

Summary of the Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: 3–7 November 2025

Forty years ago, countries came together and took the first step in protecting the ozone layer, guided by science and commitment to address this threat to human health and the environment. Marking this milestone, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer have demonstrated the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation. The Earth’s protective stratospheric ozone layer is healing.

Despite the Protocol’s successes, those attending the thirty-seventh Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol (MOP 37) had no time to rest on their laurels as they addressed a number of challenges still facing the health of the ozone layer. For example, there have been discrepancies between atmospheric monitoring and reporting of emissions of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are potent greenhouse gases covered under the Protocol’s Kigali Amendment. How to address these discrepancies was one of the more contentious issues on the agenda. Connected to this, Parties also looked at areas of the world lacking atmospheric monitoring of substances controlled under the Protocol, and discussed how to fill in the gaps.

Another issue facing many developing countries is how to find medium- and long-term solutions to the significant accumulation of inventories of refrigerant gases nearing the end of their life cycles. Halon 1301 is continuing to be used for fire suppression on aircraft due to the lack of effective alternatives. Delegates also addressed a number of administrative matters to allow the Protocol to continue its work, including:

- terms of reference for the study on the 2027–2029 replenishment of the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol;
- Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) organizational issues;
- adoption of the budget of the Trust Fund for the Montreal Protocol for 2026; and
- ensuring the viability of Montreal Protocol operations.

While delegates reached agreement and adopted 20 decisions, they postponed those on controlled substances used as feedstocks, further strengthening Montreal Protocol institutions, and TEAP organizational issues.

Despite the successful conclusion of negotiations at MOP 37, the closing plenary went late into the night and well beyond its

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scheduled close, delayed by a dispute over a nomination to represent the Eastern European States regional group on the Protocol's Implementation Committee. As weary delegates left the UN complex in Nairobi on a rainy night punctuated by the croaking of frogs, they agreed that such disputes will not break the spirit of the "ozone family" nor put a damper on an otherwise successful meeting.

MOP 37 convened from 3-7 November 2025 in Nairobi, Kenya. A total of 619 participants attended the meeting, representing governments, academia, industry, and civil society.

A Brief History of the Ozone Regime

Concerns that the Earth's stratospheric ozone layer could be at risk from chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other anthropogenic substances first arose in the early 1970s. At that time, scientists warned that releasing these substances into the atmosphere could deplete the ozone layer, hindering its ability to prevent harmful ultraviolet (UV) rays from reaching the Earth. This would adversely affect ocean ecosystems, agricultural productivity, and animal populations, and harm humans through higher rates of skin cancers, cataracts, and weakened immune systems. In response, a UN Environment Programme (UNEP) conference held in March 1977 adopted a World Plan of Action on the Ozone Layer and established a Coordinating Committee to guide future international action.

Vienna Convention: Negotiations on an international agreement to protect the ozone layer were launched in 1981 under the auspices of UNEP. In March 1985, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer was adopted. It calls for cooperation on monitoring, research, and data exchange, but does not impose obligations to reduce the use of ozone depleting substances (ODS). The Convention has 198 Parties, which represents universal ratification. Parties meet every three years.

Montreal Protocol: In September 1987, efforts to negotiate binding obligations to reduce ODS usage led to the adoption of the Montreal Protocol, which entered into force in January 1989. The Montreal Protocol introduced control measures for some CFCs and halons for developed countries (known as non-Article 5 Parties). Developing countries (Article 5 Parties) were granted a grace period, allowing them to increase their ODS use before taking on commitments. The Protocol has 198 Parties.

Since 1987, several amendments and adjustments have been adopted, adding new obligations and additional ODS and adjusting existing control schedules. Amendments require ratification by a certain number of Parties before they enter into force, while adjustments enter into force automatically. All amendments have been ratified by 197 Parties except the newest, the Kigali Amendment, which has 169 ratifications to date.

Key Turning Points

London Amendment and Adjustments: At the second MOP, held in London, UK, in 1990, delegates tightened control schedules and added ten more CFCs to the list of ODS, as well as carbon tetrachloride (CTC) and methyl chloroform. MOP 2 also established the Multilateral Fund (MLF), which meets the incremental costs incurred by Article 5 Parties in implementing the Protocol's control measures and finances clearinghouse functions. The Fund is replenished every three years.

Copenhagen Amendment and Adjustments: At MOP 4, held in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 1992, delegates tightened existing control schedules and added controls on methyl bromide,

hydrobromofluorocarbons (HBFCs), and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). MOP 4 also agreed to enact non-compliance procedures. It established an Implementation Committee (ImpCom) to examine possible non-compliance and make recommendations to the MOP aimed at securing full compliance.

Montreal Amendment and Adjustments: At MOP 9, held in Montreal, Canada, in 1997, delegates agreed to a new licensing system for importing and exporting ODS, in addition to tightening existing control schedules. MOP 9 also banned trade in methyl bromide with non-Parties to the Copenhagen Amendment.

Beijing Amendment and Adjustments: At MOP 11, held in Beijing, China, in 1999, delegates agreed to controls on bromochloromethane (also known as halon 1011), additional controls on HCFCs, and reporting on methyl bromide for quarantine and pre-shipment applications.

Kigali Amendment: At MOP 28, held in Kigali, Rwanda, in 2016, delegates agreed to amend the Protocol to include HFCs as part of its ambit and to set phase-down schedules for HFCs. HFCs are produced as replacements for HCFCs and are therefore a result of ODS phase out. HFCs are not a threat to the ozone layer but have a very high global-warming-potential (GWP). The Kigali Amendment entered into force on 1 January 2019.

Recent Meetings

MOP 35: At this meeting, which took place from 22-27 October 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya, Parties adopted the largest-ever replenishment of the MLF for the implementation of the Protocol, just shy of USD 1 billion. Delegates took key decisions on: life-cycle refrigerant management (LRM); stratospheric aerosol injection; the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on HFC baseline consumption for certain Parties; energy efficiency; and very short-lived substances (VSLs). They also took decisions on feedstock uses of methyl bromide; the import and export of prohibited cooling equipment and the related long-standing issue of dumping; and further strengthening Protocol institutions, including those concerned with combating illegal trade.

COP 13/MOP 36: This combined meeting was held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 28 October – 1 November 2024. Parties took key decisions related to: evaluating the suitability of potential sites to close gaps in the global atmospheric monitoring network; undertaking atmospheric monitoring of HFC-23 and research on sources of HFC-23 emissions to address the gap between global HFC-23 emissions reported by Parties and emission estimates derived from measured atmospheric abundances; providing further guidance and information on LRM and encouraging Parties to adopt a systemic approach to LRM; requesting the TEAP and Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP) to provide updated information on the most abundantly used VSLs; minimizing emissions of controlled substances used as feedstocks; transitioning to metered-dose inhalers with low-GWP propellants; sustainably managing halons and ensuring sufficient stocks of recovered, recycled, or reclaimed halons remain available for anticipated future needs; and preventing illegal trade in controlled substances through best practices.

OEWG 47: At this meeting, held in Bangkok, Thailand, from 7–11 July 2025, delegates started considering the terms of reference (ToR) for the study on the MLF replenishment 2027–2029 and discussed options for the organization of the TEAP and its Technical Options Committees (TOCs). They also deliberated draft decisions on LRM; feedstock uses of controlled substances; halon 1301 and other uses of fire suppressants; national and regional initiatives

Delegates resumed discussions in a contact group co-chaired by Ralph Brieskorn (Netherlands) and Azra Rogović-Grubić (Bosnia and Herzegovina) on Monday evening. After initial reflections, participants discussed how the TEAP should take into account existing control measures and the needs of low-volume and very-low volume consuming countries in the relevant draft decision ([UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/3](#), Section II.A, paragraphs 2(a) and 2(b)).

The contact group resumed on [Wednesday](#) morning and discussed which aspects should be explicitly mentioned for the TEAP to take into account. The group agreed to refer to earlier decisions of the MOP and Executive Committee for the MLF (ExCom). However, delegates couldn't agree on whether the "special needs" and/or "circumstances" of low-volume-consuming and very-low-volume-consuming countries should be explicitly mentioned for the TEAP's consideration, or whether this is already included in relevant ExCom decisions.

On Wednesday evening, the group continued discussions, mostly reverting to language from previous decisions.

