Daily report for 3–7 March 1997

The sixth session of the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM-6) of the UN Framework Convention onClimate Change met from 3-7 March 1997 in Bonn, Germany. AGBM-6 focused its deliberations on the FrameworkCompilation, which incorporated the textual proposal from Parties as well as other proposals for elements of a protocol or otherlegal instrument. AGBM-6 also convened informal roundtables on new proposals from Parties and differentiation, as well as"non-groups" to exchange views and merge different proposals.

Delegates "streamlined" the compilation text by merging or eliminating some overlapping provisions within the myriad ofproposals contained in the Framework Compilation and brought the process one step, albeit a small one, closer to fulfilling itsmandate. Much of the discussion centered on a proposal from the EU for a 15% cut in a "basket" of greenhouse gases by theyear 2010 compared to 1990 levels. Nonetheless, other proposals emerged at in the eleventh hour, signaling that AGBM-6,despite the hopes of many observers, has yet to foster much progress on several fundamental points. As one participant noted,this meeting did not necessarily eliminate the number of proposals on the table, it simply straightened and sorted them.Another commented while discussing differentiation that indicators can be read two ways and indeed indicators of progress atAGBM-6 are equally equivocal. Whether these indicators signal that the AGBM is making slow, solid progress or slouchingtoward Kyoto seems a matter of one’s expectations.

OPENING PLENARY

On 3 March, AGBM Chair Ral Estrada-Oyuela (Argentina) noted the considerable number of new proposals and called forlong-term sustained efforts from industrialized countries. He said changes would be neither easy nor inexpensive, but addedthat the costs resulting from inaction far outweigh the costs of preventative measures. He also welcomed Dan Reifsnyder (US)as rapporteur.

FCCC Executive Secretary Michael Zammit-Cutajar noted that AGBM-6 marks the last session prior to the six-month deadlinefor circulating a draft protocol. The negotiating text must "contain the seeds" of the final outcome and there should be nosurprises after 1 June 1997.

The secretariat introduced the documentation for the session: "Framework Compilation of Proposals" (FCCC/AGBM/1997/2and Add. 1); "Implementation of the Berlin Mandate: proposal from Parties" (FCCC/AGBM/ 1997/Misc.1) and "Commentsfrom Parties" (FCCC/AGBM/ 1997/Misc.2). Regarding the organization of work, the Chair urged delegates to produce,elaborate on and streamline a negotiating text to be ready by 1 June. He proposed establishing two "non-groups"— a termcoined by the Chair to describe informal discussion groups with a mandate of "streamlining" certain parts of the text containedin the Framework Compilation. One non-group was to focus on institutions and processes, final elements, definitions and thepreamble. The other non-group was to work on continuing to advance commitments in Article 4.1. He said the main purpose ofthe non-groups is to exchange views, rather than negotiate, and to merge different proposals into one text in order to facilitateadoption of a negotiating text.

The WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES appealed to delegates to act now and noted that delayed action will involve evenhigher demands. He said climate change is an issue of global justice and called on the AGBM to promote lifestyle changes indeveloped countries. CHINA, IRAN and MOROCCO, on behalf of the African Group, requested clarification on the divisionof tasks between non-groups and asked whether the non-groups would address policies and measures (P&Ms) and quantifiedemissions limitation and reduction objectives within specified time frames (QELROs). The G-77/CHINA, supported by theEU, MALAYSIA and the AFRICAN GROUP, urged that only a limited number of additional groups be established, given theconstraints facing small delegations. CHINA also cautioned the AGBM not to "waste time" on issues related to institutions anddefinitions. The Chair responded that P&Ms and QELROs would be addressed in Plenary and noted the value of institutionsand legal systems.

The EU urged countries to provide input in legal language and streamline the Framework Compilation by focusing onachievable options. The EU also suggested that the Chair develop a protocol or other legal instrument by 1 June, if the AGBMdoes not complete this work by the end of the week. IRAN said the EU proposal was premature and SAUDI ARABIA urgedthat the AGBM complete a negotiating text and not leave work for the Chair. The Chair reminded delegates that the non-groups would be open only to Parties and would not involve negotiation.

Meetings were scheduled so that no more than two meetings took place at any one time. The non-groups reported back toPlenary, which adopted their reports as a basis for the negotiating text at AGBM-7. The non-group on institutions, mechanismsand any other clauses was chaired by Takao Shibata (Japan). The non-group on elements related to continuing to advance theimplementation of existing commitments in Article 4.1 was chaired Evans King (Trinidad and Tobago).

STRENGTHENING THE COMMITMENTS IN ARTICLE 4.2 (a) and (b)

On 5 March, the Chair opened the second meeting of AGBM-6 by stating that this meeting is not intended for negotiating butfor refining and consolidating similar proposals contained in the Framework Compilation of Proposals (FCCC/AGBM/1997/2and Add.1) to set out clear alternatives for negotiation at AGBM-7.

Annex I Expert Group Chair Ian Pickard (UK) reported on studies, carried out in cooperation with OECD and IEA, on carbonand energy taxation, P&Ms to encourage innovation in transport and technology and international greenhouse gas emissionstrading. Document FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.2 contains an executive summary of these studies.

The Chair called on the AGBM to consider the submissions on general commitments and guiding objectives for P&Ms.SAMOA called for a coordination mechanism to assist Annex I Parties in implementing their commitments, as proposed in theprotocol submitted by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The mechanism would provide advice on a full range ofmeasures including taxes and subsidies and would report regularly to the "Meeting of the Parties." The mechanism would bemulti-disciplinary and open to participation by all Parties, government representatives, NGOs and scientists with relevantexpertise. SAMOA also noted the need to avoid duplication of tasks, but expressed concern that existing subsidiary bodies maynot be appropriately equipped to address technical issues.

SAUDI ARABIA and CHINA said the comments from Parties contained in document FCCC/AGBM/1997/2/Add.1 should beincluded in the Framework Compilation. CHINA also expressed confusion regarding references to Annexes X, A and B in theproposals and urged Parties to refrain from developing new categories. JAPAN suggested that Annex I Parties adopt P&Msaccording to national circumstances, in the areas of efficient use of energy, low-carbon energy, technological development andcooperation, and enhancement of sinks. The "Meeting of the Parties" shall decide on indicators for P&Ms.

The EU, supported by SWITZERLAND, favored legally-binding P&Ms and highlighted its proposed Annex A (commonP&Ms), Annex B (coordinated P&Ms that receive high priority) and Annex C (priority P&Ms for inclusion in nationalprogrammes). The EU proposal contains P&Ms on: renewable energies; energy efficiency standards; labelling and otherproduct-related measures; transport sector; economic instruments; energy policies; industry sector emissions; agriculturesector; forestry; and fluorocarbons. Several delegations commented on the EU proposal and some noted alternative approachesand priorities. POLAND and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION supported a menu approach, which takes account of variouseconomic structures and attempts to maintain a high and stable rate of economic growth. The G-77/CHINA, supported bySAUDI ARABIA, stressed that P&Ms should not have adverse impacts on developing country Parties. He also expressedconcern about new annexes that would impose new commitments on non-Annex I Parties. The EU reiterated that its proposalprovides flexibility through Annex B, which lists P&Ms to be applied according to national circumstances.

The US and SAUDI ARABIA did not support inclusion of specific P&Ms. The US also noted that sound information is notavailable for controlling greenhouse gases not listed in the proposed Annex C and suggested elaborating on P&Ms under thesection on reporting. SAUDI ARABIA also warned that P&Ms undertaken by Annex I countries could negatively affect tradewith developing countries. IRAN stressed the need for a section on general commitments and guiding measures in the protocol.

The EU clarified that energy efficiency, standards and labelling, as well as P&Ms related to fluorocarbons, should be thehighest priority. He also noted that paragraphs proposed by a number of Parties, including Norway, Iceland, New Zealand andSwitzerland, could be integrated into the EU proposal. He said some developed countries, particularly the US, have notincluded binding measures in their proposals and emphasized the EU’s conviction that P&Ms should be included to fullyencompass the Berlin Mandate and the Geneva Declaration.

CHINA reiterated that the Berlin Mandate requires an elaboration of P&Ms whose objectives should be clear at this stage. Hesaid the EU proposal is too complicated and supported a proposal by the Chair to use three "groups" rather than annexes onobjectives, common but coordinated P&Ms and national P&Ms. The US also cautioned against including too many details andcited a number of examples illustrating the difficulties of proposed P&Ms related to specific products.

The EU did not support the groupings proposed by the Chair and noted they were difficult to distinguish. He said objectivesshould not be separated from mechanisms and measures, and proposed listing all of them in Annex A. He also said thatrelevant details related to specific products must be considered because they are traded in the international market and aninternational agreement is needed to ensure results.

The EU also reported that the EU Council had reached a common position on QELROs. The EU proposed that Parties to theBerlin Mandate will reduce emission levels for carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) by 15% by2010 with a reference year of 1990. The EU also proposed an interim target for 2005.

The Chair also requested delegates to consider a proposal regarding countries with economies in transition who are requestinga specific annex because of their particular circumstances. The EU did not support a separate annex and noted that the concernsof these countries could be addressed elsewhere, such as in an introductory section. The Chair, supported by IRAN, said theseconcerns are better addressed when considering QELROs.

On 6 March, the Chair presented his draft conclusions on P&Ms, which represent a streamlined version of Section II of theFramework Compilation on strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2 (a) and (b). The draft conclusions contain fourelements: proposals regarding policies and measures; general proposals; proposals relevant to the nature and mix of policiesand measures; and lists of policies and measures.

"Proposals regarding policies and measures," address: adoption of coordinated P&Ms; preparation of National Action Plans;national and regional programmes for climate change mitigation and protection; and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs.Some of the proposals refer to P&Ms with different priority levels, while others cite specific items such as removal of coalsubsidies, technology development and transfer and promotion of renewable energy sources.

The "General proposals" support: identification of environmental and socio-economic impacts of P&Ms; compatibilitybetween P&Ms and national development programmes; and cost-effective P&Ms. Some entries in "Proposals relevant to thenature and mix of policies and measures," call for individual, rather than coordinated, fulfillment of commitments andprotection for developing countries, especially oil producing States. The section on "Lists of policies and measures" beginswith a proposal from the Chair that contains three lists regarding: policy objectives for all Annex I Parties; possiblemechanisms for implementation of P&Ms and a menu of P&Ms from which Parties could choose according to their nationalcircumstances. The Chair’s proposal is followed by entries from several Parties including Canada, the EU, Switzerland andJapan. Each entry contains specific P&Ms.

