Published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD)
Vol. 12 No. 111
Saturday, 9 October 1999
INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION ON
COMPLIANCE UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:
6-7 OCTOBER 1999
The informal exchange of views and information on
compliance under the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC) was held from 6-7 October 1999 at the
Diplomatische Akademie in Vienna, Austria. The informal exchange was
designed to facilitate deliberations on the development of a
compliance system under the Kyoto Protocol. The workshop was organized
by the Austrian Government in cooperation with the FCCC Secretariat
and the Co-Chairs of the Joint Working Group on Compliance (JWG).
Ninety-seven participants attended the meeting, including experts,
representatives from governments, UN agencies, and intergovernmental
and non-governmental organizations. Participants met in several
sessions over two days to hear presentations from experts and discuss
various issues related to compliance, including: compliance regimes
under the Montreal Protocol, the Convention on Long-range
Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) and its protocols, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO); institutional issues such as facilitative and
enforcement functions, eligibility to raise issues and information
gathering; and issues related to the consequences of non-compliance.
The Co-Chairs of the JWG will prepare a non-paper on elements of a
compliance system based on discussions held during the workshop to be
presented to the fifth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCCC AND THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL
The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change was adopted on 9 May 1992, and was opened for signature
at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in June 1992. The
Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994, 90 days after receipt
of the 50th ratification. It has currently been ratified by 179
countries.
COP-1: The first meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to the FCCC (COP-1) took place in Berlin from 28 March
- 7 April 1995. In addition to addressing a number of important issues
related to the future of the Convention, delegates reached agreement
on what many believed to be the central issue before COP-1
adequacy of commitments, the "Berlin Mandate." Delegates
agreed to establish an open-ended Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM)
to begin a process toward appropriate action for the period beyond
2000, including the strengthening of the commitments of Annex I
Parties through the adoption of a protocol or another legal
instrument. COP-1 also requested the Secretariat to make arrangements
for sessions of the subsidiary bodies on scientific and technological
advice (SBSTA) and implementation (SBI). SBSTA serves as the link
between the information provided by competent international bodies,
and the policy-oriented needs of the COP. During the AGBM process,
SBSTA addressed several issues, including the treatment of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Second Assessment
Report (SAR). SBI was created to develop recommendations to assist the
COP in the review and assessment of the implementation of the
Convention and in the preparation and implementation of its decisions.
SBI addressed several key issues during the AGBM process, such as
national communications and activities implemented jointly.
Ad Hoc GROUP ON ARTICLE 13: AG13 was set
up to consider the establishment of a multilateral consultative
process available to Parties to resolve questions on implementation.
AG13-1, held from 30-31 October 1995 in Geneva, decided to request
Parties, non-Parties, and intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations to make written submissions in response to a
questionnaire on a multilateral consultative process (MCP).
Delegates continued their discussion over the
course of three meetings. At their fifth session, they agreed that the
MCP should be advisory rather than supervisory in nature and AG13
should complete its work by COP-4.
Ad Hoc GROUP ON THE BERLIN MANDATE: The
AGBM met eight times between August 1995 and COP-3 in December 1997.
During the first three sessions, delegates focused on analyzing and
assessing possible policies and measures to strengthen the commitments
of Annex I Parties, how Annex I countries might distribute or share
new commitments and whether commitments should take the form of an
amendment or protocol. AGBM-4, which coincided with COP-2 in Geneva in
July 1996, completed its in-depth analysis of the likely elements of a
protocol and States appeared ready to prepare a negotiating text. At
AGBM-5, which met in December 1996, delegates recognized the need to
decide whether or not to allow mechanisms that would provide Annex I
Parties with flexibility in meeting quantified emissions limitation
and reduction objectives (QELROs).
As the protocol was drafted during the sixth and
seventh sessions of the AGBM, in March and August 1997, respectively,
delegates "streamlined" a framework compilation text by
merging or eliminating some overlapping provisions within the myriad
of proposals. Much of the discussion centered on a proposal from the
EU for a 15% cut in a "basket" of three greenhouse gases by
the year 2010 compared to 1990 emission levels. In October 1997, as
AGBM-8 began, US President Bill Clinton included a call for
"meaningful participation" by developing countries in the
negotiating position he announced in Washington. The insistence on
G-77/China involvement was linked to the level of ambition acceptable
by the US and in response, the G-77/China distanced itself from
attempts to draw developing countries into agreeing to anything that
could be interpreted as new commitments.
