

Summary of the 2024 Bonn Climate Change Conference: 3-13 June 2024

Just six months ago, governments delivered a milestone decision at the 2023 Dubai Climate Change Conference. The outcome of the Paris Agreement’s first Global Stocktake (GST) called on parties to contribute to global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in this critical decade. This decision also encourages the next round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), due in February 2025, to include ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets aligned with the objective to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Many hoped this would be a necessary course correction to stave off the most dangerous effects of climate change and ensure that the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is fit for purpose.

The 2024 Bonn Climate Conference was the first opportunity for parties to discuss just how to implement these calls and other elements of the GST decision. However, these discussions did not leave delegates very optimistic that the GST will lead parties to the much needed course correction.

After two weeks of negotiations, parties did not make much progress in defining the modalities of a new dialogue on implementing the GST outcome. In fact, they did not reflect much on modalities. There were entrenched disagreements over the dialogue’s intended scope: should it focus on means of implementation, especially finance, or reflect on the implementation of all elements of the GST decision?

Discussions on the mitigation work programme were even more contentious. Parties could not reach any agreement, not even to invite intersessional submissions or capture discussions held in Bonn to inform discussions at the next meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024. Many groups and parties denounced the conduct of these negotiations, emphasizing that mitigation action should not be a “taboo topic” in the process.

Many also expressed disappointment about the lack of progress on the Global Goal on Adaptation, as well as the identification of research needs and the timeliness of inputs by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in discussions on research and systematic observation.

On a range of issues, including gender, parties only adopted procedural conclusions, by which they agree to continue consideration of the matter at the next session, informed by discussions held in Bonn. Progress was overall hard to pin down and mostly related to the launch of review processes.

Looking ahead to the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties in Baku, many were wary of the lack of substantive progress on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, which is to be defined prior to 2025. Parties’ positions remain far apart on key issues such as the donor and recipient base, and they have yet to meaningfully discuss the quantum of the goal. Agreement on the goal will define the trajectory of climate action for years to come, making it a crucial issue to sort out.

The 2024 Bonn Climate Change Conference convened from 3-13 June 2024 at the World Conference Center in Bonn, Germany. It consisted of meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, 30 mandated events, and a series of side events. There were 8,606 registered participants, including 3,444 party delegates, 2,467 observers from non-governmental organizations, and 225 media representatives.

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## A Brief History of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out the basic legal framework and principles for international climate change cooperation with the aim of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 197 parties.

To boost the effectiveness of the UNFCCC, parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. It commits industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve quantified emission reduction targets for a basket of six GHGs. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and has 192 parties. Its first commitment period took place from 2008 to 2012 followed by the second commitment period, 2013-2020.

In December 2015, parties adopted the Paris Agreement, which includes the goal of limiting the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. It also aims to increase parties’ ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and make financial flows consistent with a pathway towards low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Under the terms of the Agreement, all countries will submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and will review the aggregate progress on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation every five years through a Global Stocktake (GST). The Agreement further sets out an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) for national reporting by all parties. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. To date, 193 parties have ratified the Agreement.

### Recent Key Turning Points

**Fiji/Bonn:** The Fiji/Bonn Climate Change Conference convened from 6-17 November 2017 in Bonn, Germany, under the Presidency of Fiji. The Conference of the Parties (COP) launched the Talanoa Dialogue, a facilitative dialogue to take stock of collective progress towards the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals. The COP also established the “Fiji Momentum for Implementation,” a decision giving prominence to pre-2020 implementation and ambition. Parties also provided guidance on the completion of Paris Agreement’s implementing details, the Paris Agreement Work Programme (PAWP), and decided that the Adaptation Fund shall serve the Paris Agreement, subject to decisions to be taken by Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 1-3).

**Katowice:** The Katowice Climate Change Conference convened from 2-14 December 2018 in Katowice, Poland, concluding a busy year that featured an additional negotiation session to advance work on the PAWP. Parties adopted the “Katowice Climate Package,” which finalized nearly all of the PAWP, including decisions to facilitate common interpretation and implementation of the Paris Agreement on the mitigation section of NDCs, adaptation communications, ETF, GST, and financial transparency, among others. Work on cooperative approaches, under Article 6 of the Agreement, was not concluded, and parties agreed to conclude it in 2019. The COP was unable to agree on whether to “welcome” or “note” the IPCC’s Special Report on 1.5°C of Global Warming.

**Chile/Madrid:** The Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference convened from 2-13 December 2019 in Madrid, under the

Presidency of Chile. Delegates established the Santiago Network for Averting, Minimizing, and Addressing Loss and Damage, and adopted the enhanced five-year Lima Work Programme and its Gender Action Plan. Parties also adopted three “cover decisions” under the different governing bodies, each named the “Chile/Madrid Time for Action.” On many issues, notably Article 6 and long-term finance, parties could not reach agreement.

**Glasgow:** The Glasgow Climate Change Conference convened in Scotland from 31 October – 12 November 2021, following the COVID-19 pandemic-related interruption. Parties finalized the Paris Agreement rulebook, adopting guidelines, rules, and a work programme on Article 6 and agreeing on the format of reporting under the ETF. Parties adopted the “Glasgow Climate Pact,” a series of three overarching cover decisions that, for the first time, included a reference to phasing down unabated coal power and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They also agreed to work programmes on a global goal for adaptation, and on urgently scaling up mitigation; created the Glasgow Dialogue on loss and damage; established a process towards defining a new collective quantified goal on climate finance; and launched an annual dialogue on ocean-based climate action.

**Sharm El-Sheikh:** The Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference convened in Egypt from 6-20 November 2022 and concluded with the adoption of 60 decisions. For the first time, parties recognized the need for finance to respond to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and established a fund and funding arrangements, with the details to be worked out in 2023. Key elements in the package leading to this agreement were the work programmes on urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Parties also adopted two overarching cover decisions, together called the “Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan.” Highlights of the cover decisions include:

- retaining the call to phase down unabated coal power and phase out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, as adopted in the Glasgow Climate Pact;
- urging parties that have not yet communicated new or updated NDCs or long-term low GHG development strategies to do so as soon as possible before CMA 5;
- establishing a work programme on just transition to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement; and
- calling for multilateral development bank reform.

The meeting also launched the selection process for the host of the Santiago Network secretariat and continued the technical dialogue under the GST, among other issues.

**Dubai:** The Dubai Climate Change Conference convened in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 30 November – 13 December 2023. It delivered a milestone decision: parties concluded the Paris Agreement’s first GST. The decision, among others, calls on parties to contribute to global efforts to transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems in this critical decade. It also encourages the next NDCs, due in February 2025, to include ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets aligned with the objective to limit global warming to 1.5°C.

Parties also adopted a decision paving the way for the operationalization of the new loss and damage fund, agreed on the host of the Santiago Network secretariat, adopted the GGA framework, and launched a work programme on adaptation indicators, among others.

## Report of the Meetings

The 60th session of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) opened on [Monday, 3 June](#). Parties and observers presented their opening statements, outlining expectations for the negotiations.

### Procedural Matters

**Adoption of the Agendas:** The RUSSIAN FEDERATION objected to the adoption of the agendas on the basis that four of its negotiators had not been provided with visas by the host country. After a short suspension, they withdrew their objection, reserving the right to block the adoption of outcomes should the visa matter not be resolved. Later in the day, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION reported the outstanding visas had been granted.

Nabeel Munir (Pakistan), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), and Harry Vreuls (the Netherlands), Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), pointed to constructive pre-session consultations with groups and parties on the agendas. Parties agreed to adopt the provisional agendas ([FCCC/SBI/2024/4](#) and [FCCC/SBSTA/2024/4](#)) without the items proposed for inclusion by BOLIVIA, on developed countries' immediate and urgent action to achieve net-zero emissions at the latest by 2030 and net-negative emissions thereafter, and on means of implementation for alternative policy approaches to results-based payments. Bolivia, for the LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), called out the failure of Global North countries to fulfill their obligations, highlighting that developed countries' net-zero emissions targets fall short of what is required to address the climate crisis and lamented the onset of "carbon colonialism." He invited the Troika of COP Presidencies (UAE, Azerbaijan, and Brazil) to work on developing a roadmap to facilitate non-market approaches to mitigation and adaptation.

During the closing plenary, the SB Chairs noted that they held consultations on Bolivia's proposed agenda items, but no consensus had been reached on a way forward.

**Organization of Work:** During the two-week meeting, contact groups convened on:

- the just transition work programme;
- matters relating to the forum on the impact of the implementation of response measures;
- the framework for non-market approaches (NMAs) referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.8;
- arrangements for intergovernmental meetings; and
- administrative, financial, and institutional matters.

Informal consultations convened on all other agenda items included in the adopted agendas.

During the opening plenary, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), supported by EGYPT and BOLIVIA, expressed concern about the compilation and synthesis of Annex I parties' biennial reports, noting projected increases in Annex I parties' GHG emissions between 2020 and 2030. He requested dedicated time and space to consider this agenda item, including the synthesis report. The SBI Chair confirmed that each item under this agenda item will be considered separately.

SBI Chair Munir noted that no L documents would be prepared for strictly procedural conclusions, but these would be read out in plenary and reflected in the meeting report.

### Global Stocktake

**Procedural and Logistical Elements of the Overall Global Stocktake Process:** The GST is a collective assessment of efforts and results on all areas of the Paris Agreement. It is intended to inform the development of NDCs. The first GST concluded at CMA 5 in Dubai. The objective in Bonn was to discuss how to refine the procedural and logistical elements of the GST process based on the experiences of the first GST, with a view to adopt a decision in Baku.

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Patrick Spicer (Canada) and Thureya Al Ali (UAE), and took place on [4](#), [6](#), [8](#), [10](#), [11](#), and [12 June](#). Salient points of discussion included, among others:

- whether and how to align the publication of the IPCC's seventh assessment cycle with the second GST to include the best available science;
- improving the transition between the technical assessment and consideration of output phases of the GST; and
- the composition of the High-Level Committee of future GSTs.