On [Thursday](#), the contact group discussed whether to include in the TEAP study an assessment of the need for digitalization in the servicing sector. Some Parties opposed it on the grounds that it was speculative and premature, preferring to focus on current and clear funding requirements. Others disagreed, stressing the value of anticipating the growth of, and need for, digital technologies and tools in the sector and for consistent and reliable information in this regard. The TEAP confirmed the importance of this issue, but cautioned against tasking them with an unmanageable undertaking and expecting cost estimates for a complex matter without sufficient information.

The contact group reconvened on Friday afternoon. Delegates struggled with a paragraph requesting the study to include scenarios for estimating funding for HFC phase down, including for those Parties that have not yet submitted their Kigali Implementation Plan (KIP). One delegation proposed the study also include scenarios for Parties that voluntarily chose to move directly to alternative non-controlled substances, but after long debate, the proposal was removed.

Delegates also returned to the question of whether to ask the TEAP to consider the costs and potential benefits of integrating digital technologies and tools within the servicing sector. Various attempts were made to limit this to "agreed funding levels and funding windows," if anything, but some delegations still opposed a reference to digital technologies. Eventually consensus was found in a simplified reference to have the TEAP "take into account" the integration of digital technologies and tools within the servicing sector.

There was also a brief discussion on referencing a "stable" level of funding. Some delegates objected, given the risk of false expectations such a reference might generate; others suggested using the word "predictable" in reference to funding. Eventually, the group agreed to retain "stable" as it appeared in the previous ToR. A delegation proposed, and the group agreed, to request that the details of calculations be included in an appendix.

With this, the contact group completed its work and forwarded the draft decision to plenary, where it was later adopted by the HLS.

Final Decision: In the final decision (UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.11), the MOP requests the TEAP to prepare a report for submission to MOP 38 and to submit it through OEWG 48, to enable MOP 38 to adopt a decision on the appropriate level of the

2027–2029 replenishment of the MLF. In preparing the report, the final decision states that the Panel should take into account, among other things:

- all control measures and decisions agreed on by the Parties to the Montreal Protocol and the ExCom, including those relevant to [Decision XXVIII/2](#), and the decisions of the MOP up to and including MOP 37, and of the ExCom up to and including its 98th meeting, insofar as those decisions will necessitate expenditure by the MLF during the period 2027–2029;
- the special needs of low-volume-consuming and very-low-volume-consuming countries, taking into account relevant decisions of the ExCom pertaining to those countries;
- the need to allocate resources to enable all Article 5 Parties to comply with Articles 2A to 2J of the Protocol, and the reductions and extended commitments made by Article 5 Parties in approved HCFC phase-out management plans and HFC KIPs;
- integrating digital technologies and tools within the servicing sector; and
- a scenario to allocate resources for a funding modality to support a limited number of pilot projects to enhance regional atmospheric monitoring of substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account [Decision XXXVI/1](#) and any other decisions of the MOP and the ExCom.

In estimating funding requirements associated with the reduction targets, the final decision states that the TEAP should use a clearly explained compliance-based methodology that is informed by, but independent of, the MLF business plan, and that applies a range of cost-effectiveness figures for the manufacturing sectors based on historical experience rather than only on the cost-effectiveness thresholds approved by the ExCom.

The TEAP should also:

- prepare scenarios for varying numbers of Article 5 Parties that have not yet submitted KIPs for HFC phase down in advance of the Montreal Protocol targets on a voluntary basis;
- consult widely, including all relevant persons and institutions and other relevant sources of information deemed useful;
- strive to complete the report in good time to enable it to be distributed to all Parties two months before OEWG 48;
- provide indicative figures for the periods 2030–2032 and 2033–2035, to support a stable and sufficient level of funding, on the understanding that those figures will be updated in subsequent replenishment studies; and
- share the details of calculations in the form of an appendix as part of the report to enable Parties to fully understand the Panel's analysis.

Emissions of HFC-23

Co-Chair Gabriel introduced the item on [Monday](#). She noted that the TEAP and the SAP had actioned the request in [Decision XXXVI/3](#) to update their [Decision XXXV/7](#) reports on HFC-23 emissions to reflect any additional or new information (see the September 2025 [Report of the TEAP](#) and [Report of the SAP](#)).

The SAP and TEAP gave [presentations](#) on their updated 2025 reports, highlighting that the fundamental conclusions remain unchanged: a substantial shortfall remains in their understanding of global HFC-23 emissions, despite the new information available. They also noted that the gap between reported and estimated emissions and those inferred from atmospheric abundances is between 9.6 and 13.3 kilotonnes (kt).

In response to questions, the TEAP, among other things, clarified that no new industries or HFC-23 sources were identified that could account for the wide divergence observed from 2015 emissions. The TEAP noted that, coincidentally, the market for credits for HFC-23 destruction under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) ended in 2015 but stressed that any links would be speculative.

On [Tuesday](#), CANADA introduced UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.5, co-sponsored by the EU, Norway, and Switzerland. NORWAY and the EU noted that Parties remain far from understanding the underlying causes of the emissions discrepancies, which is of great concern. Delegates agreed to establish a contact group, co-chaired by Heidi Stockhaus (Germany) and Leslie Smith (Grenada).

The contact group first met [Wednesday](#). The sponsors explained that the CRP would request the TEAP and SAP to update their reports on HFC-23 to reflect any additional or new information, to better understand the methodologies used by Parties, and to ask Parties that have not yet done so to submit relevant information.

Some delegates questioned the purpose of continuing to request updated reports and repeating the same actions. In contrast, others stressed the significance of the global gap, emphasizing that the huge discrepancy between the TEAP's bottom-up and the SAP's top-down results goes beyond the uncertainties acknowledged by both Panels.

On [Thursday](#), the contact group discussed methodologies, estimates of discrepancies, and data insufficiencies. The TEAP and SAP reiterated that their methodologies are sound and that further information on potential HFC-23 emissions from plants or processes would be very helpful.

An intense discussion was triggered by one delegation's proposal to request the SAP and the TEAP, when updating their Decision XXXVI/3 reports on HFC-23, to provide "more detailed information regarding the discrepancy between reported and atmospherically derived emissions in Eastern China that began around 2015." Delegates strongly disagreed on whether it was appropriate to mention a specific region in the draft decision. The group also disagreed to what extent it was possible and helpful for the TEAP to further describe the HFC-23-related methodologies used under the CDM before it was "discontinued" in 2015.

On Friday, the contact group continued discussing whether specific regions with large discrepancies should be targeted, but in the end this language was removed. One delegation tried to insert language urging the ExCom to provide adequate funding for Article 5 Parties to reduce emissions of HFC-23, but this was deleted after much discussion.

The contact group forwarded the decision to the plenary, which forwarded it to the HLS.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP requests the TEAP and the SAP to provide an update on emissions of HFC-23 to MOP 38, taking into account the information submitted by Parties in response to Decision XXXVI/3 and pursuant to paragraph 2 of this decision and including the following:

- additional analysis of the discrepancy between reported emissions and those derived from atmospheric measurements, including the methodologies applied;
- a description of the information and data sources used, identifying any gaps or limitations; and

- additional information on methodologies adopted by Parties for estimating and reporting HFC-23 emissions, as well as best practices for improvements to minimize such emissions.

The MOP also invites Parties that have HCFC-22 production facilities and did not submit information pursuant to Decision XXXVI/3 to submit to the Ozone Secretariat by 28 February 2026, on a voluntary basis, their current methodologies for estimating and reporting HFC-23 emissions from HCFC-22 production.

The MOP further invites relevant Parties:

- to report 2025 data on the amounts of HFC-23 generated, captured, destroyed, and stored; and
- to examine, as appropriate, their HFC-23 emissions and sources, and encourage scientific research institutions in their countries to undertake or collaborate internationally on research on their HFC-23 emissions and sources, and report to the Ozone Secretariat new relevant information, if any.

Enhancing Regional Atmospheric Monitoring of Controlled Substances

On [Monday](#), the Secretariat and the Advisory Committee of the General Trust Fund for Financing Activities on Research and Systematic Observations Relevant to the Vienna Convention presented their progress [report](#) on enhancing regional atmospheric monitoring of substances controlled by the Montreal Protocol. The [presentation](#) focused on evaluating the suitability of potential sites for monitoring regional emissions of controlled substances, updates to cost elements, and options for long-term financing.