The Chair said some Parties have submitted "negative" proposals, which note that they object to the inclusion of specificissues. He proposed including a general chapeau noting their objections and said that all ideas retained in the negotiating textdo not have to be included in the Protocol. The proposal also contains several symbols and letters and the Chair said valueswould be attributed to them in future sessions. IRAN inquired about the possibility of elaborating on each proposal. The Chairnoted that other proposals could be submitted later and asked delegates to refrain from making substantive statements.

POLAND requested that each reference to a new Annex specify which Parties will be included. NEW ZEALAND deleted itsproposal calling for compulsory phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. The G-77/CHINA noted its intention to submit a proposalon P&Ms. The EU requested that certain items from its proposed list of P&Ms also be noted in the Chair’s proposed list ofP&Ms. The EU said it would submit "List C," containing P&Ms to be given priority by Parties listed in Annex X, asappropriate to national circumstances. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION requested retaining its proposals. One states that aprotocol or other legal instrument should not change or replace statements of the Convention, including its principles. Theother states that Parties to the protocol are guided by principles of the Convention.

Delegates also commented on the Framework Compilation (FCCC/AGBM/1997/2 and Add.1). The EU deleted severalparagraphs submitted by its member States because these submissions were superseded by the common EU proposal. TheChair noted that a section on education, training and public awareness, included in the addendum, would also be included inthe negotiating text.

QUANTIFIED EMISSIONS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OBJECTIVES

Prior to consideration of QELROs, delegates heard statements from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). CLIMATEACTION NETWORK, on behalf of environmental NGOs, asked delegates if they had the political will and moral character toact in the best interest of all the citizens of the world. She also called for a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005.The US and EUROPEAN BUSINESS COUNCILS FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY proposed as priorities: setting clear near-term targets and time frames; using market-based tools to account for "external costs" of energy, which would allow each Partyto select suitable options; and reducing and eliminating institutional barriers, such as subsidies and tax exemptions.

The INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, on behalf ofEuropean industries, noted that the years 2005 and 2010 are impracticably close deadlines. He said developing countries areexpected to generate two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 and urged delegates to secure worldwideagreement. The AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, on behalf oflabor groups, expressed concern that "harsh, arbitrary" flat-rate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are being proposedwithout regard to their impact on working people. He urged delegates to remember that they hold the power to destroy jobs andincomes of millions.

Following these statements, delegates discussed aspects of the proposals on QELROs contained in the Framework Compilation(FCCC/AGBM/1997/2 and Add.1).

On "guiding objectives," the EU stated that eventual reduction of CO2 emissions to 50% of their current levels is required tokeep global average temperature from increasing more than two degrees above its pre-industrial level. He recalled the recentdecision of the EU Council of Environment Ministers, which established a common position on a reduction target for the year2010. The EU’s proposal states that, in the longer term, more sophisticated methods to allocate reduction targets shall beimplemented and will eventually lead to a convergence of emission levels based on appropriate indicators. The EU could notaccept Iran’s proposed condition that QELROs for Annex I Parties must not affect international trade or national incomes ofdeveloping countries, particularly those exporting fossil fuels.

The EU also suggested that the US proposal regarding establishment of long-term goals could be incorporated into the new EUsubmission. The US responded that this change should await a written submission from the EU.

On "legal character" of QELROs, the EU reiterated its support for QELROs for significant overall reductions and noted thatP&Ms should also be legally-binding. SWITZERLAND stressed that each Annex I Party should adopt legally-bindingQELROs. NIGERIA requested the deletion of a reference to the Geneva Ministerial Declaration, which calls for legally-binding QELROs for Annex I Parties within specified time frames with respect to sources and removal of sinks of greenhousegases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. He emphasized that the Declaration was not adopted and noted that the G-77/CHINA proposal to set "realistic and achievable QELROs in a comprehensive manner" reflects its substance. PERUreferred to the Geneva Declaration and called for reduction target for the year 2005.

On "coverage," the EU proposed covering carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), and to addhydrofluorocarbon (HFC), perfluorocarbon (PFC) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6) to the "basket" of gases by 2000. P&Ms toreduce emissions of these gases should be included in the protocol. The US proposed merging paragraphs on Annex Icommitments based on the CO2 equivalents of their emission contributions to the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases andon the exception of sources and sinks for which there is insufficient knowledge of the global warming potential (GWP) orinability to accurately measure emissions or removals. HUNGARY supported the US’s long-term goal for reduction ofatmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

NORWAY and ICELAND withdrew their proposals, as they were contained in other proposals. SAUDI ARABIA insisted onreferences to sinks and greenhouse gases other than CO2. CHINA said that the text should only include issues on whichagreement has been reached. JAPAN did not agree and called for retention of its proposal that QELROs would be set for CO2only. The MARSHALL ISLANDS, on behalf of AOSIS, stressed the need for hard targets for CO2 reductions.

On "level and timing/emissions budgets," the EU urged early stabilization of greenhouse gases. He noted that sections of theEU proposal in the Framework Compilation should be replaced with the new EU common position. The position states thatAnnex X Parties, individually or jointly, in accordance with the Berlin Mandate, shall reduce emission levels for CO2, CH4and N2O together (weighted total, using GWP, with a 100-year time horizon) by 15% by 2010 with a reference year of 1990.An interim target for 2005 will also be set. The EU opposed the concept of borrowing and the consideration of emissionsbudgets without QELROs and timetables. He favored flexibility regarding the base year for countries with economies intransition.

The G-77/CHINA called for: flexibility for Annex I countries due to their differences in starting points; no adverse effects ofP&Ms on developing countries; and no further commitments for developing countries. CHINA called for all other Annex Icountries to propose QELROs with time frames as the EU has done. He opposed emissions borrowing and, with HUNGARY,opposed a new category for countries that are rapidly developing. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION highlighted his proposal thatnew commitments of Parties do not cancel, reconsider or prolong commitments adopted by Annex I Parties for the periodbefore the year 2000. He supported 2010 as a target and said that 2005 as an intermediate target seems unrealistic. TheMARSHALL ISLANDS called for separate and short-term targets for reducing the level for CO2 emissions. The US stressedthat the Berlin Mandate does not preclude emissions budgets. He noted that the EU proposal does not specify whethercountries should abide by QELROs individually or jointly. He also suggested that the EU proposal include Table 1 of thedecision by the EU Council of Environment Ministers. This table specifies emission reduction targets for each EU country. TheEU responded that the Council decision is not part of the EU proposal for the protocol.

On 4 March, Chair Chow Kok Kee (MALAYSIA) reported on the roundtable on differentiation. He noted a growing consensusthat indicators will be useful in negotiating QELROs. He also acknowledged divergent views on whether or not the EUCouncil of Environment Ministers’ decision illustrates a differentiation practice applicable outside the EU.

The EU requested more time to determine whether proposals from individual EU countries could be deleted and incorporatedinto the EU’s new proposals. NORWAY noted that ambitious targets via legally-binding commitments can only be achievedthrough efforts such as differentiation, equitable burden sharing, comprehensive treatment of sources and sinks, andcoordination of economic instruments. He also noted that the EU decision illustrates how differentiation facilitates moreambitious targets. He stated that a 10 to 15% reduction for Annex I countries by the year 2010 would be both ambitious andrealistic. The US restated that a differentiated approach would not be appropriate. AUSTRALIA insisted that its complete texton differentiation be reproduced in the document.

On the issue of "flexibility," MALAYSIA, supported by CHINA, requested deletion of the entire section. He said that the issuewas already covered under differentiation and QELROs. The EU noted the high improbability of reaching agreement on atrading system in time for COP-3. He cited disagreement on the use of procedures for monitoring and verification and the usetrading as a substitute or delaying mechanism for domestic action.

On "Joint Implementation" (JI), the G-77/CHINA called for the deletion of the entire section. UZBEKISTAN called for theretention of text noting that JI can serve as an instrument to allow technology transfer on a more beneficial basis. The EU saidthat Germany’s proposal that "a certain portion yet to be determined may be met through JI, whereby a significant part of thecommitments must be met through measures within each Party’s own territory" should be retained for now. SWITZERLANDsupported retaining its proposal that: JI may contribute up to 50% to meeting a country’s fulfillment of commitments; JI maybegin in 2000; and JI can also take place with non-Parties to the Protocol. PERU requested retaining JI in the text, until thereview at year’s end.

Delegates also discussed impacts that new Annex I commitments may have on developing countries. SAUDI ARABIA andNIGERIA requested retaining paragraphs relating to loss of income. The EU did not support a compensation mechanism forfinancial losses of oil producing countries.

Proposals in the Framework Compilation related to measurement, reporting and communication of information and voluntaryapplication of commitments by non-Annex I Parties were accepted without amendment.

On 7 March, the Chair introduced "Draft text by the chairman, strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b):quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives within specified time frames (QELROs)." This document includes sixsections: introductory elements by the Chair; atmospheric concentration; level and timing; flexibility; possible impacts ondeveloping countries of new commitments in the new instrument/socio-economic injuries sustained by developing countries;and measurement, reporting and communication of information. The section on level and timing includes: proposals forspecific flat-rate targets and timetables for CO2 and other greenhouse gases; support for such targets and timetables withoutreference to specific numbers; differentiation via various indicators; provisions for regional economic integrationorganizations; emissions budgets; emissions based on a cumulative emissions basis; and joint implementation.

NEW ZEALAND requested that its proposal on sinks contained in Addendum 1 to the Framework Compilation be included inthe additional proposal section on "level and timing." The draft text was accepted for inclusion in the negotiating text.

POLICIES AND MEASURES

On 5 March, the Chair opened the second meeting of AGBM-6 by stating that this meeting is not intended for negotiating butfor refining and consolidating similar proposals contained in the Framework Compilation of Proposals (FCCC/AGBM/1997/2and Add.1) to set out clear alternatives for negotiation at AGBM-7.

Annex I Expert Group Chair Ian Pickard (UK) reported on studies, carried out in cooperation with OECD and IEA, on carbonand energy taxation, P&Ms to encourage innovation in transport and technology and international greenhouse gas emissionstrading. Document FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.2 contains an executive summary of these studies.

