

## Baku Climate Change Conference: Monday, 18 November 2024

The second week launched with the adoption of several decisions forwarded by the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs). The Presidency outlined the mode of work for consultations going forward, and parties and observers highlighted their expectations for progress on key issues.

### Plenary

In the morning plenary, COP 29 President Mukhtar Babayev called on parties to pick up pace. The Conference of the Parties (COP), COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), and COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) took note of the reports of Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 60 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/7](#) and [Add.1](#)), SBSTA 61 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.13](#)), Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) 60 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/13](#), [Add.1](#) and [Add.2](#)), and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.15](#)).

President Babayev outlined the mode of work for the week ahead, which will proceed in three tracks: ministerial consultations, Presidency-led consultations, and continued technical negotiations. He announced that ministerial consultations will continue with the pairs announced before the COP, and he highlighted that on:

- the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG), the focus will be the goal's structure, quantum, and contributor base;
- mitigation, the focus will be what a mitigation outcome could look like and where it could be placed;
- adaptation, the focus will be the global goal on adaptation (GGA); and
- Paris Agreement Articles 6.2 (cooperative approaches) and 6.4 (mechanism), the focus will be the registries.

He reported that the UK and Brazil, as the previous developed country Presidency and incoming developing country Presidency, respectively, will help ensure a high ambition, balanced outcome.

He said Presidency consultations on the dialogue on implementation of the Global Stocktake (GST) will focus on operationalizing the invitation to work programmes and constituted bodies to integrate the GST outcomes in their future work. The Presidency will also conduct consultations on terminology related to gender.

On technical-level work, he emphasized that:

- NCQG technical discussions will continue, with their scope and modalities to be announced in a heads of delegation meeting;
- discussions on refining GST procedures and on the dialogue on GST implementation will continue;

- discussions on other finance items are expected to deliver draft decision text by the end of Tuesday, 19 November; and
- draft decisions on all other items are expected by Wednesday, 20 November.

President Babayev informed parties that the Presidency will not initiate a process to develop a cover decision, stating that all priorities can be included in the existing mandates on the governing bodies' agendas.

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell told parties that bluffing and pushing playbooks takes up precious time and erodes the goodwill needed to realize a successful outcome.

The G-77/CHINA underlined it remains unified to realize an ambitious NCQG. They said some texts, such as on Article 6 and the refinement of the GST procedures, are a good basis for discussions.

The EU called on the Presidency to provide space for discussions on how to realize a strong mitigation outcome that follows up on the GST. They welcomed ministerial engagement on the political aspects of the NCQG.

The ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG) said the NCQG should facilitate the implementation of the GST outcome and have "all hands on deck," with developed countries taking the lead. They underscored that there cannot be a success in Baku without an outcome on mitigation, calling for a clear signal of commitment towards 1.5°C-aligned nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and creating a dedicated space to unpack the response to the GST's energy transition package.

The UMBRELLA GROUP expressed disappointment over the lack of agreement on various agenda items and echoed the call for a signal on GST follow-up as countries prepare their NDCs.

The LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) emphasized the need for co-facilitators to take into account all parties' views and welcomed there being no cover decision. With regard to the NCQG, they emphasized that "we have yet to see a number put on the table," underscoring the need for a cyclical goal whose delivery is tracked.

The BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA (ALBA) said unilateral trade measures jeopardize the implementation of the Convention and Paris Agreement.

The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) highlighted the call for a minimum allocation of USD 39 billion for small island developing states (SIDS) and at least USD 220 billion for least developed countries (LDCs) in the NCQG and said they will not leave the COP without a substantive outcome on mitigation.

The AFRICAN GROUP called for: mainstreaming attention to the special needs and circumstances of Africa; the NCQG to respond to Africa's finance needs; and due process with regard to the operationalization of the Santiago Network.

The INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) urged support for reporting and addressing technology needs, emphasized the importance of agreement on the NCQG to enhance ambition and implementation, and objected to backtracking on gender.

The LDCs said the NCQG must match the efforts needed to address the climate crisis, with clear minimum allocation for SIDS and LDCs.

The ARAB GROUP urged mitigating the impacts of response measures and underscored developed countries' finance obligations.

The MOUNTAIN PARTNERSHIP called for advancing the mountain agenda, including following up on ongoing consultations at COP 29, noting the vulnerability of mountain ecosystems to climate change.

