

Bonn Highlights: Friday, 12 June 2026

While the negotiations schedule was fairly sparsely populated, much of the key discussions were taking place in mandated and Presidency-led events, including on issues such as fossil fuel transition and how to accelerate implementation to keep 1.5°C in reach.

Negotiations

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), Parties continued exchanging views on the MWP's future, including its duration, relationship with other UNFCCC processes, and modalities based on guiding questions provided by the Co-Facilitators.

EGYPT opposed linking support to specific mitigation actions and making the MWP a permanent agenda item. INDIA and the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) opposed extending the mandate of the MWP, emphasizing its focus on "this critical decade."

TUVALU and NORWAY called for stronger operational links between the MWP and the Global Stocktake (GST). The EU underscored that mitigation is at the core of both Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and the MWP, and that, for the purpose of coherence and effectiveness, NDC implementation should be discussed under the MWP.

The ARAB GROUP lamented lack of attention to identifying barriers and challenges, and suggested that the investment-focused events (IFEs) evolve into a more practical bridge between mitigation opportunities and bankable projects. UGANDA stressed that the global dialogue topics should support practical mitigation outcomes in developing countries while reflecting national circumstances and development priorities. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA proposed restructuring the sequencing of activities, with the global dialogues held during the June Climate Meetings and the IFEs held during the governing body sessions in November, allowing dialogue discussions to mature into bankable proposals that could attract engagement from financiers and multilateral development banks.

CANADA and FIJI supported multi-year thematic tracks under the global dialogue to enable deeper technical discussions, and called for broader participation by technical experts, scientists, financiers, and other stakeholders. The LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) preferred selecting topics annually to maintain flexibility. CHINA and the UAE cautioned against policy-oriented recommendations, arguing that outputs should remain Party-driven and focused on sharing experiences, barriers, and opportunities.

Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya)

and Peer Stiansen (Norway), Parties continued sharing views on an informal note.

The AFRICAN GROUP supported funding through the UNFCCC core budget, and, acknowledging the current budget shortfall for Article 6.2 infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building of approximately USD 8–9 million, suggested that supplementary funding through voluntary contributions could be used to cover this shortfall. The EU stressed that participation in Article 6.2 is voluntary and entails both costs and benefits. The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) said Parties that choose not to participate in the Article 6.2 cooperative approaches should not be required to finance its implementation. They therefore opposed funding through the core budget and supported a combination of supplementary funding through voluntary contributions, user fees, and usage-based fees, with exemptions for small island developing states (SIDS).

BRAZIL supported the use of voluntary contributions to cover the shortfall in the short term and proposed that, for the medium term, Parties could request the Secretariat to: map funding needs according to urgency; specify whether they are recurring or one-off costs; and identify the most appropriate funding source for each category.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the informal note and prepare draft SBI conclusions.

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): SB Contact Group Co-Chair Federica Fricano (Italy) invited: comments on the [fifth dialogue](#) under the JTWP, which focused on just transition pathways for food security; and views aimed to guide the JTWP's implementation.

On key messages from the fifth dialogue, many Parties stressed the role and rights of all stakeholders. The G-77/CHINA and JAPAN highlighted whole-of-society approaches. The LDCs underscored resilience, social protection, livelihood security, and poverty eradication. BRAZIL emphasized eradicating hunger and malnutrition. AOSIS, the EU, and NEW ZEALAND stressed 1.5°C-aligned frameworks. The EU, UK, CANADA, and NEW ZEALAND underscored the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the source of the best-available science. The LMDCs said science must be kept under robust review.

The G-77/CHINA highlighted predictable, sufficient, grant-based finance that supports adaptation, social protections, and infrastructure, not just mitigation. They opposed restrictive trade measures. The UK said trade and means of implementation go beyond the mandate of this group. AOSIS, the EU, and UK emphasized the need to transition away from fossil fuels, while the ARAB GROUP, LMDCs and RUSSIAN FEDERATION rejected singling them out.