COP-3: The Third Conference of the Parties
(COP-3) was held from 1-11 December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. Over 10,000
participants, including representatives from governments,
intergovernmental organizations, NGOs and the media, attended the
Conference, which included a high-level segment featuring statements
from over 125 ministers. Following a week and a half of intense formal
and informal negotiations, including a session that began on the final
evening and lasted into the following day, Parties to the FCCC adopted
the Kyoto Protocol on 11 December. In the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I
Parties to the FCCC agreed to commitments with a view to reducing
their overall emissions of six greenhouse gases (GHGs) by at least 5%
below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. The Protocol also established
emissions trading, "joint implementation" between developed
countries, and a "clean development mechanism" (CDM) to
encourage joint emissions reduction projects between developed and
developing countries. To date, 84 countries have signed and 14 have
ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol will enter into force 90
days after it is ratified by 55 States, including Annex I parties
representing at least 55% per cent of the total carbon dioxide
emissions for 1990.
Post-Kyoto subsidiary bodies Meetings: The
subsidiary bodies of the FCCC met from 2-12 June 1998 in Bonn,
Germany. SBSTA-8 agreed to draft conclusions on, inter alia,
cooperation with relevant international organizations, methodological
issues, and education and training. SBI-8 reached conclusions on,
inter alia, national communications, the financial mechanism and the
second review of adequacy of Annex I Party commitments.
In its sixth session, AG13 concluded its work on
the functions of the MCP. After joint SBI/SBSTA consideration and
extensive contact group debates on the flexibility mechanisms,
delegates could only agree to a compilation document containing
proposals from the G-77/China, the EU and the US on the issues for
discussion and frameworks for implementation.
COP-4: The Fourth Conference of the
Parties (COP-4) was held from 2-13 November 1998 in Buenos Aires,
Argentina, with over 5,000 participants in attendance. During the
two-week meeting, delegates deliberated decisions for the COP during
SBI-9 and SBSTA-9. Issues related to the Kyoto Protocol were
considered in joint SBI/SBSTA sessions. A high-level segment, that
heard statements from over 100 ministers and heads of delegation, was
convened on Thursday, 12 November. Following hours of high-level
closed door negotiations and a final plenary session that
concluded early Saturday morning, delegates adopted the Buenos Aires
Plan of Action. Under the Plan of Action, the Parties declared their
determination to strengthen the implementation of the Convention and
prepare for the future entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. The
Plan contains the Parties resolution to demonstrate substantial
progress on: the financial mechanism; the development and transfer of
technology; the implementation of FCCC Articles 4.8 and 4.9, as well
as Protocol Articles 2.3 and 3.14; activities implemented jointly (AIJ);
the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol; and the preparations for the
first Meeting of the Parties (COP/MOP-1).
SBI-10 AND SBSTA-10: The subsidiary bodies
to the FCCC held their tenth sessions in Bonn, Germany, from 31 May -
11 June 1999, and began the process of fulfilling the Buenos Aires
Plan of Action. The SBSTA considered topics such as Annex I
communications, methodological issues and the development and transfer
of technology. The SBI discussed, inter alia, administrative and
financial matters and non-Annex I communications. SBI and SBSTA
jointly considered the mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, activities
implemented jointly and compliance. A joint SBI/SBSTA working group on
compliance (JWG) discussed identification of compliance-related
elements, including gaps and suitable forums to address them; design
of a compliance system; and consequences of non-compliance. The JWG
resolved to hold a workshop to facilitate informal exchange of views
on relevant issues, including experiences under other conventions. The
Co-Chairs were asked to make a factual, informal report, with no
recommendations, on this workshop to COP-5.
REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP
The informal exchange of views and information on
compliance under the Kyoto Protocol was opened by Amb. Ernst Sucharipa,
Director of the Diplomatische Akademie, on Wednesday, 6 October 1999.