Lamenting that countries "choose to spend money on war, conflict, and genocide, and support polluters," DEMAND CLIMATE JUSTICE called for a USD 5 trillion climate finance goal. CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK stated that, at the midway point of COP 29, countries had "nothing to show beyond empty words" and called on developed countries to deliver on the provision of trillions of public finance to developing countries.

FARMERS welcomed the decision on the joint work on agriculture, but underlined the need to shift focus to means of implementation, as these are more relevant to action on the ground.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES called for the negotiations to respect and safeguard their distinct status, knowledge, and rights, and demanded direct and equitable access to climate finance.

RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (RINGOs) called for engaging researchers in the development of NDCs and National Adaptation Plans.

TRADE UNION NGOs lamented a widening gap between the needs of society and the status of negotiations, underscoring the importance of "figures on the table in trillions" and a work programme for just transition.

WOMEN and GENDER expressed concern on the status of negotiations on the gender work programme, noting decisions at this COP will have an impact on the lives of millions.

Noting that the space for civil society is shrinking, "from badges to door shutting," and that more than 1,700 fossil fuel industry representatives are present in the Blue Zone, YOUTH NGOs (YOUNGOs) called for a robust conflict of interest policy.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs identified the need to leave Baku with a set of outcomes that chart the path to 1.5°C-aligned NDCs and lamented that the mitigation work programme (MWP) is "failing to meet its purpose" in supporting the implementation of the GST.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES called for a standalone process on multilevel action and urbanization to be agreed at COP 30.

## Finance

**Matters relating to the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF):** In joint COP/CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Clara Schultz (Sweden) and Ali Waqas (Pakistan) introduced a revised draft decision. The AFRICAN GROUP lamented the "systematic failure" to discuss the substance of the SCF's reports, let alone act on them. Others agreed further time for substantive discussions would be helpful.

The AFRICAN GROUP underlined it could not endorse the SCF's 2025 workplan, characterizing it as a "red line." The EU wanted to see the workplan approved, but, with AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND, without any further mandates. The UK and US suggested further mandates in the text to rationalize the SCF's workload.

The ARAB GROUP said the COP and CMA could note the SCF's reports and welcome the operational definition of climate finance. AILAC observed that the new text has streamlined reflections on some reports more than on others. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION suggested deleting substantive paragraphs on the [2024 SCF Forum](#), which focused on gender-responsive financing, so as to only recognize its outcome.

The Co-Facilitators will produce a more streamlined text based on parties' written comments.

**Report of, and guidance to, the Green Climate Fund (GCF):** In joint COP/CMA informal consultations, Pierre Marc (France) invited comments on the draft decisions. Many requested further work to streamline or refine paragraphs and said they would submit written comments.

The AFRICAN GROUP and ARAB GROUP underlined that many of the paragraphs were micromanaging the GCF Board. CHILE, supported by AOSIS, the ARAB GROUP, GRUPO SUR, MEXICO, and CHINA, requested several additions to strengthen collaboration with the Technology Mechanism. The EU preferred moving to a biennial provision of guidance, while AILAC, BRAZIL, and INDIA preferred maintaining an annual rhythm. Views diverged on whether to refer to the NCQG.

The Co-Facilitators will produce a revised text.

**Report of, and guidance to, the Global Environment Facility (GEF):** In joint COP/CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator David Kaluba (Zambia) introduced the revised COP and CMA decisions. The AFRICAN GROUP, supported by AILAC, requested additional paragraphs in the CMA decision to ensure sustained support for biennial transparency reports and the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency. Parties debated several paragraphs, including on: complementarity and coherence among multilateral funds and their related joint action plan; gender; annual versus biennial provision of guidance; and technology.

Many developed countries suggested deleting, or revising, the paragraph on the GGA, noting it preempts the GGA indicators that have not yet been agreed. The AFRICAN GROUP recalled that [decision 2/CMA.5](#) decision defined the GGA's thematic areas.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the text and encouraged parties to further consult among themselves.

**Report on doubling adaptation finance:** In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Jens Fugl (Denmark), parties agreed to forward a procedural decision for adoption by the CMA.