**SB Conclusions:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.3](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- take note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators at SB 60, noting it does not represent consensus among parties; and
- agree to continue considering the matter at SB 61, taking into account the informal note, with a view to concluding consideration of the matter at CMA 6.

**Modalities of the Dialogue on Implementing the Global Stocktake Outcomes:** The purpose of this item was to discuss the modalities of the dialogue, which was established in the GST outcome, with the aim of operationalizing the dialogue at CMA 6. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Patrick Spicer (Canada), and took place on [5](#), [6](#), [8](#), [11](#), and [12 June](#).

Disagreements arose on whether the dialogue should consider all aspects of the GST outcome, a position shared by the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), the EU, ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), the US, NORWAY, and JAPAN; or whether it should consider finance, given that the paragraph establishing the dialogue was contained in a section on finance, a position shared by the AFRICAN GROUP and LMDCs. The INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) and the LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) suggested a bridging proposal whereby the dialogue would follow up on all GST outcomes with a focus on finance and means of implementation.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.6](#)), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators at SB 60, noting it does not represent consensus among parties;
- agrees to continue consideration of the matter at SBI 61 with a view to concluding it at CMA 6;
- invites parties to submit views on the modalities of the dialogue; and
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis of submissions for consideration at SBI 61.

**First Annual Dialogue on the Global Stocktake Informing the Preparation of Nationally Determined Contributions:**

This mandated event, which took place on [6](#) and [7 June](#), aimed to facilitate the sharing of good practices on how the GST's outcomes

will inform the preparation of parties' next NDCs. Participants heard a series of presentations from parties and non-party stakeholders on the ways in which they integrated GST findings in their NDC process.

Participants reflected on challenges in synchronizing national legislative processes with the NDC update cycle, the value of sectoral climate targets, and the role of line ministries in implementing NDCs. The International Energy Agency highlighted findings from its new special report, "[Strategies for Affordable and Fair Clean Energy Transitions](#)," including that speeding up the transition to clean energy technologies improves the affordability of energy and can relieve pressures on the cost of living.

## **Mitigation**

### **Mitigation Ambition and Implementation Work Programme:**

This item considered parties' views on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), including reflecting on its global dialogues and investment-focused events, the most recent of which took place in [May 2024](#). Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Carlos Fuller (Belize) and Kay Harrison (New Zealand), and took place on [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), [8](#), [10](#), [11](#), and [12](#) June.

Parties' views significantly diverged on what should be included in the draft decision text to be prepared, especially on whether the decision should reflect and build on the mitigation-related elements of the GST outcome. The EIG, the EU, AOSIS, AILAC, and others supported this, while LMDCs and the ARAB GROUP opposed reflecting on the GST outcome, arguing that it was outside the work programme's mandate to do so.

Parties discussed the improvement of global dialogues and investment-focused events, although several parties stated they would only engage on the topic with the assurance that other issues would also be discussed. Comments related to, among others:

- using investment-related events to unlock funding, including blended finance and funding from multilateral development banks; and
- conducting more inclusive dialogues, including by conducting regional dialogues, which the ARAB GROUP opposed.

The Co-Facilitators produced an informal note and draft conclusions under their own authority, but parties were unable to agree on whether to discuss them. The EU, EIG, AILAC, LDCs, and others suggested the Secretariat should produce a synthesis report on potential elements for a draft decision based on intersessional submissions. LMDCs, the ARAB GROUP, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION opposed this.

During the closing plenary, SBI Chair Munir noted that parties were unable to come to an agreement. Applying rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure, the issue will be placed on the agenda for SB 61.

AOSIS expressed deep disappointment and frustration at the failure to adopt conclusions. She pointed to "tactics aimed at blocking the process" and underscored the need for a substantive decision to be adopted in Baku that reflects science, integrates the outcomes of the GST, and informs the preparation of 1.5°C-aligned NDCs.

The EU underscored that many developed and developing countries worked towards reaching agreement on the issue and supported the Co-Facilitators' informal note as a basis for work at the next session. He cautioned there cannot be a good outcome in Baku without a substantial outcome on mitigation, calling upon

the COP 28 Presidency and incoming COP 29 Presidency to do their utmost to break deadlocks and ensure that balance across all elements of the Paris Agreement is achieved.

The UMBRELLA GROUP considered it unacceptable that some parties refuse to engage with science and acknowledge the "historic" GST outcome.

EIG found it unacceptable to see some groups block progress, even in the form of a call for submissions. Emphasizing that mitigation cannot be "a taboo topic," he said Baku needs to deliver on the 1.5°C goal.

LMDCs lamented negotiations conducted in bad faith, saying the process was "co-facilitator driven rather than party-driven." He denounced that Annex I parties' emissions are projected to increase in 2030 compared to 2020 and called out developed countries' hypocrisy in discussions on means of implementation.

LDCs cautioned that the failure to make progress on the work programme jeopardizes the 1.5°C target and threatens vulnerable communities' sustainable development chances. He invited all parties to reconsider their position and do better in Baku.

AILAC lamented that the MWP is not living up to its objective, underscoring the aim to enhance means of implementation with a sectoral perspective and establish links to the GST. She found it disheartening that some parties blocked even an intersessional call for submissions against a united majority of parties, which included a majority of developing countries representing all regions of the world.

The AFRICAN GROUP underscored it remains ready to engage in the work programme going forward, noting the need to inform scaled-up support for mitigation action, especially for expanded access to modern energy and clean cooking.

**Guidance on Cooperative Approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.2:** Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables voluntary cooperation among parties in the implementation of their NDCs. Article 6.2 relates to direct cooperation among parties bilaterally or multilaterally, through various approaches. Maria Al-Jishi (Saudi Arabia) and Peer Stiansen (Norway) co-facilitated informal consultations on [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), [7](#), [8](#), [10](#), [11](#), and [12](#) June.

Discussions were informed by an informal note prepared by the SBSTA Chair, following which several iterations of draft decision text were prepared by the Co-Facilitators. Discussions focused on the "crunch issues" including authorizations, the agreed electronic format, sequencing of reviews and addressing inconsistencies, and registries.

On authorizations, parties considered the number of authorizations required; specifically, whether in addition to authorizing participation in the Article 6.2 cooperative approaches and the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs), each individual cooperative approach requires authorization. A key divergence emerged regarding the revocation of authorizations, with some opposing any revocation and others supporting its permissibility before the first issuance of ITMOs.

On registries, parties discussed the extent of the interoperability of parties' national registries and connection between the Article 6.4 mechanism registry and the international registry. Several parties, including the EU, AFRICAN GROUP, AOSIS, and others, supported the ability to transfer authorized Article 6.4 emission reductions from the mechanism to the international registry, while others, including LMDCs and the ARAB GROUP, preferred limiting the

connection to the ability to pull and view data and information on Article 6.4 emission reductions.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.8](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the work on common nomenclatures, concludes that there is no need for further discussion of this matter, deeming its consideration completed, and recommends that the CMA conclude its consideration of the matter;
- requests the Secretariat to develop an initial list of common nomenclatures, as well as a process for requesting the establishment of and changes to common nomenclatures, and to report on progress in its annual report to the CMA;
- takes note of the work on the modalities for reviewing confidential information, concludes there is no need for further discussion of this matter, deems its consideration thereof completed, and recommends that the CMA conclude its consideration of the matter;
- requests the Secretariat to develop, publish, and implement the necessary administrative procedures, including a specific code of conduct for Article 6 technical expert review teams, for treating and reviewing information identified as confidential by participating parties, and to report on its progress in its annual report to the CMA;
- takes note of the work on whether ITMOs could include emission avoidance, and agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 68. It further notes that in the absence of further guidance by the CMA, the current guidance applies, and emission avoidance is not included in the current guidance; and
- takes note of the draft text prepared for this sub-agenda item at SBSTA 60, notes that it does not represent consensus among parties, and agrees to continue consideration of the draft text at SBSTA 61 with a view to recommending a draft decisions for adoption at CMA 6;
- requests the Secretariat to organize a hybrid workshop prior to SBSTA 61 to facilitate consideration of the draft text on matters related to authorization, the agreed electronic format, sequencing, application of first transfer, addressing inconsistencies, and the issues regarding registries.

**Rules, Modalities, and Procedures for the Mechanism established by Paris Agreement Article 6.4:** Article 6.4 relates to voluntary cooperation through a centralized market-based mechanism. Informal consultations were facilitated by Kate Hancock (Australia) and Sonam Tashi (Bhutan), and took place on [4](#), [5](#), [7](#), [8](#), [11](#), and [12 June](#).

Discussions were informed by an informal note prepared by the SBSTA Chair, following which several iterations of draft decision text were prepared by the Co-Facilitators. Discussions focused on, among others, authorizations and issues relating to registries.

On authorizations, views diverged on whether mitigation contributions can be issued before authorization by the host party. EIG, AOSIS, the UK, AUSTRALIA, and others underlined that mitigation contributions can only be issued after authorization by the host country, while the AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, BRAZIL, INDIA, and others opposed, stressing authorization can be provided at or after issuance.

Most parties supported the interoperability of the mechanism registry and parties' national registries, with the AFRICAN GROUP and others also noting the need for interoperability with the international registry given that some countries will choose

to use the latter in place of national registries. LMDCs and the ARAB GROUP opposed the ability to transfer Article 6.4 emission reductions from the mechanism registry to the international registry or national registries.

Parties also considered three new proposals relating to the share of proceeds for adaptation, transition of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) afforestation and reforestation activities to the Article 6.4 mechanism, and baseline methodologies.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.7](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the work on consideration of whether Article 6.4 activities could include emission avoidance and conservation enhancement and agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 68;
- notes that in the absence of further CMA guidance, the current rules, modalities, and procedures (RMPs) apply, and that emission avoidance is not included in these, and conservation enhancement is not a separate category of activity in the current RMPs; and
- takes note of the draft text prepared for this sub-agenda item at SBSTA 60, noting that it does not represent consensus among parties, and agrees to continue consideration of the draft text at SBSTA 61 with a view to recommending a draft decisions for adoption at CMA 6; and
- requests the Secretariat to organize a hybrid workshop prior to SBSTA 61, in conjuncture with the workshop on Article 6.2, to facilitate consideration of the draft text on matters related to authorization and the mechanism registry.

