

Bonn Highlights: Friday, 20 June 2025

Negotiations on the development of the new gender action plan revealed the depth of divergences among parties as delegates debated the very notion of “gender.” Parties also voiced different views regarding the space to allocate to discussions on unilateral trade measures and the nationally determined contributions (NDCs) due in 2025.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): In Subsidiary Body (SB) informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia) invited views on draft text. Commenting on the elements for the further development of GGA indicators, parties’ views diverged on a range of issues, including:

- whether to specify a desired number of indicators;
- whether to explicitly mention indicators for tracking means of implementation;
- how and to what extent to provide guidance on the experts’ work on refining the indicators, with some countries warning against “micromanaging”; and
- timelines for further activities and workshops.

Discussions continued into the evening.

Special Event by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): This [mandated event](#) featured a presentation on the timeline and outline of the IPCC Working Group II contribution to the seventh Assessment Report. It [highlighted](#), among others:

- the inclusion of a dedicated chapter on finance, which will cover issues such as the adequacy, access to, and effectiveness of adaptation finance and funding responses to losses and damages;
- emerging topics, such as the risks and ethics of solar radiation management; and
- the planned update to the 1994 Technical Guidelines for Assessing Climate Change Impacts and Adaptations.

Guidance Relating to Adaptation Communications: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Thomas Lerenten Lelekoinen (Kenya) and Marie Wien Fjell (Norway) invited reflections on draft text. Parties generally agreed to extend the call for submissions on their experiences in applying the guidance and

to postpone the review of guidance until the tenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 10) in 2028. The EUROPEAN UNION (EU) asked for more time to reflect on these timelines. While many countries supported a deadline for submissions in early 2028, GRUPO SUR preferred 2027. GRUPO SUR also proposed inserting a new paragraph requesting the Green Climate Fund to report on its support for the preparation and submission of adaptation communications.

The ARAB GROUP, supported by the LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), suggested deleting references to the GGA Framework, which it considered “premature” given the ongoing process of developing GGA indicators. The EU, supported by CANADA and AUSTRALIA, disagreed, calling for reflections on the GGA to be included in the next round of submissions. As a compromise, the ARAB GROUP proposed including a generic reference to the GGA, but not to the GGA Framework.

Matters related to Least Developed Countries (LDCs): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Ephraim Shitima (Zambia) and Rik den Hoedt (Netherlands) invited views on draft text. Parties debated language on the LDC Expert Group’s (LEG) work on National Adaptation Plan (NAP)-related guidelines, seeking clarification on the guidelines’ focus, especially whether they relate to the NAP process in general, the formulation of NAPs, or their implementation.

Regarding encouragement for enhanced LEG collaboration with other constituted bodies, the ARAB GROUP suggested this collaboration be on “adaptation-relevant activities” rather than activities related to NAPs, the LDC work programme, gender, and responding to mandates from the Conference of the Parties (COP), the CMA, and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).

The co-facilitators will revise the draft text.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), discussions focused on the development of a digital platform for facilitating implementation of mitigation actions.

The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) and INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN (AILAC) cautioned that creation of the platform should not divert attention from the core purpose of the MWP, which is to scale up mitigation ambition, stressing the platform on its own will not achieve this. AOSIS pointed to similar platforms such as the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Registry, and underscored that the challenge for small island developing States is not inability to identify projects but lack of investor interest in such projects. The EU, UK, and CANADA cautioned against duplicating efforts, and called for assessments of existing tools and platforms to identify gaps and ascertain whether such tools can be adapted to achieve the desired objectives.

BRAZIL presented their proposal for the platform, noting it would connect existing UNFCCC and non-UNFCCC platforms, and include a core database while expanding and mutually leveraging existing tools. The AFRICAN GROUP said the platform should: focus on unlocking finance; facilitate mitigation in line with common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities; and observe national sovereignty protocols. The LMDCs stressed the platform should be facilitative and not include monitoring or evaluation functions.

Loss and Damage

2024 Review of the Warsaw International Mechanism: SB informal consultations were co-facilitated by Pasha Carruthers (Cook Islands). Parties mandated the co-facilitators to revise their draft text to capture convergence reached in informal informals, including on: integrating loss and damage work in NDCs; creating a pipeline for technical assistance requests; recognizing progress made in operationalizing the Santiago Network and matching responses to date; streamlining and simplifying access to technical assistance; and the relationship with the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage.