The Chair called on the AGBM to consider the submissions on general commitments and guiding objectives for P&Ms.SAMOA called for a coordination mechanism to assist Annex I Parties in implementing their commitments, as proposed in theprotocol submitted by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The mechanism would provide advice on a full range ofmeasures including taxes and subsidies and would report regularly to the "Meeting of the Parties." The mechanism would bemulti-disciplinary and open to participation by all Parties, government representatives, NGOs and scientists with relevantexpertise. SAMOA also noted the need to avoid duplication of tasks, but expressed concern that existing subsidiary bodies maynot be appropriately equipped to address technical issues.

SAUDI ARABIA and CHINA said the comments from Parties contained in document FCCC/AGBM/1997/2/Add.1 should beincluded in the Framework Compilation. CHINA also expressed confusion regarding references to Annexes X, A and B in theproposals and urged Parties to refrain from developing new categories. JAPAN suggested that Annex I Parties adopt P&Msaccording to national circumstances, in the areas of efficient use of energy, low-carbon energy, technological development andcooperation, and enhancement of sinks. The "Meeting of the Parties" shall decide on indicators for P&Ms.

The EU, supported by SWITZERLAND, favored legally-binding P&Ms and highlighted its proposed Annex A (commonP&Ms), Annex B (coordinated P&Ms that receive high priority) and Annex C (priority P&Ms for inclusion in nationalprogrammes). The EU proposal contains P&Ms on: renewable energies; energy efficiency standards; labelling and otherproduct-related measures; transport sector; economic instruments; energy policies; industry sector emissions; agriculturesector; forestry; and fluorocarbons. Several delegations commented on the EU proposal and some noted alternative approachesand priorities. POLAND and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION supported a menu approach, which takes account of variouseconomic structures and attempts to maintain a high and stable rate of economic growth. The G-77/CHINA, supported bySAUDI ARABIA, stressed that P&Ms should not have adverse impacts on developing country Parties. He also expressedconcern about new annexes that would impose new commitments on non-Annex I Parties. The EU reiterated that its proposalprovides flexibility through Annex B, which lists P&Ms to be applied according to national circumstances.

The US and SAUDI ARABIA did not support inclusion of specific P&Ms. The US also noted that sound information is notavailable for controlling greenhouse gases not listed in the proposed Annex C and suggested elaborating on P&Ms under thesection on reporting. SAUDI ARABIA also warned that P&Ms undertaken by Annex I countries could negatively affect tradewith developing countries. IRAN stressed the need for a section on general commitments and guiding measures in the protocol.

The EU clarified that energy efficiency, standards and labelling, as well as P&Ms related to fluorocarbons, should be thehighest priority. He also noted that paragraphs proposed by a number of Parties, including Norway, Iceland, New Zealand andSwitzerland, could be integrated into the EU proposal. He said some developed countries, particularly the US, have notincluded binding measures in their proposals and emphasized the EU’s conviction that P&Ms should be included to fullyencompass the Berlin Mandate and the Geneva Declaration.

CHINA reiterated that the Berlin Mandate requires an elaboration of P&Ms whose objectives should be clear at this stage. Hesaid the EU proposal is too complicated and supported a proposal by the Chair to use three "groups" rather than annexes onobjectives, common but coordinated P&Ms and national P&Ms. The US also cautioned against including too many details andcited a number of examples illustrating the difficulties of proposed P&Ms related to specific products.

The EU did not support the groupings proposed by the Chair and noted they were difficult to distinguish. He said objectivesshould not be separated from mechanisms and measures, and proposed listing all of them in Annex A. He also said thatrelevant details related to specific products must be considered because they are traded in the international market and aninternational agreement is needed to ensure results.

The EU also reported that the EU Council had reached a common position on QELROs. The EU proposed that Parties to theBerlin Mandate will reduce emission levels for carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) by 15% by2010 with a reference year of 1990. The EU also proposed an interim target for 2005.

The Chair also requested delegates to consider a proposal regarding countries with economies in transition who are requestinga specific annex because of their particular circumstances. The EU did not support a separate annex and noted that the concernsof these countries could be addressed elsewhere, such as in an introductory section. The Chair, supported by IRAN, said theseconcerns are better addressed when considering QELROs.

On 6 March, the Chair presented his draft conclusions on P&Ms, which represent a streamlined version of Section II of theFramework Compilation on strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2 (a) and (b). The draft conclusions contain fourelements: proposals regarding policies and measures; general proposals; proposals relevant to the nature and mix of policiesand measures; and lists of policies and measures.

"Proposals regarding policies and measures," address: adoption of coordinated P&Ms; preparation of National Action Plans;national and regional programmes for climate change mitigation and protection; and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs.Some of the proposals refer to P&Ms with different priority levels, while others cite specific items such as removal of coalsubsidies, technology development and transfer and promotion of renewable energy sources.

The "General proposals" support: identification of environmental and socio-economic impacts of P&Ms; compatibilitybetween P&Ms and national development programmes; and cost-effective P&Ms. Some entries in "Proposals relevant to thenature and mix of policies and measures," call for individual, rather than coordinated, fulfillment of commitments andprotection for developing countries, especially oil producing States. The section on "Lists of policies and measures" beginswith a proposal from the Chair that contains three lists regarding: policy objectives for all Annex I Parties; possiblemechanisms for implementation of P&Ms and a menu of P&Ms from which Parties could choose according to their nationalcircumstances. The Chair’s proposal is followed by entries from several Parties including Canada, the EU, Switzerland andJapan. Each entry contains specific P&Ms.

The Chair said some Parties have submitted "negative" proposals, which note that they object to the inclusion of specificissues. He proposed including a general chapeau noting their objections and said that all ideas retained in the negotiating textdo not have to be included in the Protocol. The proposal also contains several symbols and letters and the Chair said valueswould be attributed to them in future sessions. IRAN inquired about the possibility of elaborating on each proposal. The Chairnoted that other proposals could be submitted later and asked delegates to refrain from making substantive statements.

POLAND requested that each reference to a new Annex specify which Parties will be included. NEW ZEALAND deleted itsproposal calling for compulsory phasing out of fossil fuel subsidies. The G-77/CHINA noted its intention to submit a proposalon P&Ms. The EU requested that certain items from its proposed list of P&Ms also be noted in the Chair’s proposed list ofP&Ms. The EU said it would submit "List C," containing P&Ms to be given priority by Parties listed in Annex X, asappropriate to national circumstances. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION requested retaining its proposals. One states that aprotocol or other legal instrument should not change or replace statements of the Convention, including its principles. Theother states that Parties to the protocol are guided by principles of the Convention.

Delegates also commented on the Framework Compilation (FCCC/AGBM/1997/2 and Add.1). The EU deleted severalparagraphs submitted by its member States because these submissions were superseded by the common EU proposal. TheChair noted that a section on education, training and public awareness, included in the addendum, would also be included inthe negotiating text.

QUANTIFIED EMISSIONS LIMITATION AND REDUCTION OBJECTIVES

Prior to consideration of QELROs, delegates heard statements from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). CLIMATEACTION NETWORK, on behalf of environmental NGOs, asked delegates if they had the political will and moral character toact in the best interest of all the citizens of the world. She also called for a 20% reduction in carbon dioxide emissions by 2005.The US and EUROPEAN BUSINESS COUNCILS FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY proposed as priorities: setting clear near-term targets and time frames; using market-based tools to account for "external costs" of energy, which would allow each Partyto select suitable options; and reducing and eliminating institutional barriers, such as subsidies and tax exemptions.

The INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, on behalf ofEuropean industries, noted that the years 2005 and 2010 are impracticably close deadlines. He said developing countries areexpected to generate two-thirds of global greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 and urged delegates to secure worldwideagreement. The AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR-CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, on behalf oflabor groups, expressed concern that "harsh, arbitrary" flat-rate reductions in greenhouse gas emissions are being proposedwithout regard to their impact on working people. He urged delegates to remember that they hold the power to destroy jobs andincomes of millions.

Following these statements, delegates discussed aspects of the proposals on QELROs contained in the Framework Compilation(FCCC/AGBM/1997/2 and Add.1).

On "guiding objectives," the EU stated that eventual reduction of CO2 emissions to 50% of their current levels is required tokeep global average temperature from increasing more than two degrees above its pre-industrial level. He recalled the recentdecision of the EU Council of Environment Ministers, which established a common position on a reduction target for the year2010. The EU’s proposal states that, in the longer term, more sophisticated methods to allocate reduction targets shall beimplemented and will eventually lead to a convergence of emission levels based on appropriate indicators. The EU could notaccept Iran’s proposed condition that QELROs for Annex I Parties must not affect international trade or national incomes ofdeveloping countries, particularly those exporting fossil fuels.

The EU also suggested that the US proposal regarding establishment of long-term goals could be incorporated into the new EUsubmission. The US responded that this change should await a written submission from the EU.

On "legal character" of QELROs, the EU reiterated its support for QELROs for significant overall reductions and noted thatP&Ms should also be legally-binding. SWITZERLAND stressed that each Annex I Party should adopt legally-bindingQELROs. NIGERIA requested the deletion of a reference to the Geneva Ministerial Declaration, which calls for legally-binding QELROs for Annex I Parties within specified time frames with respect to sources and removal of sinks of greenhousegases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. He emphasized that the Declaration was not adopted and noted that the G-77/CHINA proposal to set "realistic and achievable QELROs in a comprehensive manner" reflects its substance. PERUreferred to the Geneva Declaration and called for reduction target for the year 2005.

On "coverage," the EU proposed covering carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), and to addhydrofluorocarbon (HFC), perfluorocarbon (PFC) and sulphurhexafluoride (SF6) to the "basket" of gases by 2000. P&Ms toreduce emissions of these gases should be included in the protocol. The US proposed merging paragraphs on Annex Icommitments based on the CO2 equivalents of their emission contributions to the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases andon the exception of sources and sinks for which there is insufficient knowledge of the global warming potential (GWP) orinability to accurately measure emissions or removals. HUNGARY supported the US’s long-term goal for reduction ofatmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations.

NORWAY and ICELAND withdrew their proposals, as they were contained in other proposals. SAUDI ARABIA insisted onreferences to sinks and greenhouse gases other than CO2. CHINA said that the text should only include issues on whichagreement has been reached. JAPAN did not agree and called for retention of its proposal that QELROs would be set for CO2only. The MARSHALL ISLANDS, on behalf of AOSIS, stressed the need for hard targets for CO2 reductions.