**Work Programme under the Framework for Non-market Approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.8:** Article 6.8 relates to climate cooperation between countries that does not involve any transfer or trade in the resulting mitigation outcomes. A contact group co-chaired by Kristin Qui (Trinidad and Tobago) and Jacqui Ruesga (New Zealand) considered this item on [4](#) and [8 June](#), among others. In addition to the contact group meetings, parties and non-party stakeholders also gathered in spin-off groups to discuss specific items, such as nature-based solutions.

The Secretariat provided an update on the development of the web-based platform, reporting that the party-specific section of the platform is now available. He highlighted upcoming outreach on how to access and publish NMAs on the platform.

Parties considered, among others, whether carbon pricing and other fiscal instruments, as well as nature-based solutions, should be considered as NMAs.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.4](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- invites parties that have not yet notified the Secretariat of their Article 6.8 national focal points to do so to enable them to access the NMA Platform;
- encourages parties to identify and submit their NMAs and to provide information on financial, technology, and capacity-building support available or provided for identifying, developing, and implementing NMAs on the platform; and
- requests the Secretariat to, *inter alia*, add links to the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the Paris Committee on Capacity-building on the platform in recognition of their potential to provide technology and capacity-building support for identifying and developing NMAs.

**Operation of the Clean Development Mechanism:** Discussions were informed by a [technical paper](#) on the operations of the CDM registry, as well as a [technical paper](#) on the level of resources needed for the functioning of the processes and institutions under the CDM. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Alick Muvundika (Zambia) and Karoliina Anttonen (Finland) and held on, among others, [6](#), [7](#), and [8 June](#).

On resources, AOSIS, AILAC, and the UK supported discussing timelines for winding down the CDM's operations and transferring resources to other processes, such as the Adaptation Fund and the Article 6.2 architecture. LMDCs opposed considering this until Article 6.4 is fully operational.

The EU and EIG, opposed by the AFRICAN GROUP and LMDCs, supported the administrative cancellation of certified emission reductions held in the pending account for non-payment of the share of proceeds.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.5](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- requests the Secretariat to contact CDM project participants that have not paid their share of proceeds to confirm their intention to pay, and report on responses;
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a technical paper on the further breakdown of necessary resources for the activities continuing under the CDM, and to include modalities for how available funds in the CDM trust fund are transferred to the Adaptation Fund and other potential areas of funding; and
- agrees to continue consideration of the matter at SBSTA 61.

**Emissions from Aviation and Maritime Transport:** Informal consultations on this sub-item were co-facilitated by Martin Cames (Germany) and Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya).

**SBSTA Conclusions:** The SBSTA agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 61.

## Adaptation

**Global Goal on Adaptation:** The Paris Agreement established the GGA as enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an adequate adaptation response in the context of the 2°C/1.5°C temperature goals. Discussions at SB 60 aimed at operationalizing the work programme on GGA indicators, which was established in Dubai.

Informal consultations, which were co-facilitated by Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Pedro Pedroso Cuesta (Cuba), took place on [3](#), [6](#), [8](#), [10](#), and [11 June](#), among others. Discussions centered on the engagement of experts in the indicator mapping process and criteria for indicator identification.

Parties debated the role of the Adaptation Committee (AC) in the indicator mapping process, with CANADA, the US, JAPAN, CHINA, and NORWAY proposing the AC lead the mapping process. The G-77/CHINA opposed, stating that the AC can contribute to and support the process, but not lead it.

EIG, AOSIS, LDCs, AILAC, and BRAZIL called for diversity and balanced regional representation of experts. AILAC emphasized the need for financial resources to support experts' engagement. AILAC, GRUPO SUR, and EIG welcomed the recognition of the importance of engaging with Indigenous Peoples in all phases of the work under the GGA. AOSIS, AILAC, and LDCs supported the inclusion of information on data readiness for the list of GGA indicators.

Negotiations continued in informal informals and informal consultations until the very last day of SB 60, but parties eventually reached agreement on draft conclusions.

In the closing plenary, BOLIVIA lamented a “watered down” outcome and urged partners to “remain faithful to the principles of the Convention and its Paris Agreement.” The ARAB GROUP underscored that adaptation is key for developing countries and considered progress on the matter insufficient.

**SB Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.6](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- recognize that means of implementation for adaptation are crucial, and also recognize that factors such as institutional arrangements, policies, data and knowledge, and inclusive governance are also crucial to enabling the implementation of adaptation action;
- encourage the ethical and equitable engagement with Indigenous Peoples and local communities and application of traditional knowledge, the knowledge, wisdom and values of Indigenous Peoples, and local knowledge systems in implementing the GGA Framework;
- invite submissions on existing indicators, including information on associated methodologies and data readiness for such indicators;
- specify a list of criteria informing the mapping process, such as ability of the indicators to reflect regional, national, and local circumstances;
- invite the AC to prepare a contribution to the compilation and mapping by identifying information on indicators reported by parties;
- request the SB Chairs to convene technical experts to assist in the technical work under the work programme on GGA indicators, including reviewing and refining the compilation and mapping of existing indicators and, as needed, developing new indicators;
- request the SB Chairs to ensure balance in terms of technical expertise, geographical representation, and gender of the experts, including experts from small island developing states (SIDS) and LDCs, and Indigenous knowledge holders;
- request that the SB Chairs organize a hybrid workshop prior to CMA 6 (November 2024) for parties and technical experts to facilitate the refinement of the mapping process;
- request the SB Chairs to prepare a compilation and mapping of existing indicators and areas potentially not covered by existing indicators in advance of the workshop;
- request the Secretariat to publish the refined mapping of indicators as part of the workshop report prior to CMA 6;
- request the Secretariat, with input from the technical experts, to prepare technical reports containing a list of proposed new indicators by May 2025 for consideration by SB 62 (June 2025);
- request the SB Chairs to organize two further hybrid workshops, one to be held at SB 62 to take stock of the progress of work by technical experts, and another to be held between SB 62 and SB 63 to reflect on the final list of potential indicators to be agreed at CMA 7 (November 2025);
- agree to consider additional work by the technical experts at SB 61 with a view to making a recommendation on this matter for consideration by CMA 6; and

- agree to take stock of work under the work programme at SB 61, 62, and 63, with a view to informing the decision on the work programme at CMA 7.

**Report of the Adaptation Committee and Review of the Progress, Effectiveness, and Performance of the Committee:**

Discussions under this item focused on the [AC's 2023 report](#). Informal consultations co-facilitated by SBI Chair Munir and SBSTA Chair Vreuls took place on [4 June](#), among others. Parties debated whether the AC's annual report and the review should be considered as separate sub-items at future sessions.

**SB Conclusions:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.1](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- recommend that COP 29 and CMA 6 take note of the AC's 2023 report;
- agree to continue consideration of the review of the AC's progress, effectiveness, and performance at SB 61; and
- agree to consider the annual report of the AC and the review of its progress, effectiveness, and performance under two separate sub-agenda items at SB 61.

**Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change:** Discussions focused on the progress review of the Nairobi Work Programme's (NWP) activities and guidance on strengthening its role. Informal consultations co-facilitated by Camila Minerva Rodriguez Tavaréz (Dominican Republic) and Morgan Whalen (Canada) took place on [7](#) and [12 June](#), among others. Parties debated whether recognizing the NWP's contributions to the work programme on GGA indicators would prejudice the latter's outcomes. Discussion also revolved around the need for collaboration between the NWP and the constituted bodies; the NWP's level of activity across regions; and the need for further financial support to enable the implementation of NWP activities.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.3](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- notes the reports on progress in implementing activities under the NWP and on activities, by region, between 2019-2023, and notes the information on these reports, including next steps and new activities as well as the indicative NWP workplan for 2024-2025; and
- invites parties, NWP partner organizations, and other relevant organizations to provide financial and in-kind support for implementation of NWP activities.

**National Adaptation Plans:** In these discussions, parties reflected on the LDC Expert Group's [report](#) on progress towards the formulation and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Antwi Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) and Jens Fugl (Denmark) and took place on [8 June](#), among others. Parties discussed a number of issues, including the benefits of involving the private sector to promote and contribute to adaptation; stronger language recognizing the special needs and circumstances of SIDS and LDCs, and on gender-sensitive approaches to the implementation of NAPs; and text that recognizes the contribution of Indigenous Peoples to climate action.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.8](#)), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- emphasizes the importance of continuing the assessment of progress in formulating and implementing NAPs; and

- agrees to continue further consideration of this agenda item at SBI 61, taking into consideration the informal note prepared at SBI 60, with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption by COP 29.

**Least Developed Countries:** Informal consultations co-facilitated by Jens Fugl (Denmark) and Ephraim Shitima (Zambia) considered, among others, the [report](#) of the 45th meeting of the Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LEG) held in February 2024.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.7](#)), the SBI, among others:

- recalls paragraph 46 of decision 1/CP.21 in relation to expediting support for LDCs to formulate and implement NAPs;
- welcomes the rolling work programme of the LEG for 2024-2025;
- welcomes the inclusion of activities related to the work programme on GGA indicators in the rolling work programme of the LEG for 2024-2025; and
- urges developed countries to continue to mobilize financial support for the NAP process for the LDCs, and invites parties and relevant organizations to continue providing resources for supporting implementation of the LEG work programme.

### Loss and Damage

**Terms of Reference for the 2024 Review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts:** Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Pepetua Latasi (Tuvalu) and Meredith Ryder-Rude (US) and took place on [4](#), [6](#), [8](#), and [10 June](#), among others. Parties agreed to use the terms of reference (ToRs) of the 2019 review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) as basis for discussions.