On SB 64 outcomes aimed to guide JTWP implementation, the G-77/CHINA proposed a "preliminary, balanced compilation" document reflecting all Parties' views, without seeking to narrow or negotiate them. SOUTH AFRICA added that a document could be "refined" after the sixth dialogue later in 2026. The UK and

EU supported a balanced synthesis, rather than a full compilation, arguing that this would mirror what the group produced at SB 62.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs): In SBI informal consultations, co-facilitated by Ephraim Mwepya Shitima (Zambia), Parties shared views on draft text.

On the draft SBI conclusions, the UK and CANADA, opposed by the ARAB GROUP, called for deleting a paragraph noting concern that some proposals and projects under the LDC Fund will not be funded in the time remaining in the eighth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF-8) due to lack of funds. They argued this is premature, as the GEF-8 cycle has not yet ended. CANADA requested a clarification from the GEF, noting that attribution to lack of funds may be an oversimplification.

On the draft COP decision, the ARAB GROUP called for bracketing the references to CMA decisions contained in the chapeau, pending legal advice from the Secretariat about referencing CMA decisions in a COP decision. CANADA, supported by NORWAY, said since there is not yet a clear understanding on the matter, they are not comfortable with the suggested bracketing.

Parties debated a paragraph which outlines different issues for the LEG to prioritize support on, including: moving from individual projects toward a programmatic and portfolio-based approach, navigating evolving climate finance arrangements, and aligning national adaptation plans (NAPs) with GST outcomes and the GGA Framework.

Research and systematic observation: In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Patricia Nying'uro (Kenya) invited further views on draft text.

INDIA called for referencing the already increasing warming trend in relation to the El Niño effect and opposed references to hottest years. GRENADA, supported by the EU, encouraged further regional downscaling of climate scenarios and modeling, particularly for SIDS. The EU, with INDIA, encouraged work on national-level scenarios.

GRENADA, supported by the EU, called for work on scenarios that limit the magnitude and duration of overshoot beyond 1.5°C, highlighting that the extent of carbon dioxide removal needed is linked to the magnitude and duration of overshoot. VANUATU underscored that the Paris Agreement's temperature goal is not "one of many goals," but the benchmark for all others, and pointed to glacier loss as an example of change that is not reversible on human time scales.

The EU supported work on energy system transformation, particularly deep electrification. SAUDI ARABIA opposed references to electrification and emphasized nationally-determined pathways. The EU suggested noting that there are more synergies than trade-offs between climate action and sustainable development, which INDIA opposed as a "blanket statement," stating trade-offs may be distributed unevenly. SAUDI ARABIA called for references to arid, semi-arid, and desert regions.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the draft text.

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Carol Simon (Panama) and Arne Riedel Escobar (Germany), invited views on: the midterm review of progress on the ACE work programme; and elements for a new ACE action plan.

ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs (ENGOs) said the International Court of Justice's recent advisory opinion on climate change is the "legal floor" from which the midterm review must start.

On the new action plan, NORWAY suggested developing guidance on youth participation in climate policy processes and, supported by BRAZIL, noted the value of integrating information integrity into ACE work. The LDCs suggested developing an impact-based monitoring framework. NORWAY and the EU

stressed the need to consider the budgetary implications of any new activities and build on existing structures as much as possible.

WOMEN AND GENDER emphasized that "participation without influence is just observation," and called for establishing mechanisms for effective participation. They said ACE activities should be explicitly intersectional in ways that support, among others, migrants and displaced people.

The Co-Facilitators will prepare an informal note.

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings: SBI contact group Co-Chairs Felix Wertli (Switzerland) and Kaveh Guilanpour (Georgia) invited views on enhancing observer engagement.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES' ORGANIZATIONS (IPOs) and ENGOs called for a zero-tolerance approach to intimidation, harassment, reprisals, and violence against delegates, including after they return to their home countries. IPOs highlighted cases of reprisals against climate defenders. The EU called for the Secretariat to take concrete steps to enhance the safety and security of all participants, including through measures to protect environmental and human rights defenders.