On "level and timing/emissions budgets," the EU urged early stabilization of greenhouse gases. He noted that sections of theEU proposal in the Framework Compilation should be replaced with the new EU common position. The position states thatAnnex X Parties, individually or jointly, in accordance with the Berlin Mandate, shall reduce emission levels for CO2, CH4and N2O together (weighted total, using GWP, with a 100-year time horizon) by 15% by 2010 with a reference year of 1990.An interim target for 2005 will also be set. The EU opposed the concept of borrowing and the consideration of emissionsbudgets without QELROs and timetables. He favored flexibility regarding the base year for countries with economies intransition.

The G-77/CHINA called for: flexibility for Annex I countries due to their differences in starting points; no adverse effects ofP&Ms on developing countries; and no further commitments for developing countries. CHINA called for all other Annex Icountries to propose QELROs with time frames as the EU has done. He opposed emissions borrowing and, with HUNGARY,opposed a new category for countries that are rapidly developing. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION highlighted his proposal thatnew commitments of Parties do not cancel, reconsider or prolong commitments adopted by Annex I Parties for the periodbefore the year 2000. He supported 2010 as a target and said that 2005 as an intermediate target seems unrealistic. TheMARSHALL ISLANDS called for separate and short-term targets for reducing the level for CO2 emissions. The US stressedthat the Berlin Mandate does not preclude emissions budgets. He noted that the EU proposal does not specify whethercountries should abide by QELROs individually or jointly. He also suggested that the EU proposal include Table 1 of thedecision by the EU Council of Environment Ministers. This table specifies emission reduction targets for each EU country. TheEU responded that the Council decision is not part of the EU proposal for the protocol.

On 4 March, Chair Chow Kok Kee (MALAYSIA) reported on the roundtable on differentiation. He noted a growing consensusthat indicators will be useful in negotiating QELROs. He also acknowledged divergent views on whether or not the EUCouncil of Environment Ministers’ decision illustrates a differentiation practice applicable outside the EU.

The EU requested more time to determine whether proposals from individual EU countries could be deleted and incorporatedinto the EU’s new proposals. NORWAY noted that ambitious targets via legally-binding commitments can only be achievedthrough efforts such as differentiation, equitable burden sharing, comprehensive treatment of sources and sinks, andcoordination of economic instruments. He also noted that the EU decision illustrates how differentiation facilitates moreambitious targets. He stated that a 10 to 15% reduction for Annex I countries by the year 2010 would be both ambitious andrealistic. The US restated that a differentiated approach would not be appropriate. AUSTRALIA insisted that its complete texton differentiation be reproduced in the document.

On the issue of "flexibility," MALAYSIA, supported by CHINA, requested deletion of the entire section. He said that the issuewas already covered under differentiation and QELROs. The EU noted the high improbability of reaching agreement on atrading system in time for COP-3. He cited disagreement on the use of procedures for monitoring and verification and the usetrading as a substitute or delaying mechanism for domestic action.

On "Joint Implementation" (JI), the G-77/CHINA called for the deletion of the entire section. UZBEKISTAN called for theretention of text noting that JI can serve as an instrument to allow technology transfer on a more beneficial basis. The EU saidthat Germany’s proposal that "a certain portion yet to be determined may be met through JI, whereby a significant part of thecommitments must be met through measures within each Party’s own territory" should be retained for now. SWITZERLANDsupported retaining its proposal that: JI may contribute up to 50% to meeting a country’s fulfillment of commitments; JI maybegin in 2000; and JI can also take place with non-Parties to the Protocol. PERU requested retaining JI in the text, until thereview at year’s end.

Delegates also discussed impacts that new Annex I commitments may have on developing countries. SAUDI ARABIA andNIGERIA requested retaining paragraphs relating to loss of income. The EU did not support a compensation mechanism forfinancial losses of oil producing countries.

Proposals in the Framework Compilation related to measurement, reporting and communication of information and voluntaryapplication of commitments by non-Annex I Parties were accepted without amendment.

On 7 March, the Chair introduced "Draft text by the chairman, strengthening the commitments in Article 4.2(a) and (b):quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives within specified time frames (QELROs)." This document includes sixsections: introductory elements by the Chair; atmospheric concentration; level and timing; flexibility; possible impacts ondeveloping countries of new commitments in the new instrument/socio-economic injuries sustained by developing countries;and measurement, reporting and communication of information. The section on level and timing includes: proposals forspecific flat-rate targets and timetables for CO2 and other greenhouse gases; support for such targets and timetables withoutreference to specific numbers; differentiation via various indicators; provisions for regional economic integrationorganizations; emissions budgets; emissions based on a cumulative emissions basis; and joint implementation.

NEW ZEALAND requested that its proposal on sinks contained in Addendum 1 to the Framework Compilation be included inthe additional proposal section on "level and timing." The draft text was accepted for inclusion in the negotiating text.

CONTINUING TO ADVANCE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING COMMITMENTS IN ARTICLE 4.1

On 6 March, Chair Evans King (Trinidad and Tobago) presented a report from the non-group on "Continuing to advance theimplementation of existing commitments in Article 4.1." He said that the non-group held two meetings on 4 and 5 March inwhich a collegial atmosphere facilitated frank dialogue. Discussions led to a streamlined text with narrative sections andallowed proposal authors to see how other countries viewed their proposals.

The report contains a streamlined text of the section in the Framework Compilation on continuing to advance theimplementation of existing commitments in Article 4.1. It consists of proposals requesting all Parties, inter alia, toimplement programmes containing measures to address emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all gases. It states thatthe process will reaffirm and continue to advance implementation of commitments in Article 4.1. and will not introduce anynew commitments for non-Annex I Parties.

Non-Annex I Parties’ implementation of Article 4.1 is contingent upon developed country Parties fulfilling commitmentsrelated to financial resources and technology transfer for: systematic observation and research; assessment at the national levelof economic and social impacts of climate change and of various response strategies; national education and trainingprogrammes; integrated plans for management of coastal zones, water resources, agriculture, conservation and enhancement ofsinks; data for initial national communications; and formulation, implementation, publication and updating of programmescontaining measures addressing climate change. The necessary resources for the implementation of these activities are to beprovided by the operating entity of the financial mechanism.

The report also contains proposals requesting all Parties to: regularly update national programmes that include P&Ms forincreasing energy efficiency and improving the transport sector and industrial process efficiency; provide annual greenhousegas inventory data on the basis of IPCC compatible methodologies; and make available to the COP strategies for mitigatingclimate change and national inventories of technology needs.

Proposals included in the report would also require Parties to foster bilateral, regional and global cooperation for: developmentof national inventories and indicators; development, application and diffusion of technologies; voluntary participation in AIJ;participation in the work of international bodies and programmes on climate change mitigation and adaptation; strengtheningof legal and institutional frameworks; investment in climate-friendly technologies; and reporting on public education andparticipation.

Proposals would also require that in-depth reviews of Annex I Parties’ communications include a formal opportunity for otherParties to ask questions. Parties proposed that non-Annex A or Annex B Parties would submit to the secretariat: annualinventories of greenhouse gas emissions; measures implemented; and quantified effects of actual and potential measures.Proposals would also require that all Parties establish a process for reviewing communications.

INSTITUTIONS, MECHANISMS & OTHER CLAUSES

Mr. Takao Shibata (Japan) chaired the non-group on elements related to institutions, mechanisms and other clauses, which metfrom 4-5 March. On 7 March, Mr. Shibata presented the report of the non-group. He explained that this document is based onsections of the Framework Compilation dealing with preamble and definitions, institutions and processes, and final elements.Section I on introductory elements concerns preamble and definitions. Section II addresses the following institutions andprocesses attendant to the protocol: conference of the Parties/meeting of the Parties; secretariat; subsidiary bodies; coordinationmechanism; financial mechanism; review of information and review of implementation and compliance; a multilateralconsultative process; and dispute settlement. Section III on final elements contains several parts including decision making,amendments, relationship with the Convention, adoption and amendment of annexes, right to vote, relationship to otheragreements, signature, ratification and entry into force.

He reported that, in adhering to its "non-mandate" to streamline proposals, the non-group produced a document that he wasconfident the AGBM would approve. Although the non-group did not complete its work on "final elements," the groupentrusted Mr. Shibata and the secretariat to finish work on this section.

ROUNDTABLES

This roundtable was convened on 3 March to give delegates who had not presented their submissions to the FrameworkCompilation the opportunity to elaborate on their proposals and respond to questions. AGBM Vice-Chair SuphavitPiamphongsant (Thailand) opened the roundtable and noted that 18 new proposals had been submitted.

The proposal by POLAND, BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA and SLOVENIA stated that QELROs should be legally-binding. Proposed criteria for QELROs include: GDP per capita; each Party’s contribution to global emissions; and emissionsper capita and/or emissions intensity of GDP. They also preferred the "menu approach" for establishing measures to be adoptedby Parties.

The EU proposal includes a general commitment for Parties listed in "Annex X," which would consist of OECD members andcountries with economies in transition. It groups P&Ms into Annex A (mandatory), Annex B (high priority) and Annex C(priority). The proposal allows for joint implementation and voluntary application by non-Annex X Parties.

The G-77/CHINA urged the AGBM to adhere to the Convention and the Berlin Mandate and refrain from developing newcommitments for non-Annex I Parties. The G-77/CHINA proposal calls for: ensuring that P&Ms have no adverse socio-economic impacts on developing countries; establishing a concrete compensation mechanism for damage in developingcountries arising from implementation of response measures; and setting QELROs within specified time frames, such as 2005,2010 and 2020.

FRANCE proposed differentiating the commitments of Annex I Parties according to present emission levels of greenhousegases per inhabitant and per GDP. He proposed coordinating P&Ms at an international level and considering joint measuresbetween Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. ICELAND proposed differentiation and the following parameters for identifyingdifferences in national circumstances: greenhouse gas (GHG) emission intensity and level, share of renewable energy sourcesand GDP per capita. He supported the formula Norway presented at AGBM-5, amended to account for the share of renewableenergy. MALAYSIA commented that parameters are changing regularly. MAURITIUS inquired about a supervisorymechanism for this formula. VENEZUELA, supported by COSTA RICA, suggested "historical responsibility" as anadditional criterion for differentiation. SWITZERLAND added "past efforts" by countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissionsas another criterion.