Co-Chair Harald Dovland reminded participants that the JWG had agreed
during the tenth session of the subsidiary bodies that the workshop
would be designed merely to facilitate exchange of information and
views. On organization of work, he said delegates would be recognized
by their name not their country. He outlined the agenda for the
sessions, as agreed upon in the JWG: four presentations on compliance
regimes in other bodies; a question and answer session; a presentation
by Peter Sand on compliance systems under international treaties; and
an informal exchange of views.
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND INFORMATION RELATED TO
RELEVANT EXPERIENCE IN OTHER CONVENTIONS
PRESENTATIONS: The workshop participants
first heard four presentations on compliance regimes in other bodies.
Madhava Sarma, Executive Secretary of the
Montreal Protocol, provided an overview of Montreal Protocol
provisions that relate to Parties obligations, reporting of data
and the non-compliance procedure. He identified the major obligations
of Parties as, inter alia, control measures for the phase out of 95
chemicals; control of trade with Parties and non-Parties; reporting of
data; and transfer of technology. Compliance with the control measures
is monitored through the analysis of reports presented by the Parties.
Parties are obliged to submit data to the Secretariat to the extent
that they have ratified the respective amendments. Although data is
accepted from Parties, as reported, verification is possible through
the work of the implementing agencies of the Multilateral Fund such as
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), the World Bank and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF).
Sarma said the non-compliance procedure could be
triggered by: one Party expressing a reservation regarding another
Partys compliance; the Secretariats observations in its report
on data; and a Party submitting an explanation of its non-compliance
to the Secretariat. An implementing committee created by the Meeting
of the Parties (MOP) will consider representations before it, gather
information and prepare recommendations to the MOP, which is the final
authority on non-compliance issues. In 1992 the Parties decided on an
indicative list of measures that may be taken by the MOP in case of
non-compliance. These include: providing appropriate assistance,
issuing cautions, and suspending specific rights and privileges under
the Protocol.
Sarma stressed that this procedure is based on
the presumption that all Parties wish to implement the Protocol and
that their inability to comply is due to a problem that the
international community should assist in solving. In conclusion he
suggested that the Kyoto Protocol consider two types of procedures for
non-compliance a facilitative, non-confrontational and assistance
based procedure for determining non-compliance in all cases and a
legal procedure where the non-compliance is determined to be
willful.
Henning Wuester, United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE), explained that the common compliance
regime adopted in 1997 for the Convention on Long-range Transboundary
Air Pollution (LRTAP) and its eight Protocols was under revision. He
outlined the four basic functions of the compliance committee:
conducting periodic reviews of reporting requirements; considering
specific issues referred to it by one or more Parties about another
Party, one Party on its own compliance problems, or the Secretariat
based upon information received by Parties or other sources such as
NGOs; examining the quality of data; and reporting on the
implementation of specific obligations at the request of the Executive
Body.
On access to information, he specified that
the compliance committee could: gather information from the
Secretariat or other sources through the Secretariat; get expert
advice from the Convention bodies or other experts; and visit
countries by invitation. Wuester explained that Parties had to submit
two types of reports based on a framework common to the Convention and
its Protocols one on strategies and policies adopted to mitigate
air pollution and another on emissions data.
In conclusion, he outlined the elements
essential to a compliance regime: the bodies running the
compliance regime should have a clear mandate, yet be sufficiently
flexible to adapt to the needs of the new instruments and the wishes
of the Parties; the reporting system must be transparent, well
defined, as detailed as necessary and focused on specific obligations;
and there must be independent technical bodies to assist the
compliance committee on technical issues.
Natan Elkin, International Labour Organization (ILO),
outlined the compliance system and the reporting requirements
established by the Constitution of the ILO. The compliance system is
comprised of the Committee of Experts, the Conference Committee, the
Committee on Freedom of Association and the Commission of Inquiry. The
reporting system is built around two cycles: an initial cycle of first
and second reports, and a subsequent cycle of periodic reports that
are required every two years for certain priority conventions and
every five years for the others. Failure to report is noted by the
Committee of Experts in its report that is then discussed by the
Conference Committee. The Committee of Experts presents its
conclusions as observations in the case of long-standing cases of
failure, as comments and surveys set out in its report, or in direct
requests that are communicated to the concerned governments. If a
country fails to conform to the recommendations of the Governing Body
or the repeated comments of the Committee of Experts, the Conference
Committee records the governments failure to act in its report.