On [Tuesday](#), the EU introduced UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.3, consisting of a draft decision to continue the evaluation of potential monitoring stations by identifying infrastructure and existing stations in and around the 10 locations identified by the Advisory Committee. Delegates agreed to establish a contact group, co-chaired by Alain Wilmart (Belgium) and Sophia Anselm-Larocque (Dominica).

The contact group met Tuesday evening and exchanged views on monitoring sites' selection and the time needed for a first assessment of the identified sites. Moving to CRP-based discussions, delegates mainly worked on clarifying the meaning of monitoring regions and locations.

On [Thursday](#), the contact group discussed the need for funding to advance work and what this work might entail. The Co-Chairs encouraged delegates to engage in informal consultations.

The group met twice on Friday. In the first session, discussion centered mainly on references to the involvement of "interested Parties," with delegates unable to agree on a formulation.

The group reconvened in the evening after informal consultations held earlier had resulted in revised text. The revised text included a request to the Ozone Secretariat to carry out the activities with a 2026 budget line item of USD 100,000 from the cash balance of the Trust Fund for the Protocol, on an exceptional basis. Differences emerged on a reference to the use of the budget line "until such time as funding from other sources becomes available," given the expectation of funding from the EU for this purpose. Unable to agree on this language, delegates decided to remove the reference.

Running out of negotiation time on Friday night after 6:00 pm, the group ended up agreeing to remove the entire preambular section of the draft decision and, with this, completed its work.

Final Decision: In the final decision (UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.3/Rev.1), the MOP requests the Secretariat:

- in consultation with the Advisory Committee, to continue the evaluation of the suitability of potential sites for monitoring emissions of controlled substances situated within the regions and locations identified in the information provided by the Advisory Committee to MOP 37, and with the voluntary participation of, and in consultation with, the concerned Parties;
- to prepare, in consultation with the concerned Parties that have expressed interest, for possible next steps towards establishing monitoring activities at those sites, taking into account the prioritization presented by the Advisory Committee at MOP 37 and the phased approach presented in document [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/2/Add.1](#);
- to carry out these activities with a 2026 budget line item of USD 100,000 from the cash balance of the Trust Fund for the Montreal Protocol, on an exceptional basis; and
- to report to OEWG 48 and MOP 38 on progress and any outcomes of those activities, for consideration by the Parties.

The MOP also requests the ExCom to take into consideration the information, including on the phased approach and the estimated costs, related to establishing and operating atmospheric monitoring stations as outlined in the above-mentioned documents when developing guidelines and considering a funding window to support pilot projects. It requests the ExCom to provide an update to the Parties on the progress undertaken ahead of MOP 38.

Development of Studies and Strategies to Find Medium- and Long-term Solutions to the Significant Accumulation of Inventories of Refrigerant Gases Nearing the End of Their Life Cycles in Article 5 Parties

Co-Chair Wellington introduced this item on [Tuesday](#), and delegates agreed to establish a contact group co-chaired by Morane Godfrin (France) and Sergio Merino (Mexico).

In the contact group on Tuesday, the proponents of Draft Decision B in [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/3](#), reminded delegates that the purpose of the decision would be to give the TEAP a mandate to conduct a study on the accumulation of inventories of refrigerant gases nearing the end of their life cycles, particularly in cases where there is no alternative but to destroy them.

On the proposal to request the TEAP to estimate global quantities, delegates extensively discussed whether to refer to “used” and/or “unwanted” refrigerants containing controlled substances. Some delegates raised concerns about the meaning of “unwanted,” with others providing examples of previous decisions using the term.

One delegate stressed the lack of global information, noting that reporting inventories only applies to Article 5 Parties. TEAP noted that modeling can be conducted to estimate global quantities, conceding that the result will have uncertainties.

The contact group resumed discussions on [Wednesday](#). Delegates first addressed managing uncertainties in the data reported by Parties. The group then agreed that the TEAP estimate should extend to “used and unwanted” refrigerants and the TEAP should come up with “estimates” of the potential benefits in terms of avoided ozone-depleting-potential tonnes and carbon-dioxide-equivalent tonnes associated with the reclamation and destruction of used and unwanted refrigerants.

On [Thursday](#), the contact group reached agreement on what information Parties should submit to the Secretariat and the nature of the report. They forwarded the draft to the plenary.

Final Decision: In the final decision, “Study on quantities of and options for used and unwanted controlled substances under the Montreal Protocol, including those at their end of life” (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP requests the TEAP to prepare, for consideration by MOP 39, a comprehensive report that includes:

- an estimate of the quantity at the global level of used and unwanted refrigerants containing controlled substances, taking into account the national inventories developed pursuant to ExCom [Decision 91/66](#) and other sources of information, and taking into account the uncertainties in obtaining the information relating to used and unwanted refrigerants, as well as end-of-life equipment;
- identification of existing destruction and reclamation facilities that can accept used refrigerants from other countries, and the conditions associated with exporting used refrigerants for disposal at such facilities, taking into account any legislative barriers to transboundary movements; and
- estimates of the potential benefits in terms of avoided ozone-depleting-potential tonnes and carbon-dioxide-equivalent tonnes associated with the reclamation and destruction of used and unwanted refrigerants.

The MOP requests the ExCom to conduct a review of any national inventories and plans prepared pursuant to Decision 91/66 submitted before 1 September 2026. It requests the ExCom to provide the review to the Ozone Secretariat by 15 January 2027, for subsequent transmission to the TEAP. This will assist the TEAP in preparing its comprehensive study.

The MOP invites Parties to submit, on a voluntary basis, information on existing reclamation and destruction facilities in their respective countries and, where available, the respective capacity of those facilities. This information should be submitted to the Ozone Secretariat by 31 May 2026. The decision also requests the Secretariat to make this information available to Parties.

Feedstock Uses of Controlled Substances

Co-Chair Wellington introduced this item (Draft Decision C in [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/3](#)) on [Tuesday](#) and delegates established a contact group, co-chaired by Liana Ghahramanyan (Armenia) and Morgan Simpson (UK).

In the contact group meeting on Tuesday, some delegations objected to the burden of providing additional information and emissions data. One delegate also questioned the purpose of the proposal, given the Protocol exempts from the definition of “production” of controlled substances those that are entirely used as feedstocks in the manufacture of other chemicals. The proponents emphasized the voluntary nature of the information to be provided by countries and recalled recent findings that emissions appear to be significantly higher than previously assumed.

On [Wednesday](#), several delegates in the contact group expressed concerns, including on: requesting Parties to provide data on emissions that are under the scope of the UNFCCC; assuming that increased emissions are caused by feedstock production and use; and the rationale to request information on the production of halon 1301 as a feedstock.

Other delegates stressed the need to increase the availability of data, pointing to TEAP’s last report findings on the emissions from feedstock being higher than originally thought. They also highlighted the need for a better understanding and scope of the definitions on production and consumption.

On [Thursday](#), after a lengthy discussion, the contact group provisionally agreed to alternate language on the request to the TEAP “to provide an update on emissions of controlled substances produced or used as feedstock, taking into account the information submitted by Parties in response to [Decision XXXVI/5](#), in its next 2027 report.”

The group also agreed to delete paragraphs inviting Parties to provide any available data on emissions from the different processes involved in the production or use of feedstock.

The group could not agree on whether to include a request for the TEAP to provide scenarios of the impact that feedstock emissions might have on the future evolution of the ozone layer. They also could not agree on text inviting Parties to submit information, including any emissions data, on the production of halon 1301 as feedstock.

On Friday, the group engaged in a lengthy discussion on the added value of the draft decision, with some Parties highlighting that SAP and TEAP are already undertaking the proposed tasks and questioning the merit of such a decision. Others pointed out that the Assessment Panels had indicated that they would welcome additional guidance.

The group remained divided despite the efforts from the proponents to provide alternative text addressing concerns, including by a more general wording referring to “the production and use of controlled substances as feedstock, where the TEAP has calculated exceptionally high emissions factors in its 2025 progress report.” Such general language would be used instead of singling out the “production of halon 1301 as a feedstock and its use to manufacture fipronil.” However, delegates were not able to agree on either option.

Co-Chair Ghahramanyan closed the group, noting that they were unable to find a compromise, and informed the closing plenary of the Preparatory Segment of the situation.