WOMEN AND GENDER identified barriers to observer participation, such as lengthy and complex accreditation procedures, limited access to financial resources, and safety concerns both during UNFCCC meetings and after delegates return to their countries. BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs (BINGOs) and TRADE UNION NGOs (TUNGOS) highlighted challenges related to visas, travel costs, and accommodation.

The DISABILITY CAUCUS called for recognition as a formal constituency and urged Parties to implement accessibility and reasonable accommodations throughout the UNFCCC process, including sign language interpretation, accessible communications, plain-language materials, and support for personal assistants. The INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) stressed the need for improved arrangements for persons with disabilities and, with BINGOs, called for greater transparency regarding the allocation and use of Party overflow badges.

CHINA opposed measures that would limit the participation of Parties, supported observer quotas and adequate badging arrangements for developing country observers, and called for stronger scrutiny of the list of participants to prevent "irrelevant and illegitimate" actors from "sneaking into" delegations.

CANADA stressed that the new host country agreement template must include human rights safeguards and called for enhanced participation by under-represented groups, including children and youth, Indigenous Peoples, and women and gender groups.

RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NGOs (RINGOs) said assessing observer participation based only on the locations of observer organizations' headquarters can be misleading and highlighted the need to consider the nationality of the observers themselves. They noted that many observer organizations headquartered in developed countries prioritize the nomination of representatives from developing countries.

The Co-Facilitators will prepare draft conclusions.

Mandated Events, Presidency Events, and other Sessions

Shaping the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner: COP 30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago presented the [roadmap initiative](#) as a tool to implement agreed goals and drew attention to the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels ([TAFF 1](#)). Túlio Andrade, COP 30 Presidency, welcomed the many [submissions](#) made by Parties and stakeholders to inform the roadmap's development, which will be finalized by COP 31.

TAFF 1 Co-Host COLOMBIA said the question is not whether the transition should happen, but whether the conditions

for countries to navigate it successfully can be created. The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) said the economic case for transition is clear and supports a key role for electrification. The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) highlighted that national transition roadmaps help reduce exposure to price shocks and deliver on development aspirations and domestic interests related to energy access and security.

The ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG) said the sight of tankers stranded in the Strait of Hormuz is a timely reminder of why the transition away from fossil fuels is so important, adding that the initiative should not result in a one-off document, but be a sustained process that stimulates the development of national and corporate transition roadmaps. The EU said the roadmap must be grounded in findings from the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) and GST 1. They said TAFF 1 was an important event and encouraged the COP 31 Presidency to provide opportunities for discussion.

Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA): COP 30 President Corrêa do Lago opened this [mandated event](#) and described the GIA as part of a “second tier” of climate multilateralism focused on accelerating implementation outside the formal negotiations. He emphasized that, unlike negotiated outcomes, implementation does not require consensus and called for mobilizing all actors and resources to strengthen resilience, accelerate climate action, and keep the 1.5°C goal within reach.

Sally Box, incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations (Australia), outlined the purpose and structure of the GIA, describing it as a cooperative, facilitative, and voluntary initiative to support countries in implementing their NDCs and NAPs. She said it would identify and accelerate a limited number of high-impact solutions that have the potential to trigger global change, and link the selected solutions with finance, technical tools, and implementation partners.

Ana Toni, COP 30 Presidency, outlined the proposed selection process, explaining that: an independent group of experts and scientists would identify a shortlist of around ten solutions based on specific criteria; and a board would then select three or four priority solutions.

Tuğba Dinçbaşı, incoming COP 31 Presidency (Türkiye), described the Climate Implementation Bridge, which is connected to the Accelerator and is also being developed under the COP 31 Action Agenda, highlighting its goal of bringing on-the-ground actions and finance together.