**Dialogue on the scope of Paris Agreement Article 2.1c and its complementarity with Article 9:** In the CMA contact group, Co-Chair Ben Abraham (New Zealand) presented the revised draft decision. Among other issues, parties debated which organizations should provide submissions on topics for workshops under the dialogue. The US supported "parties and other relevant stakeholders" but opposed reference to "operating entities," noting the Loss and Damage Fund is now an operating entity but is not relevant to Article 2.1c. The AFRICAN GROUP and LDCs preferred "parties, constituted bodies, and the operating entities of the financial mechanism," stressing the importance of all operating entities. The ARAB GROUP suggested "parties and non-party stakeholders," which the AFRICAN GROUP rejected. The US proposed reverting to the agreed language from CMA 5, from which the AFRICAN GROUP said the reference to bodies "under the Convention and the Paris Agreement" would have to be deleted. Parties agreed to use previous language with that deletion and agreed to forward the draft decision to the CMA.

## Mitigation

**Guidance on Cooperative Approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.2:** During the CMA contact group, the Presidency informed parties of ministerial consultations on the registry section of this agenda item, and urged parties to continue their deliberations on all other elements. Co-Chairs Maria Aljishi

(Saudi Arabia) and Peer Stiansen (Norway) referred to the informal note forwarded by the SBSTA, and welcomed bridging proposals.

Parties considered the consequences, if any, of “significant and persistent inconsistencies” identified by the Article 6 technical expert review, with the AFRICAN GROUP and AOSIS supporting and the LMDCs opposing language on consequences.

On changes to authorization, the UK called for specifying that after the first transfer, changes will only be allowed in extraordinary circumstances, such as force majeure. PAKISTAN questioned the definition of “inconsistencies” in the text and underlined that the section on further guidance on initial reports would place a significant reporting burden on developing countries and is beyond the group’s mandate.

ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs and YOUTH NGOs cautioned against watering down requirements that ensure environmental integrity, and WOMEN AND GENDER lamented the lack of reference to just transition, empowerment of women, gender equality, and mandatory stakeholder intervention and consultations.

The Co-Chairs will prepare clean text and consult with the Presidency on the way forward.

**Rules, Modalities, and Procedures for the Mechanism established by Paris Agreement Article 6.4:** During the CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Kate Hancock (Australia) and Sonam Tashi (Bhutan) introduced a new draft CMA text that incorporates the draft text forwarded by SBSTA 61 to the CMA.

On operation of the mechanism, parties highlighted the need to balance regulatory stability with continuous improvements. AOSIS, supported by the UK and others, called for ensuring that ongoing improvements can be made to reflect best available science. On post-issuance authorization, AOSIS reiterated their preference for no post-issuance authorization, but said if such authorization is to be permitted, there should be a time limit of two years after issuance, which the AFRICAN GROUP, GRUPO SUR, and others opposed.

On transition of CDM activities to the Article 6.4 mechanism, several parties questioned the EU’s proposal to request the Supervisory Body to consider the additionality of CDM projects that are requesting transition, noting existing rules on CDM additionality and on transitioning CDM projects to the Article 6.4 mechanism.

The Co-Facilitators invited parties to submit bridging proposals to inform the preparation of clean text.

**Work Programme under the Framework for Non-market Approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.8:** The CMA adopted the decision forwarded by SBSTA 61 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.15/Add.1](#)).

**Matters relating to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):** During the CMP informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Karolina Anttonen (Finland) and Alick Muvundika (Zambia) introduced a new draft text containing three sections, on: general matters; functioning of the CDM beyond the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period; and management of financial resources. Objecting to linking the CMP and CMA, BRAZIL suggested deleting the sections on functioning of the CDM and management of financial resources, which most parties opposed.

On the CDM’s functioning, AILAC and the UK, among others, lamented the failure to carry forward the draft CMP decision discussed under SBSTA 61. Highlighting the links between winding down the CDM’s operations and deciding on a “fiscally responsible” quantum to transfer from the CDM Trust Fund to other areas, they suggested inserting options relating to the CDM’s termination. The LMDCs opposed, pointing to discussions under Article 6.4 about additional requirements that could prevent many CDM projects from transitioning to the Article 6.4 mechanism and opposed “stranding” such projects.

On resource management, the AFRICAN GROUP reiterated their preference to transfer funds to both the Adaptation Fund and

for Article 6 capacity building, but proposed, supported by AOSIS, an alternative option of transferring to the Adaptation Fund only. The UK supported transferring to both the Adaptation Fund and for Article 6 activities, and preferred not specifying which Article 6 activities would benefit from the transfer. The EIG supported also transferring funds to Article 6, noting this should be an allocation, not a loan.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the draft text.