As areas needing further engagement in informal informals, parties identified: guidelines for national loss and damage plans and NDCs; support for estimating needs; the idea of a state of loss and damage report; financial support and scaling up finance; and information on loss and damage in the Global Stocktake (GST).

The AFRICAN GROUP suggested informal informals be open to observers. The co-facilitators recalled that precedent is for such meetings to be closed. CANADA proposed using the time remaining in the session to hear interventions from observers. Observers stressed, among others: the importance of considering non-economic loss and damage; scaling up finance; direct access; alignment with human rights obligations; and for the negotiations to remain open to observers.

Finance

Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund (AF): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Isatou Camara (Gambia) introduced an informal note covering: arrangements for the AF to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement; the AF Board composition; and fifth review of the AF. There was convergence on deferring the AF review and consideration of the AF Board composition until after the transition.

On the service arrangements, AOSIS, supported by most parties, proposed amending the text to ensure the new arrangements with the World Bank, as Trustee of the AF serving the Paris Agreement, are in force before terminating the old arrangements with the World Bank as interim Trustee. The EU highlighted the need to ensure Secretariat services can continue when the transition is completed, with the AFRICAN GROUP suggesting the AF Board address this after the transition. Parties requested legal advice from the Secretariat to clarify issues relating to the Trustee and Secretariat arrangements.

The co-facilitators will prepare a revised informal note covering the service arrangements.

Third biennial in-session workshop on information to be provided in accordance with Paris Agreement Article 9.5: In this [mandated event](#), Co-Facilitators Elena Pereira (Honduras) and Solomon Schonfield (UK) recalled that developed countries shall, and other parties are invited to, submit information on projected levels of climate finance. They recalled that the CMA decided to consider updating, at CMA 7, the type of information to be provided under Article 9.5 reporting (annex to decision [12/CMA.1](#)).

The Secretariat provided an overview of the third round of these communications ([FCCC/CP/2025/2-FCCC/PA/CMA/2025/3](#)). They highlighted, among others: two parties submitted for the first time; five submitted communications on a voluntary basis; three emphasized their commitment to at least triple their adaptation contributions; and four indicated having almost reached a balance between mitigation and adaptation.

Developed and developing countries shared experiences in the preparation and use of *ex-ante* finance reporting. They reflected on, among others: predictability across electoral cycles; enhancing consistency in Article 9.5 reporting without losing context-specific detail; strengthening the granularity of data; challenges in aggregating data from different government entities; enhancing clarity on points of contact to access bilateral support, noting frequent changes in governmental structures; better addressing areas identified for improvements; interlinkages with biennial transparency reports; and informing the next GST.

As elements that require political guidance, parties pointed to, among others:

- elements related to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance, particularly on access;
- comparability between *ex-ante* and *ex-post* reporting on climate finance (Paris Agreement Articles 9.5 and 9.7); and
- incentivizing voluntary submissions.

Other Issues

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5: In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Patrick Spicer (Canada), parties continued expressing views on the scope, modalities, and outputs of the dialogue.

On scope, the LMDCs stressed the focus should be on strengthening enablers and identifying disenablers such as

unilateral measures that redirect financial flows away from developing countries. AOSIS and the LDCs, opposed by INDIA, called for a follow-up to all GST outcomes, as well as knowledge exchange. On outputs, AOSIS, opposed by INDIA and CHINA, called for an annual synthesis report that summarizes discussions, for consideration by the CMA at its annual sessions. The EU and AFRICAN GROUP supported a summary report of each dialogue and a synthesis report of all the summary reports.

The co-facilitators will prepare draft text.

Technology Implementation Programme: In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Elfriede More (Austria) and Omar Alcock (Jamaica), parties tabled various edits to a revised draft CMA decision.

CHINA, opposed by several parties, objected to language referencing the GST. The ARAB GROUP, with CHILE, preferred not to recall specific paragraphs of the [GST decision](#). CHINA proposed inserting a new paragraph on the elaboration of a “strategic and ambitious” technology goal.