Where more drastic measures are called for, a resolution is adopted.
Nicholas Lockhart, World Trade Organization (WTO),
distinguishing the compliance regime of the WTO from that of
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), said that the WTO regime
was Party driven and did not involve the Secretariat. He introduced
the three phases and the institutional actors under the dispute
settlement regime. In the diplomatic phase, formal or informal
consultations are entered into. This is a prerequisite to formal
litigation and is used as a means of resolving the dispute or
collecting information.
The judicial phase is characterized by a
compulsory procedure and confidentiality. A panel composed of experts
operates like a court of first instance. It makes an objective
assessment of the matter and delivers a report that is automatically
adopted by the dispute settlement body. Each party can submit
information at any time of the dispute and the panel can request that
information be delivered. If this is not done, the panel may draw
inferences regarding information withheld. An appellate body provides
a safety net in view of the automaticity with which the
panels report is adopted. It may uphold, modify or reverse the
panels findings.
The final phase is implementation. The panel
and/or appellate body reports are automatically adopted by the dispute
settlement body that then makes recommendations on its basis. One of
the strengths of the dispute settlement process is its reliance on
negative consensus as a basis for decision making: unless there is
consensus against a recommendation, its content is automatic. A
dispute over implementation of the recommendations may be referred
back to the dispute panel and it can lead to trade sanctions.
Question and Answer Session: Co-Chair
Espen Rønneberg questioned if the adherence to the LRTAP common
reporting format was strict and whether, given the LRTAP system was
under development, there would be any scope for retroactive penalties.
He also sought elaboration on the issue of comparability of data and
standards. Wuester responded that adherence to the framework had been
varied and consequently was under revision. He said the format would
evolve continuously based on experience in reporting and the comments
of the Parties. On retroactive penalties, he said that he did not have
the experience to respond to this, since no case of strict
non-compliance had yet been brought before the committee. He said,
however, the focus was on non-confrontational methods and assistance.
He said work was underway on the issue of comparability of data and
technical standards, but several issues were yet to be resolved.
Peter Sand, University of Munich, suggested that
a useful contrast could be drawn between the WTO adversarial process
and the ad hoc procedures of the ILO. One participant questioned
whether the prominent role that the Secretariats play in the
non-compliance procedure affects their neutrality. Sarma and Elkin
replied in the negative.
One participant inquired if any proposal for
fixing a system of multilateral sanctions existed under the WTO that
would effectively take into account level playing field concerns
of smaller States. Lockhart responded that while no such proposal
existed, it would be useful to note that the first few cases before
the WTO dispute settlement panel were brought and won by developing
countries against the US. Another participant asked if parties could
withhold information despite their obligation to appear before the
dispute settlement panel. Lockhart replied that the compulsory
jurisdiction of the WTO existed because the members had agreed to it.
Although no legal right existed to do so, in practice countries did
withhold information. He said the panel could draw inferences based on
such behavior.
One participant asked how long the entire
compliance process would take in the case of each of the international
instruments discussed. Lockhart responded that at the WTO it could
take 15 months. Sarma said the Montreal Protocol process would take
less than a year.
COMPLIANCE SYSTEMS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
TREATIES
Peter Sand, University of Munich, referred to
recent efforts by political scientists to develop a management
approach to treaty compliance that seeks to address non-compliance
through assistance or capacity building. He presented the different steps in a compliance process. The
first step would involve a reporting system on environmental quality
data, baselines and implementation of obligations. The reports would
go through a verification process that entailed assessing quality,
reviewing implementation, monitoring compliance and establishing a
fact-finding mission. He outlined four different types of compliance
institutions and procedures: a complaint mechanism triggered by a
Party or the Secretariat; an adversarial proceeding of a judicial
nature whereby a state would initiate a dispute settlement procedure
against another state; a custodial system whereby the Secretariat or
NGOs, as opposed to Parties, have a custodial duty over treaty
compliance; and an implementation body especially created to take over
compliance issues.