Halon 1301 and Its Continuing Use in the Aviation Industry; Management of Other Controlled Substances Used for Fire Suppression

Co-Chair Wellington introduced this agenda item on [Tuesday](#), and delegates agreed to establish a contact group, co-chaired by Jana Mašíčková (Czechia) and Juan José Galeano (Argentina).

On [Wednesday](#), the contact group addressed draft decision D in [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/3](#), which had been negotiated at OEWG 47. Delegates agreed to update the preamble to reflect the outcome of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Assembly in September 2025 (resolution A42-11), which calls on the ICAO Council to develop a proposal for a revised cut-off date for halon 1301 replacements in new aircraft.

After a lengthy discussion, delegates reached agreement on the remaining contentious paragraphs, which addressed the import and export of recovered, recycled, or reclaimed halons and other controlled substances used for fire suppression, as well as information on the development of acceptable and certifiable replacements for fire suppression. The agreed draft was forwarded for adoption.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2](#)), the MOP requests that:

- the Ozone Secretariat liaise with the ICAO Secretariat on the matter of fire suppression agents controlled under the Montreal Protocol, and facilitate the exchange of information between the

TEAP (through its Fire Suppression TOC) and the relevant ICAO technical committees and working groups:

- the TEAP, based on the above, better assess the future use of and need for halons in civil aviation;
- the TEAP submit a report on halon availability and the global distribution of halon banks to the Parties in advance of OEWG-48.

The MOP also:

- encourages Parties to liaise, through their national ozone officers, with their national civil aviation authorities to gain an understanding of how halons and their alternatives are being used and supplied to air carriers to meet ongoing civil aviation needs;
- encourages Parties to reassess any national import and export restrictions, other than licensing or quota requirements, with a view to facilitating the import and export of recovered, recycled, or reclaimed halons and other controlled substances used for fire suppression, with the aim of facilitating the meeting of remaining needs of the Parties, taking into account the requirements of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, where applicable; and
- invites Parties to submit, on a voluntary basis, to the Ozone Secretariat, by 31 March 2026, available information regarding the development of alternatives suitable for use as substitutes in fire suppression, and to request the Secretariat to forward the information received to the TEAP for its consideration and for inclusion, at the latest, in its 2027 progress report.

National and Regional Initiatives to Support the Implementation of the Kigali Amendment

Co-Chair Gabriel introduced this item on [Tuesday](#), and delegates agreed to establish a contact group co-chaired by Mariska Wouters (New Zealand) and Camilla Noel (Vanuatu).

In the contact group, the Co-Chairs conducted an initial exchange of views on the CRP submitted by Rwanda and supported by the African Group (Draft Decision E in [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/3](#)). Some delegates asked the proponents to clarify the expected outcomes and their importance. Some Parties expressed skepticism about a proposed workshop, especially in a limited funding scenario. One delegate opined that the Secretariat should not be requested to provide a synthesis of national reports on activities and lessons learned in relation to centers of excellence for sustainable cooling and testing centers for energy efficiency. Another proposed considering a declaration marking the 10th anniversary of the Kigali Amendment.

On [Wednesday](#), the proponents updated their proposal to: invite Parties to submit information related to the implementation of the Kigali Amendment; and request the Secretariat to produce a background information paper based on the submissions received and use it to decide whether to organize the previously-proposed workshop.

Delegates made several suggestions in an attempt to reach agreement on the draft decision. However, despite their efforts, they could not reach agreement. Co-Chair Noel invited the proponents and interested Parties to conduct informal discussions.

On Friday, the proponents presented updated text following informal consultations, including elimination of the call for a workshop. After making some minor language adjustments and ensuring consistency with the language used by the ExCom, the group reached consensus. They forwarded the draft decision for adoption.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP:

- invites Parties to submit to the Ozone Secretariat, by 1 June 2026, information, including policies, activities, and key lessons learned, in relation to centers of excellence for sustainable cooling and testing centers for energy efficiency as related to the implementation of the Kigali Amendment; and
- requests the Ozone Secretariat to collate and summarize the information provided and make it available by MOP 38.

TEAP Organizational Issues

Options for the organization of the TEAP and its TOCs: Co-Chair Gabriel introduced this item on [Tuesday](#) morning. The US proposed to continue discussions in an informal group, which was agreed.

Informal discussions were held on [Wednesday](#), co-facilitated by Cindy Cunil (Belize) and Matěj Mrlina (Czechia), and consisted mainly of a question-and-answer exchange with the TEAP. The TEAP explained that it meets at least once per month online and three times per year in person, including in conjunction with the OEWG and MOP meetings, and that the four TOC Co-Chairs meet online as often as once a week. They noted that all this work is strictly voluntary, and it is a challenge for experts to remain committed long-term, particularly those from non-Article 5 Parties. Delegates and the TEAP agreed on the need to allow the TEAP to continue its work and to further discuss this issue in light of the forthcoming TEAP progress report.

On Friday, Co-Facilitator Cunil reported to the Preparatory Segment plenary on the TEAP's commitment and Parties' agreement to continue consideration of this at OEWG 48.

Changes in the membership of the TEAP: On [Tuesday](#), Co-Chair Wellington informed delegates that four nominations had been received to date and asked Parties for additional nominations as soon as possible. Delegates agreed to address the nominations and prepare a CRP in an informal group.

On Friday, Co-Chair Wellington noted agreement on the CRP during plenary.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP:

- endorses the appointment of Marta Pizano (Colombia) as Co-Chair of the Methyl Bromide TOC for an additional term of four years;
- endorses the appointment of Ian Porter (Australia) as Co-Chair of the Methyl Bromide TOC for an additional term of two years;
- endorses the appointment of Helen Tope (Australia) as Co-Chair of the Medical and Chemicals TOC for an additional term of four years; and
- endorses the appointment of Helen A. Walter-Terrinoni (US) as Co-Chair of the Flexible and Rigid Foams TOC for an additional term of four years.

Further Strengthening Montreal Protocol Institutions

On [Tuesday](#), Co-Chair Wellington informed delegates that a note was available on the informal meeting on facilitating implementation of the Montreal Protocol held on the Sunday before MOP 37 ([UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/7](#)). The EU introduced a CRP during the afternoon plenary ([UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.4](#)) and suggested continuing discussions in a contact group. Delegates agreed, instead, to establish an informal group co-facilitated by Sandrine Benard (Norway) and George Chaumba (Zimbabwe).

In informal discussions on [Wednesday](#), Parties grappled with the roles of licensing, reporting, and combating illegal trade, and their interlinkages in strengthening the Protocol. Several delegates reiterated their concern with increasing reporting burdens and linking licensing systems to compliance. Many favored a more supportive, integrated, and advisory approach, cognizant of differing national circumstances.

The informal group briefly met on Friday and agreed to defer this item for further discussions at OEWG 48.

Compliance and Data Reporting Issues

On [Tuesday](#), Co-Chair Gabriel introduced this item and UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.1. Martijn Hildebrand (Netherlands), ImpCom President, reported on the ImpCom's work on Parties' compliance issues during its 74th and 75th meetings. He presented nine draft decisions for MOP 37 consideration.

Delegates agreed to forward the updated draft decisions to the HLS, where they were adopted.

Final Decisions: The nine ImpCom decisions are contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2.

In the first decision, which addresses **compliance** regarding data and information provided by Parties, the MOP:

- notes that 194 Parties of the 198 Parties that were required to report data for 2024 had done so by 31 October 2025;
- notes with concern that four Parties, namely Armenia, Comoros, Iceland, and São Tomé and Príncipe, had not reported their data for 2024 by 31 October 2025, and that this places them in non-compliance with their data reporting obligations; and
- urges the Parties listed above to report the required data to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

In the second decision, on **Libya**, the MOP decides that no further action is necessary in view of the Party's return to compliance with HCFC control measures and the other commitments contained in its plan of action to ensure its return to compliance.

In the third decision, on the **Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)**, which relates to repeatedly exceeding committed limits for both the production and consumption of HCFCs, the MOP decides:

- to suspend the rights and privileges relating to trade in HCFCs between the DPRK and other Parties to the Protocol, so no such trade will be permissible under the Protocol; and
- that the trade suspension will continue until the DPRK returns to compliance with control measures in relation to HCFCs or until otherwise decided by the MOP.

In the fourth decision, on non-compliance by **Mali**, the MOP invites Mali to submit to the ImpCom either a request to revise its HFC data for baseline years or a plan of action with time-specific benchmarks to ensure the Party's prompt return to compliance with its HFC obligations under the Protocol.