Parties emphasized the need to reflect on the evolving institutional landscape on loss and damage, especially with regard to the Santiago Network and the new loss and damage fund. The G-77/CHINA supported a broad review of the WIM and its functions. The US, opposed by AILAC and GRUPO SUR, suggested considering how the functions of the WIM have been implemented, but not review the functions themselves. Parties also debated the G-77/CHINA's proposal for the Secretariat to prepare a series of inputs to the review.

**SB Conclusions:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.4](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- finalize the ToRs for the 2024 review of the WIM;
- agree to undertake the review at SB 61 based on the ToRs and to forward the outcomes to the appropriate bodies;
- invite submissions on gaps and challenges related to enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the WIM, the usefulness of its outputs and activities, and ways to improve the implementation of its functions;
- request the Secretariat to prepare a summary report of the views to serve as input to the 2024 review of the WIM;
- request the Secretariat to prepare a background paper on: relevant decisions and mandates; institutional arrangements relating to loss and damage; progress of implementation of the workplan of the WIM ExCom and the plans of action of its expert groups, technical expert groups, and task force;

progress of operationalization of the Santiago Network; and implementation of mandates and recommendations arising from the 2019 WIM review and relevant outcomes of the first GST;

- request the Secretariat to organize an event in conjunction with SB 61 to provide inputs to the 2024 review; and
- note the discussions at SB 60 relating to representation on the WIM Executive Committee.

**Dialogue on Loss and Damage Funding:** The objective of this mandated event, which convened on [6](#) and [7 June](#), was to reflect on how to enhance collaboration and coordination between loss and damage institutions. Parties' comments related to, among others: hopes for a quick capitalization of the Fund; minimum allocation for SIDS and LDCs; a quantum on loss and damage funding under the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance; and tracking the delivery of loss and damage funding.

With regard to an upcoming high-level event on loss and damage finance, several called for: holding the dialogue before COP 29; fostering actual dialogue, rather than a series of statements; engagement with stakeholders such as the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the International Organization for Migration; and a follow-up process to leverage discussions.

## Finance

**Adaptation Fund:** Discussions focused on matters related to membership in the Adaptation Fund Board in view of the Fund exclusively serving the Paris Agreement. At the outset of informal consultations co-facilitated by Ralph Bodle (Germany) and Amena Yauvoli (Fiji), parties agreed to postpone the consideration of the matter, but diverged on when to resume it.

The EU, SWITZERLAND, AUSTRALIA, the US, and NORWAY favored putting it on the agenda for SB 61 in Baku. Pointing to a possible resolution on the Article 6.4 mechanism in Baku, they emphasized the need to ensure the Fund is ready to receive shares of proceeds from the mechanism that might materialize before SBI 62.

The AFRICAN GROUP and the ARAB GROUP preferred postponing to SBI 62, emphasizing the matter should be reconsidered once a share of proceeds actually materializes, not when it is likely to materialize. CHINA supported this, adding it is unlikely shares of proceeds would materialize by then.

The Co-Facilitators consulted with the SBI Chair on the way forward. During the closing plenary, SBI Chair Munir noted parties could not reach agreement on the matter and that it will therefore be placed on the agenda for SBI 61, in accordance with rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure.

**New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance:** COP 21 decided that, prior to 2025, the CMA shall set a NCQG from a floor of USD 100 billion per year, taking into account the needs and priorities of developing countries. A dedicated ad hoc work programme was convened to facilitate this.

Work programme Co-Chairs Zaheer Fakir (UAE) and Fiona Gilbert (Australia) led discussions on [5](#), [6](#), [8](#), [10](#), and [11 June](#). At the outset, parties provided the Co-Chairs a mandate to streamline their [input paper](#). The Co-Chairs revised their input paper twice, with various groups and parties pointing to elements they want to see removed, inserted, or reinserted.

With respect to substance, comments related to, among others:

- ensuring the goal is fit for purpose and implementable, responsive to developing countries' needs, and supports implementation of NDCs and NAPs, in line with the 1.5°C goal;
- aligning the NCQG with the NDC and GST cycles;
- the recipient base possibly reflecting vulnerability, macroeconomic circumstances, and regional equity;
- possible burden sharing among developed countries, to enhance transparency and accountability; and
- whether to address issues such as the contributor base and alignment of finance flows (Paris Article 2.1c).

Many parties identified areas where they considered there was some commonality, including on the need for better access and using the ETF as a basis for the transparency arrangements, but with updates to make it fit for purpose. The ARAB GROUP, CHINA, and others underlined the lack of proposals on the goal's quantum and questioned how to discuss access and other issues without an idea of quantum. The AFRICAN GROUP called for clarity on provision and mobilization targets.

The work programme Co-Chairs will:

- produce a summary of the meeting, including information on progress made;
- start preparations for the third meeting of the work programme;
- publish guiding questions for submissions ahead of the third meeting; and
- prepare an input paper for the third meeting.

**Tenth Technical Expert Dialogue under the Ad Hoc Work Programme on the NCQG:** This mandated event took place on [3 June](#). Panel discussions focused on the goal's level of ambition, qualitative elements, structure, and transparency arrangements. Participants shared a host of reflections, challenging one another's positions on, among others:

- developed countries' contribution to the core of the goal;
- adjusting the quantum of the goal according to the evolving needs of developing countries;
- correlations between levels of development and enabling environments; and
- safeguards meant to address the risk of corruption becoming a disproportionate barrier to access.

**First Workshop under the Dialogue on Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c):** Paris Agreement 2.1(c) defines the objective to make finance flows consistent with a pathway to low-GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. This [mandated event](#) took place on [12](#) and [13 June](#) and focused on adaptation investments and the consistency of financial flows with a climate-resilient development pathway. Discussions highlighted, among others:

- that climate-risk-informed approaches should not drive up the cost of capital for countries perceived as high-risk;
- the role of central banks in fostering the incorporation of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations into financial decision making;
- the use of direct cash incentives as part of corporate actors' ESG engagement, for example to support agroforestry and intercropping;
- lack of enactment of policy frameworks such as the Glasgow Leaders' Declaration on Forests and Land Use;
- reinvestment of carbon tax revenue to support industry transition and minimize backlash against climate policy;
- using blended finance to overcome barriers related to high-risk perception and mobilize private finance; and



- balancing the need for safeguards with that of speedy project implementation.

Breakout group discussions touched upon risks related to greenwashing, harmful finance flows, and stranded assets. Participants emphasized the need to make the best use of scarce public finance, ensuring it delivers change for the most vulnerable. They reflected on the opportunities and limitations of impact investment and how to go beyond a project-based approach. Delegates agreed that voluntary action by the private sector is not enough, and that regulation is needed, including to ensure transparency on finance flows and achieved impacts.

Discussions emphasized that governments will have to make difficult policy choices, with several underscoring that limited fiscal space makes it difficult for many developing countries to set up “carrots” to ensure social buy-in. They underscored the need to recognize individual countries and industries have different starting points and ensure that transition plans also address sectors such as agriculture and health.

### **Just Transition and Response Measures**

**Just Transition Work Programme:** This item aims to explore just transition pathways to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement. The [first dialogue](#) under the work programme took place on 2-3 June 2024. A contact group co-chaired by Marianne Karlsen (Norway) and Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) met on [4](#), [5](#), [6](#), [7](#), [8](#), [10](#), [11](#), and [12](#) June.

Discussions in contacts groups dealt with, *inter alia*:

- ensuring more interaction and better inclusion of observers and non-party stakeholders in future dialogues;
- how the topics for the second dialogue should be decided, with agreement that they should be decided by the SB Chairs “in a transparent and consultative manner”;
- whether to hold future dialogues intersessionally or in coordination with SB meetings;
- requesting constituted bodies to include information on progress towards integrating just transition into their processes in their reports; and
- a proposal from the G-77/CHINA to establish a work plan for the work programme, with the US opposing.

**SB Conclusions:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.5](#)), the SBs, among others:

- welcome the first hybrid dialogue under the work programme, and encourage their Chairs to publish an informal summary of the discussions of each dialogue starting with the first;
- reiterate that the topic of the second hybrid dialogue, which will be held before SB 61, will be decided by the SB Chairs upon consultation with parties, observers, and non-party stakeholders “in a transparent and consultative manner”;
- emphasize working systematically to cover the elements of the work programme (delineated in paragraph 2 of [Decision 3/CMA.5](#));
- emphasize the importance of ensuring the effective and inclusive participation of parties and non-party stakeholders in the second dialogue, encouraging the Chairs to consider interactive engagement formats; and
- agree to continue consideration of the matter at SB 61, taking note of the [informal note](#) prepared by the Co-Facilitators, views submitted via the submission portal, and the annual summary

report on the dialogues, with a view to recommending a draft decision to CMA 6.

**Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement:** Delegates considered the Secretariat’s [report](#) on progress in implementing the workplan of the Forum and its Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) with a view to inform the development of a five-year workplan. Contact group discussions, which were co-chaired by Xolisa Ngwadla (Botswana) and Maria Samuelsen (Denmark), convened on [5](#) and [12 June](#), among others.

The Secretariat reported on progress in implementing the workplan of the Forum and its KCI. Parties debated a new table of activities to be included in the five-year workplan, with the EU, UK, US, CANADA, and SWITZERLAND pointing out that the new table was not reflective of parties’ submissions. The US proposed deleting references to just transition as it is already covered under a different agenda item.

**SB Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.7](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- welcome the Forum’s technical events on guidelines and policy frameworks to promote just transition and understanding of the positive and negative impacts of low- and zero-emission transportation technologies;
- initiate the development of the five-year workplan of the Forum and its KCI in line with the Forum’s functions, work programme, and modalities, and considering policy issues of concern to parties; and
- agree to continue work on this matter at SB 61, taking into account the [non-paper](#) prepared at SB 60, with a view to recommending a draft decision on the matter for consideration and adoption at COP 29, the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), and CMA 6.