The ARAB GROUP tabled a new paragraph referencing various new and emerging technologies such as carbon capture, utilization and storage. BRAZIL, supported by the EU, preferred for the TIP to be “technologically agnostic.” BURKINA FASO and BRAZIL emphasized the role of local communities’ technologies.

The EU asked the Secretariat to elaborate the budgetary implications of the different suggestions.

Discussions will continue in informal informals.

Terms, Composition, and Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE): In informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Xiang Gao (China) and Hans Kolshus (Norway) invited views on draft text, noting it contains: a draft COP decision on the term, composition, and ToRs of the CGE; text that may be reflected in a CMA decision; and ToRs.

The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) emphasized the existence of the CGE should not be jeopardized by lack of agreement on a possible revision of its ToRs. JAPAN and the UK supported an extension of the CGE until 2029, while the ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and LDCs called for extending its term until otherwise decided by the COP, making it a permanent constituted body. The EU supported an extension until 2032. AOSIS, the EU, AUSTRALIA, and CANADA, opposed by the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs, urged updating the CGE’s composition. The EU emphasized the importance for CGE members to remain in office until their successors are elected.

The ARAB GROUP and LMDCs called for bracketing the text on a CMA decision, with the ARAB GROUP noting that the CGE serving the CMA does not mean there is a mandate for a CMA decision.

The G-77/CHINA emphasized, among others, the importance of continued support for the preparation of biennial update reports and for the CGE to support increasing the pool of developing country experts through targeted outreach and training initiatives. The AFRICAN GROUP proposed that the CGE also: promote

the development of national teams of government officials in developing countries structured along the key components of the Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) component to preserve institutional memory; and support the development of robust and sustained national measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems.

The co-facilitators will revise their draft text.

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): During the SB contact group co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore), parties continued to provide input on issue clusters displayed on-screen. On synergies within the UNFCCC, parties identified links with adaptation discussions, as well as the MWP and the dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, highlighting the need for coherence and international cooperation. JAPAN proposed inviting the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) to integrate elements of the JTWP into its work. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted there is no agreed definition of “just transition” and questioned how just transition will be integrated into existing work plans or workstreams.

On synergies across the UN system and beyond, CHINA suggested a joint event with the World Trade Organization on the impact of unilateral cross-border measures. JAPAN suggested work on implementing just transition pathways in collaboration with the International Labour Organization.

Response Measures: During the SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Xolisa Ngwadla (Botswana) invited views on an informal note.

The G-77/CHINA, opposed by AUSTRALIA, CANADA, and the UK, proposed dedicating two hours to discuss unilateral trade measures. The AFRICAN GROUP, opposed by the EU, proposed including unilateral trade measures in the Forum’s work programme. The EU pointed to language in [Decision 16/CP.29](#) (response measures) relating to the cross-border impacts of measures taken to combat climate change, and opposed going beyond this agreed language. JAPAN identified the World Trade Organization as the appropriate forum to discuss unilateral trade measures. The G-77/CHINA and RUSSIAN FEDERATION requested referring the issue of where to discuss unilateral trade measures to the SB Chairs if it cannot be resolved by the group.

Regarding the G-77/CHINA’s proposal to start work on draft decision text regarding the global dialogue, the UK opposed, noting there is no mandate to start drafting decision text at SB 62.

Gender: In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) and Jared Huntley (Australia), parties exchanged views on the development of a new gender action plan (GAP). They highlighted the GAP should be: pragmatic and implementable; ambitious and action-oriented; well-resourced; intersectional; respecting cultural values and national circumstances and priorities; and aligned with key milestones of the UNFCCC process. The G-77/CHINA emphasized means of implementation, including for the

development of national GAPs, with LDCs pointing to support to gender focal points.

BRAZIL underscored the need to safeguard previously agreed language. As a priority, they emphasized the recognition of women and girls of African descent, supported by the DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, and highlighted interrelation of racial discrimination and socio-economic vulnerability. The EU and AUSTRALIA supported the importance of an intersectional lens. CANADA referred to women, girls, and gender-diverse people.