IRAN’s proposal opposes CO2 taxes, energy taxes and new commitments for non-Annex I countries. His suggestions forreducing GHG emissions include: a focus on all GHGs; market-determined energy prices; removal of subsidies on coal andpolluting energy sources; development of renewable energy sources; enhancement of sinks; and attention to production andconsumption sector activities and industrial processes. IRAN also proposed a compensation mechanism for adverse impacts ofresponse measures. Responding to ZIMBABWE, IRAN noted that its proposed compensation mechanism is designed tocompensate countries that incur losses due to polices and measures stipulated by the AGBM legal instrument and does notprovide funds for countries that incur damages resulting directly from climate change. The US suggested that the proposalrequires the AGBM to project the consequences of non-action and asked what methodology would be used to make such aprojection. IRAN replied that further details would be supplied at a later date.

AUSTRALIA proposed: a collective reduction objective for "Annex A" Parties, which are those listed in Annex I of theFCCC; mitigation activities that result in equal percentage changes in per capita economic welfare among "Annex A" Parties;differentiated commitments; use of indicators in the negotiation process; and further consideration of market-based approachessuch as emissions trading and joint implementation. The proposal also supports a regular review process that Parties mayactivate with regard to their own commitments. Responding to MALAYSIA, AUSTRALIA said formula approaches are toosimplistic to account for wide variations among countries’ circumstances and emphasized that differentiation is not a means todelay action, but to achieve fairness. AOSIS asked why supporters of differentiation had not pooled their proposals andrequested information on how differentiation would work in practice. CHINA expressed concern that emissions trading wouldreplace government commitments with activities of firms and individuals.

KUWAIT, NIGERIA and SAUDI ARABIA supported the proposal by the G-77/CHINA. They expressed concern abouteconomic and social consequences of developed country Parties’ policies and measures and requested adequate compensationfor developing countries. They recalled Article 4.8(h), which refers to countries whose economies are highly dependent onincome generated from fossil fuels, and Article 4.10, which states that Parties shall take into consideration the specific needsand concerns of fossil fuel producing countries and adverse effects resulting from the implementation of commitments. Theynoted that developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change.

The US asked whether: developed countries that export fossil fuel or suffer from increased oil prices are eligible forcompensation; developers of solar power are liable for injury; and developed countries that take action to prevent damage indeveloping countries are also liable under this proposal. SAUDI ARABIA reiterated that developed country Parties should bearmore of the burden and accommodate such effects through measures like differentiation. ITALY pointed out that theConvention does not include a compensation mechanism. SAUDI ARABIA, supported by IRAN, noted Article 4.8, stating thatfunding action be considered in regard to the specific needs of developing countries. KUWAIT noted his disappointment thatthe developed countries’ proposals do not mention any provision for developing countries’ compensation.

CANADA noted that economic change resulting from changes in energy sources has occurred over the past century and willcontinue regardless of a protocol. SAUDI ARABIA emphasized that it is the right of every Party to try to minimize the adverseimpacts of an international legally-binding agreement according to provisions given in the Convention. NEW ZEALANDemphasized the importance of flexibility with respect to time (multi-year average emissions limitations); place (emissionstrading); and coverage (all GHGs and sinks).

The US proposal contains: emissions budgets (banking and borrowing emissions); and annual reports on measurement,reporting and compliance by "Annex A" and "Annex B" countries. Annex B would contain countries that have voluntarilyentered before protocol adoption. Other elements of the US proposal are: non-compliance measures (e.g. denial of opportunityto engage in emissions trading or loss of voting rights); continuing to advance implementation of Article 4.1, particularly "noregrets" measures; and emissions trading between Parties with budgets, and joint implementation between all Parties. Severalcountries noted the complexity of the US proposal. In response to the EU, the US highlighted the ability of countries todetermine their own budgets and the penalty for emissions borrowing. THAILAND suggested that the AGBM not spend timediscussing emissions trading.

UZBEKISTAN proposed differentiation for Annex I Parties, according to the level of economic development and GDP percapita. He called for flexibility regarding obligations of countries with economies in transition, and developed country supportfor non-Annex I country activities.

ROUNDTABLE ON NEW PROPOSALS FROM PARTIES

This roundtable was convened on 3 March to give delegates who had not presented their submissions to the FrameworkCompilation the opportunity to elaborate on their proposals and respond to questions. AGBM Vice-Chair SuphavitPiamphongsant (Thailand) opened the roundtable and noted that 18 new proposals had been submitted.

The proposal by POLAND, BULGARIA, ESTONIA, LATVIA and SLOVENIA stated that QELROs should be legally-binding. Proposed criteria for QELROs include: GDP per capita; each Party’s contribution to global emissions; and emissionsper capita and/or emissions intensity of GDP. They also preferred the "menu approach" for establishing measures to be adoptedby Parties.

The EU proposal includes a general commitment for Parties listed in "Annex X," which would consist of OECD members andcountries with economies in transition. It groups P&Ms into Annex A (mandatory), Annex B (high priority) and Annex C(priority). The proposal allows for joint implementation and voluntary application by non-Annex X Parties.

The G-77/CHINA urged the AGBM to adhere to the Convention and the Berlin Mandate and refrain from developing newcommitments for non-Annex I Parties. The G-77/CHINA proposal calls for: ensuring that P&Ms have no adverse socio-economic impacts on developing countries; establishing a concrete compensation mechanism for damage in developingcountries arising from implementation of response measures; and setting QELROs within specified time frames, such as 2005,2010 and 2020.

FRANCE proposed differentiating the commitments of Annex I Parties according to present emission levels of greenhousegases per inhabitant and per GDP. He proposed coordinating P&Ms at an international level and considering joint measuresbetween Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. ICELAND proposed differentiation and the following parameters for identifyingdifferences in national circumstances: greenhouse gas (GHG) emission intensity and level, share of renewable energy sourcesand GDP per capita. He supported the formula Norway presented at AGBM-5, amended to account for the share of renewableenergy. MALAYSIA commented that parameters are changing regularly. MAURITIUS inquired about a supervisorymechanism for this formula. VENEZUELA, supported by COSTA RICA, suggested "historical responsibility" as anadditional criterion for differentiation. SWITZERLAND added "past efforts" by countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissionsas another criterion.

IRAN’s proposal opposes CO2 taxes, energy taxes and new commitments for non-Annex I countries. His suggestions forreducing GHG emissions include: a focus on all GHGs; market-determined energy prices; removal of subsidies on coal andpolluting energy sources; development of renewable energy sources; enhancement of sinks; and attention to production andconsumption sector activities and industrial processes. IRAN also proposed a compensation mechanism for adverse impacts ofresponse measures. Responding to ZIMBABWE, IRAN noted that its proposed compensation mechanism is designed tocompensate countries that incur losses due to polices and measures stipulated by the AGBM legal instrument and does notprovide funds for countries that incur damages resulting directly from climate change. The US suggested that the proposalrequires the AGBM to project the consequences of non-action and asked what methodology would be used to make such aprojection. IRAN replied that further details would be supplied at a later date.

AUSTRALIA proposed: a collective reduction objective for "Annex A" Parties, which are those listed in Annex I of theFCCC; mitigation activities that result in equal percentage changes in per capita economic welfare among "Annex A" Parties;differentiated commitments; use of indicators in the negotiation process; and further consideration of market-based approachessuch as emissions trading and joint implementation. The proposal also supports a regular review process that Parties mayactivate with regard to their own commitments. Responding to MALAYSIA, AUSTRALIA said formula approaches are toosimplistic to account for wide variations among countries’ circumstances and emphasized that differentiation is not a means todelay action, but to achieve fairness. AOSIS asked why supporters of differentiation had not pooled their proposals andrequested information on how differentiation would work in practice. CHINA expressed concern that emissions trading wouldreplace government commitments with activities of firms and individuals.

KUWAIT, NIGERIA and SAUDI ARABIA supported the proposal by the G-77/CHINA. They expressed concern abouteconomic and social consequences of developed country Parties’ policies and measures and requested adequate compensationfor developing countries. They recalled Article 4.8(h), which refers to countries whose economies are highly dependent onincome generated from fossil fuels, and Article 4.10, which states that Parties shall take into consideration the specific needsand concerns of fossil fuel producing countries and adverse effects resulting from the implementation of commitments. Theynoted that developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change.

The US asked whether: developed countries that export fossil fuel or suffer from increased oil prices are eligible forcompensation; developers of solar power are liable for injury; and developed countries that take action to prevent damage indeveloping countries are also liable under this proposal. SAUDI ARABIA reiterated that developed country Parties should bearmore of the burden and accommodate such effects through measures like differentiation. ITALY pointed out that theConvention does not include a compensation mechanism. SAUDI ARABIA, supported by IRAN, noted Article 4.8, stating thatfunding action be considered in regard to the specific needs of developing countries. KUWAIT noted his disappointment thatthe developed countries’ proposals do not mention any provision for developing countries’ compensation.

CANADA noted that economic change resulting from changes in energy sources has occurred over the past century and willcontinue regardless of a protocol. SAUDI ARABIA emphasized that it is the right of every Party to try to minimize the adverseimpacts of an international legally-binding agreement according to provisions given in the Convention. NEW ZEALANDemphasized the importance of flexibility with respect to time (multi-year average emissions limitations); place (emissionstrading); and coverage (all GHGs and sinks).

The US proposal contains: emissions budgets (banking and borrowing emissions); and annual reports on measurement,reporting and compliance by "Annex A" and "Annex B" countries. Annex B would contain countries that have voluntarilyentered before protocol adoption. Other elements of the US proposal are: non-compliance measures (e.g. denial of opportunityto engage in emissions trading or loss of voting rights); continuing to advance implementation of Article 4.1, particularly "noregrets" measures; and emissions trading between Parties with budgets, and joint implementation between all Parties. Severalcountries noted the complexity of the US proposal. In response to the EU, the US highlighted the ability of countries todetermine their own budgets and the penalty for emissions borrowing. THAILAND suggested that the AGBM not spend timediscussing emissions trading.

UZBEKISTAN proposed differentiation for Annex I Parties, according to the level of economic development and GDP percapita. He called for flexibility regarding obligations of countries with economies in transition, and developed country supportfor non-Annex I country activities.