### **Reporting**

**Greenhouse Gas Data Interface:** Under the Convention’s and Kyoto Protocol’s reporting requirements, parties submit GHG inventories. The GHG data interface is an online tool to facilitate access, searching, and sorting of the information provided by parties. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Daniela Romano (Italy) and Thiago Mendes (Brazil).

During the closing plenary, SBSTA Chair Vreuls noted parties were unable to reach agreement on this matter. Applying Rule 16 of the draft rules of procedure, the issue will be placed on the agenda for SBSTA 61.

**Annex-I Reporting: Status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports:** The SBI considered the note by the Secretariat on the status of submission and review of national communications and biennial reports ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.3](#)) and agreed to continue consideration of this agenda sub-item at SBI 61.

**Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports:** The SBI considered the compilation and synthesis ([FCCC/SBI/2023/INF.7](#) and [Add.1](#)) and agreed to continue consideration of this sub-agenda item at SBI 61.

**Report on national GHG inventory data:** The SBI considered the report prepared by the Secretariat on ([FCCC/SBI/2023/15](#)) and agreed to continue consideration of this agenda sub-item at SBI 61.

**Technical review of information reported in biennial reports and national communications:** The SBSTA considered the 2023 report ([FCCC/SBSTA/2023/INF.4](#)) and took note of the information therein.

**Technical review of GHG inventories:** The SBSTA considered the 2023 report ([FCC/SBSTA/2023/INF.6](#)) and took note of the information in this report.

**Technical review of GHG inventories and other information reported:** The SBSTA considered the 2023 report ([FCCC/SBSTA/2023/INF.7](#)) and took note of the information in this report.

**Non-Annex I Reporting: Information contained in national communications:** The SBI considered the information contained in national communications and agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61.

**Provision of financial and technical support:** Discussions on this item focused on the provision of financial support for developing countries' reporting under the Convention. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Steven Brine (Australia) and Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) on [6 June](#), among others. Co-Facilitator Brine recalled that parties adopted procedural conclusions on this item at SBI 59, but agreed to continue discussions at SBI 60, taking into account the draft text prepared in Dubai.

Parties emphasized the need to reflect on both financial and technical support and underscored the need for the Global Environment Facility to support parties in an integrated way regarding their reporting under both the Convention and the Paris Agreement.

**SBI Conclusions:** The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61 taking into account the draft text prepared by the Co-Facilitators at SB 60.

**Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports:** The SBI considered the [summary reports](#) and took note of them.

**Reporting Tools under the Enhanced Transparency Framework:** Discussions focused on the Secretariat's technical paper on parties' experience with the test version of the reporting tools under the ETF ([FCCC/TP/2024/2](#)). Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Daniela Romano (Italy) and Thiago Mendes (Brazil), took place on [6 June](#), among others. The Secretariat, in response to parties' questions, explained that: user manuals will be available for all reporting tools once their final version is launched; instruction videos and technical documents on how to navigate the tools will be introduced; a support team has been established within the Secretariat that will address any technical issues reported by parties; and training sessions will be held in the Africa and Latin American and the Caribbean regions ahead of COP 29, as well as at COP 29.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.6](#)), the SBSTA, *inter alia*:

- welcomes the development of a test version of the ETF's reporting tools, and the regular hands-on technical training workshops to demonstrate the functions of those reporting tools to national experts from parties;
- considers the Secretariat's technical paper on parties' experience with the test version of the ETF reporting tools, including challenges encountered by developing countries in integrating the tools into their national inventory arrangements;
- notes the Secretariat will make reporting tools available for parties by the end of June 2024;

- emphasizes the importance of the Secretariat providing training and technical support to enhance the developing countries' capacity to use the tools, in particular for LDCs and SIDS and particularly in the first six months after their release; and
- notes that additional resources may be required for organizing the trainings and integrating the remaining features.

### Technology and Capacity Building

**Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism:** This item considers the potential links, collaboration, and cooperation between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Peter Govindasamy (Singapore) and Stephen Minas (Greece).

On [4 June](#), an in-session workshop considered what the Financial Mechanism can do to enhance support for the implementation of the outcomes of the technology needs assessments (TNA) process and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) technical assistance. Ideas discussed included:

- streamlining the process of converting these outcomes into bankable projects and enhancing efficiencies through a "plug and play" approach;
- implementing strategies to enable National Designated Authorities to plan ahead and implement multi-year programmes rather than operating on a project-by-project basis; and
- allocating adequate funds to support implementation of the TNAs and CTCN technical assistance outcomes.

**SBI Conclusions:** The SBI agreed to continue consideration of the matter at SBI 61, taking into account the draft text prepared at SB 60, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 29.

**Capacity Building:** Cristina Carreiras (EU) and Nathalie Flores González (Dominican Republic) co-facilitated informal consultations on [6 June](#), among others, during which parties considered draft decision text on the second review of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building under the CMA.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2](#)), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- reiterates that needs and gaps remain in addressing the priority issues identified in the framework for capacity building in developing countries and noted that further efforts are needed to address current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs related to developing countries' implementation of the Paris Agreement;
- recommends a draft decision on the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity building in developing countries under the Convention for consideration and adoption by COP 29 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.1](#)); and
- recommends draft decisions on the second review of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building for consideration and adoption by COP 29 and the CMA 6 (November 2024) ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.2](#) and [Add.3](#)).

### Other Issues

**Research and Systematic Observation:** The annual research dialogue convened at the June session of the SBSTA provides a space to convey research findings and lessons learned from activities undertaken by regional and international research programmes and

organizations. It also serves to discuss needs for climate change research and research-related capacity building, particularly in developing countries. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Patricia Nying'uro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland). Parties met on, among others, [5](#), [7](#), [10](#), [11](#), and [12](#) June. During discussions, parties considered, among others:

- whether to acknowledge the organization of the [16th meeting of the research dialogue](#) held on 4 June, with the ARAB GROUP and CHINA opposing and stating that the organization and the choice of topics of the dialogue did not reflect a party-driven process;
- whether to invite the IPCC to take into account, in determining its future products and assessment cycles, work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, with AOSIS, the EU, US, and others in favor, and SAUDI ARABIA and KUWAIT opposing;
- whether to specify research needs, such as related to: constraints to climate-resilient and sustainable development above 1.5°C; adaptation limits; economic and non-economic loss and damage; climate attribution; non-carbon dioxide GHGs other than methane; the implications of different emission metrics in informing mitigation policies and the alignment of the financial system; and
- whether and how to capture the scientific community's response to these research needs.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.9](#)), the SBSTA, among others:

- encourages the IPCC to enhance inclusivity and regional representation in its seventh assessment cycle;
- takes note, with appreciation, of the 16th meeting of the research dialogue;
- notes the discussion on scientific advances and knowledge gaps, as well as on research needs and research capacity-building needs, and encourages parties and the scientific community to take action to address climate-related research gaps and needs, including by strengthening research capacity at the regional level, inclusivity, and scientific cooperation; and
- invites parties and relevant organizations to submit views on possible themes for the 17th meeting of the research dialogue, to be held in conjunction with SBSTA 62, and encourages its Chair to identify themes for the dialogue “in a consultative and inclusive manner”; and
- encourages its Chair to consider inviting the scientific community to present on how research needs and gaps are being addressed.

During the closing plenary, CHINA stressed the importance of following the appropriate rules and procedures in negotiations, and noted his concern and serious reservations about only receiving the conclusions text minutes before its introduction in plenary. Noting that the theme selection for the research dialogue was “problematic,” CHILE expressed his concern that conclusions do not specify research needs. Expressing their disappointment, AOSIS argued that the process is “increasingly struggling to reflect the best available science.” LMDCs expressed their “deep disappointment” and concern at certain parties’ refusal to include the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities (CBDR-RC) in the discussions. The AFRICAN GROUP and UMBRELLA GROUP expressed their concerns about the negotiation process.

### Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform:

Discussions focused on reviewing the outcomes and activities under the Facilitative Working Group (FWG) and the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP), including the workplan of the LCIPP for 2025-2027, and progress related to the representation of local communities.

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Clement Yow Mulalap (Micronesia) and Kajsa Fernström Nåtby (Sweden) and took place on [5](#), [7](#), and [10 June](#), among others. Discussions centered on: strengthening the LCIPP and mainstreaming its work in the UNFCCC process; budgetary implications of the Secretariat’s activities on the LCIPP; and recognition of both formal and informal language interpretations at FWG meetings and mandated events under the LCIPP. Parties also debated whether to invite the CMA to decide that the FWG shall also serve the Paris Agreement.

**SBSTA Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.1](#)), the SBSTA recommends a draft decision for COP 29 that, *inter alia*:

- acknowledges the role and contributions of Indigenous Peoples and of local communities in nature stewardship and climate leadership and the disproportionate effects of climate change on them;
- welcomes the progress of the FWG in facilitating implementation of the LCIPP functions and the report of the FWG including the draft workplan of the LCIPP for 2025-2027;
- decides to continue the mandate of the FWG;
- encourages parties to actively engage under the LCIPP and in the meetings of the FWG;
- invites parties to provide simultaneous interpretation into languages other than UN official languages at meetings of the FWP and mandated events under the LCIPP and requests the Secretariat to make necessary arrangements for accommodating such additional simultaneous interpretation;
- requests the FWG to report on the outcomes of its work, including activities under the workplan for 2025-2027, to propose recommendations on the scope and function of the LCIPP, and to prepare a draft workplan for LCIPP for 2028-2031 for consideration by COP 32 through SBSTA 66;
- decides the next review of the FWG will take place in 2027 and requests the SBSTA to conduct the review at SBSTA 66 with a view to adopt a decision at COP 32; and
- invites parties and organizations to provide financial support for LCIPP’s implementation of its functions.

### Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on

**Agriculture and Food Security:** Discussion focused on the operationalization of the joint work and development of the dedicated online portal. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Una May Gordon (Belize) and Annela Anger-Kraavi (EU) and took place on [4](#), [7](#), [8](#), [10](#), and [11 June](#), among others. Parties discussed possible workshop topics for the roadmap of the joint work, which included, among others: means of implementation, including finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity-building; and integration of agriculture in food systems in NDCs, NAPs, and long-term strategies, Technology Needs Assessments, Technology Action Plans and National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans. The Secretariat noted the online portal will be ready by the end of June 2024 and launched at SB 61.