In the fifth decision, on non-compliance by **Saint Vincent and the Grenadines**, the MOP:

- notes the submission of an explanation for its non-compliance and a plan of action to ensure its return to compliance with the HFC consumption control measures by 2035;
- notes that the submitted plan of action includes a prolonged timeline for the Party to return to compliance;
- requests the Party to submit a revised plan of action after its KIP has been approved by ExCom;

- urges the Party to work with relevant implementing agencies to develop its plan of action to phase down consumption and production of HFCs; and
- cautions the Party that if it fails to return to compliance, the MOP will consider further measures.

In the sixth decision, on non-compliance by **Tajikistan**, the MOP:

- requests the Party to submit to the Ozone Secretariat, no later than 31 March 2026, for consideration by the ImpCom, a plan of action with time-specific benchmarks to ensure the Party's prompt return to compliance with its HFC obligations under the Protocol, as well as specific policies that it will adopt in support of its implementation efforts; and
- cautions the Party that if it fails to return to compliance, the MOP will consider further measures.

In the seventh decision, on non-compliance by **Zambia**, the MOP:

- urges the Party to provide an explanation for the deviation as a matter of urgency, no later than 31 March 2026, and, if appropriate, to submit by that date a plan of action with time-specific benchmarks to ensure the Party's prompt return to compliance with its HFC obligations, as well as specific policies that it will adopt in support of its implementation efforts, for consideration by the ImpCom; and
- cautions the Party that if it fails to return to compliance, the MOP will consider further measures.

In the eighth decision, which addresses the **status of the establishment of licensing systems** under Article 4B, paragraph 2 *bis* under the Montreal Protocol, the MOP:

- urges Djibouti and San Marino to provide information to the Ozone Secretariat on the establishment and operation of their licensing systems no later than 31 March 2026;
- invites San Marino to send a representative to the seventy-sixth meeting of the ImpCom unless the Party reports, prior to the meeting, on the establishment and operation of its licensing system; and
- urges all Parties to the Montreal Protocol that ratify, accept, or approve the Kigali Amendment to establish and implement their import and export licensing systems for controlled substances within three months of the date of entry into force of the Amendment for each Party.

In the ninth decision, the MOP approves the requests for the revision of baseline data by **Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Guinea, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Morocco, Nauru, Nigeria, Niue, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu**.

Status of Ratification of the Kigali Amendment

Co-Chair Gabriel introduced this item on [Tuesday](#), noting that 169 Parties had ratified the Kigali Amendment as of 31 October 2025, which is 29 Parties short of universal ratification. She called for those countries who had not yet done so to ratify as soon as possible. The draft decision was forwarded to the HLS.

On Friday, during the HLS, Parties adopted the decision.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP:

- notes that, as of 7 November 2025, 169 Parties had ratified, approved, or accepted the Kigali Amendment; and
- urges all Parties that have not yet done so to ratify, approve, or accept the Kigali Amendment to ensure broad participation and achieve the goals of the Amendment.

Other Matters

Ensuring the viability of Montreal Protocol operations:

On [Tuesday](#), the US introduced UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/CRP.6, co-sponsored by Norway, on ensuring the viability of Montreal Protocol operations by assessing “options for making effective and efficient changes” to the timing and length of the MOPs and other meetings, as well as Secretariat support for such meetings. They emphasized the proposal's timeliness and intent to initiate a strategic conversation of the future without prejudging the outcome.

A contact group, co-chaired by Alessandro Giuliano Peru (Italy) and Carmen Rivero (Argentina), was set up with a mandate to discuss all queries and concerns before tackling the proposed text.

In the contact group on [Wednesday](#), the proponents explained their intention to present options for discussion, rather than a recommendation, addressing the timing and duration of meetings and Secretariat support. They noted that even though the Protocol has worked successfully for many years, it is useful to assess if the processes are still fit for purpose.

Some delegates argued that the Protocol's success shows that nothing needs to be changed. Many stressed it is important not to prejudge the process or the outcome. Some cautioned against limits to developing countries' participation. Others brought up the challenges of online meetings.

The contact group reconvened on [Thursday](#). In response to the previous day's discussions, the proponents proposed adding that the Secretariat's report would be non-prejudicial and would note both the potential benefits and drawbacks of options for ensuring the viability of Montreal Protocol operations.

When one delegate suggested that the Secretariat also report options for the format of meetings, including virtual meetings, many argued that virtual meetings were not appropriate for decision-making. While the proponents argued that some of the meetings of the Assessment Panels and TOCs could be virtual, the reference to meeting format was removed. After some amendments, delegates agreed to the text and forwarded it for adoption.

Final Decision: In the final decision (contained in UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.2), the MOP:

- requests the Secretariat to prepare a report, for consideration by OEWG 48, on the options for making effective and efficient changes, with associated cost estimates, to the timing of, Secretariat support for, and length of the MOP and OEWG meetings, the ImpCom, the assessment panels, and the timing of replenishment decisions; and
- notes that the report should be non-prejudicial with respect to the Parties' future consideration of the options presented therein, and should include both the potential benefits and drawbacks of options.

High-level Segment Report

MOP 36 Vice-President Ndiaye Cheikh Sylla (Senegal), on behalf of MOP 36 President Kerryne James (Grenada), opened the HLS on [Thursday](#) morning. Parties were treated to a performance by Ghetto Classics, a Kenyan non-profit youth programme based in informal settlements that gives free music education to underprivileged children.

Sheila Aggarwal-Khan, Director of Industry and Economy Division, UNEP, welcomed delegates and introduced a video message from UNEP Executive Director Inger Andersen. Stating that this protocol “has always found its way to consensus when

it mattered most.” Andersen acknowledged the present-day more “turbulent times” and differing positions, but expressed confidence that Parties will find a way, as they always have, guided by science.

Deborah Mlongo Barasa, Cabinet Secretary for Environment, Climate Change, and Forestry, Kenya, highlighted her country’s efforts under the Protocol.

MOP 36 Vice-President Sylla drew attention to achievements in advancing atmospheric monitoring in 2025 and looked forward to next steps to tackling regional monitoring gaps. He noted important work ahead on HFC-23, feedstock emissions, strengthening the Protocol, and the 2027–2029 MLF replenishment, and expressed great pride in serving a process “that has time and time again demonstrated what dedication and mutual understanding can deliver for the planet.”

Newly elected MOP 37 President Paul Krajnik (Austria) expressed appreciation for the honor of having been elected once again as MOP President, after having served as MOP 32 President.

Organizational Matters

Election of MOP 37 officers: By acclamation, delegates elected: President: Paul Krajnik (Austria); Vice-Presidents: Meringo Obed Baloyi (South Africa) and Chen Haijun (China); and Rapporteur: Cristina Vaca (Panama). No Vice-President was nominated from the Eastern European States (EES).

Adoption of the HLS agenda, organization of work, credentials of representatives, and other matters: Delegates adopted the agenda and organization of work ([UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/1](#), section II, and [UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/2](#), paras. 99-101). Delegates were reminded of the process for submitting, reviewing, and accepting credentials.

Final Outcome: On Friday the MOP approved the credentials of the representatives of the 97 Parties whose credentials have been found to be in good order and provisionally approved the participation of 57 Parties on the understanding that they would forward their credentials to the Secretariat as soon as possible.

Presentations by the Assessment Panels

On [Thursday](#), the SAP [presented](#) preliminary updates on the 2026 Scientific Assessment of Ozone Depletion by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP. The Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP) [presented](#) a summary of its contribution to the 2026 Quadrennial Assessment. The TEAP [presented](#) an update on its forthcoming reports, including by its five TOCs, and on the 2026 Quadrennial Assessment.

Presentation by the ExCom for the Multilateral Fund

On [Thursday](#), Chair Alessandro Guiliano Peru (Italy) [presented](#) on the 2024 accomplishments of the MLF aimed at implementing the Kigali Amendment to phase down HFCs in Article 5 Parties, and an operational framework for energy efficiency ([UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/8](#)).

Statements by Heads of Delegation

The HLS included statements from two Ministers, one State Secretary, and several Ambassadors, High Commissioners, and other dignitaries. Speakers expressed their unwavering commitment to the Protocol, with some stressing its preeminence as the most effective environmental treaty in history.