On the consequences of non-compliance, he
explained that these could range from incentives such as financial or
technical assistance, to disincentives whereby the granting of an
advantage normally allowed under the treaty would be refused, and to
corrective measures.
He concluded by stressing that the retaliatory
remedy of terminating a treaty as a consequence of its breach, as in
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, made
little sense in the case of MEAs. He highlighted the special case of
international humanitarian law whose provisions can in no
circumstances be ignored. He said it was up to environmental lawyers
to develop similar rules that departed from a retaliation approach.
INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS: Participants
put forth a range of views on compliance and clarified various issues
during this session. One participant commented on the reluctance to
discuss state-to-state, as opposed to multilateral, interactions in
the context of the non-compliance procedure. Sand responded that while
the issue of state-to-state interactions should be kept in mind, the
focus should be on those aspects of the non-compliance procedure that
are not state-to-state.
Another participant sought information on
approaches to non-compliance at the international level that could
strengthen domestic regulations. Sand responded by giving examples,
inter alia, that the ILO had focused specifically on strengthening
national regulations on labor standards.
One participant asked what the legal consequence
of merely signing the Protocol was and whether an amendment would be
required to design a compliance system that would have binding
consequences. Sand responded that several existing provisions of the
Protocol with legal consequences could serve as a basis for a
non-compliance procedure. He clarified that although a treaty would
have binding consequences only upon ratification, there was an
expectation that the signatory would not act contrary to treaty
commitments.
Another participant noted that the Montreal
Protocols indicative list of measures that could be taken in the
case of non-compliance, which included the suspension of Protocol
rights and privileges, was adopted through a MOP decision rather than
through the tedious process of an amendment. In response, Sarma said
that the indicative list was drafted under Montreal Protocol Article 8
(non-compliance procedure) that mandates Parties to draft a
non-compliance procedure. Therefore the adoption of this list was
presumably legal.
The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL)
outlined elements of its paper on compliance. On compliance
information systems, he noted that review might be more effective if
review teams can raise compliance concerns with Parties and identify
areas of non-compliance. On compliance response systems, he stressed
that compliance will be enhanced if civil society has the right to
initiate the non-compliance procedure. On the question of
determination of non-compliance, he said various features of the WTO
dispute settlement system were worth emulating. These include the
composition of the panel with independent experts rather than
government representatives, the existence of due process provisions,
and the use of negative consensus to arrive at decisions.
INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO A
COMPREHENSIVE COMPLIANCE SYSTEM UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL:
Facilitative and Enforcement Functions of a
Compliance System/Institutional Arrangements to Meet these Functions:
In introducing this item, Sand noted that while facilitation may only
be available to non-Annex I Parties, enforcement would address
compliance issues relating to any Annex I and non-Annex I obligation.
He suggested that participants consider whether one or two bodies be
established to exercise the facilitative and enforcement functions. He
also suggested that the relationship of the compliance system with
other institutional arrangements under the Protocol, such as the
dispute settlement mechanism, be discussed.
Susan Biniaz (US) presented her countrys
proposal, as contained in the charts in document FCCC/SB/1999/7/Add.1.
The proposal is based on several assumptions, inter alia: the design
must be specific to the Protocol; both facilitation and enforcement
should be provided for; non-compliance with Protocol Article 3
(quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments) should lead
to binding consequences known in advance; and two different bodies
should be established to deal with the two functions.
Following the presentation, one participant
sought elaboration on the distinctive nature of the facilitative and
enforcement functions in the proposal and, with other participants,
questioned the application of the latter only to developed countries.
She added that compliance with Protocol targets could also be handled
through a facilitative process, as shown by the Montreal Protocol
experience. With others, she asked whether the adoption of binding
consequences by the compliance body needed to go through the amendment
procedure as specified in Protocol Article 18 (non-compliance).
In response, Biniaz explained that while
representatives of Parties would deal with the facilitative function,
independent experts would handle enforcement issues. She added that
non-Annex I countries would not be amenable to enforcement and binding
consequences since their obligations, such as in Protocol Article 10
(continuing to advance the implementation of existing commitments),
were imprecise. On the procedure for the adoption of binding
consequences, she noted that is was not useful to let Protocol Article
18 (non-compliance) drive the substance of the debate.