ROUNDTABLE ON DIFFERENTIATION

This roundtable was convened following a request by AGBM-5 to allow delegates to informally exchange views ondifferentiation. Chair Chow Kok Kee (Malaysia) welcomed the speakers on differentiation and called for a non-confrontationalprocess that promotes understanding rather than political positions. Mr. Harald Dovland (Norway) said that differentiationprovides for a more equitable and ambitious goal than the lowest common denominator agreement allowed by a flat-rateapproach. He highlighted single and multiple criteria approaches to differentiation and emphasized that differentiation formulasare not necessarily meant to determine binding targets, but to provide tools for guiding negotiations.

He cited the EU’s proposed goals as an ambitious example for differentiation and cautioned that flexible instruments, such asjoint implementation, are not a replacement for differentiation.

The US did not support the suggestion that progress can be achieved through differentiation and said that under a flat ratecountries could accomplish more. He questioned the "trade-off" between differentiation and a flat rate and asked if a system ofdifferentiation is necessary. The Chair then introduced other panelists, who spoke in their individual capacity.

Mr. Akihiko Furuya (Japan) said that differentiation is indispensable for achieving fairness and noted that the Berlin Mandatecalls for taking into account the different starting points of countries. He discussed a "formula-based approach," under whichQELROs can be divided according to specific indicators. He also noted the "selective approach," under which countries coulduse GDP as an indicator, and the "negotiation approach," under which each country would negotiate its QELROs with othercountries.

Mr. Maciej Sadowski (Poland) said that the preferred approach involves differentiation by countries and noted that aggregationinto groups could be effective. He underscored the political difficulties in agreeing on a common set of criteria and proposedconcentrating on the target to be achieved by each Party.

Amb. Louet (France) noted that differentiation is not a result of theoretical considerations, but of unavoidable practicalnecessity. He noted that the EU has adopted a common position and explained that a greenhouse gas emissions reduction of30% for Luxembourg and 25% for Germany, could be offset by Portugal’s and Greece’s respective greenhouse gas emissionsincrease of 30% and 40%, which account for differences in starting points. He noted that even countries favoring the flat-rateconcept recognize the need for flexibility. He cautioned that a tradable permit system would give premium to the biggestproducer of greenhouse gases.

The EU underlined the differences in countries’ ability and costs associated with meeting commitments. As a regional group, itis taking on joint commitments and will engage in internal burdensharing. A number of EU countries are willing to committhemselves to reduce emissions. SWITZERLAND stressed that there is no good unique indicator that can take into accountnational circumstances and said that the logical starting point of the discussion is agreement on the quantity to differentiate.

The US suggested focusing on targets, outcomes and QELROs so that overall reductions can take place while Parties who findtargets burdensome can trade emissions with others. GERMANY urged countries to enrich progress by making concreteproposals regarding numbers for significant overall reductions and the contributions that countries intend to make toward thesegoals.

Amb. Howard Bamsey (Australia) stressed that differentiation is necessary for reflecting different national circumstances. Henoted there are a large number of proposals, but a small number of indicators. He outlined common groups among proposedindicators: those based on economic structures and resource bases; those based on emission reduction tasks includingpopulation growth, economic growth and per capita resources; and others based on trade impacts.

GERMANY stated that differentiation within the EU was not based on indicators, because indicators do not reflect politicalreality. She noted that Germany, Denmark and Austria accepted the largest shares of the reduction burden because they areconvinced that combating climate change is important. The US noted that the EU collectively argued in 1990 that they wouldreduce emissions drastically. He said this reduction would have been possible with a flat-rate.

GERMANY, referring to the EU experience, suggested making a joint commitment for a future protocol, setting commontargets for Annex I Parties and deciding how to share them. AUSTRALIA asked how differentiation was achieved within theEU and noted this could set an example for Annex I countries on the road to Kyoto. ICELAND stressed the need to reachconclusions on differentiation before Kyoto.

CLOSING PLENARY

AGBM Chair Ral Estrada-Oyuela opened the final meeting of AGBM-6 by instructing delegates to focus attention on thethree draft texts that reflect efforts to streamline the Framework Compilation and its Addendum: the report of the non-group onelements related to institutions, mechanisms and other clauses; the Chair’s draft text on QELROs; and the Chair’s draft text onelements related to objective, principles, review of commitments, education, training and public awareness, evolution andannexes.

The Chair introduced his draft text on "Elements related to objective, principles, review of commitments, education, trainingand public awareness, evolution and annexes." Section I of the document addresses objective and principles. The fourproposals on objective reflect a range of views: while one proposal calls for QELROs, another simply refers to Article 2 of theConvention and paragraph 2 of the Berlin Mandate.

Proposals in the section on principles note difficulties of countries dependent on fossil fuel production, coordination betweenclimate change responses and socio-economic development, and transfer of technology.

Proposals in Section II, Review of Commitments, address timing, criteria, mechanisms and the scope of reviews, as well as aParty’s ability to activate the review process with regard to its own commitments. Section III, Education, Training and PublicAwareness, refers to Article 6 of the Convention. Section IV, Evolution, addresses conditions under which future commitmentsshould develop. Section V, Annexes, contains proposals concerning listing of Parties, QELROs and methodological issues.Delegates agreed the draft text will be included in the negotiating text.

Regarding the organization of future work, he informed the AGBM of an extension of the deadline for new proposals to 1April 1997. The negotiating text will be available in the six official UN languages by 1 June. It will replace narrative sectionsof the text with legal language. CHINA stressed that the AGBM has not started negotiating yet and requested retention of thetitle "draft text by the Chairman" for the new document. The Chair did not accept this request and refused to hear any furthercomments on this matter. CHINA, supported by HUNGARY, also requested that any text submitted after the deadline shouldbe included in the addendum of the new text. The CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC supported China’s proposal and calledfor an addendum for new proposals rather than integration into the Chair’s draft text. The EU also called for clarification onthis matter. The Chair responded that late submissions will be published in full in Miscellaneous documents. The Chair saidthat any new proposals should be structured like the framework compilation and should be clearly derived from proposalsalready on the table. The Chair noted that the next session, scheduled from 28 July to 7 August 1997 in Bonn, will be moredifficult as Parties will have to engage in negotiations. He announced that there will be two teams of interpreters to allow twomeetings to convene in parallel and repeated that the session will start on Thursday 31 July, rather than Friday, 1 August. Herequested Parties to review the negotiating text before the next session and emphasized that Annex I Parties must reviewQELROs and policies and measures, stressing that without agreement among themselves negotiations will be blocked. Herecalled that Annex I Parties should take the lead, show the will to advance the process, and fill in the "blanks" long beforeKyoto. Participants also decided to request the rapporteur, with the support of the secretariat, to prepare the report of thesession. The Chair said that the negotiating text will be added to the report as an addendum.

The G-77/CHINA stressed that all proposals outside the Berlin Mandate should be "off the table" at AGBM-7. He also statedthat there should be agreement on QELROs before issues of implementation are further discussed. He reiterated that articles ofthe Convention should apply to the protocol or other legal instrument and announced that, in addition to proposals made inDecember 1996, they would like to table further proposals. These should be read together with proposals previously submitted.They said that former proposals would be complementary but not inconsistent with the new proposal. On the suggestion ofCHINA, the Chair agreed to include the G-77/China proposal in a Miscellaneous document.

PERU pointed out that Annex I Parties’ proposals lack numbers and that in this sense the meeting was a "disappointment". Shenoted the lack of figures for 2005 in the EU proposal and submitted a proposal that includes a demand for Annex I Parties toreduce emissions by 15% in 2005. The Chair apologized for interrupting the statements of many Parties but added that he is"trying to conduct the business in the best way" and warned that the number of Parties he will interrupt at the next session maybe even greater.

AGBM-6 was adjourned at 12.15 pm on Friday, 7 March 1997.

OTHER SUBSIDIARY BODIES

On 6 March, AGBM Chair Estrada announced that progress was made on the election of officers other than the Chair for theSBSTA. MOROCCO, on behalf of the African Group, reported the following nominees: Mr. Soobaraj Nayroo Sok Appadu(Mauritius) as the Vice-Chair of SBSTA and Mr. Alvaro Jos Rodriguez (Colombia) as Rapporteur. JAMAICA thanked theAfrican Group for this offer and requested that it be recorded. SBSTA Chair Tibor Farago (Hungary) noted that the officialelection would take place during the next SBSTA session.

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ADVICE

On 6 March, AGBM Chair Estrada announced that progress was made on the election of officers other than the Chair for theSBSTA. MOROCCO, on behalf of the African Group, reported the following nominees: Mr. Soobaraj Nayroo Sok Appadu(Mauritius) as the Vice-Chair of SBSTA and Mr. Alvaro Jos Rodriguez (Colombia) as Rapporteur. JAMAICA thanked theAfrican Group for this offer and requested that it be recorded. SBSTA Chair Tibor Farago (Hungary) noted that the officialelection would take place during the next SBSTA session.

SUBSIDIARY BODY FOR IMPLEMENTATION

On 6 March, SBI Vice-Chair Jos Romero (Switzerland) reconvened SBI-5 to finish its work from the previous week. Hepresented the draft conclusions of the informal group on financial and technical cooperation chaired by Manuel Dengo (CostaRica). On review of the financial mechanism, the SBI welcomed new information provided at this session, including the reportprepared by the GEF (FCCC/SBI/1997/2) and two workshops conducted by the GEF. The conclusions note that the Partiesrequested additional time for review of this information. The SBI also noted that information from other sources, includingParties, would be particularly important for facilitating a fully-informed review. The SBI added that the report of the UNGeneral Assembly Special Session for the review of the implementation of Agenda 21 would be of interest for reviewing theGEF.

The SBI agreed to guidelines on the review process, invited Parties to submit views on the financial mechanism by 15 May1997, and requested the secretariat to prepare a compilation and a synthesis report of the submissions for SBI-6. The SBI alsohighlighted the need for full replenishment of the GEF. The proposed guidelines note objectives, methodology and criteria forthe review. The objectives will be to review the financial mechanism and to take appropriate measures regarding its:conformity with Article 11 of the Convention; conformity with the COP’s guidance; effectiveness in implementing theConvention and in providing financial resources on a grant or concessional basis, including the transfer of technology; andeffectiveness in providing resources to developing country Parties under Article 4.3.