**SB Conclusions:** In their conclusions ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.2](#)), the SBs, *inter alia*:

- invite relevant international organizations to submit information on their activities related to the joint work every year, and request the Secretariat to take this into account in preparing the annual synthesis report and make this annual report available for consideration at the first SB session each year, starting in 2025;
- request the Secretariat to hold in-session workshops in hybrid format, in accordance with the road map contained in the annex, and encourage observers to participate in the workshops;
- request the Secretariat to prepare a report on each of the workshops for consideration by the SBs;
- request the Secretariat to dedicate time during the workshops to coordinate in relation to the joint work and include this in the report to COP 30 on the progress and outcomes of the joint work;
- invite parties and observers to submit views on the workshops' subject, format, and suggested speakers;
- request the Secretariat to develop the online portal in accordance with the timeline specified in the annex; and
- agree to continue consideration of this matter at SB 61.

The annexed roadmap defines a timeline for work until SB 65. The topic of the first workshop, to be held between SB 61 and SB 62 is: systemic and holistic approaches to implementation of climate action on agriculture, food systems and food security, understanding, cooperation and integration into plans. The topic of the second workshop, to be held between SB 63 and SB 64 is: progress, challenges, and opportunities related to identifying needs and accessing means of implementation for climate action in agriculture and food security, including sharing of best practices.

**Gender:** The SBI initiated the final review of the implementation of the enhanced Lima work programme on gender and its gender action plan, starting with consideration of the work programme ([FCCC/SBI/2024/11](#)). Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Angela Ebeleke Yoka (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and Marc-André Lafrance (Canada).

Delegates could not conclude the review as planned.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.9](#)), the SBI agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61 on the basis of the draft text prepared at SB 60 with a view to recommending a draft decision thereon for consideration and adoption by COP 29.

**In-Session Workshop on Progress, Challenges, Gaps, and Priorities in Implementing the Gender Action Plan and on Future Work to be Undertaken on Gender and Climate Change:** In this three-day-long [mandated event](#), discussions touched upon, *inter alia*:

- the pervasive “siloing” of gender within programmes;
- moving from creating plans to ensuring implementation;
- gender-disaggregated data;
- capturing the “diverse realities of people” by adopting an intersectional lens across the action plan; and
- enhancing linkages and complementarities with processes such as those related to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance and the GGA.

**Action for Climate Empowerment:** The SBI considered the Secretariat's 2023 summary report on progress in implementing activities under the work programme on Action for Climate Empowerment ([FCCC/SBI/2023/16](#)). Informal consultations were

co-facilitated by Pemy Gasela (South Africa) and Arne Riedel (Germany). Parties were unable to conclude their consideration of the matter at SBI 59 and could not conclude it at SB 60 either.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions, the SBI agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 61, taking into account the informal note prepared by the Co-Facilitators at SB 60.

**Annual Dialogue on Ocean and Climate Change:** During this [mandated event](#), which took place on [11](#) and [12 June](#), speakers presented case studies, best practices, and challenges related to ocean and climate action at the regional and national level. This was followed by interactive breakout sessions and a final wrap-up in plenary. Discussions touched upon, among others:

- mechanisms to track the extent and distribution of nutrients and plastic pollution in the ocean;
- the recently adopted Agreement on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement);
- approaches such as ecosystem-based adaptation, nature-based solutions, integrated coastal zone management, and adaptive management;
- mangrove restoration and nature-based seawalls, which protect against erosion, sequester carbon, and serve as habitat for many species;
- the need to scale up options to implement ocean-based renewable energy and decarbonize the maritime industry;
- the role of Indigenous Peoples and coastal communities, and the need to protect their rights by implementing free, prior, and informed consent; and
- the importance of viewing the ocean as intrinsically valuable, not only as a solution to climate change.

**Expert Dialogue on Children and Climate Change:**

This [mandated event](#) took place on [4 June](#) and highlighted the disproportionate impacts of climate change on children, including with regard to: physical and mental health; access to essential services such as food, water, and sanitation; the disruption of education; and cultural impacts.

**Expert Dialogue on Mountains and Climate Change:** SBSTA Chair Vreuls opened this day-long [mandated event](#) by highlighting its objectives: to enhance understanding of climate change impacts on mountains and downstream communities, showcase solutions contributing to the resilience of mountain ecosystems, and discuss ways to accelerate action. Speakers reflected on, among others:

- the importance of mountain regions in the global water cycle and the increasing dependence of lowland populations on mountain water runoff;
- impacts such as glacier loss, reduction of snow cover, and flood events;
- the irreversible changes in mountain ecosystems that will result from overshooting 1.5°C of global warming;
- data and research gaps, such as on mountain medicinal plants and invasive alien species;
- the use of citizen science, for example to map water springs;
- Indigenous Peoples' intricate relationship with mountain ecosystems in terms of cultural and spiritual practice, as well as diets; and
- the importance of transboundary collaboration to accelerate adaptation efforts.

**Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings:** This agenda item considers the organization of COP 29; potential hosts for COP 31, COP 32, and COP 33; and the Secretariat's papers on enhancing the effectiveness of the process ([FCCC/SBI/2024/8](#), [FCCC/TP/2024/5](#), [FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.4](#), [FCCC/TP/2024/1](#)). SBI Chair Munir chaired the contact group discussions which took place on [4](#), [5](#), [7](#), [8](#), and [10 June](#), among others.

On the organization of COP 29, the EU, EIG, US, CANADA, and NORWAY called for language on upholding human rights. The COP 29 Presidency highlighted staff training on the code of conduct and the creation of a dedicated protest zone.

With regard to the provisional agendas for meetings in Baku, discussions focused on, among others: the placement of the item on the dialogue on implementing GST outcomes under matters related to the GST or to finance; considering the report from the annual dialogue on how the GST informs the preparation of NDCs; considering the seventh review of the Financial Mechanism under both the COP and CMA; and having an item on the special needs and circumstances of Africa.

The EU, LDCs, UK, and CANADA, opposed by the LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and CHINA, proposed to cluster certain issues under umbrella items. The EU, EIG, and JAPAN supported a stronger role of the Bureau in the preparation of provisional agendas. NORWAY and the UK supported multi-annual agenda planning to ensure better alignment with the cycles of certain mandates.

The US, UK, and AUSTRALIA lamented the Secretariat's decision not to provide a virtual platform at SB 60. The EU, CANADA, NORWAY, and MEXICO requested that host country agreements be made public. The WESTERN EUROPEAN AND OTHERS GROUP (WEOG) indicated they hope to reach an agreement on a regional nomination for the host of COP 31 by COP 29, with Australia and Türkiye reiterating their candidacies.

On observer engagement, BRAZIL requested that greater representation be secured for observers from developing country organizations and suggested specific provisions for observers from incoming Presidencies. SWITZERLAND warned that requiring fees for developed country organizations could unintentionally exclude them from the process. Noting challenges with resourcing existing trust funds, the EU and US objected to establishing a new trust fund for developing country observer participation.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.3](#)), the SBI, *inter alia*:

- takes note of the document on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings prepared for SB 60;
- notes that the Presidents of COP 31, 32, and 33 would come from WEOG, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific, respectively;
- emphasizes that the Secretariat and hosts of sessions and mandated events should make logistical arrangements that will facilitate the inclusive and effective participation of parties and observers, including timely issuance of visas; availability of affordable accommodation; a safe and secure conference venue for all; and ease of access to the venue;
- notes with concern the difficulties experienced by some delegates in obtaining visas to enable them to attend sessions of the governing and subsidiary bodies, and mandated events convened at the seat of the Secretariat;
- requests the Secretariat and future hosts of sessions and mandated events to enhance virtual access;

- emphasizes the importance of ensuring that participants can exercise their human rights without fear of intimidation and repercussions;
- notes that host country agreements for COP sessions should be made publicly available;
- invites submissions on increasing efficiency in the UNFCCC process with a view to continue consideration thereof at SBI 62; and
- highlights steps for enhancing observer engagement, including encouraging parties to consider improving time management of meetings with a view to enabling the UNFCCC's nine constituencies to deliver short interventions at meetings on agenda items related to observer engagement.

**Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters:** This agenda item considered the report on the Secretariat's 2023 activities and financial performance ([FCCC/SBI/2024/9](#)), 2022-2023 budget performance ([FCCC/SBI/2024/7/Add.1](#)), status of contributions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.5](#)), and Secretariat's 2024-2025 work programme ([FCCC/SBI/2024/INF.1](#)), among others, with a view to recommending draft decisions on these matters for consideration and adoption at COP 29, CMP 19, and CMA 6.

Contact group discussions, co-chaired by Gabriela Blatter (Switzerland) and Zita Wilks (Gabon), took place on [7](#) and [10 June](#), among others. The UK noted the lack of consultation with parties before the Secretariat canceled the regional climate weeks and virtual access to SB 60. The ARAB GROUP requested: availability of the UN Board of Auditors' report, consideration of revenue-generating options, and clarification of the Executive Secretary's travel expenditures. Parties debated the suggestion to have the Secretariat present potential cost implications of decisions before they are agreed.

**SBI Conclusions:** In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.4](#)), the SBI recommends a draft decision for COP 29 which, *inter alia*:

- urges parties that have not made contributions in full to the core budget to do so, and expresses concern about the high level of outstanding contributions, which has affected the implementation of activities;
- expresses concern about activities and events being canceled due to unpredictability of contributions to the trust fund for supplementary activities, while some elements of the Secretariat's work programme were substantially increased;
- urges parties to further contribute to the trust funds for participation in the UNFCCC and for supplementary activities to ensure a high level of implementation of the Secretariat's work programme;
- requests the Secretariat to significantly improve the transparency of its budget management process including by preparing quarterly reports on the extent to which the core and supplementary budgets are funded, starting in the first quarter of 2025 at the latest;
- requests the Secretariat to prepare an information document after each session of the COP that shows the additional activities mandated at the session and their respective cost implications;
- expresses concern about the high number of unimplemented recommendations from the UN Board of Auditors, and urges the Executive Secretary to immediately implement the standing recommendations; and

• encourages the Secretariat to enhance clarity on the nature of activities, whether mandated or not, in documents on the programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027.