ARGENTINA pointed to Article 7.3 of the [Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court](#), according to which “gender” refers to “the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society.” Cautioning against overlooking children and the elderly, they advocated for a broader vulnerability perspective and suggested the Lima Work Programme on Gender be replaced with a “new document that adapts to new realities and consensus.”

The LDCs, CANADA, KENYA, and ICELAND highlighted the role of men and boys in gender-responsive climate action. Parties also identified possible focus areas for the GAP. BRAZIL and the EU, pointed to care work. AOSIS and the EU highlighted sexual reproductive health and gender-based violence.

The co-facilitators will produce draft text.

Research and Systematic Observation: In SBSTA informal consultations co-facilitated by Patricia Nying’uro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland), parties proposed edits to revised draft conclusions. The EU proposed flagging the “limits and risks” of carbon dioxide removal and abatement technologies, and adding references to the 1.5°C goal. GUATEMALA, supported by AUSTRALIA, stressed the importance of distinguishing between Indigenous values and knowledge systems, and local knowledge. GRUPO SUR suggested referencing carbon accounting frameworks.

CHILE underscored the role of endogenous modelling and elaborated on the proposed request for SBSTA to review the extent to which the IPCC’s reports address research gaps identified.

On the state of the climate, INDIA, supported by SAUDI ARABIA, proposed using language from previous decisions linking temperature records to long-term warming caused by historic emissions.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings: In the contact group co-chaired by Laurence Ahoussou (Canada) and Kristina Stege (Marshall Islands), AUSTRALIA and TÜRKIYE reiterated their bids to host COP 31. The African region reported that Nigeria has declared itself as a possible host of COP 32, and that consultations are still ongoing. The Asia-Pacific region reported that one country has declared itself as a possible host of COP 33 and that consultations are still ongoing.

On the elements for the provisional agendas for COP 30, CMP 20, and CMA 7, the LMDCs, supported by the ARAB GROUP, recalled they proposed two items for the agendas and requested

the Secretariat to include their proposals in accordance with the rules of procedure. CHINA clarified that their concession at SB 62 does not extend to the provisional agendas for Belém. NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN and others expressed concern about proposed additions to the agenda that could delay parties’ work in Belém. The AFRICAN GROUP noted their intention to propose an agenda item on the special circumstances and needs of Africa.

The EU, supported by NEW ZEALAND and JAPAN, but opposed by the LMDCs, called for space on the CMA agenda to consider the NDC synthesis report and the biennial transparency reports. The EU, supported by the UK, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, and JAPAN, but opposed by the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs, requested that the dialogue on GST implementation be placed under GST matters on the CMA agenda.

Regarding the organization of COP 30, the EU, supported by CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK (CAN) and YOUTH NGOS (YOUNGOS), called for host country agreements to:

- include provisions guaranteeing the human rights of all participants, including their freedom of speech and assembly;
- provide assurances regarding the availability and affordability of accommodation and logistical spaces for all participants; and
- be made publically accessible on the UNFCCC website.

CAN and YOUNGOS further called for an electronic visa issuance within one week for all accredited participants. They also called for measures to prevent “corporate capture” by requiring conflict of interest disclosure, with YOUNGOS pointing to the [measures](#) adopted under the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. YOUNGO further called for developing a UNFCCC child safeguarding policy.

In the Corridors

With a growing appetite for reform, delegates are increasingly looking to other multilateral agreements for inspiration. Today’s discussions demonstrated that this can be a double-edged sword. Many observers applauded a push for countries to adopt hard-and-fast transparency requirements like those contained in the tobacco control regime. On the flipside, one delegation referenced the hotly disputed definition of gender in the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal Court to argue for equating gender and sex. “They pulled that one right out of the dustbin of international cooperation,” fumed an observer and pointed out how that definition had evolved significantly in judicial practice since.

By the afternoon, the past five days of intense negotiations started to make themselves felt. The general fatigue was compounded by a lack of progress across key agenda items such as gender, response measures, and the just transition work programme. As a seasoned delegate opined: “It’s been one hour meeting here, one hour there, and not much progress in between.” Another jokingly proposed to move Saturday’s discussions outside to the sunny river banks of the Rhine, quipping that “a change of scenery would do us all good.”