Under methodology, the review shall draw upon the following sources: information provided by Parties on their experienceswith the financial mechanism; annual reviews by the COP on how the financial mechanism’s activities conform with theCOP’s guidance; the GEF’s annual report to the COP; reports from the GEF monitoring and evaluation programme; reportsfrom the Commission on Sustainable Development and relevant bilateral and multilateral funding institutions; and relevantinformation provided by other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations.

Under criteria, the effectiveness of the financial mechanism will be assessed taking into account the following: transparency ofdecision-making processes; adequacy, predictability and timely disbursement of funds for activities in developing countryParties; responsiveness and efficiency of the GEF project cycle and expedited procedures, including its operational strategy;amount of resources provided to developing country Parties, including financing for technical assistance and investmentprojects; amount of finance leveraged; and sustainability of funded projects.

The SBI also took note of the information on relevant action by the GEF Council, contained in documentFCCC/SBI/1997/Misc.3, and requested the secretariat to provide subsequent SBI sessions with such information as it becomesavailable. The Vice-Chair thanked delegates for their participation and adjourned SBI-5.

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF AGBM-6

Bonn hosted the February/March meetings of the four FCCC subsidiary bodies, marking their first sessions in the secretariat’snew home town. SBSTA, SBI and AG-13 met during the first week to continue their work on issues such as budgetary matters,joint implementation, technology transfer and a multilateral consultative process. AGBM-6 set itself the task of "streamlining"its Framework Compilation of proposals into a negotiating text for its next session. In this regard, AGBM-6 was neither adisappointment nor a ripping success. Delegates managed to merge or eliminate some overlapping provisions within themyriad of proposals contained in the Compilation. They also officially gave the Chair a mandate to produce a draft negotiatingtext. However, other proposals emerged in the eleventh hour, such as one by the G-77 on QELROs, which signaled thatAGBM-6 did not foster much progress on several fundamental points, despite the hopes of many observers. This meeting didnot necessarily eliminate the number of proposals on the table, it simply straightened and sorted them. AGBM-6 brought theParties one step, albeit a small one, closer to fulfilling its mandate.

A number of past disagreements did not rear their heads at this meeting, most notably over scientific uncertainty of climatechange or the form of the new instrument to be adopted at COP-3. Nonetheless, the meeting unveiled a host of disagreementsover the content of the protocol regarding issues such as timetables and targets, policies and measures, and compensation, andforeshadowed a number of battles on the horizon before Kyoto. In short, when it comes to the concepts now on the table, therestill seems to be fundamental disagreement. AGBM Chair Estrada, in his opening comments, noted that one serious problemfacing these negotiations was disagreement among developed countries on the content and treatment of issues that will formthe basis of the protocol.

Indeed several noticeable disagreements, mostly trans-Atlantic, emerged with respect to the targets and timetable for QELROsand the specifics related to policies and measures. Delegates also differed on the idea of differentiating between Annex IParties with regard to each Parties’ goal for lowered emissions. Developing countries, as well, voiced concerns, particularly onproposals containing unspecified new annexes and proposals on JI and trading.

QELROs: During the debate over QELROs, Parties voiced a number of diverse, often fundamentally different,perspectives. The EU, Switzerland and Norway were the only Annex I countries proposing specific targets. The strongest ofthese proposals came from the EU after its Ministerial Council meeting, calling for a 15% reduction across the EU by 2010,replacing a host of individual commitments from members of the EU. According to some, this proposal could overshadow theAOSIS protocol goal of 20% by 2005. The US, on the other hand, proposed emissions trading, multi-year emissions budgets,borrowing of emissions from future budgets and joint implementation with developing countries for credit. Apart from the fewdelegations who provided specific QELROs proposals, most governments based their proposals for strengtheningcommitments in Article 4.2 (a) and (b) on a call for flexibility. The aim of differentiation, as it was recurrently stated by itssupporters during plenary and roundtable discussions, is to achieve maximum flexibility. Whereas some countries, includingthe US, Australia and New Zealand continued to insist on flexible measures, such as JI and emissions trading, others used theterm "flexibility" for proposing to introduce different levels of commitment.

This request for "fairness" is based on the Berlin Mandate’s call for a consideration of different starting points of countries. Ifthe concept of differentiation would find its way into a protocol or other legal instrument, most Parties would probably present"special circumstances," which could move the debate from its essence — the reduction of GHG emissions — to intractabledistribution questions. Poland suggested resolving this problem by aggregating countries into groups. Germany and Russiafollowed this concept by proposing a certain degree of flexibility for countries with economies in transition. Norway andIceland put forward a specific formula for differentiation for all countries. Australia, Iran, Japan and Poland proposedindicators or criteria on which differentiation could be based. Not many of these, however, addressed the more practicalproblems concerning information and quantification to determine a fair and equitable set of commitments. The EU’sopposition to differentiating commitments caused some controversy, in particular after the EU presented its EnvironmentMinisters’ Council decision to implement its own, quantified targets by taking on board joint commitments and internalburdensharing. Several Parties stated that they viewed the internal burdensharing concept of the EU as a contradiction to theiropposition to differentiation. The US, formerly very strongly opposed to alternatives to a flat-rate approach, even suggestedincluding the table with the differentiated reduction targets as a proposal for the protocol "to have a full range of options."Having lost strong speakers against differentiation, the debate seems to have moved slightly from whether differentiation ispossible, to how differentiation can be accomplished.

The bottom line, however, still is that differentiation needs to be preceded by countries’ firm proposals for firm targets andtimetables. A number of developing countries were strongly suspicious of both the US proposal for emissions trading and theEU proposal on P&Ms and argued that both would prove far too complicated for a protocol.

COMPENSATION: Developed countries voiced their own concern about a potentially complicated matter as anotherdeveloping country issue came to the fore: impacts of P&Ms and compensation for these impacts. The G-77, particularly theoil-producing countries, called for concrete compensation mechanisms for adverse impacts on developing countries arisingfrom implementation of response measures. Iran, Nigeria and Kuwait provided some detailed suggestions on thesemechanisms, including the establishment of a compensation fund. Uzbekistan proposed to request the IPCC to makerecommendations on ways to reduce negative impacts of Annex I commitments on developing countries. Reaction to theserequests reflected that some delegations did not take the proposal too seriously and perhaps viewed it as a delaying strategy.One delegate asked if developed countries that suffer from increased oil prices would be eligible for compensation or ifdeveloped countries who help with adaptation measures would liable for injury. Within the G-77, AOSIS delegationsresponded that compensation should not concern lost revenues, but should address damages arising from temperature increasesand sea level rise. Some participants expressed surprise that AOSIS did not voice stronger support for this proposal given itsvulnerability to the effects of climate change. Others, however, suggested that AOSIS countries are fully aware of the practicalproblems in measuring, quantifying and billing for the impacts of climate change and a strong stance on this issue wouldmerely be another stone in the road.

Nonetheless, some participants reported that the G-77 proposal announced during the final day will include a reference tocompensation. Should support for this idea spread among members, the picture could become even more complicated. Thealready complicated mix of proposals on QELROs, according to many, raised more questions than it answered: how will JI andemissions trading be squared with QELROs? Under what conditions could developing countries accept AIJ and emissionstrading? How will the EU stance against differentiation among Annex I countries square with the fact that emission reductiontargets among EU countries range from a 40% increase to a 30% reduction? How closely will the US cling to many of itspositions, when a number of delegations appear steadfastly opposed? Nonetheless, one participant reported that the G-77proposals announced on the final day includes a "weak" reference to compensation. Should this concept become a focus ofdiscussion, it will add another factor to an already complicated picture and delay progress towards a protocol.

SBSTA: Discussions in other subsidiary bodies are linked to the AGBM and could provide marker of progress and anindicator for future negotiations. This round of subsidiary body meetings was marked by a relative absence of science-relateddisagreements. Past SBSTA sessions involved controversies over use of the IPCC Second Assessment Report (SAR). Incontrast, during AGBM-6, few if any delegates used scientific uncertainty to buttress their arguments. In fact, the EU cited theSAR’s results in presenting its proposed 15% emissions reduction target for the year 2010. Furthermore, IPCC Chair BertBolin created little reaction on the floor in stating that "no reasonable future reduction by Annex I countries would stabilizeglobal emissions." Absence of a heated science debate and the methodological tasks SBSTA outlined for the work planindicate that upcoming activities for the scientific community should focus on questions of implementation. It remains to beseen, however, what role scientists might play in assessing the impacts of P&M implementation by Annex I countries.

AG13: AG13’s discussions on a future multilateral consultative process (MCP), while at an early stage, producedwhat was characterized as its own Framework Compilation from past proposals and, based on discussions, could likelyencounter problems similar to the AGBM. While not exactly a microcosm, there is some solid agreement as well as divergentperspectives as AG13 is heading toward a negotiating process. Chair Patrick Szll opened AG13-4 stating that the groupcannot continue on a "diet of general statements" and, by the end of the session, noted that the group has achieved more thanexpected. Unlike the AGBM, delegates displayed a stronger willingness to compromise and incorporate proposals. This wasparticularly obvious when China and the EU tried to incorporate their proposals into the text. Like the AGBM, however,AG13’s efforts to clarify the form of a future MCP leave many details unclear, particularly in defining its field of expertise andin squaring its work with that of the SBI and SBSTA. Similarly, AG13-4 indicated that some differences will need to beresolved regarding the fundamental question of whether an MCP should have an advisory or a supervisory role.

SBI: The SBI’s discussions also indicated some areas of future disagreements. Delegates requested more time andmore detailed information on many newly-proposed programmes, and expressed particular concern over the post-Kyotoprocess. Budget items for peer reviews of developing country national communications and mentions of emissions tradingwere not popular with developing countries. Developed countries voiced concern over a proposed increase in secretariat staffand the need for more resources. Delegates likewise requested more time to consider details of the GEF review. Whendiscussing arrangements for COP-3, China and several other developing countries complained that negotiations on the GenevaMinisterial Declaration during COP-2 took them by surprise and, as a result, insisted on language noting that any newsubstantive proposals must be circulated six months prior to COP-3. When other delegations noted that standard UN practiceprovided ample warning, statements hinting at "conspiracy" and a lack of transparency arose frequently. This debate, waged atlength, could prove particularly telling for Kyoto.

LOOKING TOWARDS KYOTO: During discussion on differentiation, a statement from the US noted that indicatorscan be read two ways. The indicators of progress for the climate change negotiations are equally equivocal. Whether theseindicators signal that the AGBM is making slow, solid progress or slouching toward Kyoto seems a matter of opinion, asevidenced by participants’ comments.