One participant suggested that the compliance
system be built around the concept of facilitation given the real
risks of countries withdrawing from MEAs. Another participant added
that the facilitative function should also include a preventive
dimension. Another wondered whether the MCP (FCCC Article 13) could
act as the facilitative body under the Protocol. In response another
participant said that Protocol Article 16 (MCP) required Parties to
consider the application of the MCP, modified as appropriate, to the
Protocol.
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and CIEL presented
a joint proposal for a compliance system under the Protocol. They
proposed the creation of two bodies, a non-compliance body and a
facilitative body. The compliance process could be triggered by NGOs,
the Secretariat, Parties and through self-reporting. Cases of Annex B
Parties non-compliance with certain select articles would go before
the screening committee that would either dismiss the case or refer it
to the non-compliance or facilitative body. In the case of non-Annex B
Parties, the case would proceed directly to the facilitative body.
Each body could refer the case to the other if it would be more
appropriately dealt with there.
One participant asked if there was a trend in
international law regarding the increasing role and significance of
NGOs and independent experts in compliance procedures. She also
inquired whether NGOs and civil society should be allowed to trigger
the process and what the composition of the compliance body should be.
Sand responded that the frequency of verification
by independent fact-finding actors had increased over the years.
Regarding composition of the compliance body, Sarma said the body
could either be of the WTO type or the MEA type. Universal
participation was critical for MEAs but not for the WTO. Given the
danger of countries abandoning MEAs, he said judgments on compliance
should ultimately be political, although aided by experts.
Eligibility to Raise Issues: Sand
introduced this item by stressing that the decision on who could
trigger the compliance system was a very important issue. He said it
was clear that Parties as well as the COP/MOP had this function, but
that it was more complicated when it came to the Secretariat. He added
that other potential actors, such as affected groups, could be
eligible to trigger the compliance system.
One participant stressed that this issue was
linked to the nature of the procedure. In the case of enforcement, the
number of actors entitled to trigger the process would be more limited
than in a facilitative context. With regard to Protocol Article 6.4
(joint implementation), she said that raising an issue under Protocol
Article 8 (review of information) should not prevent a Party from
proceeding with joint implementation. On the role of the COP/MOP, she
said it should not have to approve whether an issue went forward to
facilitation or enforcement, but could have a say at the end of the
compliance procedure.
One participant cautioned that the potential
triggering role of the Secretariat should not affect its neutrality.
Another participant said that any Party was eligible to raise
compliance issues regarding Protocol Article 3 (quantified emission
limitation and reduction commitments). He added that Protocol Article
3.2, which requires that Annex I Parties shall, by 2005, have made
demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments, could be the
basis for a facilitative compliance process in order to help Parties
put on track what has to be put on track. One participant
stressed that the determination of who was eligible to trigger a
compliance regime should be decided on the basis of what was best for
the efficient functioning of the Protocol.The process should be open
and transparent. He emphasized the need to look at processes developed
under other treaties and reviewed possible actors:
-
any Party or group of Parties, generally
accepted;
-
the Secretariat, as shown by previous
positive experiences under the LRTAP and the Montreal Protocol;
-
SBI or SBSTA or COP/MOP, which is redundant
since it is covered by a group of Parties;
-
expert review teams, as under Protocol
Article 8 (review of information); and
-
NGOs or civil society, through a Party rather
than through a Secretariat.
Two participants suggested a possible screening
of the issues that would take the enforcement track, either by
requesting the triggering actor to bring concrete evidence of a
Partys possible non-compliance, or by providing that the
enforcement track only be taken if the expert review teams have
identified a potential problem.
Information Gathering: Co-Chair Dovland,
introducing the topic of information gathering, asked participants to
consider the information already available under the climate change
regime including emissions inventories of Annex I countries, national
communications, and reports of expert review teams. Sand commented
that four key questions had to be answered. They are:
-
Who collects the information?
-
What type of information should be gathered?
-
Where should the information be gathered?
-
How should the information gathering system
function?