In its conclusions ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.5](#)), the SBI recommends a draft decision for CMP 19, mirroring the draft decision for COP 29.

#### **Cooperation with other International Organizations:**

During its opening plenary, the SBSTA noted the report ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/Inf.1](#)).

#### **Closing Plenary**

During the closing plenary on Thursday, 13 June, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell underscored that business-as-usual is a recipe for failure and that success requires getting more serious about bridging divides. He stressed the need to make progress outside the UNFCCC process, especially on finance.

SBI Chair Munir stated that real progress is only possible through dialogue and engagement with one another. He noted agreement on critical issues, such as on adaptation and just transition, among others. However, he also pointed out the failure to make progress in other areas such as mitigation. He encouraged everyone to work together in Baku so that parties can deliver on the promises they made to the world and to future generations.

The G-77/CHINA pointed out that the NCQG must be in accordance with the Convention and the Paris Agreement, with developed countries fulfilling their commitments to developing countries based on the principles of equity and CBDR-RC.

The EU expressed disappointment at the outcome of the MWP, stating that there cannot be a good outcome at COP 29 if it does not include a substantial outcome on mitigation. He welcomed the progress on the NCQG but pointed out that, to make it work, there is a need to strengthen the broader financial architecture, create conditions to catalyze investments, and ensure finance is delivered where it is needed and at the scale required.

The UMBRELLA GROUP lamented the lack of progress in the MWP and some parties' attempts to block progress. They welcomed the recognition of the research dialogue and assessment of the IPCC's role in the process, stating that best available science is the backbone of countries' best response to the climate crisis.

The EIG reiterated its call for a transparent and party-driven process where parties trust the facilitators to streamline and prepare the text and for parties to express their agreement or disagreement, but noted that some parties directly engage with the Secretariat to stall progress in some work programmes. They hoped to finalize the operationalization of Article 6.2 and 6.4 and to build on the work programme on gender in Baku.

The BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA (ALBA) stressed its commitment to defending the principle of CBDR-RC and their right to development. They emphasized that 2024 is the year of finance, pointing out the need for greater funding for adaptation implementation and ensuring that transition is truly just.

AOSIS called out parties for their slow response and lack of progress in implementing the outcomes of the first GST. They pointed out that competing agenda items and the lack of time and space to work on a number of thematic areas would make it difficult for them to negotiate in Baku, given their limited resources. Noting the critical importance of adaptation for SIDS, they stressed that their full participation in the process is key to keeping the 1.5°C goal alive.

The AFRICAN GROUP lamented the trend of a lack of appetite to discuss means of implementation, noting pronouncements about urgency of action are not accompanied by actual action. Stressing that adaptation is about the dignity of people, they urged parties to step up their commitment to adaptation, and, lamenting efforts to reinterpret mandates, stressed the MWP must not create new targets or goals.

LMDCs pointed to unbalanced progress with hours spent discussing some issues, such as mitigation, while ignoring others such as means of implementation. They called for COP 29 to deliver on past failed promises about finance and, among other things, define a quantum for the NCQG.

LDCs regretted the challenges that arose from the increased number of agenda items and mandated events, the lack of virtual participation, and visa issues. Noting progress on the GST, they expressed hope this would guide discussions in Baku. They urged countries to respect and be guided by the principles of the Convention and Paris Agreement in defining the NCQG.

The ARAB GROUP underscored the importance of adaptation and, urging adherence to the Convention's principles, especially CBDR-RC, called for implementing and reflecting these in all negotiated decisions.

AILAC highlighted that more than 80% of climate action in the group's countries is financed through debt, which comes at great cost to them. They urged implementation of all calls in the GST decision in an integrated manner, and called for the Troika's support in achieving this.

The Coalition for Rainforest Nations stressed emission avoidance activities must not be eligible under Paris Agreement Articles 5.2 (reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation), 6.2, or 6.4, noting the need for robust environmental integrity and comprehensive carbon accounting to ensure effective implementation of the Paris Agreement.

BASIC stressed that the NCQG must be delivered on a solid and effective basis, based on grants and public finance. They deplored what they described as an attempt to dilute climate finance obligations, and expressed concern at repeated attempts by some developed country parties to "undermine the Convention" by changing the mandate of the MWP.

GRUPO SUR stressed the need for discussions on Article 6 to conclude in Baku. They further noted that any new goal agreed under NCQG discussions should not increase the debt burden of developing countries.

The MOUNTAIN PARTNERSHIP highlighted the success of the Expert Dialogue on Mountains and Climate, noting the research gap on mountain-related issues. She called on the IPCC to dedicate one chapter of its upcoming seventh assessment report to mountains, and reiterated her request for an annual mountain dialogue under the UNFCCC.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs noted the private sector's role in scaling up climate finance. They called for the right enabling environment for businesses that reflects an ambitious NCQG, tools to scale up mitigation, and identification of key barriers to mitigation across all sectors.

ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs called for developed countries to step up to their responsibilities and phase out fossil fuels. They stressed that carbon finance is not climate finance and the

reparations owed to developing countries are in trillions, which must go to those on the frontlines who suffer the most from climate change impacts.

FARMERS welcomed the decision on the joint work on agriculture and food security and looked forward to engaging in the workshops. They stressed the need for an ambitious NCQG and called for timely and appropriate climate finance for small-scale farmers as they are solution providers to the climate crisis, particularly on food security.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' ORGANIZATIONS applauded the decisions on the LCIPP and joint work on agriculture and food security, but stressed that free, prior, and informed consent should be reflected in all the work streams undertaken in Baku. They also called for support on robust sustainable development tools for NMAs and direct access to climate finance for Indigenous Peoples.

RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NGOs, in acknowledging the critical contribution of the IPCC, encouraged parties to use best available science in developing their NDCs. They urged parties to explore mitigation and adaptation solutions and to fund diverse scientific perspectives, which reflect a rapidly evolving research landscape that can help catalyze a just and sustainable future.

TRADE UNION NGOs expressed disappointment at the outcome of the just transition work programme, saying they expected that the time in Bonn should have been used to share experiences and best practices to develop ambitious NDCs. They pointed out the lack of progress on the NCQG, and stressed this must integrate the principle of just transition.

WOMEN AND GENDER lamented the slow pace of the gender work programme and the delay in action on other work streams, resulting in loss of faith in the multilateral space. They called for the global community to protect women's rights and to deliver on gender equality in Baku. They stressed that climate finance must be delivered on scale and be gender responsive.

YOUTH NGOs expressed disappointment at the negotiations that "left people behind" and did not allow for civil society to intervene in a meaningful way, mentioning as an example that only three children were present in the children's dialogue. They demanded more ambitious NDCs, fossil fuel phase-out, and outcomes that address finance gaps.

**Conclusion of the Session:** The SBSTA and SBI then adopted their respective draft meeting reports (FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.2 and FCCC/SBI/2024/L.1). The meeting was gavelled to a close at 1:06 am on Saturday, 14 June 2024.

## **A Brief Analysis of the 2024 Bonn Climate Conference**

As the first week of the 2024 June Climate Conference got underway, participants witnessed a telling metaphor: the river Rhine, already dangerously high, began rising, threatening to burst its banks. It seemed appropriate for a process that is trying to rein in a dangerously warming world, and whose recent decision on the Paris Agreement's first Global Stocktake (GST) is meant to inspire the course-correction needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C.

The June meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)'s Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) are not meant to be groundbreaking. They are supposed to pave the way for the governing body meetings in November, where decisions are actually made. Yet even by this relatively humble standard, it was difficult

to pin down what progress—if any—was achieved this time. Much like a river, the two-week long meeting seemed to flow nowhere and everywhere at once. Parties clashed on substantive ideas and on process alike, with visions colliding so intensely that entire agenda items sank under the water.

This brief analysis will examine parties' attempts to rein in a seemingly ever-more complex process and steer the world onto a Paris Agreement-compatible pathway.

### ***A Process Trying to Stay Afloat***

If the flow of a river is important to flood prevention, so too is its volume. The same applies to the UNFCCC process. As interest in climate change and the process has grown, so has attendance and programming at UNFCCC events: over 8,000 people registered for the SBs, and the two weeks saw a record number of 30 mandated events. "The process has really ballooned," one seasoned observer commented. "And it's clearly become too much for delegations and the Secretariat alike."

Delegates discussing arrangements for intergovernmental meetings made it clear that parties' capacity to follow multiple simultaneous negotiating streams and meet the ever-increasing demand for submissions and participation in intersessional workshops is compromised—especially for smaller delegations, such as those from least developed countries (LDCs).

But delegates were not the only ones showing the strain. The past few years have seen the UNFCCC Secretariat becoming increasingly vocal about the fact that parties' financial contributions are not matching the workload that increases with every meeting—and the meeting in Bonn was no exception to this trend, as the read-out of newly agreed work's budgetary implications showed during the closing plenary.

Budgetary constraints are also what the Secretariat highlighted to motivate its last-minute decision not to offer virtual coverage of the meeting, save for plenaries and events for which remote access was mandated. This decision was decried by many who have grown accustomed to the virtual participation opportunity ushered in by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some saw it as a strategic move to put pressure on parties, others noted that a funding-starved Secretariat cannot offer services it cannot afford.

How do you keep an ever-growing process inclusive and adequately resourced? Possible answers came from all sides but left no one satisfied. Brazil lauded the value of detailed annotations to the agendas, which lay out the issues to be addressed under the different agenda items, as this facilitates participation both for parties and observers. Not much else found agreement. Some called for streamlining meeting agendas, but others worried that any clustering of items under broader headings could undermine the party-driven nature of the process and frame discussions in a way that is not agreeable to all.