One noted that the number of meetings will not hasten the progress of real action to combat climate change. Progress willoccur when the constituencies that stand to gain from action are mobilized and supportive of the potentially painful measuresthat could be required. To date, with the exception of small island States, the groups that would benefit directly from actionoften appear only via general if not vague terms, such as "future generations of mankind" and "global benefit of all." Thosewho face immediate monetary losses, however, are far more tangible and frequently waiting in the lobby. Another observernoted that AGBM-6 marked a milestone if only because the number of government delegates was surpassed by the number ofNGO representatives, most of whom came from industry.

One veteran observer commented that these negotiations were difficult and, given the scale of both the problem and thechanges entailed by a solution, delegates were making considerable progress and will accomplish their assigned task. Anotherparticipant summarized the views of many skeptics by noting a certain irony: while Parties talked, positioned and bargained,the Rhein overflowed its banks due to unseasonably warm weather and melting snow in the mountains.

Chair Estrada made ample use of the gavel in the final sessions of AGBM-6 in an attempt to keep Parties focused on theproposals and away from lengthy debate. He noted that he may have to employ a heavy gavel with even more frequency atfuture AGBM meetings. Of all the signals and indicators regarding future sessions, this one is probably the safest bet.

THINGS TO LOOK FOR

FCCC SUBSIDIARY BODIES: The next sessions of the subsidiary bodies are scheduled to take place in Bonnfrom 28 July to 7 August 1997 at the Hotel Maritim. SBSTA, SBI and AG-13 will meet from 28-30 July and will likely meetonce more the following week. The AGBM will begin on Thursday, 31 July. The subsidiary bodies are scheduled to meetagain from 20-31 October 1997 at a conference facility in Bonn to be determined. At present, all subsidiary bodies except forAG13 are scheduled to meet in October.

COP-3: The third Conference of the Parties is scheduled for 1-12 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. COP-3 willimmediately allocate the completion of decisions of the Berlin Mandate process to a sessional Committee of the Whole, opento all delegations. The political negotiations will be finalized in a ministerial segment, which will be convened from 8-10December and where the final text of a protocol or other legal instrument will be adopted. For all meetings related to theFCCC, contact the secretariat in Bonn, Germany; tel: +49-228-815-1000; fax: +49-228-815-1999; e-mail:secretariat@unfccc.de. Also try the FCCC home page at http://www.unfccc.de and UNEP’s Information Unit for Conventionsat http://www.unep.ch/iuc.html.

WORKSHOP ON ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY IN THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EAST REGION:This workshop will be held in Cairo, Egypt, on a date to be determined, and will be sponsored by the International Centre forEnvironment and Development (ICED) and the US Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI). The workshop intends tocontribute to the understanding of the concept of AIJ and international discussions supporting the FCCC, and provide anopportunity for countries to identify and discuss AIJ projects of regional importance. For more information, contact: Eng HadiaEl Zayyat; tel: +20-2-304-6032; fax: +20-2-304-6033; e-mail: iced@intouch.com, or Jackie Kreiger; tel: +1-202-586-3487;fax: +1-202-586-3485/86l; e-mail: cmst@igc.apc.org.

METHANE MITIGATION CONFERENCE: This conference, scheduled from 3-5 June 1997, will be held at theNational Agriculture University Campus, in Kiev, Ukraine. The conference intends to educate participants on the technical andeconomic aspects of methane mitigation. For information, contact Tom Kerr at the US Environmental Protection Agency; tel:+1-202-233-9768; fax: +1-202-233-9569; e-mail: kerr.tom@epamail.epa.gov.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY: Thisconference is scheduled from 26-29 May 1997, at the Westin Bayshore Hotel in Vancouver, Canada. The main aim of theconference is to provide the audience with speakers who have practical experience with technologies suitable for AIJ. Theywill report on their activities, highlighting achievements and potential pitfalls. For more information, contact Andrea Smith;tel: +44-0-1242-680753; fax: +44-0-1242-680758; e-mail: andrea@ieagreen.demon.co.uk. Also try their WWW site:http://www.ieagreen.org.uk.

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES EXHIBITION: This conferenceis scheduled from 12-13 June 1997 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, and is sponsored by the International Climate ChangePartnership and the US Environmental Protection Agency. The conference will feature two days of conference sessionsdesigned to demonstrate to the private and public sectors that the climate change policy process is moving forward in such amanner that will affect the global economy and, therefore, corporate business practices. For information contact: InternationalClimate Change Conference; tel: +1-703-807-4052; +1-703-243-2874.

WORLD SUMMIT OF CITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION: This conference, scheduled from 27-28 November1997, in Nagoya, Japan, will raise awareness of the importance of combating climate change at the local level. Participants willdiscuss ways that local governments can effectively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. For more information contactPhilip Jessup, Cities for Climate Protection; tel: +1-416-392-1462; fax: +1-416-392-1478; e-mail: pjessup@iclei.org.

CLIMATE CHANGE

FCCC SUBSIDIARY BODIES: The next sessions of the subsidiary bodies are scheduled to take place in Bonnfrom 28 July to 7 August 1997 at the Hotel Maritim. SBSTA, SBI and AG-13 will meet from 28-30 July and will likely meetonce more the following week. The AGBM will begin on Thursday, 31 July. The subsidiary bodies are scheduled to meetagain from 20-31 October 1997 at a conference facility in Bonn to be determined. At present, all subsidiary bodies except forAG13 are scheduled to meet in October.

COP-3: The third Conference of the Parties is scheduled for 1-12 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. COP-3 willimmediately allocate the completion of decisions of the Berlin Mandate process to a sessional Committee of the Whole, opento all delegations. The political negotiations will be finalized in a ministerial segment, which will be convened from 8-10December and where the final text of a protocol or other legal instrument will be adopted. For all meetings related to theFCCC, contact the secretariat in Bonn, Germany; tel: +49-228-815-1000; fax: +49-228-815-1999; e-mail:secretariat@unfccc.de. Also try the FCCC home page at http://www.unfccc.de and UNEP’s Information Unit for Conventionsat http://www.unep.ch/iuc.html.

WORKSHOP ON ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY IN THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EAST REGION:This workshop will be held in Cairo, Egypt, on a date to be determined, and will be sponsored by the International Centre forEnvironment and Development (ICED) and the US Initiative on Joint Implementation (USIJI). The workshop intends tocontribute to the understanding of the concept of AIJ and international discussions supporting the FCCC, and provide anopportunity for countries to identify and discuss AIJ projects of regional importance. For more information, contact: Eng HadiaEl Zayyat; tel: +20-2-304-6032; fax: +20-2-304-6033; e-mail: iced@intouch.com, or Jackie Kreiger; tel: +1-202-586-3487;fax: +1-202-586-3485/86l; e-mail: cmst@igc.apc.org.

METHANE MITIGATION CONFERENCE: This conference, scheduled from 3-5 June 1997, will be held at theNational Agriculture University Campus, in Kiev, Ukraine. The conference intends to educate participants on the technical andeconomic aspects of methane mitigation. For information, contact Tom Kerr at the US Environmental Protection Agency; tel:+1-202-233-9768; fax: +1-202-233-9569; e-mail: kerr.tom@epamail.epa.gov.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TECHNOLOGIES FOR ACTIVITIES IMPLEMENTED JOINTLY: Thisconference is scheduled from 26-29 May 1997, at the Westin Bayshore Hotel in Vancouver, Canada. The main aim of theconference is to provide the audience with speakers who have practical experience with technologies suitable for AIJ. Theywill report on their activities, highlighting achievements and potential pitfalls. For more information, contact Andrea Smith;tel: +44-0-1242-680753; fax: +44-0-1242-680758; e-mail: andrea@ieagreen.demon.co.uk. Also try their WWW site:http://www.ieagreen.org.uk.

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE AND TECHNOLOGIES EXHIBITION: This conferenceis scheduled from 12-13 June 1997 in Baltimore, Maryland, USA, and is sponsored by the International Climate ChangePartnership and the US Environmental Protection Agency. The conference will feature two days of conference sessionsdesigned to demonstrate to the private and public sectors that the climate change policy process is moving forward in such amanner that will affect the global economy and, therefore, corporate business practices. For information contact: InternationalClimate Change Conference; tel: +1-703-807-4052; +1-703-243-2874.

WORLD SUMMIT OF CITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION: This conference, scheduled from 27-28 November1997, in Nagoya, Japan, will raise awareness of the importance of combating climate change at the local level. Participants willdiscuss ways that local governments can effectively reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. For more information contactPhilip Jessup, Cities for Climate Protection; tel: +1-416-392-1462; fax: +1-416-392-1478; e-mail: pjessup@iclei.org.

COMMISSION ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

CSD: The fifth session of the CSD is scheduled for 8-25 April 1997. The Special Session of the UN GeneralAssembly for review of the implementation of Agenda 21 is scheduled for 23-27 June 1997. For information on the CSD or theSpecial Session contact: Andrey Vasilyev, UN Division for Sustainable Development; tel: +1-212-963-5949; fax: +1-212-963-4260; e-mail: vasilyev@un.org. Also try the DPCSD home page at http://www.un.org/DPCSD and the Special Session homepage at http://www.un.org/dpcsd/earthsummit/.

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY

GEF: The proposed schedule of GEF Council Meetings in 1997 includes: 18-19 May, NGO Consultation; 20-22 May,GEF Council Meeting; 2-3 November, NGO Consultation; and 4-6 November, GEF Council Meeting. For more informationcontact Marie Morgan at the GEF Secretariat; tel: +1-202-473-1128; fax: +1- 202-522-3240. Also try the GEF home page athttp://www.worldbank.org/html/gef.

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT

TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICT OR COMPATIBILITY?: This conference is scheduled for 11 April1997 at Chatham House in London and is sponsored by the Royal Institute for International Affairs, the American Chamber ofCommerce (UK) and Cameron May Ltd. This conference will provide the first opportunity for businesses, governmentsrepresentatives, NGOs and academics to analyze the current state of the debate in the wake of the WTO meeting. For moreinformation contact: Sharon Moore, the Conference Unit, Royal Institute for International Affairs; +(44) 171-957 5700; fax:+(44) 171-321 2045. Also try http://www.riia.org.