On who should gather the information, he said the
existing structure had to be related to the compliance body. On the
type of information to be gathered, he said a distinction should be
drawn between environmental quality data and Parties implementation
data. He identified sources of information as, inter alia,
governments, NGOs and industry. In the case of industry,
confidentiality concerns could be raised. On the functioning of the
information gathering system, he referred to the need for due process.
Participants stressed the need to refer to
Protocol Article 8 (review of information) in discussing the
information gathering aspect of compliance. On the link between the
expert review team reports and the compliance procedure, Co-Chair
Dovland noted that there were two options. The report could go
directly to the compliance body or it could go to the COP/MOP through
the Secretariat. In the latter case it would go to the compliance body
only if a Party complained. One participant highlighted a third option
wherein guidelines would specify the situations where the report would
go directly to the compliance body. Some favored a role for the
COP/MOP while others objected, as such a role would politicize the
compliance issue.
One participant asked what voting arrangement
could be put in place in the COP/MOP for cases of non-compliance. If
it were consensus, the party in non-compliance could vote itself out
of the compliance procedure. She also suggested that there be at least
one multilateral trigger to the compliance mechanism.
A few participants highlighted the importance of
timeliness, with one suggesting that a balance be struck between
timeliness and efficiency. One participant, stressing the facilitative
function of the compliance system and the obligations under the
Protocol, highlighted the need for Parties to have the opportunity to
respond to and correct any problems expert review teams identify. She
also stressed the necessity for a body that could provide expert
facilitative advice. A few participants underscored the need to
formalize the involvement of expertise, with one inquiring if a
permanent standing source of technical expertise existed and if not,
how the gap could be filled. Co-Chair Dovland commented that there is
an existing roster of experts, including the IPCC roster, that could
be drawn upon.
On confidentiality of information, one
participant recommended that confidentiality should not be maintained
at the expense of an effective compliance regime. Sarma, citing the
Montreal Protocol example, said that information specific to
compliance could be made public and other information could be kept
confidential. One participant recommended that the Secretariat be the
appropriate body to gather information. Another participant cautioned
against the use of information from outside bodies.
One participant highlighted the relationship
between the expert review team process and the triggering of the
compliance mechanism. He said that the expert review teams report
should contain at least the minimum information necessary to determine
non-compliance. Parties should be able to request more information if
necessary. Another participant sought clarification on what kind of
non-compliance developing countries could find themselves in. She also
asked what kind of information would be available from developing
countries, given that expert review teams did not deal with developing
countries. Co-Chair Rønneberg highlighted the fact that there are
several avenues to raise compliance questions even within the
Convention processes.
Range of Consequences of
Non-Compliance/Automatic Consequences: Sand introduced the item by
outlining the different possible consequences in international
instruments. These range from making non-compliance publicly known,
such as in human rights conventions, to making adverse inferences on
the part of the Party that has not delivered requested information,
such as the WTO dispute settlement procedure, or to imposing
sanctions. He explained that sanctions could consist of positive
measures resulting from a facilitation process, such as access to
financial or technical assistance, or of punitive measures issued on
an enforcement basis, such as withholding funding available under the
Protocol. He added that procedural principles needed to be developed,
such as requiring proportionality between the degree of non-compliance
and the sanction imposed. He concluded by addressing the issue of
automaticity, which he understood to mean that a determination on
facts would lead to the imposition of sanctions without requiring a
decision on non-compliance. He linked automaticity to the binding
consequence of sanctions and created a distinction between non-binding
consequences, which would be automatic and subject to an appeal
process, and binding consequences, which would not be automatic and
therefore not subject to an appeal process.
A few participants said the compliance system
should, as far as possible, only impose sanctions once facilitation
had been exhausted. One participant added that although public
awareness of non-compliance was an important consequence, it could be
insufficient in the context of technical environmental treaties.
Supported by others, he said that a list of possible consequences
should include high financial sanctions, the proceeds of which would
be used to finance greenhouse gas reduction projects in developing
countries. Other participants said they could support neither
financial nor trade sanctions.
In response to a query, Sand said that the
current trend at the global level favored trade sanctions and public
exposure of non-compliance. He added that financial penalties were
used in other contexts but there was limited information on their
effectiveness. He cautioned that Parties might leave the organization
upon withdrawal of their voting rights.