### **Technology Transfer and Development and Capacity Building**

**Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN):** The COP adopted a decision forwarded by SB 61 ([FCCC/SB/2024/L.11](#)).

**Technology implementation programme:** In the CMA contact group, Co-Chairs Diann Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda) and Elfriede More (Austria) invited views, noting lack of progress on the matter under the SBI. Parties agreed that the technology implementation programme (TIP) should: build on the lessons learned from the Poznan strategic programme; align with the Technology Mechanism assessment cycle; and inform the next GST. While the EU and US suggested the TIP be modeled after the MWP and just transition work programme, developing countries emphasized the need for modalities that “ensure the programme delivers,” with CHILE saying the focus should be on the word “implementation” rather than “programme.” The EU and US, opposed by SAUDI ARABIA, said the TIP should respond to the GST outcomes. CHILE stressed that the G-77/China’s detailed proposal for the operationalization of the TIP already incorporates many relevant aspects of the GST outcomes.

The AFRICAN GROUP and LDCs called for the TIP to be operationalized under both the COP and CMA, while the EU and NORWAY stressed it is to function under the CMA.

In terms of modalities, parties generally agreed that the TIP should include in-session dialogues, but with different views on their number and topics. The G-77/CHINA supported: one technical dialogue on specific topics, such as financial barriers, trade restrictions, and intellectual property rights; and one regional dialogue to better respond to region- and country-specific issues. Additionally, the G-77/CHINA envisioned an implementation accelerator and a national system of innovation hubs, to be funded by operating entities of the Financial Mechanism, as a second TIP component.

The Co-Chairs will prepare draft text based on the views expressed.

**Matters relating to Capacity Building:** The COP adopted: decisions forwarded by SBI 60 on the terms of reference for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.1](#)), and the second review of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building (PCCB) ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.2](#)); and a decision on the annual technical progress report of the PCCB forwarded by SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.13](#)). The CMA adopted a decision on the second review of the PCCB ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.2/Add.3](#)) forwarded by SBI 60 and a decision on the 2024 annual technical progress report of the PCCB ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.12](#)) forwarded by SBI 61.

### **Other Issues**

**Report of the Adaptation Committee:** The COP and CMA welcomed the 2023 and 2024 reports of the Adaptation Committee ([SB/2023/5](#) and [SB/2024/4](#)).

**Matters related to LDCs:** The COP adopted a decision forwarded by SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.17/Add.1](#)).

**2024 Review of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM) and joint annual report of the WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) and the Santiago Network:** In COP/CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Pasha

Carruthers (Cook Islands), parties discussed how to move forward with discussions, considering no texts were forwarded by the SBs.

Many delegates underscored the importance of reaching a decision to bolster the work of the WIM and Santiago Network, and reiterated their respective priorities, including: providing support for the preparation of biennial transparency reports; exploring ways to integrate loss and damage in NDCs; mandating a state of loss and damage report; and revisiting the work of the ExCom's expert group on action and support.

The G-77/CHINA, supported by the US and many others, called for reverting to a separate consideration of the 2024 WIM review and the joint annual report. Discussions continued in informal informals.

**Provision of financial and technical support to developing countries:** In CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark) and Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) noted that the SBs had not forwarded any text to serve as a basis for discussions under the CMA.

AILAC thanked the Secretariat for the summary report on the in-session facilitative dialogue for sharing experience in gathering, analyzing, and managing data ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/4](#)), but noted that it does not capture parties' views on financial challenges. AILAC also stressed that while reporting challenges must be addressed, financial support for reporting should not come at the expense of climate action. The US: welcomed the Secretariat's work on outreach and knowledge-sharing; called for acknowledging available financial support and encouraging eligible countries to access it; and re-emphasized that this is not an appropriate forum to discuss specific guidance to the GEF or aspects related to the NCQG.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

**Procedural and logistical elements of the overall Global Stocktake process:** In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Patrick Spicer (Canada), countries suggested various edits to the latest iteration of the draft decision text. Discussions revolved around, among others, whether to: recall the Convention principles in the preamble, as proposed by CHINA and opposed by the EU, US, and AUSTRALIA; specify the list of non-party stakeholders participating in the GST, as proposed by the LDCs and opposed by the AFRICAN GROUP, INDIA, and CHINA; encourage the collection of gender-disaggregated data, opposed by the AFRICAN GROUP and CHINA; and underscore the role of the three Presidencies presiding during the duration of the GST, as favored by the US and AUSTRALIA, or only that of the incoming and current Presidencies, as favored by the LMDCs. Countries converged on further streamlining language regarding the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in the GST process.

