informal ministerial meetings. Yet, those in Bonn hoping for progress on these issues were disappointed. There was very little evidence in the ADP that these ministerials had even occurred.
ADP 2-10 demonstrated the challenges in trying to bridge the disconnect between higher-level political processes and technical negotiations. Some highlighted that while the ministerials did provide guidance on how to address the issue of differentiation, they did not specify how to operationalize it under the thematic elements. The absence of clarity at the political level on how to address differentiation in each of the sections characterized facilitated group discussions at the technical level in Bonn.
Yet, by the end of the session, there was a sense that some of the momentum generated in July on differentiation had slowly begun to percolate down into the spin-off group on differentiation in the mitigation section. Parties were able to at least identify all the ways differentiation was reflected in the text. The open question is whether technical negotiations should feed into political negotiations or vice versa. For some, delegates in the technical negotiations have both history and expertise on their side, which are valuable resources to resolve issues, and inform the political discussions. For others, the political level should provide guidance to the technical negotiations, in part by identifying political trade-offs and crafting compromises.
A TALE OF TWO CITIES
…it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness…
For many, one of the most important outcomes of the meeting was the broad mandate given on Friday to the Co-Chairs to produce a new non-paper, comprising a negotiating text. This mandate became increasingly necessary throughout the week in light of the incremental progress made. By this metric, ADP 2-10 proved a success. Parties swiftly agreed to request that the Co-Chairs prepare their first text, a “concise single consolidated document… that corrects imbalances, which is inclusive and not restrictive in terms of content, includes crystallized, manageable options, and creates better articulation for all central issues between the core agreement and COP decisions.”
The Co-Chairs’ task is made more formidable because of parties’ largely incremental progress toward a single negotiation text that more closely resembles what will hopefully be adopted in Paris. The concise, single document that parties seek is a long way from the Geneva negotiating text and the Co-Chairs’ Tool, which remain largely unchanged after ADP 2-10. Before October, the Co-Chairs will have to try to draft text for some issues and identify options for others on which views sharply diverge, in order to make the leap from a compilation of views to a negotiation text ready to be discussed in Bonn in October and serve as the draft of the post-2020 Paris agreement.
Contributing to this momentum is the heads of state meeting to be convened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on 27 September, upcoming finance ministerials, the expected agreement on a “finance package” in Lima on 7 October, as well as submission of some major INDCs, including from India and Brazil.
Many hoped for a more symbiotic relationship between the political and technical levels. The political negotiations would provide direction on tricky political issues to the technical level, to facilitate negotiations. The technical level in turn would inform the political level with clear options and advice on their implications in order to avoid arbitrary decisions during the final hours of COP 21.
In these last weeks before Paris, these levels must merge, hopefully coupling political agreements with technical progress on the text. Echoing ADP Co-Chair Djoghlaf’s sense of urgency, one delegate emphasized “whether we are prepared or not, we have a date with history in Paris.”
CCAC Working Group Meeting: The Working Group meeting of the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants (CCAC) will take place from 8-9 September 2015. CCAC, hosted by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), is a voluntary international coalition of partners focusing on addressing short-lived climate pollutants in order to protect the environment and public health, promote food and energy security, and address near-term climate change. The CCAC Working Group oversees the CCAC’s cooperative actions. dates: 8-9 September 2015 location: Paris, France contact: CCAC Secretariat phone: +33-1-44-37-14-50 fax: +33-1-44-37-14-74 email: firstname.lastname@example.org www: http://www.ccacoalition.org/
Latin American and Caribbean Carbon Forum 2015: The 2015 Latin American and Caribbean Carbon Forum will provide a platform for participants to discuss regional options and the enabling policy conditions that would be required to move towards carbon neutral economies in the Latin American and Caribbean region, as well as associated challenges. dates: 9-11 September 2015 location: Santiago, Chile contact: Leontina Barrera email: Leontina.BARRERA@cepal.org www: http://www.ieta.org/latin-american-and-caribbean-carbon-forum-2015