Regarding the range of sanctions, several
participants stressed the need for advance notice of the options
available to the compliance body. This would help ensure legal
certainty and would act as a deterrent. One participant said the range
of consequences should be different for Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties since, in his view, facilitation would only be available to
non-Annex I Parties.
On the issue of automaticity, one participant
interpreted it to mean that a sanction could be imposed without the
approval of the non-compliant Party. Another participant said that
automaticity cannot not take into account the cause, type and degree
of non-compliance. She valued a menu approach whereby the Party
could choose the consequence of its non-compliance, such as borrowing
from a subsequent period or buying emission reduction units. On
specific compliance cases, one participant said that Annex I Parties
adopting mitigation measures that did not minimize adverse effects on
other Parties would risk being in non-compliance. Another Party said
that incentives should be put into place to ensure compliance with
Protocol Article 3.2 (demonstrable progress by 2005). She added that
Protocol Article 18 (non-compliance) could not interpreted to mean
that binding sanctions needed to be adopted through an amendment.
Other Matters
Co-Chair Rønneberg invited Sand to comment on
the annex to the note of the Co-Chairs of the joint working group on
compliance (FCCC/SB/1999/7) and asked participants to comment on next
steps. Sand said that all the elements included in the annex were
useful and needed further elaboration. On next steps, participants
expressed different views. One participant said he hoped a compliance
regime would be adopted during COP-5, another said COP-6. Several
participants said it would be helpful if the Co-Chairs drafted
elements of a compliance system for the JWG to consider at COP-5. One
participant said that such elements should provide for a distinction
between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties compliance. Another
participant said the list of consequences should be agreed upon before
addressing other elements of the compliance system. A third
participant said the elements put forward by the Co-Chairs should
leave room for a facilitative as well as an enforcement scenario.
CLOSING SESSION
In conclusion, Co-Chair Rønneberg said the
meeting had been successful and that the Co-Chairs would provide an
oral report of the workshop at COP-5. He said they would also prepare
a non-paper on elements of a compliance system based on the annex to
the note of the Co-Chairs of the JWG (FCCC/SB/1999/7), Parties
submissions (FCCC/SB/1999/7/Add.1) and discussions during the
workshop. He thanked the organizers of the workshop as well as its
sponsors: Austria, Canada, the EC, Finland, France, Germany, Japan and
Switzerland. He closed the meeting at 1:00 PM on Thursday, 7 October.
THINGS TO LOOK FOR BEFORE COP-5
FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON ENERGY,
ENVIRONMENT AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: The 4th International
Congress on Energy, Environment and Technological Innovation will be
held from 20-24 October 1999 in Rome, Italy. Organized by "La
Sapienza" and "Roma Tre" Universities and the
Universidad Central de Venezuela, the Congress offers the opportunity
for high-level scientific debate and communication between
participants on the problems related to regional and urban management.
For more information, contact: EETI99, Facolta di Ingegneria, Via
Eudossiana 18, 00184 Rome, Italy; fax: +39-6-4883235; Internet:
http://www.ing.ucv.ve/ceait/eeti.htm.
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON KYOTO MECHANISMS
BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIES: "Kyoto Mechanisms Business
Opportunities: How Much is a Project Worth? Selection, Verification
and Certification of Projects," will be held in Basel,
Switzerland, from 21-22 October 1999. For more information contact:
Wolfram Kaegi, Institute for Economy and the Environment, University
of St. Gallen, Tigerbergstrasse 2, CH-9000 St. Gallen, Switzerland; tel: +41-71-224-2583; fax: +41-71-224-2722; e-mail: Wolfram.Kaegi@unisg.ch; Internet: http://www.iwoe.unisg.ch/forschung/ji/seminar.html.
FCCC FIFTH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE
PARTIES: COP-5 will be held from 25 October - 5 November 1999 at
the Maritim Hotel in Bonn, Germany. For more information, contact: the
FCCC Secretariat; tel: +49-228-815-1000; fax: +49-228-815-1999;
e-mail: secretariat@unfccc.de;
Internet: http://www.unfccc.de/.
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