On [Thursday](#) afternoon, many outlined their actions to implement both the Protocol and the Kigali Amendment and reaffirmed their commitment to multilateral environmental cooperation. They highlighted the undeniable linkages between ODS and climate

change mitigation, and emphasized various regulatory and other measures to phase down and phase out ODS, as well as the relevance of acting collectively to address the matter.

On Friday, MOZAMBIQUE, PERU, ECUADOR, UGANDA, and others urged continuation of the MLF’s invaluable support and an adequate 2027–2029 replenishment, with MOZAMBIQUE calling for a detailed study of the financing of current projects.

MAURITIUS emphasized the need for enhanced capacity-building, and technological and financial support, especially for least developed countries and small island developing states. BURUNDI highlighted national training and awareness sessions for technicians, customs officers, importers, traders, and media, as well as professors and students.

UGANDA pointed to a lack of reclamation centers to deal with ODS, and expressed appreciation to the Ozone Secretariat, UNEP’s OzonAction, Germany, the UK, and others for their support.

BANGLADESH noted challenges, including on technician training, and expressed its pride in hosting the Bhola Island monitoring station.

AZERBAIJAN announced its approval of the Kigali Amendment on 14 October 2025, and accession to the Rotterdam Convention. YEMEN assured Parties of its willingness to ratify the Kigali Amendment, but noted an inability to do so currently, referring to a coup d’état. IRAQ emphasized regional cooperation and expressed willingness to serve as a regional hub for capacity-building and knowledge transfer, welcoming partnerships.

The INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF REFRIGERATION assured Parties of its willingness to support capacity-building and training efforts, and urged cross-sectoral government coordination, the establishment of inter-institutional platforms, and integrated strategies.

The CHILDREN AND YOUTH MAJOR GROUP underscored the need for youth-centric capacity-building and green skills pilot projects and jobs. They called for: institutionalizing a formal youth fellowship programme within the Assessment Panels; curricula co-designed with youth; and dedicated resources through the MLF for youth awareness campaigns.

Dates and Venues for the Next Meetings

On Friday evening, President Krajnik said the dates for MOP 38 are 2-6 November 2026. RWANDA offered to host the MOP in Kigali, on the tenth anniversary of the Kigali Amendment’s adoption.

Final Decision: The final decision calls for convening MOP 38 from 2-6 November 2026 in Kigali, Rwanda.

Other Matters

Request by Kyrgyzstan and others on their exclusion from the EES regional group: On [Thursday](#) morning, KYRGYZSTAN, supported by KAZAKHSTAN and TAJIKISTAN, requested to include under Agenda Item 8 on Other Matters, a discussion about their concerns that some Parties in the EES regional group were attempting to exclude them, as well as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, from the regional group. The issue was included on the agenda.

On Friday morning, KYRGYZSTAN explained that, after over 30 years of constructive participation in the EES regional group, some countries within the group had “unexpectedly” put forward an initiative to exclude five Central Asian countries (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), also preventing them from submitting nominations for Montreal Protocol

bodies. They called for the Parties' assistance in preventing the politicization of this "strictly procedural issue," and suggested renaming the group as the "Eastern European, Caucasus, and Central Asian countries." Pointing to the lack of an EES group's nominee for the ExCom, they underscored their openness to candidates from any Party within the group.

KAZAKHSTAN said that the proposed exclusion lacks a legal basis and is contrary to the Montreal Protocol's practices, noting that in 2014, Kazakhstan was elected as rapporteur, nominated by the EES regional group.

AZERBAIJAN stressed that the principles and criteria on the definition of UN regional groups require review, which would benefit from additional information. KAZAKHSTAN proposed requesting the preparation of a comprehensive report on resolutions, practices, and relevant information regarding the historic UN allocation of countries to regional groups. TAJIKISTAN added that any proposed changes to the regional groups should be discussed in a transparent manner, based on consensus, and in conformity with international laws and customary practices.

CHINA expressed support for Kyrgyzstan and the other Parties, called for following the established practices, and opposed any attempts to exclude countries from any group to which they are affiliated. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION highlighted the right of independent States to decide in which group to participate, and supported renaming the group.

KUWAIT called on Parties to discuss the issue, taking into consideration historical and legal aspects, and, with IRAN, underscored that the Protocol's success relies on all Parties working together, cooperating, and helping each other. They called for keeping the "Montreal Protocol family" united.

The EU, SLOVAKIA, ESTONIA, POLAND, LITHUANIA, and CZECHIA stressed that the Montreal Protocol is not the right forum to discuss the composition of regional groups or their names. Some noted that the discussion falls under the purview of the UN General Assembly.

TÜRKIYE noted administrative difficulties of readjusting groups, expressing its reluctance to modify them. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA proposed that the Secretariat, in coordination with relevant bodies, provide clear guidance on possible ways forward and, cautioning against creating potential undesired precedents, noted that no final decision should be taken at this stage.

The US opined that the issue is not one for a decision under the Protocol, and that it can be reflected in the meeting report, and asked if Parties are free to decide in which group they can participate. The Secretariat clarified that the decision for admittance to a regional group has to be made by the group in question.

President Krajnik urged Parties to continue discussions intersessionally, noting that the statements will be recorded in the meeting report. He also requested the Secretariat to prepare background information on this matter for consideration by OEWG 48, if necessary.

Closing Plenaries

The Preparatory Segment convened its closing plenary on Friday afternoon and then again in the evening to approve draft decisions and forward them to the HLS for adoption. Throughout Friday evening, after the Preparatory Segment approved the drafts, the HLS convened to adopt them. The HLS also adopted the draft report of the meeting, after a paragraph-by-paragraph review (UNEP/OzL.Pro.37/L.1 and Add.1)

Consideration of the membership of Montreal Protocol bodies for 2026: After Parties submitted their nominations for membership to the ImpCom, the ExCom, and the OEWG Co-Chairs during the week, Co-Chair Wellington presented the nominees on Friday evening. For the **OEWG 48 Co-Chairs**, the nominees were: Leila Akello Gonasa (Uganda) and Annie Gabriel (Australia). They were then forwarded to the HLS and approved by acclamation.

For the **MLF ExCom**, the Article 5 Party nominations included: Cameroon and Lesotho (Africa); India and Kuwait (Asia-Pacific); and Brazil, Mexico and Cuba (Latin America and the Caribbean). Non-Article 5 Party nominations included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, France, Japan, and the US. Mathatela Ntsatsi (Lesotho) was nominated as Chair and Paul Taylor (Australia) as Vice-Chair. KAZAKHSTAN nominated itself and sought Parties' support. In the absence of opposition, Co-Chair Wellington recommended forwarding the nominations to the HLS, including Kazakhstan's, where they were approved by acclamation.

For the **ImpCom**, for a two-year term, the nominees included: Kenya (Africa), Lebanon (Asia-Pacific), Ecuador (Latin America and Caribbean), and Norway (Western European and Others Group). Benin, the Dominican Republic, Montenegro, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia will continue as members for 2026. Linda Kosgei (Kenya) was nominated to serve as President. No nomination was received from the EES region.

CZECHIA self-nominated for the open seat for non-Article 5 Parties for the EES region. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION opposed this, pointing out that the MOP should only elect Parties formally nominated by the respective regional groups.

Co-Chair Wellington noted it was an unprecedented situation in which a Party puts forward a self-nomination in the absence of consensus in its regional group. She suggested forwarding the draft decision with the four nominations from regional groups to the HLS.

In response, CZECHIA noted the right of a Party to bring forward its nomination, even without consensus within its regional group, and requested that its nomination be represented in the decision. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION drew attention to the fact that the EES group didn't even manage to consider the nominations and, supported by KYRGYZSTAN, noted the lack of consensus of the Plenary and opposed sending it to the HLS.

SLOVAKIA opined that self-nomination in the absence of regional group consensus is legitimate and appropriate. Some Parties referred to the precedent of Kazakhstan's unopposed self-nomination just moments before.

Co-Chair Wellington suspended the meeting for 90 minutes.

The Preparatory Segment resumed at 10:18 pm. CZECHIA, supported by POLAND, ROMANIA, GERMANY, FRANCE, LITHUANIA, FINLAND, SLOVAKIA, ITALY, BELGIUM, the NETHERLANDS, IRELAND, ESTONIA, SWEDEN, PORTUGAL, NORWAY, BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, NORTH MACEDONIA, SWITZERLAND, LIECHTENSTEIN, CANADA, the UK, MONTENEGRO, the US, and GEORGIA, maintained that it should be included in the list of nominations for the ImpCom.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supported by KYRGYZSTAN, opposed this, arguing CZECHIA did not genuinely represent the region and that its inclusion was a violation of procedure. KAZAKHSTAN thanked all Parties for their support of its self-nomination for the ExCom and called for a spirit of compromise to prevail.