Global Aviation Partnerships on Emissions Reductions (E-GAP) - Multiplying Environmental Action: This forum is being organized by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to highlight the results achieved thus far through partnerships between ICAO, governments and other organizations that are focused on reducing GHG emissions from international aviation. Initiatives formed as a result of the seminar will be presented to UNFCCC COP 21 in December 2015. dates: 16-17 September 2015 location: Montreal, Quebec, Canada contact: ICAO phone: +1-514-954-8219 fax: +1-514-954-6077 email: email@example.com www: http://www.icao.int/Meetings/EGAP/Pages/default.aspx
UN Sustainable Development Summit 2015: More than 150 world leaders are expected to attend the UN Sustainable Development Summit to formally adopt a new development agenda. The post-2015 sustainable development agenda, “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” includes: a declaration; the Sustainable Development Goals and targets; means of implementation and a new Global Partnership for Development; and a framework for follow-up and review. dates: 25-27 September 2015 location: UN Headquarters, New York contact: UN Division for Sustainable Development fax: +1-212-963-4260 email: firstname.lastname@example.org www: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/summit/
Africa Climate Talks: West/Central/North Africa and West African SIDS: Under the theme, “Democratizing Global Climate Change Governance and Building an African Consensus toward COP 21 and Beyond,” the Africa Climate Talks (ACT!) are being organized by the Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa) Programme. ClimDev-Africa is a joint Programme of the African Union Commission, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African Development Bank. dates: 1-3 October 2015 location: Dakar, Senegal contact: Jacqueline Chenje, Communications Officer, Africa Climate Policy Centre, UNECA phone: +251-11-544-3489 email: JChenje@uneca.org www: http://climdev-africa.org/cop21/act
42nd Session of the IPCC: The 42nd session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 42) will convene in October 2015 to elect a new Chair, among other things. dates: 5-8 October 2015 location: Dubrovnik, Croatia contact: IPCC Secretariat phone: +41-22-730-8208/54/84 fax: +41-22-730-8025/13 email: IPCC-Sec@wmo.int www: http://www.ipcc.ch/
26th Meeting of the Adaptation Fund Board: The Adaptation Fund Board supervises and manages the Adaptation Fund under the authority and guidance of the countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol. dates: 6-9 October 2015 location: Bonn, Germany contact: Cathryn Poff, Adaptation Fund Secretariat phone: +1-202-473-7499 fax: +1-202-522-2720 email: email@example.com www: http://www.adaptation-fund.org
Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund: The 2015 Annual Meetings of the World Bank Group and the IMF will bring together ministers of finance and central bank governors from the institutions’ 188 member countries, and provide a forum for civil society, the private sector, academics and others to engage in discussions on economic issues. dates: 9-11 October 2015 location: Lima, Peru contact: David Theis, World Bank phone: +1-202-458-8626 email: firstname.lastname@example.org www: https://www.imf.org/external/am/2015/index.htm
ADP 2-11: The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) will hold the eleventh part of its second session in Bonn, Germany. dates: 19-23 October 2015 location: Bonn, Germany contact: UNFCCC Secretariat phone: +49-228-815-1000 fax: +49-228-815-1999 email: email@example.com www: http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php
Fifth Conference on Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA–V): The Climate Change and Development in Africa (CCDA) conference series was conceived as an annual forum to enable linkages between climate science and development policy by promoting transparent discussions between key stakeholders in the climate and development community. location: Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe contact: African Climate Policy Centre phone: +251-11-551-7200 fax: +251-11-551-0350 email: firstname.lastname@example.org www: http://www.climdev-africa.org/ccda5
G20 2015 Leaders’ Summit: The Turkish Presidency of the Group of 20 (G20) will host G20 leaders in Antalya, Turkey, for the G20 Leaders’ Summit. The G20 aims to conclude the Summit with practical outcomes on such priority areas as development, climate change, financing for climate change, trade, growth, and employment. dates: 15-16 November 2015 location: Antalya, Turkey contact: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs email: G20info@mfa.gov.tr www: https://g20.org/
UNFCCC COP 21: The 21st session of the COP to the UNFCCC and associated meetings will take place in Paris. dates: 30 November - 11 December 2015 location: Paris, France contact: UNFCCC Secretariat phone: +49-228 815-1000 fax: +49-228-815-1999 email: email@example.com www: http://www.unfccc.int
For additional meetings, see http://climate-l.iisd.org/