**Report on the annual dialogue on the GST informing NDC preparation (referred to in paragraph 187 of decision 1/ CMA.5):** In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Noura Alissa (Saudi Arabia) and Kaarle Kupiainen (Finland), countries discussed a Secretariat report ([FCCC/PA/CMA/2024/5](#)) on the first annual GST dialogue to facilitate knowledge sharing on how the GST's outcomes are informing the preparation of parties' next NDCs, held at SB 60.

Parties expressed divergent views on elements to be included in a potential decision on this item. The EIG, the EU, AOSIS, and the LDCs said the decision should send a strong signal ahead of the next round of NDCs, and advocated for specific guidance on mitigation, adaptation, and means of implementation. The LMDCs advocated for a short and simple decision that welcomes the organization of the dialogue and takes note of the report. EGYPT said this should not become another "mini GST" and warned against parties "cherry-picking" key messages from the report. CHINA remarked that the annual GST dialogue had fulfilled its mandate and suggested, opposed by the EU and GHANA, that no further annual dialogues be organized.

**Matter relating to the Committee to Facilitate Implementation and Promote Compliance of the Paris Agreement:** In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Arne Riedel (Germany), parties continued to discuss draft decision text. The Secretariat answered questions about the functionality of the NDC registry to display NDCs that are active during different time horizons. Delegates debated how to capture this discussion in the draft decision, with the EU, supported by the US, the UK, CANADA, and CHILE, proposing, and SAUDI ARABIA opposing, a reference to the registry. After a huddle, parties agreed to refer more broadly to the section of the Committee's annual report that outlines the current limitations of the registry.

**Gender:** In COP informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Ruleta Thomas (Antigua and Barbuda) and Marc-André Lafrance (Canada) noted the Presidency is conducting consultations on terminology, and invited comments on other bracketed elements in the draft decision text forwarded by the SBI.

Parties debated, among others: how to capture latest trends in terms of gender composition; language on coordination with relevant UN entities, and whether to specifically refer to the Conventions on Biological Diversity and on Desertification; support for gender focal points; references to just transition not being limited to just transition of the workforce; and references to elements related to the Paris Agreement.

The Co-Facilitators emphasized the importance of agreeing on the future work on gender. Discussions continued in informal informals.

#### **Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform:**

The COP adopted a decision forwarded by SBSTA 60 ([FCCC/SBSTA/2024/L.1](#)). CANADA lauded the work of the Platform's Facilitative Working Group, encouraging parties to continue to engage and participate in this work.

**Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters:** The COP adopted decisions forwarded by SBI 60 and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.4](#) and [L.11](#)), which the CMA endorsed. The CMP adopted decisions forwarded by SBI 60 and SBI 61 ([FCCC/SBI/2024/L.5](#) and [FCCC/SBI/2024/L.10](#)).

#### **In the Corridors**

Starting the second week, President Babayev took center stage, laying out the intense mode and pace of work for the days ahead. He set firm timelines for several issues to conclude by midweek. In finance consultations, negotiators were told their timeline was by the end of the day. That was clearly not possible, given their many comments and the little time they had to engage so far. One negotiator rejected the Presidency's timeline as "arbitrary," saying sticking to it would only lead to Rule 16. On the other hand, negotiators dealing with loss and damage items which had been "Rule 16'ed" under the Subsidiary Bodies, seemed lost about what they should do and how they could relaunch discussions on a better footing.

Some observers were taken aback at another, perhaps even firmer line drawn by the Presidency: there will be no cover decision this year—at least not one initiated by the Presidency. Instead, it is up to ministers to try to muster parties' agreement on what a mitigation outcome could be, and where it should land.

The mitigation work programme is fundamentally stuck, living on as a series of dialogue events. Others pointed to the yet-to-be-operationalized dialogue on the implementation of the Global Stocktake (GST) as the place to track efforts towards energy transition along with the other GST outcomes. But there, too, there is no agreement on the dialogue's scope. One negotiator said the Presidency's consultation on the GST "was almost entirely about mitigation," making him worry that the three streams for ministerial consultations outlined by the Presidency may quickly become crossed. "Cover decisions are almost expected now as a useful place to fill in the gaps, but I am not sure a dumping ground decision will solve the problem this time around," worried one delegate.