Many sighed in relief when they heard that the incoming Conference of the Parties (COP) 29 Presidency has no intention for the meeting in Baku, Azerbaijan, to match the (exorbitant) participant numbers of COP 28 (over 61,000) or even COP 27 (over 33,000). Yet, who determines whose participation is meaningful and where exactly balance in representation lies? Various parties floated ideas, including quotas, but none stuck.

The June meetings gave no real answers about how to stem the tide, but it is clear that the process will need solutions sooner rather than later. These issues are not just procedural: they contribute to

process-fatigue and have a real impact on the public perception of how equitable and fit-for-purpose the UNFCCC really is.

### *Up the Creek... Without a Draft Text*

Every droplet in a river is important, but a wise boater knows to read the water. Unfortunately, the strong undercurrents of discussions in Bonn left parties' boats floundering, rather than sailing smoothly.

The GST decision acknowledged that parties are not on track to achieve the 1.5°C goal, and sets out a number of calls for action for parties to contribute to the needed reduction in global emissions. Parties are now supposed to reflect on their response to these calls.

In Bonn, they had two main opportunities to do so: the discussions on the mitigation work programme (MWP) and those aimed at fleshing out the modalities of a work programme for implementing the GST outcome. The idea is that these discussions inform the preparation of the next round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), due in February 2025.

Perhaps the greatest frustration for many participants was the lack of progress under the MWP—a process meant to “urgently” scale up both ambition and implementation. Yet, its informal consultations devolved into spats about whether parties even *could* discuss substantive ways to scale up mitigation. The Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) blocked any attempt to discuss anything but revisions on the format for the work programme's global dialogue. “I have never seen such bad-faith negotiating,” one outraged developed country delegate said.

Both in the discussions under the MWP and in relation to the GST dialogue, the urgency of the timeline was drowned in a flood of back-and-forth arguments over mandate. Observers saw age-old hackles unfold over parties' respective contribution to the joint cause of emissions reduction and how to ensure means of implementation to enable or enhance action.

The Environmental Integrity Group was clear in rebutting the idea that the GST is a “menu of options,” noting it calls for efforts by all. The Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC) was especially intent on bridging these divides: the group championed the idea for the GST dialogue to follow up on all aspects of the GST, with a focus on means of implementation. AILAC clarified that a majority of developing countries, representing all regions, were keen to see the MWP live up to its potential. The African Group also professed its interest in discussing opportunities for scaled-up investment in mitigation action, pitching its longtime priorities of enhancing energy access and clean cooking.

Finance is as much of a cause of stalled progress as it is a victim, it seems. Baku is meant to be “a finance COP.” However, the discussions held in Bonn raised doubts over whether parties will even agree on the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance.

Developed countries have yet to bring concrete numbers to the table. In the absence of proposals on the magnitude of public finance provision, developing countries are reluctant to engage on other possible layers of the goal, especially broader finance flow alignment (Paris Agreement 2.1c)—an issue that delegates only timidly engaged with in Bonn during a dedicated dialogue.

Small island developing states and least developed countries were clearly at wits end, caught between developed countries' and emerging economies' fights over an expanded donor base and

criteria for recipient eligibility and allocation. “If we're meant to set a new goal in Baku, we're clearly up the creek without a paddle,” one observer diagnosed.

Discussions on research and systematic observation were also unequivocally fraught. Amid objections by LMDCs and the Arab Group, parties could not agree to extend a formal invitation to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to consider how best to align its work with the GST cycle. For seasoned delegates, this in itself was not surprising. What was more astonishing was the lack of agreement over identifying parties' research needs and attempting to keep track of how the scientific community responds.

Experts will have their chance to contribute to the process soon enough though: parties did agree to launch substantive work on adaptation indicators and have milestones in place for parties and experts, including Indigenous Peoples, to fine tune the mapping process. While this is not exactly a win, considering that the Global Goal on Adaptation was established in the Paris Agreement nearly a decade ago, it does move things along towards substantive engagement on adaptation progress.

Some agenda items did manage to stay afloat despite the turbulent waters. For two weeks, negotiators working on approaches for voluntary cooperation in the implementation of NDCs (Paris Agreement Article 6) buckled down and pushed hard to achieve some kind of consensual agreement that would at least advance discussions towards possible agreement in Baku.

In the end, they agreed to postpone further consideration of emission avoidance and conservation enhancement to 2028 and maintain the status quo until then. While this does not bring the operationalization of Article 6 any closer, it contributes to securing its environmental integrity. It may also help give parties head space to focus on “crunch” issues, such as how countries should authorize the transfer of mitigation outcomes under Article 6.2 or whether countries without national registries will be able to use the international registry to record and transfer mitigation outcomes. If the progress feels slow, it is at least meaningful. “Article 6 is a long way off from being fully functional,” one tired negotiator confessed, “but we won't start from nothing in Baku. That's something. And we managed to squeeze in an intersessional workshop.”

### *Reading the Rapids on the Way to Baku*

Delegates in Bonn didn't have to get their feet wet—at least, not yet. Just as the water reached the boardwalk, the river receded before the final days of the conference. But it left questions along the high-water mark.

The Secretariat has mobilized partners across the UN system and beyond to support parties in preparing their first biennial transparency reports (BTRs) under the Paris Agreement's reporting framework. Andorra and Guyana led the way, but it is not clear how many parties will respond to the incoming COP 29 Presidency's call to submit these BTRs before Baku.

What will the last scheduled meeting for the NCQG deliver in terms of concrete textual progress? What role will the Azeri Presidency play in bringing parties together? And how will it respond to the clear stand expressed by some parties that there will be no successful outcome to COP 29 without progress on mitigation and 1.5°C alignment of NDCs?



Whatever progress comes before Baku, it will emerge from discussions in back rooms and workshops, G7 meetings between leaders, and ministerial dialogues. In the meantime, the June session has made it clear to all who attended that, when it comes to climate action, the line between sink and swim has never been finer.

## Upcoming Meetings

### High-level Political Forum on Sustainable Development

**(HLPF) 2024:** HLPF 2024 will take place on the theme, “Reinforcing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and eradicating poverty in times of multiple crises: The effective delivery of sustainable, resilient, and innovative solutions.” It will conduct in-depth reviews of SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 2 (zero hunger), SDG 13 (climate action), SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and SDG 17 (partnerships for the Goals). **dates:** 8-17 July 2024 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York **www:** [hlpf.un.org/2024](https://hlpf.un.org/2024)

**IPCC 61:** The meeting will be the third meeting of the IPCC’s seventh assessment cycle. **dates:** 27 July - 2 August 2024 **location:** Sofia, Bulgaria **www:** [ipcc.ch/meeting-doc/ipcc-61](https://ipcc.ch/meeting-doc/ipcc-61)

**Fifth Global Climate and SDG Synergy Conference:** The Conference, co-convened by the UNFCCC Secretariat, aims to develop recommendations on enhancing synergistic implementation of the sustainable development goals and climate action. **dates:** 5-6 September 2024 **location:** Rio de Janeiro, Brazil **www:** [sdgs.un.org/climate-sdgs-synergies](https://sdgs.un.org/climate-sdgs-synergies)

**Summit of the Future:** The event will explore “multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow” and adopt the “Pact for the Future,” an action-oriented declaration of solidarity with present and future generations. **dates:** 22-23 September 2024 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York **www:** [un.org/en/common-agenda/summit-of-the-future](https://un.org/en/common-agenda/summit-of-the-future)

**UNGA High-level Meeting to Address Existential Threats Posed by Sea-Level Rise:** The UN General Assembly will convene a one-day high level plenary meeting on addressing the threats posed by sea-level rise. **date:** 25 September 2024 **location:** UN Headquarters, New York **www:** [press.un.org/en/2024/ga11258.doc.htm](https://press.un.org/en/2024/ga11258.doc.htm)

**2024 UN Climate Change Conference (UNFCCC COP 29):** This event will include the 29th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 29), the 19th meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 19), and the sixth meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 6) that will convene to complete the first Enhanced Transparency Framework and the NCQG, among other matters. The 61st sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 61) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 61) will also meet. **dates:** 11-22 November 2024 **location:** Baku, Azerbaijan **www:** [unfccc.int/cop29](https://unfccc.int/cop29)

**G20 Brazil Summit 2024:** The Summit is expected to continue conversations on finance, sustainable infrastructure, and climate change, among other topics. **dates:** 18-19 November 2024 **location:** Rio de Janeiro, Brazil **www:** [www.g20.org/en](https://www.g20.org/en)

For additional upcoming events, see: [sdg.iisd.org](https://sdg.iisd.org)

## Glossary

|         |  |
|---------|--|
| AILAC   | Independent Association for Latin America and the Caribbean                            |
| AOSIS   | Alliance of Small Island States  |
| BASIC   | Brazil, South Africa, India and China  |
| CBDR-RC | Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities                 |
| CMA     | Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement |
| CMP     | Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol  |
| COP     | Conference of the Parties  |
| EIG     | Environmental Integrity Group  |
| ETF     | Enhanced Transparency Framework  |
| GGA     | Global Goal on Adaptation  |
| GHGs    | Greenhouse gases   |
| GST     | Global Stocktake   |
| IPCC    | Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change  |
| LCIPP   | Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform                                      |
| LDCs    | Least developed countries  |
| LEG     | LDC Expert Group   |
| LMDCs   | Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries  |
| MWP     | Mitigation ambition and implementation work programme                                  |
| NAPs    | National adaptation plans  |
| NCQG    | New collective quantified goal   |
| NDCs    | Nationally determined contributions  |
| NMAs    | Non-market approaches  |
| SBs     | Subsidiary Bodies  |
| SBI     | Subsidiary Body for Implementation   |
| SBSTA   | Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice                                |
| SIDS    | Small island developing states   |
| UAE     | United Arab Emirates   |
| UNFCCC  | UN Framework Convention on Climate Change  |
| WIM     | Warsaw International Mechanism on loss and damage                                      |