Several attempts by the Co-Chairs to find agreement were opposed by the RUSSIAN FEDERATION. Recalling the Co-Chairs'

attempt to come up with “the most equitable solution,” Co-Chair Wellington proposed a draft decision to have the Secretariat organize an extraordinary MOP during OEWG 48 to enable Parties to take a decision on the outstanding members of the ImpCom, prior to the Committee’s 76th meeting.

CZECHIA agreed to the Co-Chair’s proposal. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION agreed only as long as CZECHIA was removed from the Co-Chairs’ draft decision. CHINA, supported by the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, suggested preparing two draft decisions: one with nominations that have been confirmed, and another for the extraordinary meeting for the vacant seat. CZECHIA and the EU preferred bracketing the entire text and forwarding it as one single draft decision.

In a final attempt at compromise, Co-Chair Wellington proposed a decision including the paragraph requesting the organization of an “extraordinary MOP during OEWG 48, to enable Parties to take a decision on the outstanding membership of the ImpCom 2025, prior to the 76th meeting of the ImpCom,” with the proposed provisional agenda annexed.

CZECHIA and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION accepted the proposal, and the decision was forwarded to the HLS. Co-Chair Wellington thanked all Parties for their cooperation and flexibility, and closed the Preparatory Segment at 12:03 am on Saturday morning.

MOP 37 President Krajnik then resumed the HLS, and the decision was adopted.

Final Decision: The final decision authorizes the Secretariat to organize an extraordinary MOP during OEWG 48 to enable Parties to take a decision on the outstanding membership of the ImpCom for 2026, prior to the 76th meeting of the ImpCom.

Closing of the MOP: MOP 37 President Krajnik thanked the Co-Chairs for their outstanding work during “this particular, very difficult evening session.” He noted that the MOP took important decisions for the future that could be useful for the Convention’s future development. Stressing that the “Montreal Protocol was always known for its spirit of compromise,” he invited Parties to continue working in that manner in future meetings.

He gavelled MOP 37 to a close at 12:07 am on Saturday, 8 November 2025.

A Brief Analysis of MOP 37

“This community has always met challenges with collaboration and resolve,” applauded UN Environment Programme (UNEP) Executive Director Inger Andersen, in her welcoming address to the thirty-seventh Meeting of the Parties (MOP 37) to the Montreal Protocol. Later, MOP 37 President Paul Krajnik (Austria), reinforced this sentiment, stating that the “Montreal Protocol was always known for its spirit of compromise.”

Time and again, the Montreal Protocol has been lauded for being the most effective environmental treaty in history. Established to protect the ozone layer by phasing out the production and consumption of ozone-depleting substances, the Protocol has sheltered humanity from most of the dire consequences of ozone layer depletion and increased ultraviolet radiation. Increased skin cancers, eye cataracts, and immune deficiency disorders, as well as impacts on agri- and aquacultural production and ecosystems, have all been mitigated. What’s more, the Protocol’s original measures are estimated to avert up to 1°C of global warming by 2050, with the subsequent Kigali Amendment projected to avoid another 0.3–0.5°C warming by 2100.

So, is the work done? What’s next? Is the Montreal Protocol still fit for purpose? These were some of the questions delegates focused on at MOP 37. This brief analysis examines the key issues delegates faced. It considers how Parties are: engaging with the Protocol’s science-based Assessment Panels to resolve challenges of unexplained and unexpected emissions; strengthening and funding international and national processes for implementing the Protocol; addressing cases of non-compliance when production and consumption limits for controlled substances are disregarded; and preparing for emerging challenges.

Benefiting from the Most Effective Science-Policy Interface

It can hardly be overstated what an important role the Protocol’s Assessment Panels—the Environmental Effects Assessment Panel (EEAP), the Scientific Assessment Panel (SAP), and the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP)—play in implementing the Protocol. The Panels research and report on all aspects relating to chemicals controlled by the Protocol including, just to name a few, the state of the ozone layer, impacts on human health and ecosystems, technical progress in the transition to alternative substances, and the status and management of controlled substances. The Panels not only produce countless reports that provide the scientific basis for the Protocol’s decisions, but are also actively engaged at Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) meetings and the MOPs, giving presentations and responding to questions in both plenary and contact group settings. At MOP 37, contact group meetings often started with a question-and-answer session between delegates and Panel members.

Through the Panels’ regularly updated reports and engagement, Parties become aware of new developments in monitoring, science, and technology. Lately, these developments have included discrepancies between reported and atmospherically derived emissions of hydrofluorocarbon (HFC)-23, an extremely powerful greenhouse gas. Other noteworthy developments in recent years are the significant increases in production of controlled substances used as feedstock with high factors of unintended emissions, and gaps in the regional networks for atmospheric monitoring.

These three topics were addressed in separate contact groups at MOP 37, but are in fact related: HFC-23 often accrues as an unwanted by-product of the production of hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC)-22 as a feedstock, and HFC-23 is used as a feedstock for halon 1301 production. Feedstock uses are currently exempt from phase-out and phase-down obligations. Still, many Parties think it is important to keep an eye on feedstock uses as they often result in unintended emissions through leaks and other deficiencies. Consequently, a sufficiently dense and regionally-balanced network of atmospheric monitoring stations is key to having a clearer idea of overall emissions, verify emissions data reported by Parties, and detect any unexplained or unexpected emissions.

MOP 37 made mixed progress on these topics. On atmospheric monitoring, Parties agreed to fund the continued evaluation of the suitability of 10 potential monitoring sites in five prioritized regions to fill the largest monitoring gaps. On feedstocks, Parties discussed whether to request the TEAP to prepare further analysis of emissions data and process information, but disagreed over whether current TEAP work already covers this. On HFC-23 emissions, Parties agreed to request the TEAP and SAP to provide updated HFC-23 emissions reports, based on additional information submitted by Parties.

The discrepancy around HFC-23 emissions was of particular concern given this chemical has a 100-year global warming potential of 14,800 CO₂-equivalent and unreported emissions were in the order of 9.6–13.3 kilotonnes in 2023 (combined SAP and TEAP estimates). The SAP estimated that 30–50% of these unexplained emissions stemmed from eastern China. As China also accounted for 79% of total reported HFC-23 generation in 2023, the Chinese delegation was naturally in the spotlight. They explained their collaboration with academia and internationally to detect the sources of the atmospherically detected emissions, which are significantly higher than they officially reported, and wondered how they could do more. China also questioned why other Parties weren't investigating the matter in their own countries, and why the US was delaying the publication of its HFC-23 emissions data.

Some delegates were reminded of the previous case of unreported emissions of chlorofluorocarbon (CFC)-11 between 2013 and 2019, which was resolved more quickly than HFC-23. The permanence of the unexplained HFC-23 emissions over a number of years has generated a sense of frustration among delegates and some feared that the carefully-built trust among the ozone family could suffer serious damage if a solution cannot be reached soon.

On a more positive note, the unexplained HFC-23 emissions also demonstrate how the Montreal Protocol effectively monitors the production and consumption of controlled substances and is able to sound the alarm if data reported by Parties don't tell the full story. As one participant noted, it allows the international community to stay alert and react to developments in science, industry, and society.

Getting Value for Money

The TEAP alone is made up of over 150 experts, writes up to 18 reports per year, meets face-to-face at least three times a year, and regularly engages online—up to once a week for the Co-Chairs of its Technical Options Committees (TOCs). This work is all done on a voluntary basis. And the work and reports of the Assessment Panels are just one aspect of how the Montreal Protocol works.

The Ozone Secretariat is another. Numerous delegations showed appreciation for how well the Secretariat had prepared for the MOP once more, with an outstanding quality of both pre- and in-session documents. But quality has its price: “We’re working harder than ever with less staff,” Executive Secretary Megumi Seki explained. Her words reflect decreasing fund balances and reserves as well as increasing unpaid Party contributions. At the same time, governments at all levels around the globe are facing tight fiscal environments, with changed spending priorities, also due to increasingly unstable geopolitical circumstances. And last but not least, the UN80 Initiative is looking into “streamlining environmental support for more impactful action,” referring to “environmental responsibilities being dispersed across UN entities.”