SOUTH AFRICA welcomed the focus on implementation and called for balanced geographical representation among the selection panel, greater participation by practitioners than academic experts, and stronger attention to adaptation and loss and damage. NORWAY underscored the initiative as an opportunity to scale up mature solutions outside the negotiating process. AOSIS called for measurable outcomes, transparent tracking of progress, and safeguards to ensure that small and vulnerable countries are not left behind. The LDCs stressed that the initiative should remain focused on keeping the 1.5°C goal within reach. The EU said the GIA should support implementation of GST 1 and feed into GST 2.

The LMDCs emphasized that the initiative should: remain Party-driven, facilitative, and voluntary; avoid policy recommendations; and address mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage in a balanced manner. The ARAB GROUP called for attention to solutions that have received less international support and momentum, including carbon capture, utilization, and storage, and carbon dioxide removal technologies.

Mission to 1.5°C: This [consultation event](#) with Parties and non-Party stakeholders was moderated by Chao Feng, incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations (Australia), and Yalchin

Rafiyev, COP 29 Presidency. COP 30 President Corrêa do Lago reminded delegates that the [Mission to 1.5°C](#) is designed to enable ambition and implementation of NDCs and NAPs, and to reflect on accelerating implementation, international cooperation, and investment. Sally Box, incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations (Australia), pointed to a [call for submissions](#) to help shape the process, which she noted will continue through 2026 with the aim of publishing a report for decision-makers prior to COP 31.

On substance, the EU and AOSIS urged limiting the extent and duration of overshoot over 1.5°C. The EU, AOSIS, UK, and NORWAY highlighted addressing the energy transition. The UK and NORWAY drew attention to nature-based solutions. SWEDEN emphasized energy, transport, waste management, and food systems. The LDCs highlighted means of implementation and addressing debt constraints. SAUDI ARABIA noted finance and unilateral trade-related measures. AILAC emphasized locally-led initiatives, with LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES (LGMA) urging 30% of climate finance for local implementation by 2030.

On next steps in the process, the EU supported continuing this work beyond COP 31, linking it to GST 2, and urging those Parties that have yet to do so to submit new NDCs. AILAC proposed developing integrated transition roadmaps. AOSIS urged support for NAPs. SAUDI ARABIA stressed the voluntary nature of this initiative, stating that it is not connected to any UNFCCC work programme or constituted body. EGYPT said suggestions to link outcomes from this initiative or any component of the Action Agenda to the formal process are “not acceptable, nor are they helpful.”

Information event on the financial impact of the withdrawal of the US from the Convention: SBI Chair Julia Gardiner noted that the US withdrawal will take effect on 27 February 2027 and, as they were the largest contributor to the core budget and also a large contributor to the supplementary budget, their withdrawal risks limiting the Secretariat's ability to support Parties in implementing climate action. Executive Secretary Simon Stiell emphasized the need for early engagement to mitigate the funding gap in the 2028-2029 biennium. He underscored the shared responsibility to ensure that available resources are used as effectively and efficiently as possible, noting efficiency gains achieved amid the addition of new mandates. The Secretariat reported that the distribution of the budget among the remaining Parties according to the indicative assessment scale would amount to a 27% increase for all Parties to maintain the current budget.

In the Corridors

“At this point, it seems like everyone is tired and confused,” sighed a delegate leaving the venue on Friday and wishing for it to be Sunday already.

The negotiations schedule was fairly empty. Some may wonder what was keeping delegates busy then. But this is without counting the many other discussion formats that make up a large part of the 2026 June Climate Meetings. “We have gotten somewhat used to World Cafés by now,” said one negotiator, “but now we also have these Presidency initiatives to keep track of and feed into.”

It is clear that these initiatives are not equally palatable to Parties. “Big oil producers seem to have decided that the best strategy is to simply ignore the whole thing,” advanced one observer with regard to the initiative on fossil fuel transition roadmaps. The sessions on the Global Implementation Accelerator and the Mission to 1.5°C for their part had a broad attendance, but largely resembled “sounding boards” where Parties tried “doing damage control” on late-stage additions to decision text.

“Also, who even is the Presidency at this point?” pondered another delegate. “After all, there are now four countries on the podium.”

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