Delegates heard the Executive Secretary's call and discussed how Parties could ensure that meetings under the Protocol were adequately resourced and supported, efficient, and effective. The US and Norway submitted a draft decision requesting the Secretariat to prepare a report looking at options for increased efficiency. Different opinions emerged as to what extent Protocol operations could and should be reviewed. “Things are working fine, so why change them?” asked many delegates. Others were concerned that the underlying motivation for the review would simply be to cut costs.

Indeed, one option discussed was holding some meetings virtually, which faced strong objections from a number of Article 5 (developing) countries. The Secretariat pointed out, however,

that cost savings of virtual meetings might not be substantial given the high cost of online set-ups for interpretation. Delegates also informally considered how the TEAP and its TOCs could be reorganized to keep their work remits coherent and manageable, but postponed taking any decision on this until after the 2026 Assessment Reports are completed.

Despite some tension, Parties agreed to ask the Secretariat to prepare such a report, under the caveat that it would be non-prejudicial and would note both the benefits and drawbacks of various options. Some participants saw this as an encouraging step to ensure that the Secretariat—and Parties—could keep up the high quality of outputs longer-term. Others were convinced that it would be a longer process to investigate, assess, and agree on any changes to what seems a well-oiled machine. “We’re certainly getting value for money,” one delegate pointed out, but wondered whether this comes at the risk of a “collective burnout” in the Secretariat and the Assessment Panels.

Balancing Carrots and Sticks

Even if all operations run smoothly, and implementation mechanisms work effectively, success is not guaranteed. This became evident when the Implementation Committee (ImpCom) reported on its review of Parties' compliance. The ImpCom presented nine draft decisions involving over ten countries for MOP 37's consideration, addressing delays in reporting and action plan commitments, but also more serious issues such as Parties exceeding their maximum allowances for the use of controlled substances.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) failed to act on repeated reminders to reduce both the production and consumption of HCFCs to committed limits. This triggered what is a first under the Montreal Protocol: the ImpCom recommending the suspension of a Party's rights and privileges relating to trade such that it will no longer be permitted to engage in trade of HCFCs with other Parties until it returns to compliance. This recommendation wasn't made lightly: at three previous MOPs, DPRK had been reminded of its obligations under the Protocol and cautioned about the measures the MOP may take if non-compliance continues.

Without a material discussion, the MOP followed the recommendation of the ImpCom and sanctioned DPRK, which wasn't represented at this MOP. One delegate labelled the MOP's decision as a “clear escalation away from collaborative ‘feel good’ approaches to hard sanctions.” This development indeed demonstrates that Parties are not shying away from using all instruments at hand to ensure ozone layer protection and climate change mitigation.

What's Next?

Despite the many decisions taken at this MOP, some topics remained unresolved. One is, as noted above, how to effectively address unintended emissions of feedstocks, which are exempt from phase-out and phase-down obligations under the Protocol if they are used in the manufacture of other chemicals. The other unresolved issue is how to strengthen Parties' licensing systems for the import and export of controlled substances, and what further measures to take to combat illegal trade. This item was not developed enough for a decision, with many believing the scope on licensing systems was too narrow.

Also, some of the successfully concluded agenda items merely provide the basis for the next steps in a longer process to overcome various challenges. For instance, although the HCFC phase out is on track to be reached by 2030, and many Parties are set up for

a successful HFC phase down, success will still be dependent on further technological advances and receiving much-needed financial support from the MLF and other sources. Future implementation in Article 5 countries will be closely tied to future MLF funding, which will be negotiated in 2026. The tenth anniversary of the Kigali Amendment in 2026 marks a good opportunity to take stock of how Parties are meeting their HFC-related commitments, and if future funding will be sufficient to maintain progress.

Meanwhile, other emerging issues are on the horizon, as illustrated by the Assessment Panels' presentations. For example, the TEAP noted that restrictions for the use of many alternative substances in the future through their classification as per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) could slow down the phase-down of HFCs. The Panel warned that such classifications as PFAS could mean "improperly extending the persistent, bioaccumulative toxin properties of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS) to other chemicals." Many delegations raised concerns about replacing a bad chemical with one that's worse, but agreed that it is a very complex topic and more research and discussion is needed. In any case, funding challenges are likely to exacerbate remaining technical challenges so that concerted action is needed to ensure future success.

One seasoned participant likened the Montreal Protocol to a science-based "implementation mechanism" that has been sheltered from shifting priorities and politics observed in other multilateral environmental fora. Nonetheless, delegates are in for a busy 2026. Not only will they need to make progress on some of the unresolved issues like HFC-23 discrepancies, feedstocks, and illegal trade, but they will also have to finalize the next MLF replenishment.

At the same time, many will be eager to ensure that the growing strains on the current system, which has worked very effectively for many years, do not result in a breakdown in the system. In this respect, Parties' growing focus at MOP 37 on keeping the Protocol fit for purpose seems timely. The need for all key stakeholders to stay alert, flexible, and nimble in how they respond to current and future threats will not diminish in the years to come, as the Montreal Protocol seeks to continue its long and impressive run of success.

Upcoming Meetings

2025 UN Climate Change Conference: This event will include the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 30), the 20th meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20), and the seventh meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7). The 63rd sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 63) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 63) will also meet. **dates:** 10–21 November 2025 **location:** Belém, Brazil **www:** unfccc.int/cop30

OECPR-7 and UNEA-7: The seventh session of the Open-ended Committee of Permanent Representatives and the seventh session of the UN Environment Assembly will meet back-to-back. UNEA-7 will convene on the theme "Advancing sustainable solutions for a resilient planet." **dates:** 1–5 and 8–12 December 2025 **location:** Nairobi, Kenya **www:** unep.org/environmentassembly/unea7

70th GEF Council Meeting: The Global Environment Facility's Council meets twice annually to develop, adopt, and evaluate the operational policies and programmes for GEF-financed activities, and review the work program. The event will include the 5th Global Biodiversity Framework Fund Council Meeting, and the 39th Least

Developed Countries Fund and Special Climate Change Fund Council meeting. **dates:** 15–19 December 2025 **location:** virtual **www:** thegef.org/events/70th-gef-council-meeting

First meeting of the ISP-CWP Plenary: The first session of the Plenary of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution will review scientific findings, adopt key reports, and guide the Panel's work programme. **dates:** 2–6 February 2026 **location:** Geneva, Switzerland **www:** unep.org/isp-cwp/plenary

IPCC-64: During the 64th session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, delegates will advance work related to the seventh assessment cycle. **dates:** 24–27 March 2026 **location:** Bangkok, Thailand **www:** ipcc.ch

64th Sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies: The 64th sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) will consider a range of issues in preparing for the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 31) in late 2026. **dates:** 8-18 June 2026 **location:** Bonn, Germany **www:** unfccc.int/conference/first-sessional-period-2026

Montreal Protocol OEWG 48: The 48th meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer is expected to consider reports from the SAP, the EEAP, and the TEAP, and conduct other work. An extraordinary meeting of the MOP will convene to elect representatives to the ImpCom. **dates:** 13-17 July 2026 **location:** TBD **www:** ozone.unep.org/meetings

Montreal Protocol MOP 38: The 38th Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol will review issues related the implementation of the Protocol, commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Kigali Amendment, and adopt the 2027–2029 replenishment of the Multilateral Fund. **dates:** 2-6 November 2026 **location:** Kigali, Rwanda **www:** ozone.unep.org/meetings

For additional upcoming events, see: sdg.iisd.org

Glossary

CFCs	Chlorofluorocarbons
CRP	Conference room paper
EEAP	Environmental Effects Assessment Panel
EES	Eastern European States
ExCom	Executive Committee of the MLF
GWP	Global warming potential
HCFCs	Hydrochlorofluorocarbons
HFCs	Hydrofluorocarbons
HLS	High-level segment
ImpCom	Implementation Committee
KIPs	Kigali Implementation Plans
MLF	Multilateral Fund
MOP	Meeting of the Parties
ODS	Ozone depleting substances
OEWG	Open-ended Working Group
SAP	Scientific Assessment Panel
TEAP	Technology and Economic Assessment Panel
TOC	Technical Options Committee
ToR	Terms of reference
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme