Summary report, 14–25 April 2025

The conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in the high seas has been an issue of global discussion for more than two decades. The Ocean covers over two-thirds of the Earth’s surface and most of it lies in areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ). Fragmented legal frameworks have left biodiversity in these areas vulnerable to ever growing threats, including overfishing, climate change, and pollution.

In what was lauded as major breakthrough for multilateralism, states adopted the international legally binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on the conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement) in June 2023. As of late April 2025, the BBNJ Agreement has 113 signatories and 21 parties. It will enter into force 120 days after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification, approval, acceptance or accession. At the current pace of ratification, the expectation is that the first meeting of the Agreement’s Conference of the Parties (COP 1) could convene in late 2026.

However, many elements needed for the Agreement to become truly operational are yet to be agreed upon. This is why the UN General Assembly decided to convene a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which at its organizational session agreed to hold three sessions until early 2026, and more if needed. The PrepCom is tasked with addressing the nuts and bolts that will guide the orderly implementation of the Agreement. At its first session, discussions focused on the:

• rules of procedure of the COP;
• rules of procedure and modalities of operation of the subsidiary bodies;
• arrangements for the Secretariat, including the selection of its seat;
• funding of the Secretariat, COP, and subsidiary bodies;
• arrangements with the Global Environment Facility; and
• operationalization of the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM).

PrepCom I worked on the basis of aids to negotiations prepared by its Co-Chairs as well as background notes prepared by the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS), which is the Agreement’s Interim Secretariat. Delegates also held an initial exchange of views on the matters to be considered at PrepCom II, including cooperation with other instruments, frameworks, and bodies, which is key for the smooth implementation of the Agreement.

In advance of PrepCom II, the Co-Chairs and UNDOALOS were tasked with preparing:

• revised aids to negotiations, taking into account discussions held at PrepCom I and any additional input delegations may provide in writing until 2 May 2025;
• a matrix outlining proposed rules of procedure and modalities for each subsidiary body;
• a comparison of secretariat arrangements in other multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs); and
• draft terms of reference for a group to seek expert input on the CHM and a flowchart on the functions of the CHM and its possible linkages to institutions established under the Agreement.

PrepCom I convened at UN Headquarters in New York from 14-25 April 2025, bringing together approximately 200 representatives of governments, civil society, and several intergovernmental bodies with links to the process.

A Brief History of the BBNJ Negotiations

The conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ increasingly attracts international attention, as scientific information, albeit insufficient, reveals the richness and vulnerability of such biodiversity, particularly around seamounts, hydrothermal vents, sponges, and cold-water corals, while concerns grow about the increasing anthropogenic pressures posed by existing and emerging activities, such as fishing, mining, marine pollution, and bioprospecting in the deep sea.

UNCLOS, which entered into force on 16 November 1994, sets forth the rights and obligations of states regarding the use of the Ocean and its resources and the protection of the marine and coastal environment. Although UNCLOS does not refer expressly to marine biodiversity, it is commonly regarded as establishing the legal framework for all activities in the Ocean.

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), which entered into force on 29 December 1993, defines biodiversity and aims to promote its conservation, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources. The CBD applies to processes and activities carried out under the jurisdiction or control of its parties. The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization, which entered into force on 12 October 2014, applies to genetic resources within the scope of CBD Article 15 (Access to Genetic Resources) and to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources within the scope of the Convention.

Key Turning Points

Working Group: Established by General Assembly resolution 59/24 in 2004, the Ad Hoc Open-ended Informal Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ met three times between 2006 and 2010 to exchange views on institutional coordination, the need for short-term measures to address illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing and destructive fishing practices, marine genetic resources (MGRs), marine scientific research on marine biodiversity, marine protected areas (MPAs), and environmental impact assessments (EIAs).

The “Package”: The fourth meeting of the Working Group (31 May – 3 June 2011) adopted, by consensus, a set of recommendations to initiate a process on the legal framework for the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ, by identifying gaps and ways forward, including through the implementation of existing instruments and the possible development of a multilateral agreement under UNCLOS. The recommendations included a “package” of issues to be addressed in this process, namely:

• MGRs, including questions on benefit-sharing;
• area-based management tools (ABMTs), including MPAs;
• EIAs; and
• capacity building and the transfer of marine technology (CB&TT).

A Legally Binding Instrument: Between 2014 and 2015, the Working Group engaged in interactive substantive debates on the scope, parameters, and feasibility of an international instrument under UNCLOS. At its ninth meeting, the Working Group reached consensus on recommendations for a decision to be taken at the 69th session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to develop a new legally binding instrument on BBNJ under UNCLOS, and to start a negotiating process to that end.

Preparatory Committee: Established by UNGA resolution 69/292, the Preparatory Committee was mandated to make substantive recommendations on the elements of a draft text of an international legally binding instrument under UNCLOS, taking into account the various reports of the Co-Chairs on the Working Group’s work; and for the Assembly to decide at its 72nd session whether to convene an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) to elaborate the text. It considered the scope of an international legally binding instrument and its relationship with other instruments, guiding approaches and principles, as well as the elements of the package. Despite diverging views, with a wide majority of countries arguing that the Committee had exhausted all efforts to reach consensus, the outcome, which was adopted by consensus, comprised:

• non-exclusive elements of a draft internationally legally binding instrument text that generated convergence among most delegations;
• a list of main issues on which there is divergence of views, with the indication that both do not reflect consensus; and
• a recommendation to UNGA to take a decision, as soon as possible, on convening an IGC.

UNGA resolution 72/249 established the IGC with a mandate to meet for four substantive sessions and conclude its work by the first half of 2020.

IGC Organizational Meeting: The IGC organizational meeting took place from 16-18 April 2018. Delegates agreed to: focus IGC-1 on substantive discussions based on the elements of the package; take consensus-based decisions on the preparation process of a zero draft; and mandate newly-elected IGC President Rena Lee (Singapore) to prepare a concise document that identifies areas for further discussion, that does not contain treaty text, and that would not constitute a zero draft.

IGC-1-3: During the first three meetings of the IGC (September 2018, March-April 2019, and August 2019) delegates clarified positions on the package elements before deliberating on the IGC President’s Aid to Negotiations, which contained options structured along the lines of the 2011 package. At the third session, delegates began textual negotiations based on a zero draft containing treaty text, developed by IGC President Lee.

Virtual Intersessional Work: Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, delegates worked remotely from September 2020 to February 2022 via an online discussion platform to share views on the more contentious issues in the draft text. President Lee clarified that the intersessional work would not substitute for negotiations at IGC-4 but would allow for clarifying positions and enhancing mutual understanding.

IGC-4: Delegates reconvened in an in-person informal-informal setting governed by Chatham House rules from 7-18 March 2022. With COVID-19 restrictions only permitting two representatives per delegation in the room at one time and extremely limited observer participation, delegates addressed a revised draft text of the agreement. Diverging views still persisted on the establishment of an access and benefit-sharing (ABS) mechanism. On EIAs, delegates agreed to base future negotiations on a cross-regional proposal on a tiered approach to conduct EIAs, although they were unable to reach consensus on who would be ultimately responsible for decision making. On CB&TT, some delegates supported a capacity-building mechanism, with a regional group proposing a cooperation and coordination mechanism addressing all relevant sections of the agreement. Delegates also agreed to ask UNGA to extend the IGC’s mandate.

IGC-5.1: The first part of IGC-5, which convened from 15-26 August 2022, made notable progress in reaching agreement on some key issues. However, consensus could not be reached, and the session was suspended. Outstanding issues included: the establishment of an ABS mechanism; monetary benefit-sharing; intellectual property rights; decision-making; thresholds related to EIAs; and area- versus impact-based approaches.

IGC-5.2: The second part of IGC-5 convened from 20 February – 4 March 2023. After more than 36 hours in closed-door President’s consultations to hammer out the final articles, lasting well into the weekend, IGC President Lee emerged with the text of an agreement. Delegates agreed to establish an open-ended informal working group to undertake technical edits to ensure uniformity of the text and harmonize the wording in all six UN official languages.

IGC-5.3: At the further resumed session of IGC-5, which took place at UN Headquarters from 19-20 June 2023, governments finally adopted the BBNJ Agreement. Delegations called on states to sign the Agreement, which was opened for signature on 20 September 2023. They called for the initiation of a preparatory process to pave the way for entry into force of the Agreement, alongside a pledging conference to mobilize the requisite resources for ratification and implementation.

In its resolution 78/272, adopted on 24 April 2024, UNGA established the Preparatory Commission for the entry into force of the Agreement and the convening of its first COP.

Organizational Session of the PrepCom: The organizational session of the PrepCom convened from 24-26 June 2024 at UN Headquarters to elect its Co-Chairs and Bureau members, adopt its programme of work, and schedule its future meetings.

PrepCom I Report

On Monday, 14 April, PrepCom Co-Chair Adam McCarthy (Australia) welcomed participants, emphasizing the BBNJ Agreement is a “shining achievement” of multilateralism and demonstrates that states can cooperate for the benefit of humankind and the planet.

Co-Chair McCarthy recalled decisions adopted at the organizational session in June 2024, including on the composition of the Bureau of the Commission, dates of meetings, and the programme and modalities of work. He recalled that the Commission took note that, on an exceptional basis and without setting a precedent, the three seats of the Asia-Pacific region on the Bureau would rotate among nine states, and welcomed China, Indonesia, and Tonga as Bureau members for PrepCom I. 

Co-Chair Janine Coye-Felson (Belize) underscored the importance of the PrepCom for the implementation of the BBNJ Agreement and for demonstrating multilateralism at work. She emphasized the need to work collaboratively to maintain momentum to make the Agreement a reality.

Elinor Hammarskjöld, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and UN Legal Counsel, noted the meeting sends a powerful message that states are ready to act and deliver on the promises of the BBNJ Agreement. She underscored that the conclusions of the negotiations on the Agreement were a historic achievement and triumph of multilateralism and invited participants to continue engaging in the same spirit of compromise and flexibility. 

Hammarskjöld further highlighted that the Global Environment Facility (GEF) has allocated up to USD 34 million for ratification support and early action for the Agreement, noting that 30 states have already received support and that more funding is available. She further invited contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund to assist developing countries’ participation in the PrepCom. She emphasized that inclusive and effective participation, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), is key for the success of the Commission. 

Organizational Matters

Agenda: On Monday, 14 April, Charlotte Salpin, Meeting Secretary, provided a summary of the documents available on the conference website. Noting that the Commission had agreed that there would be no opening statements, Co-Chair Felson introduced the provisional agenda (A/AC.296/2025/L.1), which delegates adopted.

Co-Chair Felson then introduced the provisional programme of work (A/AC.296/2025/L.2). CHINA suggested that PrepCom I discussions prioritize the issues to be agreed at COP 1, including the rules of procedure and the financial rules, forwarding the rest of the issues to PrepCom II. They also underlined the need to maintain consensus-based decision making and called for this to be carried into the BBNJ implementation phase. Co-Chair Felson noted that the guiding questions prepared by the Co-Chairs would facilitate and focus the discussions and welcomed the call for consensus-based decision making.

Organization of work: Co-Chair McCarthy introduced the proposed organization of work, circulated in late February 2025. He noted that delegates at the organizational meeting had agreed: that the meeting should encourage inclusivity, transparency, and meaningful participation; to hold no more than two parallel meetings at a time; and to intersessional work, as required. He proposed that the PrepCom consider the three clusters of issues on: governance; the operation of the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM); and the financial rules and financial resources and mechanism. He noted these three clusters of issues would be discussed in informal working groups for the duration of the meeting. He highlighted that, if necessary, delegates would meet in parallel three times during the second week. Delegates adopted the organization of work as outlined. In the second week, Co-Chair McCarthy noted that, due to the brisk pace of negotiations, parallel sessions would no longer be required.

Credentials: On Monday, 14 April, Co-Chair Felson proposed to postpone the appointment of members of the credentials committee, noting that this would also postpone the consideration of the credentials of representatives. Delegates agreed to this proposal.

Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties

On Monday, 14 April 2025, Co-Chair McCarthy opened discussions in an Informal Working Group, recalling that the Co-Chairs prepared an aid to discussions and negotiations (A/AC.296/2025/3). He noted the document contains draft rules of procedure that were developed on the basis of rules of procedure of other instruments and processes. He emphasized that the elements contained in the draft are not exhaustive, do not preclude the consideration of other matters, and are without prejudice to the position of any delegation. He pointed to the Co-Chairs’ guiding questions, circulated ahead of the meeting, relating to: structure; missing elements; elements that may be deleted; elements on which there is agreement or disagreement; and which elements are considered most important. He invited delegates to keep in mind interlinkages with other issues to be addressed by the PrepCom.

The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) emphasized the need to take into account the needs and priorities of developing countries and fully recognize the special circumstances of small island developing states (SIDS), least developed countries (LDCs), and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs). They underscored that support for the Agreement’s entry into force and implementation must be responsive to developing country needs and priorities.

The G-77/CHINA considered: the Agreement already defines the venue of COP meetings; the rules of procedure for ordinary COP meetings should apply mutatis mutandis to extraordinary meetings; and organizations of the UN system should be able to participate as observers. They underscored that the COP should make every effort to adopt decisions by consensus and called for clarity on: the double majority suggested for the amendment of the rules of procedure; voting by regional economic integration organizations (REIOs); and the preparation of the provisional agenda, including the role of the Secretariat and Bureau therein. They questioned whether the Chairs of Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) should retain the right to vote, underscoring the need for impartiality.

The CORE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP (CLAM) underscored that COP meetings, whether ordinary or extraordinary, should be held in person, but suggested including a provision regulating hybrid and virtual formats, noting this may be needed under exceptional circumstances such as global health emergencies.

CLAM preferred for COP meetings to take place at the seat of the Secretariat or at UN Headquarters, noting flexibility regarding the location of extraordinary meetings while respecting regional rotation. They suggested annual meetings during the first few years after the Agreement’s entry into force, followed by biennial meetings. They considered the provisions on observer participation and on voting by REIOs need to be clarified, and called for adding a provision on the drafting and publication of COP reports.

The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) highlighted missing elements, including the need for dedicated SIDS’ representation on the COP Bureau. On election of officers for the SBs, they called for explicit inclusion of SIDS. They called for discussions on the application of the COP rules mutatis mutandis to the SBs, noting that each body could require their own rules of procedure, and noted these bodies could establish their own programmes of work.

On the location of COP meetings, PACIFIC SIDS (P-SIDS) said that for small delegations, it may be worth exploring virtual options. On voting on amendments, they said that this should be done sequentially following UN practice, but called to delete the reference to the additional step giving the President the power to determine the order of decision-making on amendments.

The AFRICAN GROUP suggested a regional rotation for the location of COP meetings to enhance the visibility of the process. They supported annual COP meetings in the initial phase and called for elaborating the procedures for approving observer organizations. On the rules applicable to the SBs, they called for specific guarantees for African participation and called for discussions on a differentiated approach for SBs. The group did not support virtual or hybrid meetings, except for meetings of the SBs and extraordinary meetings.

The CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM) called for the inclusion of language on, inter alia: allowing voting by proxy; calling for the Secretariat to report to the COP; and addressing the nexus between arrears and voting rights. They also noted the need for language on emergency measures, in line with Article 24 of the Agreement.

The EUROPEAN UNION (EU) called for the rules to allow for the full participation of REIOs. They flagged elements for further elaboration, including: frequency of meetings, suggesting staggering the frequency of COP meetings as is the case under the Minamata Convention; the addition of elements to the provisional agenda; and the application of rules to the SBs, noting that this should include decision-making procedures. 

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted that the agreement does not provide checks and balances or sustainable financing for the establishment of MPAs, which could politicize their establishment or only allow those with the finances to recommend establishing them, which could be detrimental for SIDS and other developing countries.

CHINA called to incorporate language supporting the implementation of BBNJ Article 6 (no prejudice) and Article 18 (area of application) to ensure the COP does not consider matters related to any areas under dispute, as agreed in the objective of the BBNJ Agreement. They advised caution on holding virtual COP meetings and called for clarity on the threshold required to convene extraordinary meetings. On observer participation at the COP, they suggested categorizing observers according to their legal status, such as those that are signatories, non-signatories, intergovernmental entities, and NGOs. They supported a “reasonable sized” Bureau, considering equitable geographical representation. They did not support term limits for Bureau members. On the allocation of Bureau seats, they supported taking into account specific circumstances, such as SIDS’ representation.

NEW ZEALAND emphasized the need for language on emergency measures and supported observer participation at all meetings of the COP and the SBs. With CANADA and AUSTRALIA, they called for outlining the principle of consensus-based decision making in more detail.

The UNITED KINGDOM (UK) underscored the need to consider the SBs’ specific functions when considering their rules of procedure, and, with P-SIDS, said the SBs should have limited rather than open-ended membership. They expressed openness to reflect on the frequency of COP meetings and said meetings should convene at the seat of the Secretariat or at UN Headquarters, but were open to exploring suggestions for virtual modalities in extraordinary circumstances. They welcomed CARICOM’s suggestion on the impacts of arrears on voting rights and suggested consolidating all provisions relating to the Bureau in one section of the document.

CANADA, with AUSTRALIA, called to retain the possibility for the COP to decide on meeting in other locations. They supported adding language on hybrid and virtual meeting modalities for exceptional cases. They suggested the COP convene biennially, noting that additional extraordinary meetings may be convened in the first five–seven years to ensure rapid implementation of the Agreement. They supported the explicit inclusion of Indigenous Peoples as observers in COP and SB meetings. They suggested the rules of procedure of the COP apply mutatis mutandis to the SBs and called for specifying the length of terms for the Bureau. 

JAPAN favored biennial COP meetings. They called for reflecting on the functions of the different SBs before determining their rules of procedure and clarifying voting rules for REIOs. They emphasized their perspective that rules of procedure do not create additional rights and obligations for states under international law.

AUSTRALIA welcomed suggestions to explore rotational COP hosting and supported calls for virtual or hybrid participation modalities. They noted their preference for annual meetings until decided otherwise and for majority voting rather than the one-third threshold currently suggested. They supported the participation of Indigenous Peoples and local communities (IPLCs) and noted the provision on participation by UN organizations may need to be adjusted depending on the decision on the structure of the Agreement’s Secretariat. 

NORWAY noted the rules of procedures for the SBs should account for the fact that SBs make recommendations to the COP. They called for reflecting on emergency measures and the possible need for hybrid meetings, and said observers should be allowed to participate in all meetings.

TÜRKIYE preferred biennial meetings of the COP, a geographical rotation of the venue, and consensus-based decision making. THAILAND supported biennial meetings and welcomed the convening of virtual or hybrid meetings to ensure the participation of all interested states. They informed delegates that Thailand would sign the BBNJ Agreement within the course of PrepCom I.

SINGAPORE underlined that the rules of procedure should emphasize consensus over voting in decision making. They supported annual meetings of the COP until a “steady state is reached,” after which the COP can decide on the frequency of its meetings. They called for more effective consideration of the relationships between the SBs and, with CHILE, also supported greater elaboration of the operationalization of emergency measures envisaged under the Agreement.

CHILE supported annual meetings of the COP and called for further discussions on which meetings would be held at the seat of the Secretariat and which would be held at UN Headquarters. They underlined the importance of stakeholder participation. 

SWITZERLAND supported biennial meetings of the COP, with more frequent COPs at the beginning. They suggested changing the COP Presidency at the end of a COP, so as to ensure the new President’s participation in the organization of the upcoming COP. On the venue of the COP, they supported a rotation, but noted the costs associated with holding big meetings. They noted Bureau membership should be based on geographical representation and not give preference to specific groups. They called to ensure observer participation.

EGYPT called for elaboration of the rule that SB Chairs be members of the Bureau and supported suggestions for aligning the decision-making procedures of the COP with those of the subsidiary bodies.

BANGLADESH supported a mixed approach to the frequency of COP meetings, noting resource and logistical constraints for developing countries. They supported a regional rotation of COP meetings. They called for a stand-alone Secretariat in the long term, and for SIDS and LDCs seats on the SBs. They stressed the need to include developing country voices, as well as the voices of civil society.

VIET NAM supported virtual meetings to encourage broader participation and called for an expanded Bureau to enhance transparency.

ICELAND supported biennial meetings of the COP once the process is “up and running.” They noted the need for a higher threshold to convene an extraordinary meeting of the COP. They underlined the need to align with existing international frameworks and bodies (IFBs). They underscored the need to prioritize consensus-based decision making. On the rules for adopting proposals for the establishment of ABMTs, they called for the text to align with the language in the BBNJ Agreement, noting that some of these decisions may need to be taken at extraordinary meetings of the COP.

The PHILIPPINES underscored consensus as the preferred form of decision making. They said COP and SB meetings should be open to observers unless otherwise decided, with an open-access platform allowing for active stakeholder participation. They called for fixed term limits and ensuring gender and geographical balance in the election of officers to the COP and SBs. They called for specifying the procedures for establishing SBs, noting the COP and SBs should meet at the seat of the Secretariat or at UN Headquarters unless the COP, or the Secretariat in consultation with parties, decides otherwise.

SRI LANKA said COP meetings should be convened in person, with hybrid or virtual meetings only under exceptional circumstances. They suggested that the COP should take place annually, noting that a biennial meeting schedule could be considered at a later stage.

SAUDI ARABIA called for clarifying the provisions on voting with regard to REIOs and emphasized decisions and recommendations shall be adopted by consensus. 

IRAN suggested elaborating the rules of procedure for extraordinary meetings, emphasizing the need for consistency across processes. They called for distinguishing between different types of observers. They suggested involving the Bureau in preparing provisional agendas, expressed caution with regard to conferring SB Chairs a right to vote and the convening of virtual meetings. They also emphasized that their participation in the PrepCom does not prejudge Iran’s status as a non-party to UNCLOS. 

MOROCCO supported regional rotation of the COP Presidency, which could be done at the end of a COP. They called for a regionally-balanced Bureau and supported the categorization of observers. They called for further discussions on linking voting rights to arrears.

The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE preferred not to restrict the COP’s ability to decide on alternative meeting locations and supported provisions on hybrid meetings under special circumstances. They strongly supported annual meetings, particularly during the initial phase. They called for clarifying decision-making provisions under emergency conditions, pointing to virtual meetings and email-based procedures. They underscored that the exclusion of observers from any meeting should be limited to exceptional circumstances, be time-bound, and require a majority vote, and underscored that procedures for the approval of observer organizations should not be unduly onerous. They supported electing incoming COP Presidents at the end of a given meeting and they recommended empowering SB Chairs to represent the bodies intersessionally and equip them to take decision intersessionally in exceptional circumstances, through virtual or email procedures.

The INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (ICEL) suggested proxy voting may be helpful to address quorum issues, and strongly supported annual meetings, at least in the initial stages. They suggested adding provisions on the approval of meeting reports and deleting the provision on the SB Chairs’ right to vote. 

The INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL called for the rules to differentiate Indigenous Peoples from local communities, including in rules pertaining to observer participation, pointing to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) in this regard.

In the second round of comments, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION cautioned against giving NGOs “unprecedented roles,” opining that these organizations are sponsored by developed countries to represent specific interests and noting that this is “what led to the unbalanced BBNJ Agreement.” They called for NGO participants to disclose their sponsorship and “prove their value” in working in the interest of the common good. They underscored the need for consensus-based decision making.

Noting the Agreement’s ambiguous wording on place and frequency of meetings, P-SIDS supported annual meetings initially, with fewer meetings down the line, and called to factor this into budget planning and election cycles. They noted that extraordinary meetings could address either emergency measures or a backlog of issues. They supported a dedicated SIDS seat on the Bureau.

AOSIS noted calls to elaborate on the operationalization of emergency measures, and on voting procedures. They underlined that SBs in other processes have a dedicated SIDS seat on their Bureaux. CARICOM called for clarity on the mode of submission of credentials, noting that delegations should be allowed to submit physical credentials up to the penultimate day of the meeting. They called for the SBs to be able to set their own meeting times, and called for more reflection on the term limits of members of these bodies, preferring a two-term limit. 

The INTERNATIONAL SEABED AUTHORITY (ISA) called for states to consider special rules to address situations where the implementation of the Agreement may clash with the mandates of existing IFBs.

The EU supported the rules of procedure of the COP applying mutatis mutandis to the SBs, but expressed openness for these bodies to adopt additional rules for their operation. They agreed that the modalities for observer participation need further discussion. They supported the rule related to voting procedures for REIOs, and suggested that the President decide on whether all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, in order to initiate voting procedures. They called for the elaboration on the role of the rapporteur, among other issues.

CLAM suggested reflecting on provisions for observer participation under other agreements and called for clarity on use of “ordinarily” in the context of the COP meeting’s venue.

CHINA supported holding meetings at the seat of the Secretariat and called for further discussions on the role of the Bureau and the COP President in the preparation of provisional agendas. They also called for further reflection on Bureau membership, underscoring regional seat allocation, while acknowledging that some regions may represent more parties than others and acknowledging SIDS’ call for a dedicated seat. Echoing Iceland, they underscored the need to strive for consensus-based decision making, with voting only under exceptional circumstances. They called for further clarification on the provision on decisions on competence of the COP.

The UK called for a majority threshold for the convening of extraordinary meetings. They supported New Zealand, Canada, and others in calling for clarifying that voting only applies once all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. They suggested Switzerland’s proposal for early election of COP Presidents is already addressed in the draft, specifically under draft rule 22.2. Noting that one of the Bureau’s functions is to review progress under the SBs, they suggested the SB Chairs be able to attend Bureau meetings without being ex-officio Bureau members. They supported ensuring that the SBs engage with each other directly rather than having to go through the COP.

AUSTRALIA noted that the SBs could advise the COP on any additional rules they adopt to support the specifics of their operations. They highlighted the need for a measure of independence of these bodies, specifically the Scientific and Technical Body.

On quorum and the right to vote, BRAZIL, with IRAN and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, called for further clarity on the rules applicable to REIOs, specifically the meaning and application of the phrase “present and voting.”

IRAN called for further discussions on the visa arrangements for developing countries if meeting venues are subject to regional rotation.

On Wednesday, 16 April, Co-Chair Felson called for additional comments on the location and frequency of COP meetings. On the location of COP meetings, AOSIS emphasized ensuring quorum and, with CARICOM and SRI LANKA, pointed to the need to fund SIDS’ participation, especially in the case of rotational locations. CARICOM cautioned against varying the COP venue, underlining that attending meetings outside of UN Headquarters is cost prohibitive and a logistical challenge for CARICOM and other members.

CLAM called for clarity on the meaning of the phrase that the COP should “ordinarily” meet at the seat of the Secretariat or at UN Headquarters. 

The FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA and CANADA noted the expectation that COP 1 will be held at UN Headquarters, as it will need to take a decision on the seat of the Secretariat. 

The AFRICAN GROUP said meetings should primarily be held at the seat of the Secretariat or UN Headquarters to ensure accessibility, but noted there is value in exploring regional rotation, as in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with due consideration for addressing participation barriers.

SWITZERLAND noted the advantage of meeting at UN Headquarters is that almost all countries have diplomatic missions in New York, which would reduce participation costs, whereas they suggested there would not be a big difference in participation costs between meetings held at the seat of the Secretariat compared to rotating locations. SWITZERLAND also highlighted that in other processes it is up to parties to make hosting offers and that host countries are expected to cover the additional costs associated with hosting the COP elsewhere than at the seat of the Secretariat/UN Headquarters. They called for clarifying expectations for a rotational system, including with regard to how extraordinary meetings would factor in the rotation. 

ICELAND preferred that ordinary meetings of the COP take place at UN Headquarters to take into account the needs of smaller delegations. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION underlined that the rules of procedure should “strictly adhere” to UNGA rules, noting that rules stipulate that meetings should occur at UN Headquarters, and opposed rotational meetings except in extraordinary circumstances. 

CANADA noted that “ordinarily” could mean “normal practice,” but said they are open to rotation. The UK underlined that there is no reading of the text that provides for rotating locations, noting this is a drain of time and resources and could create participation challenges. AUSTRALIA explained that the term “ordinarily” means “habitually, normally, usually” and implies flexibility regarding circumstances that are not normal and that this flexibility applies to both ordinary and extraordinary COP meetings. 

JAPAN called for specifying that it is up to the COP to decide on alternative locations, supported by IRAN, and noted the question of location also depends on the seat of the Secretariat. IRAN called for attention to privileges and immunities and the obligation of host countries, noting this also ties into the question of the Secretariat’s link to the UN, as the UN Office of Legal Affairs usually makes such arrangements. 

On the frequency of COP meetings, AOSIS, CARICOM, and P-SIDS supported annual meetings of the COP at the beginning. AOSIS and NEW ZEALAND suggested the COP could adjust the frequency of meetings after the first few years. CLAM, the EU, and CANADA supported specifying a sunset clause in the rules of procedure reflecting annual meetings at the beginning and biennial meetings later on in the process, as under the Minamata Convention. The AFRICAN GROUP and CANADA supported a phased approach, with annual meetings for the first three to five years, followed by biennial meetings.

SWITZERLAND and JAPAN preferred defining a biennial rhythm as the default, noting the rules of procedure should have a long shelf-life, but expressed openness for annual meetings with a sunset clause, with SWITZERLAND suggesting an initial phase of four years. ICELAND supported a sunset clause of five years. SINGAPORE underlined that it may be premature to set a sunset clause. SWITZERLAND, TÜRKIYE, and AUSTRALIA emphasized that a biennial rhythm allows time for parties to implement decisions. BANGLADESH and AUSTRALIA opposed a sunset clause, noting it would be difficult to specify when institutional arrangements are finalized, preferring for the COP to review the frequency of its meetings.

The REPUBLIC OF KOREA called for biennial meetings once implementation has begun. The PHILIPPINES and SINGAPORE supported annual COP meetings, with SINGAPORE underlining that this be the practice, “unless otherwise decided by the COP.” CHINA suggested mandating COP 1 decide on the frequency of COP meetings based on the number of contracting parties.

P-SIDS noted that extraordinary meetings may be convened not only due to emergencies, but also to address a high workload, such as in relation to the establishment of MPAs. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE underscored the need for quick progress on MPAs. 

The CBD Secretariat noted that since its entry into force, the CBD: held 16 ordinary COP meetings and two extraordinary ones, in 18 different countries, including at its seat; with annual meetings from 1994-1996 and then biennial meetings.

Co-Chair Felson then invited views on virtual or hybrid meeting formats. Most delegations emphasized COP meetings should take place in person. 

AOSIS, CARICOM, the EU, CLAM, TÜRKIYE, CHINA, NORWAY, and the UK agreed virtual or hybrid meetings should be limited to exceptional circumstances. The UK noted that hybrid meetings are disadvantageous to delegates off-site and highlighted the high costs of running hybrid meetings. IRAN pointed to the possibility of hybrid meetings, with the decision on physical attendance left to individual states with the understanding that they may be excluded from certain parts of the meeting that require in-person attendance. CUBA stressed that many states do not have the technology to participate in virtual meetings, including due to unilateral coercive measures. P-SIDS highlighted that there should be an option to give statements virtually in exceptional circumstances. 

The AFRICAN GROUP, SWITZERLAND, and P-SIDS supported live broadcasting of meetings to offer an opportunity to follow debates online, in particular for non-state stakeholders.

CLAM considered no substantive decisions should be adopted in such formats. IRAN expressed concerns about virtual COPs including that it would be difficult to fully implement the rules of procedure including on issues such as voting requests. CHINA noted that any virtual meetings should have a limited scope, with no substantive decision-making taking place, including voting; and that the COP should decide on holding a virtual meeting. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called to adhere to UNGA rules on online meetings, noting these should only be held in “truly exceptional circumstances” like the COVID-19 pandemic.

NORWAY noted that emergency measures may constitute the need for an extraordinary meeting, which could be held virtually. CARICOM noted the need for voting to be possible under emergency measures. 

The AFRICAN GROUP and P-SIDS expressed openness for virtual and hybrid modalities for intersessional work and meetings of the SBs. JAPAN and CHINA noted there was more flexibility for modalities for convening SB meetings. CUBA supported hybrid meetings of the subsidiary bodies in exceptional circumstances. P-SIDS emphasized the possibility for virtual subsidiary bodies’ meetings does not rule out in-person meetings, but underscored the value of virtual meetings for the Scientific and Technical Body (STB) to consider MPA proposals in a timely manner. Noting that the SBs adopt recommendations, they considered that while there cannot be voting in virtual meetings, virtual decision making is possible if there is consensus, pointing to decisions adopted under UNGA during the COVID-19 pandemic. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted UNGA used a “no-objection” procedure.

The CBD Secretariat noted CBD Decision 16/24 affirms that the meetings of the CBD’s COP and SBs should be held in person, unless in the event of extraordinary circumstances, and reaffirmed that, in the event of extraordinary circumstances, meetings could be held virtually, following consultations among parties and a decision of the COP Bureau, as long as no substantive decisions are taken online, with the exception of decisions on budgetary and procedural matters to allow the Secretariat to function. They also noted the provision of online streaming to enhance inclusiveness and transparency, subject to the availability of financial resources.

On the threshold for convening extraordinary meetings, CARICOM, the AFRICAN GROUP, CHINA, with the UK, stressed that it should be a majority of members, not one third. The EU supported a threshold of one third. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE cautioned against being too prescriptive, noting these measures could be adopted in the intersessional period.

On emergency measures, CARICOM suggested reflecting on provisions for emergency measures in other processes. CLAM recalled the STB is supposed to make a recommendation on the matter for adoption by the COP. SINGAPORE and NEW ZEALAND noted openness for the COP to meet in a hybrid or virtual manner to adopt emergency measures and emphasized discussing the termination of emergency measures. ICELAND called for mindfulness on the role of the STB on addressing emergency measures, noting the need for cooperation with IFBs in this regard.

On the preparation of meeting agendas, the AFRICAN GROUP supported a limit of 30 days ahead of the meeting to propose supplementary agenda items and called for meeting documents to be shared early. The UK preferred a timeline of fewer than 15 days for submissions of supplementary items. SINGAPORE emphasized the value of long notice periods, emphasizing that the timely sharing of meeting agendas informs internal decisions on the composition of delegations. CHINA proposed that the COP Bureau assist in the preparation of the agenda for extraordinary meetings. The EU said the Secretariat should notify states 60 days before an extraordinary meeting. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE suggested documents be circulated 40 or 50 days before any meeting in all UN languages.

On observers, AOSIS and the AFRICAN GROUP cautioned against “reinventing the wheel,” suggesting reflecting on precedents in other processes. CLAM and CHINA suggested the COP define participation modalities for observers and emphasized elaborating on observer categorization and roles. 

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that UNCLOS Member States and regional and sectoral organizations under the remit of UNCLOS should actively participate in decision making, with no decision adopted by the COP until agreement is obtained by all UNCLOS parties. 

CHINA, supported by NIGERIA, called to categorize observers into non-state parties, specialized agencies of the UN, other intergovernmental organizations, and “other entities,” including NGOs, holders of traditional knowledge, scientific bodies, and others. They stressed that the four categories of observers would need to submit a request to participate and that the process may differ depending on their legal status, with the admission of “other entities” subject to the no-objection procedure, as applied under the UN Ocean Conference. 

AUSTRALIA called for more time to reflect on this proposal. CANADA pointed to the UNGA modalities for observer participation. IRAN supported a categorization of observers based on their distinct statuses to ensure legal clarity, pointing to the UN Convention to Prevent Corruption in this regard. NIGERIA underscored that the reference to participation not being unduly restrictive (Agreement Article 48) does not mean the absence of restrictions. 

The UK called for clarity on the practice of granting observer status and who gets to decide on the matter, and noted meetings should be open to observers, in principle. They also called for a deadline to inform observers of meetings. JAPAN and P-SIDS called for clarification on the need for the president’s approval for observer participation. 

The AFRICAN GROUP called to distinguish between intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, scientific institutions, Indigenous Peoples and local communities, and others. They suggested adopting a structured accreditation process whereby entities must submit an application to the Secretariat detailing their mandate and relevance to the Agreement, with the applications to be shared by all parties before COP meetings. They noted the admission should be based on clear criteria, with a decision to be adopted by the COP based on consensus or non-objection. They also suggested observer status may be granted on a sessional or standing basis and the status may be revoked.

INDIA emphasized the importance of stakeholder engagement and transparency, pointing to the Aarhus Convention. They called for establishing: a mechanism for stakeholder consultation; outreach to inform and empower stakeholders at the regional and national level; and support for states on stakeholder engagement.  

ICELAND underlined the need to secure the participation rights of IFBs. The CBD SECRETARIAT underlined the importance of transparency and inclusivity, noting that observers participate in CBD meetings without the right to vote, and have to gain parties’ support for their proposals. The ISA called for the establishment of a mechanism for the COP and other bodies to be able to reach out to external experts and others. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE called to ensure that accreditation practices are not overly burdensome. 

GREENPEACE urged Indigenous Peoples membership in all bodies of the Agreement, noting their status enshrined under UNDRIP. The INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL: noted that a no-objection procedure could be used to silence observer voices and ultimately erode trust; highlighted that the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) accreditation process addresses issues related to sponsorship disclosures; and emphasized that Indigenous Peoples’ organizations are different from NGOs, as they are rights holders under international law.

On Monday, 21 April, Co-Chair Felson summarized discussions held during the first week, noting among other issues, agreement that the draft rules of procedure are fit for purpose, and convergence on holding meetings of the COP at the seat of the Secretariat or at UN Headquarters, with discussions on holding meetings elsewhere revolving around the cost. She also pointed to convergence around the frequency of COP meetings, noting they should initially be held annually and then move to a biennial calendar, with support for in-person meetings. She drew attention to the need for further discussions on observer participation, specifically categorization of observers. She noted support for the rules to address emergency measures, and discussions on the modalities for meetings to agree on these measures. She noted suggestions to discuss: the term of the COP President; interactions between the COP, the SBs, and external entities; the voting rules; and the nexus between voting rights and procedures, among others.

Delegates then continued their exchange of views. On the role of the Bureau, CHINA considered the Bureau should contribute to developing meeting agendas. The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized the Bureau assists the COP President, supports agenda preparation, liaises with the Secretariat intersessionally, and offers procedural guidance, but does not engage in substantive decision making. JAPAN emphasized the consultative nature of the Bureau. The UK, supported by ICELAND, suggested emulating the relevant provision under the ISA, for the Bureau to assist the President with general work, review progress, and make recommendations for progressing work. The EU and the UK called for clarifying the role of the Rapporteur. The UK suggested the Rapporteur be responsible for compiling summary records of meetings, noting meeting records should not be negotiated among parties. 

On the size and composition of the COP Bureau, AOSIS stressed the need for a dedicated seat for SIDS, as is the case in the UNFCCC and in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) towards a treaty on plastic pollution, with P-SIDS and CARICOM calling for dedicated seats for SIDS and LDCs also on the Bureaux of the SBs. Recalling the Agreement acknowledges the needs of African coastal states, the AFRICAN GROUP encouraged an inclusive approach reflecting the range of relevant categories of countries without selecting one over others. ICELAND recalled the need for gender balance in addition to equitable geographical representation.

The EU, JAPAN, TÜRKIYE, and ICELAND suggested there should be one President and nine Vice-Presidents, IRAN supported two representatives from each of the five UN geographical regions. CLAM suggested 15 members in total, with three each per regional group. AUSTRALIA supported a dedicated SIDS seat. CARICOM proposed one President, one Vice-President from each region, as well as one seat for SIDS and one seat for LDCs. CHINA suggested that the countries contributing the most resources and the regions representing more members should have more seats. SRI LANKA called for a regional rotation of the roles of President and Rapporteur. CLAM, CHINA, and the UK considered the SB Chairs should not be ex-officio members of the Bureau, with CLAM noting this would complicate regional balance. JAPAN, CLAM, the UK, and ICELAND supported inviting the SB Chairs to participate in Bureau meetings, where appropriate. 

On terms of office, CARICOM, JAPAN, the EU, TÜRKIYE, SRI LANKA, and AUSTRALIA supported a two-term limit, with the EU noting the length should depend on the frequency of COP meetings. CHINA preferred not to set term limits. AUSTRALIA questioned whether the term limit should apply specifically to consecutive terms. 

On the SBs’ cooperation with the COP and IFBs, AOSIS, SRI LANKA, the EU, the PHILIPPINES, and TÜRKIYE noted that the SBs should have autonomy. CARICOM, with the PHILIPPINES, called for flexibility of the SBs in setting their meeting schedules and activities, with reports to the COP. The EU considered it burdensome for the COP to decide on the meeting dates of SBs, and suggested reflecting on whether these dates should be set by the Secretariat in consultation with the Bureau or the SB chairs. The UK called for a “light touch” involvement of the COP, retaining oversight as it relates to budgetary implications. 

AUSTRALIA, with the PHILIPPINES, supported empowering the SBs to interact with each other and with IFBs, including intersessionally, noting they remain accountable to the COP. ICELAND noted that the role of the individual SBs differs and are not sufficiently defined in the Agreement, emphasizing the need to provide guidance on their interaction with IFBs. BANGLADESH suggested establishing a formal coordination mechanism for the SBs, and called for the SBs to hold intersessional briefings with the Bureau and stakeholders. 

ISA called for ensuring coherence and coordination with, and not undermining, existing IFBs. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE supported giving the SBs flexibility to develop their own agenda, subject to the COP’s direction when necessary, and for empowering the SB Chairs to represent their respective bodies when collaborating with other SBs and IFBs. They suggested the Implementation and Compliance Committee (ICC) and the STB may benefit from more specific procedures in this regard.

On the SB Chairs, CLAM and the AFRICAN GROUP supported a regional rotation. SAUDI ARABIA supported a balance between developed and developing countries among SB Chairs, pointing to the UNFCCC as a model. On voting by the SB Chairs, CARICOM took note of concerns of bias, but indicated that since Chairs will be serving in their individual capacities, they should be allowed to vote. P-SIDS outlined that SBs typically choose their own Chairs, and, with TÜRKIYE and the PHILIPPINES, noted that Chairs should retain their right to vote. The AFRICAN GROUP and SRI LANKA said they should not be granted the right to vote. TÜRKIYE noted that denying voting rights could disadvantage small states. AUSTRALIA considered that if the Chairs are appointed by the SBs rather than the COP, then they should have the right to vote. The EU expressed openness to consider different options on voting by SB Chairs, noting it depends on the size and function of the SBs and the capacity in which the Chairs serve.

Discussions then focused on decision making. Delegates agreed on the need to clearly elaborate that decision making should be consensus based, with voting only when all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. On how to determine whether all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted, P-SIDS and the EU considered this should be determined by the President. CHINA, opposed by P-SIDS, supported a role for the Bureau in the determination.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for checks and balances to ensure the Agreement does not harm the rights of the users of the Ocean provided under UNCLOS, especially cautioning against closing off parts of the global Ocean through MPAs, noting a lack of clarity on the criteria for establishing these, and urged for all UNCLOS parties to be involved in decision making.

On how to differentiate between matters of substance and procedural issues for which the draft rules of procedure foresee different voting thresholds, JAPAN, opposed by P-SIDS, suggested that if the question as to a matter’s nature arises, it should be treated as a matter of substance, rather than subjecting the question to the President’s ruling.

Delegates then exchanged views on proxy voting. CLAM and JAPAN noted that the draft does not contain a rule on proxy voting. AOSIS noted openness to its consideration, with CARICOM and P-SIDS also expressing flexibility and noting it may help overcome in-person participation challenges faced by some SIDS. The EU called for preparing a document to provide more clarity on proxy voting. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted that proxy voting is not practiced by UNGA. TÜRKIYE and SAUDI ARABIA did not support proxy voting. The UK, with P-SIDS, noted that proxy voting does not usually fall under formal rules.

On voting by REIOs, the EU and NORWAY supported the text (draft rule 44.2), noting it is standard language under the UNFCCC and the Minamata Convention on Mercury. ICELAND noted draft rule 44.2 reproduces Article 64.2 of the Agreement, calling on states to retain the rule as drafted. CLAM, with JAPAN, called to introduce a definition on “present and voting” in relation to the voting of REIOs, underscoring that the number of REIO votes should not exceed the number of REIO states present and voting. The AFRICAN GROUP underlined that only REIO states that are party to the Agreement and present and voting should be allowed to vote. EGYPT questioned how states designate their voting rights to REIOs and how to treat states that may be party to more than one REIO. CARICOM called for clarification on the need for the rule on voting by REIOs.

On voting methods, JAPAN suggested that any party may request a secret ballot.

On quorum, JAPAN noted that rule 26 does not distinguish between the quorum for opening a meeting and for decision making, calling for this distinction to be made. CARICOM suggested that all major decisions should be taken at UN Headquarters to guarantee quorum. CARICOM, with the PHILIPPINES and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE, called for consideration on lowering the two-thirds majority required for decision making. P-SIDS, AOSIS, and SINGAPORE preferred a simple majority of parties present and voting, lamenting the confusion caused by the double requirement for quorum on decision making. CLAM noted that for REIOs, the number of those present and voting should be counted in determining quorum. On thresholds and amendments, the AFRICAN GROUP, CHINA, TÜRKIYE, and JAPAN insisted on a high threshold for amending the rules of procedure. TÜRKIYE called for all amendments to be taken by consensus.

On addressing Articles 6 (without prejudice) and 18 (areas of application), CHINA suggested adding an additional paragraph on the implementation of Article 18 of the BBNJ Agreement that the COP should not make a decision on a submission on an issue under dispute between two states, noting this is the practice under the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. In support, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION reiterated that none of the COP rules of procedure should undermine the mandates of existing IFBs or of UNCLOS as a whole.

CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, the UK, the EU, the PHILIPPINES, VIET NAM, NORWAY, and the EU underscored these articles are already well articulated in the Agreement and should not be reproduced in the rules of procedure, also noting that these are matters of substance and not of procedure. 

CHINA underlined that Article 18 contains some procedural elements related to decision making on ABMTs, noting this needs to be reflected in the rules of procedure. CHINA noted that Article 18 lacks a trigger point and suggested emulating the approach taken in other IFBs for reflecting such matters in rules of procedure, pointing to the International Maritime Organization’s approach to designating especially sensitive areas, among others. Co-Chair McCarthy referred delegates to rule 61 (precedence of the Agreement), noting that the Agreement shall prevail in the event of conflicts between the rules of procedure and the Agreement. He also noted that this question may be one of the few on which there is a stark divide between delegations’ positions and invited them to reflect on a possible way forward at PrepCom II.

Discussions continued on Tuesday, 22 April. AOSIS called for reflecting on a rule for suspending voting rights in relation to arrears, with waivers for attenuating circumstances. The EU also called for addressing the election of members to the SBs in the rules of procedure. 

On the rules of procedure of the COP applying to the SBs, delegates agreed these should apply mutatis mutandis, with the possibility to agree on additional rules of procedure for the different bodies to reflect their functions and mandates. The EU noted that the Agreement already specifies that some SBs, such as the ICC, should have specific rules. SWITZERLAND emphasized the need for clarity on the rules of procedure applying to each body, and suggested developing a table to list the additional rules that apply to each body. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION noted the rules of procedure should also apply to other types of bodies established under the Agreement, such as working groups, with the possibility to define additional rules for each. The EU noted that all SBs should strive for consensus, but that a mechanism is needed to facilitate reporting to the COP in the absence of consensus. 

In their final discussion on the rules of procedure, P-SIDS supported the rule providing for the election of SIDS representatives in the SBs. On the quorum for opening a meeting, P-SIDS supported a simple majority, noting that a majority should be required for decision-making procedures, as under UNGA rules. On the threshold for amendments, P-SIDS supported a simple majority of those present and voting. They called for the rules to be functional and emphasized that the rules should ensure SIDS’ meaningful participation.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION proposed that the rules should be revised along the lines of those of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and the ISA to ensure that no decision undermines the interests of UN Member States, including related to the establishment of MPAs. They highlighted the practice of adopting decisions on MPAs only when there is consensus.

The NORTHEAST ATLANTIC FISHERIES COMMISSION highlighted the experience of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs) in implementing and monitoring ABMTs in ABNJ, and called for the rules of procedure to enable the engagement of such intergovernmental observers.

The WESTERN CENTRAL PACIFIC FISHERIES ORGANIZATION highlighted the fruitful cooperation between tuna RFMOs and expressed readiness to engage with the BBNJ Secretariat, noting constructive cooperation is critical to ensure conservation and sustainable use of ocean resources.

Next Steps: In plenary on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair Felson highlighted that the Co-Chairs will produce a revised aid to discussions for consideration at PrepCom II.

Rules of Procedure and Modalities for the Operation of the Subsidiary Bodies

This matter was discussed in a Working Group. On Tuesday, 15 April 2025, Co-Chair Felson introduced the note by the Secretariat (A/AC.296/2025/4), which provides examples and reference points from the SBs of other instruments. She pointed to the guiding questions prepared by the Co-Chairs. She first called for comments on the commonalities between the subsidiary bodies. Delegates later addressed each of the bodies separately.

On the rules of procedures for the SBs, delegates generally supported the mutatis mutandis application of the COP rules of procedure, noting that additional rules may be needed to adjust to each body’s specificities. In this regard, the G-77/CHINA, supported by ICELAND, underlined that form should follow function. P-SIDS highlighted that the COP is mandated to adopt the rules of procedure for the SBs, with CHINA calling for the rules to be adopted at COP 1. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE supported establishing the SBs at COP 1, with the INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE (IUCN) highlighting the STB in this regard. 

CLAM, CARICOM, CHINA, SWITZERLAND, NEW ZEALAND, and TÜRKIYE supported having a single document outlining the rules of procedure of all SBs, suggesting that terms of reference and the modalities for operation also be included in the document. 

AOSIS, P-SIDS, the AFRICAN GROUP, the EU, the PHILIPPINES, and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE noted SBs should be able to interact with each other and, with CLAM, also collaborate with existing IFBs. P-SIDS and the MALDIVES supported giving the SBs flexibility to carry out their work, for example by giving them authority to create working groups and, with the EU and IUCN, to draw on outside expertise. The AFRICAN GROUP noted that the level of independence and decision-making authority of the bodies varies, with some primarily making recommendations to the COP and others having more direct operational mandates.

On the terms of reference and modalities for the operation of the SBs, CANADA, with ICELAND, AUSTRALIA, SRI LANKA, NORWAY, BANGLADESH and the UK, underlined the need for setting clear mandates for all the bodies to avoid overlaps, duplications, and mandate creep. The EU emphasized addressing the modalities for meetings, including the meeting format, timing, quorum, working language, and decision-making procedures in the absence of consensus. P-SIDS noted that the SBs could benefit from virtual intersessional work.

P-SIDS noted it is up to the COP to assign agenda items to each body. Supporting CARICOM, the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE said the SBs should be able to determine their own programme of work. AOSIS called for targeted work programmes for SIDS. The UK called for COP oversight of the SB’s programmes of work as these have financial implications, with SWITZERLAND, but noted the COP should not micromanage their work. SWITZERLAND called for synergies between all the biodiversity-related conventions, including the BBNJ Agreement, and underlined the need for a structure to facilitate these synergies, pointing to the Bern Process on cooperation and collaboration between biodiversity-related conventions.

AOSIS and the EU called to ensure conflicts of interests of SB members are adequately addressed. The AFRICAN GROUP also called for consistent reporting procedures, including with regard to timeframes and formats, where appropriate. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE supported reflecting all views in the outcomes of the SBs. 

On observers, the PHILIPPINES called for clear provisions on stakeholder participation, including provisions for IPLCs. P-SIDS suggested creating an advisory group for the SBs to draw on the traditional knowledge of IPLCs, with members being self-selected from among the seven socio-cultural regions, noting they would not have voting rights. The INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL called for ensuring Indigenous Peoples’ participation in all SBs and cautioned against implying that Indigenous knowledge is of lesser standing than science. They underscored the need for self-selection of Indigenous knowledge holders. GREENPEACE called for a SIDS seat on all SBs. They highlighted the need for a two-way transfer of knowledge between Indigenous Peoples and the Committee, and proposed the establishment of a stand-alone IPLC Committee under the Agreement. Jane Fonda, speaking for GREENPEACE, emphasized the importance of a quick entry into force of the BBNJ Agreement to support the Global Biodiversity Framework’s 30x30 target on Ocean protection.

On membership in the SBs, CLAM and P-SIDS considered the size of each body should reflect its tasks, with P-SIDS suggesting the STB would be larger, as the consideration of issues related to ABMT, EIA, and MGR requires different types of expertise. AOSIS and P-SIDS underlined the importance of operationalizing specific considerations for SIDS, including through a dedicated seat for SIDS on each body. AOSIS and CARICOM called for ensuring the participation of early career ocean professionals (ECOPS) as members of the SBs. The EU suggested establishing gender focal points to support the consideration of gender balance. INDIA recommended that gender balance should be observed at the election stage of the discussions, not at the nomination phase, to ensure gender balance is actually met. TÜRKIYE emphasized taking into account gender balance at all stages of the process, including nomination and election. IRAN underlined the need for clear provisions prioritizing developing countries, including their representation in the ABS Committee, Capacity Building and Transfer of Marine Technology (CBTMT) Committee, Finance Committee, and STB. The PHILIPPINES opposed lumping together mainland and maritime states in the Asia-Pacific region, emphasizing the specific representation of archipelagic developing countries like the Philippines and Indonesia.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that all states should have the right to provide input to all SB meetings. CHINA emphasized that not all parties can be represented in the SBs, as these would become unwieldy and an unreasonably large size would be detrimental to the bodies’ efficiency. They called for strictly abiding by the guiding principles outlined in the Agreement, factoring in equitable geographical representation and the representation of SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs.

The EU emphasized specifying the rules for government nomination and the role of regional groups therein. P-SIDS and the PHILIPPINES underscored members should be nominated by governments and elected by the COP in their individual capacity based on their skills. AUSTRALIA noted that there may be a need to establish a pool of experts, where necessary, to staff these bodies.

ICELAND and NORWAY called for the membership of the bodies to be capped, based on the needs of each body, and called for discussions on the specific expertise required. SWITZERLAND noted the need for a delicate balance between capping the number of experts in the bodies, and the political considerations that could cause states not represented to reopen issues discussed by the bodies at the COP. JAPAN supported a balance of expertise and regional representation and, noting the higher than usual number of SBs, they supported a maximum of three experts per regional group, with SIDS specific representation included in the regional representation wherever possible.

P-SIDS, the AFRICAN GROUP, the PHILIPPINES, NEW ZEALAND, and TÜRKIYE supported term limits, with P-SIDS and TÜRKIYE suggesting members could be re-elected once and NEW ZEALAND suggesting a stand-down period. AOSIS supported single term memberships of the experts. CARICOM, the PHILIPPINES, NEW ZEALAND, ICELAND, NORWAY, JAPAN, THAILAND, and the UK supported staggered membership to retain institutional memory.

Next Steps: In plenary on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair McCarthy highlighted that the Co-Chairs will produce a matrix with options related to all the SBs to help visualize the state of discussions thus far, for further consideration at PrepCom II.

Access and Benefit-Sharing Committee

In general comments, CARICOM, with CANADA, suggested that the Committee be mandated to establish an ad hoc technical expert group to support its functions. The EU and SWITZERLAND called for referencing the Cali Fund on the sharing of monetary benefits from digital sequence information (DSI) as a means to streamline actions between the Agreement and the CBD. INDIA proposed mandating the ABS Committee to provide and facilitate dispute resolution and capacity-building functions. SINGAPORE recalled that, according to Agreement Article 59, parties may refer disputes of a technical nature to an ad hoc expert panel. They also underscored that if the COP requests the ABS Committee to consider such a matter, the ABS Committee should make recommendations to the COP, not to specific parties between whom there may be an ABS-related dispute.

On rules of procedure, delegations supported the COP rules applying mutatis mutandis to the ABS Committee, with many noting that they would be tailored to fit the needs of the Committee. AOSIS, P-SIDS, and CARICOM stressed that SIDS should be afforded the opportunity to comment on decisions related to them, with AOSIS supporting the submission of minority reports for ABS Committee decisions. AOSIS called for clear provisions for interactions between the ABS Committee and the other SBs, and reiterated interest in a dedicated joint programme of work on SIDS issues cutting across all the SBs. The UK emphasized the need for the SBs to strategically cooperate more generally in delivering on their mandates. CARICOM and CANADA stressed the need for provisions for the Committee’s interaction with the CHM and, with the EU, guidance on consulting with IFBs. CARICOM supported the Committee electing its own Chair(s). The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE emphasized the need to clarify whether technical expertise on ABS will sit within the ABS Committee, the STB, or both.  

On meeting modalities, AOSIS and CARICOM underlined that the scheduling of hybrid meetings should take into account SIDS time zones. CARICOM suggested convening joint intersessional meetings with other SBs. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE suggested reflecting on the desired meeting frequency depending on the frequency of COP and SB meetings.

On the composition of the 15-member body, AOSIS, CARICOM, and GREENPEACE emphasized the need for a seat for SIDS, with the AFRICAN GROUP calling for LDCs, and LLDCs to also be represented. CARICOM called for prioritizing the participation of ECOPs. P-SIDS emphasized the need for IFBs to contribute to the work of the Committee, with CARICOM noting that IFB representatives could be ex officio members. The EU called to include states with activities in ABNJ. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for all states to be represented, with work to be done on the basis of consensus. SWITZERLAND called for engaging with industry representatives. CANADA called for engaging representatives of Indigenous Peoples organizations, with the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE calling for prioritizing their full and effective participation. NORWAY supported using expert groups to address specific issues.

On membership terms, AOSIS supported members serving for one term. CARICOM supported members serving two terms of four to six years. CLAM supported a four-year term, with staggered membership to ensure continuity. SRI LANKA also suggested four-year terms, with two possible terms. CANADA, with the UK, cautioned against lengthy terms and suggested that if members are reelected, their second term could be shorter.

On eligibility and expertise, CARICOM called for expertise in natural and social sciences, law and, with the EU and CANADA, data science. INDIA supported members with multidisciplinary expertise. CANADA also pointed to marine bioprospecting. The UK cautioned against negotiating a list of desired expertise, but flagged the value of members with practical experience in commercializing DSI-related products.

Capacity-Building and Transfer of Marine Technology Committee

In general comments, AOSIS called for UNDOALOS to develop draft guidelines for needs assessments to operationalize Article 42.4 (CBTMT responsive to developing country needs), for consideration at COP 1, taking into account the work of other IFBs in this regard. The UK noted the high workload of UNDOALOS in the intersessional period, suggesting reconsidering the timing of this work.

AOSIS called for specific SIDS monitoring frameworks, including reports from the CBTMT Committee on the funding allocated to SIDS for marine scientific research and capacity development, the number of training programmes accorded to SIDS, and the quantity and quality of the marine technology transferred to SIDS, such as ocean monitoring equipment.

CARICOM highlighted the functions of the CBTMT Committee including: reviewing support for the assessed needs; mobilizing funds for implementation; measuring effectiveness based on performance indicators; developing draft needs assessment guidelines and procedures; developing modalities and procedures for the operation of the Committee and for accessing CBTMT; and collaborating with the other SBs as well as existing IFBs. They highlighted the Committee’s role in facilitating compliance with all the provisions of the Agreement on CBTMT, and recommending amendments for the approval of the COP.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION lamented the lack of concrete obligations on technology transfer in the Agreement.

On rules of procedure, most delegations supported tailoring the COP rules to address the functions of this Committee. TÜRKIYE considered there is no need at this point to define additional rules of procedure, but the COP may decide otherwise. TIMOR LESTE supported the Committee making decisions on its programme and method of work. The EU noted the Committee should strive to reach consensus, but that there should be provisions for the Committee to prepare reports and provide recommendations to the COP in the absence of consensus. The EU and the PHILIPPINES noted the Committee should be given flexibility to collaborate with other IFBs, with oversight by the COP. P-SIDS also supported guidance on cooperation with others. The UK noted the PrepCom can only cover “half of the conversation,” inviting countries that are members of relevant IFBs to address the matter under these bodies. 

The EU emphasized the Committee should be able to invite external experts to contribute to its work on an ad hoc basis, and, with ICEL, that observers should be able to attend meetings. AUSTRALIA said the Committee should proactively bring matters to the attention of the COP. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that all interested states and organizations should be able to participate with their perspective to be duly considered and no recommendation to be adopted without consensus.

On size and composition, the AFRICAN GROUP considered its membership should be larger than that of other committees and, with TIMOR LESTE, have dedicated seats for SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs, underscoring this is a red line for the Group. They also emphasized youth participation. CARICOM suggested a 21-member committee, with eight seats guaranteed for women. They suggested three seats for each UN regional group, and two each for SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. CARICOM called for a focus on ECOPs, with the UK suggesting parties could be invited to give due consideration to nominating ECOPs. 

The EU suggested appointing gender focal points to support achieving gender balance, but emphasized that what matters more than the exact number of women on the Committee, is that gender considerations are taken into account in the work of the Committee. P-SIDS suggested 10–22 members, with dedicated seats for SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. CLAM supported 18 members, with three from each UN regional group and one seat each for SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. CLAM called for balanced representation across all subsidiary bodies. TÜRKIYE suggested at least 20 members. The PHILIPPINES suggested 20 members, and, with INDONESIA, emphasized the fair representation of archipelagic states and the need for rotation within regions. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION suggested every state nominate one representative. 

The EU and the UK cautioned against trying to define a specific list of types of expertise envisioned for Committee members. P-SIDS highlighted the need for members to have policy and technical expertise and be familiar with the realities of SIDS. CLAM suggested members should have scientific, legal, policy, and project management expertise. 

On membership terms, AOSIS favored one term, with CARICOM noting that the length of term should be no less than four years and no more than six years. The EU and AUSTRALIA proposed two-year terms, with no more than two consecutive terms, with TÜRKIYE and OMAN, and noted the length of term should take into account the frequency of COP meetings. P-SIDS favored two-to-four year terms, with a two-term limit. CLAM supported four-year terms, with one possible reelection. Delegates supported staggered terms.

On the capacity in which members serve on the Committee, AOSIS and CARICOM noted experts work in their personal capacity. The EU noted delegates have been suggesting members serve in an “individual,” “expert” or “personal” capacity, and underscored their perspective that the Agreement is sufficiently clear by specifying that members serve “objectively in the best interest of the Agreement.” P-SIDS noted members should serve in their personal capacity, objectively, and in the best interest of the Agreement. 

Finance Committee

On rules of procedure, CLAM preferred that these reflect the specific functions of the Committee, although the COP rules could be applied mutatis mutandis. CARICOM called for aligned rules of procedure with other SBs, including related to the frequency of elections, term limits, and staggered elections. TIMOR LESTE and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE emphasized observer participation in the Finance Committee. On interactions with other committees, AOSIS noted links with the ABS Committee, the Compliance Committee, and CBTMT Committee, proposing that they work through a dedicated joint programme of work for SIDS. The EU, with CARICOM, highlighted links with the CBTMT Committee, and noted the need to ensure there are no overlaps in their work. CARICOM called for clear modalities between the two committees on issues related to resource mobilization.

On size, eligibility criteria, and expected expertise, AOSIS, P-SIDS, and CARICOM supported a limited membership body, with dedicated seats for SIDS. CLAM supported a limited composition of experts. The EU preferred the UNFCCC model and called not to engage in prolonged discussions over the eligibility criteria. P-SIDS called for experience in fund disbursement, fundraising, accountability, and transparency, noting that the terms of reference for this Committee will be very specific. In terms of the size, they pointed to similar bodies in other MEAs, noting the 15 members at ISA, 20 at the UNFCCC, and 70 at the CBD.

On terms of office and renewal modalities, AOSIS supported single terms for the committee members. The EU and P-SIDS supported a two-year term.

Additionally, AOSIS and CARICOM underlined the need for a conflict of interest provision for this committee. CLAM called to draw lessons from the ISA and UNFCCC. CARICOM called for intersessional in-person meetings to advance its work. P-SIDS noted that experts need not only be lawyers. 

Implementation and Compliance Committee

On rules of procedure and modalities of operation, delegates called for emphasizing the transparent, facilitative, non-adversarial, and non-punitive nature of the Committee. They supported the COP rules of procedure applying mutatis mutandis to the ICC, with specific elements to be defined as needed. P-SIDS stressed the need to develop the Committee’s specific terms of reference. 

P-SIDS, with CHINA, the EU and UK, noted the Committee addresses compliance both at an individual and systemic level, with the UK pointing to the Basel Convention as an example. AOSIS, ICELAND, the PHILIPPINES, and AUSTRALIA called for specifying provisions on interactions with other SBs. CARICOM called to elaborate on the compliance triggers. CLAM called for the regular review of triggers. P-SIDS called for clearly defining the monitoring and compliance role of the Committee, which must be carried out in close coordination with relevant IFBs. 

The EU called for provisions on: the process for parties to submit reports to the ICC; triggers to enable the Committee to offer support to parties; and the process enabling the Committee to develop a recommendation for the COP to issue a statement regarding a party’s implementation. They also called for operationalizing Agreement Article 55.4 on the ICC drawing on information from SBs and IFBs. 

CHINA called for the non-adversarial and facilitative nature of the Committee to be included as part of the Committee’s rules; supported the development of separate, tailored rules to address the unique functions of the ICC; and noted the need for the rules to also elaborate on compliance triggers. 

P-SIDS and the EU emphasized the need for clear provisions on conflicts of interest. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested the ICC publish annual implementation trend reports and maintain a repository of best practices. INDIA suggested the Committee develop an early warning system to address compliance issues before they escalate, pointing to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources as an example. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION emphasized addressing inconsistencies with UNCLOS to prevent disputes. 

The UK suggested cooperation with other IFBs could support the ICC in developing its methods of work and its work programme. TÜRKIYE called for the development of tailored rules for the Committee once it begins its work, including rules on conflicts of interest and confidentiality procedures. The PHILIPPINES highlighted the need to address the interaction between the Committee and the financial aspects of the Agreement, supporting the relationship flow chart in this regard.

On membership, AOSIS called for a dedicated seat for SIDS and underlined the need for adequate funding for participation of members of this Committee. They supported members serving in their personal capacities. CARICOM supported a 13-member committee, with two members from each UN region and one each from SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. CLAM supported a 15-member committee, with equitable regional representation. P-SIDS called for a dedicated seat for SIDS and emphasized the participation of IPLCs. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION opined that all UNCLOS members should be able to participate as observers. The UK supported ex officio membership for other SBs. TÜRKIYE supported 15 members to ensure expertise and balanced representation. CHINA called for members with legal expertise. ICELAND called to consider the ICC as a cross-cutting body and supported other IFBs serving as ex officio members. AUSTRALIA supported a 15-member committee. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE noted that members should serve in their national capacities. 

On eligibility and selection criteria, AOSIS suggested experts on implementing issues related to MGRs, ABMTs, EIAs, and capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. CARICOM called for adequate provisions on geographical and gender balance and highlighted the need for expertise related to monitoring and evaluation. CLAM supported members with legal and socio-economic expertise. LIBERIA and the PHILIPPINES underscored the need for regional and gender balance on the committee. 

P-SIDS and the EU emphasized the need for clear provisions on conflicts of interest, calling on nominees to submit a declaration of interests. The AFRICAN GROUP agreed on the need for a due diligence process to screen nominees, based on clear criteria related to neutrality and competence.

 ICELAND underscored the importance of observer participation including from NGOs, and suggested establishing a forum for the Secretariat to receive relevant input from observers.

On the terms of office, CARICOM supported two four-year terms of members nominated by parties and elected by the COP. CLAM preferred a four-year term, with the possibility of reelection. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested 20-24 members, and said term length should be divisible by two or four. TÜRKIYE preferred a two-year term.

Scientific and Technical Body

On rules of procedure and modalities, the EU highlighted that the COP rules should apply. NEW ZEALAND supported the COP rules of procedure applying, but tailored to the STB’s needs. CHINA emphasized the differences between the COP and STB, both in terms of membership and functions, emphasizing the need for distinct rules of procedure to account for the STB’s specificity and for COP 1 to adopt the rules of procedure for all subsidiary bodies.

Many delegations emphasized the importance of ensuring the STB can engage with IFBs. CLAM noted not all relevant IFBs have a mandate to conduct such collaboration. ICELAND, the UK, and SINGAPORE underscored providing a mandate for the STB to collaborate with others, with ICELAND noting this should not be contingent upon reciprocity, and SINGAPORE cautioning against “dictating the other side of the conversation.”

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION underlined that the STB should not duplicate the efforts of existing IFBs, noting that the rules of procedure should ensure that all work of the STB should be done on the basis of consensus. ISA shared their experience on interactions with other bodies, noting that its Legal and Technical Committee does not regularly interact with other bodies. ICEL proposed that information exchange could take place under the supervision of the COP. The MARVIVA FOUNDATION called for the body to be granted the autonomy to establish formal mechanisms for collaboration and cooperation with existing IFBs. 

ICELAND, the UK, and AUSTRALIA suggested the STB will further develop its operational modalities for approval by the COP. AOSIS called for ensuring that SIDS have an opportunity to communicate concerns before the STB submits recommendations to the COP. CARICOM called for defining rules for a silence procedure.

The EU underlined the STB’s cross-cutting function in the ABMT chapter of the Agreement, including in the identification of areas subject to ABMTs and throughout that process. He noted that this also relates to emergency measures. The EU also called for clear rules for the effective implementation of the EIA chapter of the Agreement, noting that the STB will have a supervisory role as states conduct EIAs. They noted that STB would need to prepare guidelines for the conduct of EIAs, provide timelines for EIAs, among other issues. They underlined that the STB should avoid duplication of efforts, build synergies, and collate knowledge on relevant issues from other IFBs, making it a catalyst for cooperation.

SINGAPORE reminded delegates of the debates during the IGC negotiations about the state-led vs. international nature of the EIA process, with agreement on it being state-led, and emphasized the STB’s role in providing recommendations.

The AFRICAN GROUP stressed that external expertise could be consulted on a case-by-case basis; and outlined that decision making should be tailored on a task-based approach. They also supported minority reports in cases where consensus cannot be reached, underlined the need for a pool of experts, and called for documents to be shared at least 60 days before the meeting. They underlined the need for financial provisions for participation of all STB members.

NEW ZEALAND supported the STB working in thematic working groups and also permitted to provide minority and majority reports on decisions. They called for a provision on conflict of interest, as under the International Whaling Commission. They called for greater clarity on the phrase “reconsideration of a proposal.”

ICELAND and the UK emphasized engagement with external experts to address knowledge gaps, with the UK cautioning against over-engineering modalities for such engagement, noting the aim should be to create an enabling environment for engagement with a wide community of experts.

On the size of the STB, AOSIS supported a limited membership. CARICOM suggested 27 members in the initial phase, with five seats per region, one seat for SIDS, and one seat for a representative with expertise on the traditional knowledge of IPLCs. CLAM suggested membership be open to all state parties to the Agreement, noting the STB could then create dedicated working groups to address its specific functions. AOSIS, with P-SIDS, the EU and NEW ZEALAND, preferred a limited body of experts working in their personal capacities. The EU pointed to the pool of experts envisioned under the Agreement. The AFRICAN GROUP preferred an STB composed of 20-30 members, and noted that the STB could form working groups on EIAs, MPAs, and ABMTs, among other issues. CHINA supported the establishment of working groups.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that all states should be invited to nominate their experts to the STB. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA suggested 20 members during the initial phase, with possible expansion in the future to adjust to a growing workload. ICELAND stressed that the Agreement mandates that members of the STB contribute in their expert capacity. BANGLADESH suggested no more than 20-35 members. The UK expressed caution as to a specific seat allocation per region, noting the Agreement may not have universal participation by COP 1. CANADA preferred 30 members. P-SIDS proposed 36 members, with dedicated seats for SIDS, and highlighted the role of the roster of experts.

On eligibility criteria and expected expertise, AOSIS emphasized context-based knowledge, especially with regard to SIDS. CARICOM delineated a list of fields of expertise to draw on. P-SIDS noted that the STB would require a wide range of expertise. The EU cautioned against a lengthy discussion on this issue, calling for trust in parties to nominate the correct experts to the STB, noting that the expertise should be from relevant fields, including relevant traditional knowledge, and experience and expertise in conducting EIAs and establishing MPAs. The AFRICAN GROUP called for expertise in oceanography, marine ecology, data science, and the socio-economic dimensions of biodiversity, and called for a standardized, merit-based process for nominating experts. The UK echoed the EU, noting it would not be fruitful for the PrepCom to define a specific list of expected fields of expertise. ICEL noted that expertise relating to ABMTs and EIAs may overlap. IUCN noted the need for interdisciplinary and geographical representation on the STB, including the views of Indigenous Peoples and their traditional knowledge. They supported the STB consulting with a broad range of external experts, and called for clear mandates on how this will be facilitated. They underlined that the STB is not a political forum, and called to protect the body from political influence, including by ensuring the experts serve in their individual capacities.

On the selection process, CARICOM said there should be a set number of female candidates from each regional group. The EU underlined that this should be a non-political process, and underscored the need to appoint a gender focal point to ensure gender balance on the STB. The AFRICAN GROUP proposed that parties submit nominations 90 days prior to the COP, ensuring gender and regional balance, to allow the COP to elect the members with the necessary skills and qualifications to perform their duties. The UK said the STB and other SBs should elect their own Chairs and the Chair should not be an ex-officio member of the COP bureau. They also objected to nominations by regional groups, noting this could create practical challenges. CHINA suggested each party can only nominate one person, which should be a national of that party.

On the terms of office and renewal modalities, AOSIS, CARICOM, and the UK supported one possible reelection and, with P-SIDS, the EU, NEW ZEALAND, and the AFRICAN GROUP, staggered elections. CARICOM suggested five-year terms, and questioned whether it should be up to the COP to elect the STB Chair. P-SIDS and the UK noted that terms should take into account the frequency of the COP. The EU supported two terms. NEW ZEALAND and CANADA supported a stand-down period after which a previously appointed member could be reappointed. BANGLADESH suggested a review of continued compliance with eligibility criteria before appointing members for a second term. The UK, with CHINA, suggested a four-year term. 

On meetings of the STB, CARICOM emphasized these should be open to observers, suggesting specific criteria be defined for holding closed meetings. CLAM suggested meetings be conducted back-to-back with those of the COP. NORWAY emphasized the high expected frequency of STB meetings, considering the magnitude of the tasks assigned to the body, highlighting the relevance of intersessional work and virtual meetings. 

In terms of models from which to draw on in setting up the STB, CARICOM pointed to the Legal and Technical Commission of the ISA. CLAM pointed to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES). The CBD SECRETARIAT shared lessons in the modalities and functioning of its Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical, and Technological Advice (SBSTTA), noting it is open to participation by NGOs and IPLCs, cooperates with other scientific and technical bodies, and has its own Bureau and Chair. They highlighted that various intersessional activities support the SBSTTA’s work, including expert group meetings.

Arrangements for the Functioning of the Secretariat, including its Seat

This issue was discussed in an Informal Working Group on Tuesday, 14 April, Monday, 21 April, and Tuesday, 22 April. Co-Chair McCarthy pointed to the note prepared by the Secretariat (A/AC.296/2025/5).

In general comments, the G-77/CHINA, EU, UK, and AUSTRALIA called for additional information to inform discussions on this matter. They suggested that UNDOALOS, as the Interim Secretariat, prepare a comparative analysis of existing MEA secretariats, examining elements such as linkages to the UN, legal status in the host country, and privileges and immunities. CLAM also called for more information on the processes for appointing the executive secretary, staffing structures, special funds, the relationship to the GEF, and audit mechanisms.

The EU, UK, AFRICAN GROUP, and SINGAPORE called for a preliminary assessment of human resource and other requirements for the Secretariat to commence its operations, to inform the decision on the budget to be adopted at COP 1. The EU and SINGAPORE emphasized taking into account different growth scenarios, with the UK and the AFRICAN GROUP adding it should also reflect on transition arrangements. SWITZERLAND called for estimates on parties’ assessed contributions.

On the legal status of the Secretariat and headquarters agreement, the EU noted that the issue of international legal personality depends on whether the Secretariat is linked to the UN System or not, with JAPAN calling for clarity on the matter. The EU and NEW ZEALAND emphasized that staff should be granted the necessary privileges and immunities to carry out their tasks, and underlined the need to consider the privileges and immunities of staff dependents, reflecting international practice. CARICOM suggested including safeguards to mitigate abuses of privileges and immunities. P-SIDS noted the provisions on privileges and immunities presented in the note are “pretty standard,” and underscored the importance for the host country to ensure the timely delivery of visas for delegations to attend meetings. IRAN, with JAPAN, highlighted privileges and immunities of experts engaging with the Secretariat and state representatives attending meetings, and called to establish an advisory body to serve the host state. CLAM emphasized that the Secretariat needs to have the legal capacity to coordinate with other bodies. 

On whether to establish the Secretariat as a standalone entity or link it to an existing organization, the AFRICAN GROUP underlined the Secretariat should have strong links to the UN system to ensure effective global cooperation, but, with the UK, should have programmatic independence. CARICOM and P-SIDS considered a link to the UN would be helpful. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that, “if it is ever established” the Secretariat should be established under the UN. The UK emphasized the Secretariat needs to be empowered to deliver on the objectives of the Agreement. ICELAND, NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN, and SWITZERLAND supported having a Secretariat with some institutional linkages with the UN system, pointing to the model of the UNFCCC. The PHILIPPINES preferred a standalone Secretariat, noting that it will also manage the CHM, which will require cooperative relationships with other IFBs. CHINA supported a standalone Secretariat. 

On the selection of the seat of the Secretariat, the EU called for the PrepCom to extend an invitation for states to submit bids to host the Secretariat, noting offers should address financial aspects, and, with JAPAN, proposed that the UN Secretary-General carry out a preliminary assessment of the predefined criteria for all offers to host the Secretariat before COP 1. CARICOM suggested the PrepCom set timelines for the submission of offers. P-SIDS called for a “light touch approach” with regard to the PrepCom’s role in defining the selection criteria, supported by the UK, noting it should be up to candidates to present their packages and cautioning that selection criteria could be shaped to favor one candidate over another. CLAM also warned against prescriptive criteria and called for the PrepCom to focus on the structure of the Secretariat, underscoring the decision on the seat is to be taken by consensus at COP 1. ICELAND said the PrepCom should clarify expectations to inform candidates. The PHILIPPINES underlined the need for the seat to be able to provide reasonably priced accommodations in relation to hosting COP meetings. The AFRICAN GROUP and the PHILIPPINES emphasized taking into account the prospective host country’s willingness to shoulder costs for the operation of the Secretariat. SWITZERLAND noted the importance of proximity to diplomatic networks.

AOSIS called for transparency on the host selection process, proposing the establishment of a formal time-bound period for countries to express their interest and submit their bids, and ensuring all candidates are publicly disclosed. CARICOM supported the idea of the PrepCom guiding the COP to facilitate the selection of the seat from an administrative standpoint. They noted that a deadline for the expressions of interest could be set, suggesting three months before COP 1, but opposed the definition of selection criteria, as these could be construed as political.

P-SIDS called for a presentation by candidates at PrepCom II, including their proposed timeline for the operationalization of the Secretariat. On the timing for selection, they noted the ambiguity in the Agreement, but said that, if the decision were to be taken by the PrepCom, it would be made by signatories to the Agreement, while parties would take the decision at the COP. They preferred that the selection be consensus based.

The AFRICAN GROUP considered that a decision on the seat should be adopted by consensus at COP 1. CLAM considered the PrepCom’s discussions on the seat to be premature, calling instead to discuss the Secretariat’s institutional structure. The EU welcomed the criteria for deciding on the seat and called for all potential offers to be made in a timely manner. IRAN objected to establishing selection criteria. 

BELGIUM said that the Secretariat’s effectiveness will rest on scientific excellence, diplomatic accessibility, and operational readiness, suggesting that Brussels can deliver on these pillars. She outlined the diplomatic infrastructure of the country and Brussels specifically as a diplomatic and marine science hub.

CHILE reiterated their offer to host the Secretariat in the coastal city of Valparaiso, pointing to its contribution to the Voluntary Trust Fund for the participation of developing country representatives and to the possible creation of a “BBNJ visa.” They called for continued dialogue to ensure they can submit a proposal.

On human resources, the G-77/CHINA underscored the need for developing countries to be equitably represented in the Secretariat. P-SIDS and the UK noted the size of the Secretariat will change over time. The AFRICAN GROUP underscored the Secretariat’s structure should reflect the need for swift progress on capacity building. CHINA called for a “small footprint” Secretariat. The EU emphasized that staff remuneration should be in the line with the UN pay scale to ensure attractiveness.

Delegates requested the Co-Chairs to prepare draft text to inform discussions at PrepCom II. CHINA strongly recommended that, in preparing the document, the Co-Chairs rely on views expressed at PrepCom I, without removing any options from the table. Co-Chair McCarthy said all options would be retained. 

On Monday, 21 April, Co-Chair Felson shared that UNDOALOS had agreed to prepare a document comparing other MEAs’ arrangements on the functioning of the Secretariat. Pointing to consultations with the Bureau, she noted the document will address: 

• size and structure of the Secretariat;
• funding mechanisms, including with regard to the GEF, special funds, and scales of contribution;
• relationship with the UN system;
• headquarters arrangements;
• legal capacity and legal personality in the host state and international legal personality;
• scope of privileges and immunities of the Secretariat and staff;
• privileges and immunities for state representatives and related obligations for facilitating the participation of state representatives, including through the provision of visas;
• appointment of the executive secretary, including their job description, qualification, and geographical representation;
• accountability mechanisms;
• audit mechanisms;
• modalities for cooperation with IFBs;
• arrangement for the equitable representation of developing countries in the Secretariat; and
• budgets of the Secretariat.

Co-Chair Felson noted the document will take the form of a matrix to allow for an easy comparison of each model, only providing factual information, without an analysis of the merits of the different models. She highlighted it will not be possible for UNDOALOS to prepare information on estimated budgets for the funding of the secretariat depending on the model chosen, due to limited resources during the intersessional period. 

In the ensuing discussion, IRAN emphasized the role of the Secretariat in assisting countries in the implementation of the Agreement and, with the EU, in facilitating coordination with other IFBs. CLAM and the EU underscored that the decision on whether to set up the Secretariat as a standalone institution will be key. The EU also called for attention to the line of accountability of the executive secretary. 

AOSIS noted PrepCom II may show some convergence around particular models, with a follow-up study to provide more detail on estimated budgets for the funding of these models. P-SIDS noted the document will help prospective candidates for the seat of the Secretariat.

The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized ensuring that administrative support services, staff regulations, and financial procedures are aligned with the UN. They called for a small, functionally comprehensive Secretariat with staff assigned to departments such as the Clearing-House Mechanism, marine genetic resources, capacity building, and monitoring and evaluation units, ensuring participation of developing countries. They urged for the concerns of developing countries to be considered during the host state negotiations. They supported awarding delegates with privileges and immunities to effectively participate in meetings, regardless of the relationship between the host country and individual states, welcoming Chile’s suggestion for a BBNJ visa. To inform PrepCom II discussions, they recommended initiating the development of guidance for the host country agreement, among others. 

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION underlined that the Secretariat is a body of the COP, and not an international organization that would need a separate charter or statute.

The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) offered to host the Secretariat, underscoring its experience in hosting the Secretariats of 17 biodiversity-related MEAs and its work on fostering synergies among MEAs. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE suggested UNDOALOS conduct anonymous interviews to gain more accurate insights and called for addressing elements such as project management processes, administration of consultation procedures, administration of subsidiary bodies, document distribution, and organization of meetings.

Next Steps: In plenary on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair Felson highlighted that UNDOALOS will produce a matrix on models for secretariat arrangements. She noted diverging views on the modalities and timing of the seat selection process, with progress in the discussions also depending on reflections regarding the preferred model for the Secretariat.

Financial Rules Governing the Funding of the Secretariat, COP, and SBs

Delegates discussed this issue in an Informal Working Group on Thursday, 17 April, and Monday, 21 April. Co-Chair McCarthy introduced the Co-Chairs’ aid to negotiations (A/AC.296/2025/7), noting this is an issue to be decided at COP 1.

Delegates emphasized linkages with other matters, especially the choice on the institutional structure of the Secretariat, with the G-77/CHINA calling on UNDOALOS to circulate a comparative analysis on the implications of the secretariat model to inform discussions on financial rules. The EU stated it would be more complex, time consuming, and expensive to develop the financial rules for an independent entity, such as based on an “ISA model.” AUSTRALIA favored the financial rules under the UNFCCC. JAPAN called for a comparative study on an independent model such as the ISA, and noted that if linked to the UN system, there may be more efficient financial management, but that there may be additional costs. CHINA supported an independent model with financial rules as under the ISA.

The G-77/CHINA called for ensuring timely contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund to support the participation of developing states in all meetings pertaining to the Agreement and emphasized the need to consider the needs of SIDS, LDCs, and LLDCs. AOSIS, P-SIDS, NEW ZEALAND, and AUSTRALIA underlined the importance of the rules operationalizing the special circumstances of SIDS, with BANGLADESH highlighting the need to include climate-vulnerable countries, and the PHILIPPINES drawing attention to the special needs of archipelagic states.

In terms of general governance structure, TÜRKIYE supported the CBD model, noting they could consider temporary arrangements under a UNFCCC model with the goal to set up an independent fund. 

As missing elements, several delegations highlighted details on the Special Fund and the distribution of roles between the GEF and Special Fund. TIMOR LESTE, the AFRICAN GROUP, and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE emphasized simplified access and approval procedures, with the AFRICAN GROUP also calling for direct access. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION questioned the role of the GEF. EGYPT called for attention to the sharing of monetary benefits from DSI. 

On the length of the financial period, the EU, the UK, and CANADA preferred a two- to three-year period, noting it is time consuming to prepare a budget every year, but that financial accounting and auditing should still take place annually in multi-year financial periods, and called for taking into account the frequency of COP meetings. JAPAN and CLAM supported a two-year cycle, although the COP may initially meet annually. CARICOM supported a two-year period, emphasizing the need to harmonize timelines, including with regard to the convening of meetings and the preparation of reports. AOSIS and TÜRKIYE also supported a two-year period.

On the preparation of budget proposals, CLAM highlighted the need for a budget report accompanying all proposed activities. The EU suggested dividing the budget according to administrative and programme matters, with the programme part providing explanations on sub-programmes, outputs, and expected achievements to make the budget results-oriented and transparent. TIMOR LESTE and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE suggested mandating the SB Chairs to prepare programmes of work for their bodies with estimated costs to inform the budget discussions. The EU highlighted risks of overuse and abuse related to the supplementary budget proposals, pointing to the experience under the ISA, and, with AUSTRALIA, called for defining safeguards. 

On the voluntary trust fund, AOSIS urged eligibility of all SIDS. On a working capital reserve, the EU suggested including provisions specifying a time limit, that parties must have a say in access to the reserve, and that it should not be used to cover outstanding contributions by parties. JAPAN called for more information on this, as there is no such structure under the CBD. CARICOM underscored the importance of this provision given the current multilateral context. AUSTRALIA said consensus within the COP should be required to determine the level of the reserve, suggesting it could amount to 12 months of operating costs. They called for defining principles for when it is appropriate to draw from the reserve, emphasizing it should not be to subsidize ongoing costs.

On the application of the rules to other funds under the Agreement, AOSIS, with P-SIDS, said these should not apply to the Special Fund and to the arrangements with GEF. P-SIDS said that the draft rules should not apply to any additional funds, noting these should be governed by special arrangements and calling for intersessional work on the matter.

On assessed contributions by parties, AOSIS, CARICOM, and P-SIDS emphasized the need to include SIDS in the cap on assessed contributions. AOSIS and CARICOM called for a provision on the suspension of payment expectations for SIDS affected by disasters. The EU supported the UN scale as a basis, and noted the need for further reflection on the fork between the lowest and highest contributions. On the upper limit of assessed contributions, CHINA called for this to be set at 20% of the total. They supported the timely payment of assessed contributions, but called for flexibility on the date of payment given countries’ adherence to differing financial calendars. CHINA called for clarity on the currencies envisioned as USD equivalent. The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized the special circumstances of developing countries, especially LDCs and LLDCs. 

On voluntary contributions by parties, the EU emphasized the modalities are key to allowing for the contribution of REIOs. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION cautioned on the risk of interference linked to voluntary contributions. On other types of funding, CLAM called for specific rules of accountability and norms to avoid conflicts of interest for private sector entities. ICEL called on the PrepCom to consider institutional arrangements to enable outreach to donors, including the establishment of a fundraising body or the operationalization of a donor matchmaking service under the CHM.

On arrears, AOSIS suggested the suspension of voting rights to incentivize the clearing of arrears. The EU called for highlighting the budgetary consequences of parties not adequately contributing to covering the functioning costs of the Agreement. The EU suggested a period shorter than six years to clear arrears. NEW ZEALAND called for more discussion. CLAM emphasized avoiding discrimination. 

The EU called for defining criteria for the investment of contributions not immediately required. The AFRICAN GROUP proposed that any interest gained from such investment be used to support capacity building and technology transfer, particularly to LDCs, LLDCs, and SIDS.

On the auditing of accounts, the UK and CANADA underlined the need for robust oversight and auditing, noting this is also linked to the Secretariat structure, pointing to the UNFCCC model as preferable. The PHILIPPINES preferred the ISA model. CARICOM highlighted UN auditing rules, emphasizing the need to consider the bespoke secretariat arrangements.

On administrative support costs, CARICOM emphasized clarity on reimbursement modalities. 

On Monday, 21 April, Co-Chair McCarthy summarized discussions held during the first week. He noted the model on which the rules would be based will depend on the model chosen for the Secretariat. He underscored the need to ensure access to funding and for specific rules to operationalize the special circumstances of SIDS. He noted that delegates also stressed the need to ensure specific financing for SIDS and LDCs, and for supporting meeting participation of SIDS and LDCs. He noted discussions on incentivizing the payments of arrears, as well as rules for private sector contributions. He highlighted convergence on the financial rules not applying to the GEF and the Special Fund; as well as on the UN scale of assessments as the basis for the BBNJ Agreement’s scale. He noted the need for additional discussions on the working capital reserve.

Co-Chair Felson initiated a second round of discussions. On the general structure, CLAM considered the UNFCCC model as the suitable model, noting this does not mean that all the model’s components should be automatically transferred. They expressed flexibility for the CBD model with regard to the Trust Fund.

The EU supported a two- to three-year financial period, expressing openness to consider even longer periods to align with the GEF replenishment cycle. 

On the preparation of budget proposals, the EU supported information on the actual income and expenditures for each year of the previous financial period as well as estimates of actual expenditure in the current financial period. They called for caution on supplementary budget proposals, emphasizing the need for safeguards should the provision be retained. TÜRKIYE noted the value of supplementary budget proposals to ensure adaptability to changing needs. The EU called for clarification on: the distinction between income and received funds; and the 20% threshold for transfer between appropriate lines.

CLAM supported adopting a policy on the exceptional use of such funds from the working capital reserve and called for flexibility on payment deadlines. TÜRKIYE called for a gradual, proportional system to address persistent arrears, with sensitivity to exceptional circumstances and the suspension of voting rights only after extended non-adherence to payment obligations. They also emphasized the need for safeguards against undue influence related to the provision of funding. 

Next Steps: In plenary, on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair Felson noted that delegates highlighted that a number of decisions depend on arrangements for the Secretariat. She also highlighted: 

• support for a two-year financial period, with some raising the possibility of a longer period; 
• support for a provision on supplementary budget proposals, with the need to define safeguards for the approval of such proposals; 
• the importance of the head of the Secretariat being able to make transfers between appropriation lines, with a preference expressed establishing a stable limit for such transfers;
• support for a working capital reserve, with the need to define policies for its use;
• the need to add language on preventing undue influence from major donors with respect to voluntary contributions; and
• support for defining measures to address arrears, noting the need for flexibility with regard to payment deadline and exceptional circumstances.

She said the Co-Chairs will revise their aid for negotiations for PrepCom II, inviting submissions by 2 May 2025.

Arrangements with the Global Environment Facility

Delegates addressed this issue in an Informal Working Group on Thursday, 17 April, and Monday, 21 April.  Co-Chair Felson introduced the Co-Chairs’ aid to negotiations (A/AC.296/2025/8), noting that the GEF had been consulted in the preparation of the document, including the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).

The G-77/CHINA stressed that capacity building and the transfer of marine technology are essential to support developing countries’ implementation of the Agreement, particularly for SIDS and LDCs, and urged new, adequate, and predictable finance. AOSIS, CARICOM, and P-SIDS emphasized the need to take into account the special circumstances of SIDS, including through the GEF minimizing administrative burdens on SIDS and maximizing accessibility.

The G-77/CHINA called on UNDOALOS to prepare a document on operationalizing the Special Fund and a comparative analysis of existing MEA Secretariats’ linkages with the GEF, for discussions at PrepCom II. The EU, UK, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, and NORWAY emphasized emulating the approach taken under other MEAs.

Commenting on elements missing from the draft, AOSIS, P-SIDS, CARICOM, and the AFRICAN GROUP highlighted adding references in the preamble to Agreement provisions on complementarity and coherence among operating entities of the financial mechanism (Article 52.7) and the periodic review of the financial mechanism (Article 52.16). AOSIS and the AFRICAN GROUP pointed to the commissioning of an independent assessment of the GEF. CARICOM called for adding a paragraph confirming the Finance Committee shall periodically report and make recommendations on the identification and mobilization of funds under the mechanism and the assessment of needs of parties, in particular SIDS and LDCs. 

P-SIDS called for provisions that promote active problem solving between the COP and the GEF. SRI LANKA called to include elements related to the selection criteria for funding. SWITZERLAND suggested specifying that the Council will ensure the effective operation of the GEF as a source of funding for activities for the purpose of the Convention in accordance with guidance provided to it by the COP.

BANGLADESH proposed a fast-track funding mechanism under the GEF. CHINA emphasized referencing the dual purpose of conservation and sustainable use in the operative part of the MoU. 

AOSIS and CARICOM requested deleting elements concerning non-GEF related finance, with CARICOM cautioning on the risk of double counting. The UK noted such information could help enhance synergies.

On guidance from the COP, CLAM highlighted that the GEF should act under the authority of the COP, with the COP defining guidelines and programming priorities for the funds allocated for the functioning of the Agreement. CARICOM highlighted the need for redress procedures for the COP to gain clarity from the GEF and to request the GEF to reconsider pertinent decisions. AOSIS called for clarification on how reconsideration of project decisions has worked under other MEAs.

On reporting, the G-77/CHINA underlined that the reports should allow for the COP to gain a full picture of the portfolio of relevant GEF projects. CLAM called for the GEF’s reports to have detailed information on modalities of access and financial flows. AOSIS emphasized timely submission of reports, with the AFRICAN GROUP suggesting the GEF should make its reports available at least 12 weeks ahead of COP meetings. CARICOM called for more extensive, periodic reporting requirements by the GEF to enhance transparency. The EU, UK, JAPAN, SWITZERLAND, and NORWAY cautioned against micromanaging the GEF. 

On monitoring and evaluation, the AFRICAN GROUP called for renaming the section “periodic review,” with CLAM and AOSIS, and suggested adding a paragraph: for the COP to contract an independent assessment of the GEF and its Council; for the COP to communicate the results of the independent assessment to the GEF; and for the GEF Council to take action to address the recommendations and report back to the COP thereon. 

On reciprocal representation, THAILAND emphasized the GEF’s engagement with the Finance Committee and the CBTMT Committee. P-SIDS highlighted cooperation with the proposed advisory body on traditional knowledge. On the entry into effect of the MoU, JAPAN called for clarity on the timing of consultations with the GEF Council vis-à-vis COP 1.

On Monday, 21 April, Rawleston Moore, GEF, noted that all the Facility’s projects require country endorsement letters before submission to the GEF Council or GEF CEO for approval, highlighting this minimizes the likelihood that a country would consider a GEF decision not to be consistent with the BBNJ Agreement or COP guidance. They also emphasized that all GEF partner countries have the opportunity to comment on GEF Council approved projects and that the GEF Secretariat maintains linkages with MEA Secretariats to ensure the implementation of COP guidance and COP decisions. 

The GEF indicated that in the case of the Minamata Convention, the INC submitted the MoU to the GEF in time for it to be considered by the Council, so that they could finalize it in time for COP 1 to adopt it. 

The REPUBLIC OF KOREA recognized the importance of a procedure for redress and supported a reporting schedule that aligns with the meetings of the COP. The EU underlined the COP’s authority over the GEF’s arrangements for the Agreement and called for focus on cooperation between the COP and the GEF Council, instead of instituting a process for questioning the decisions of either body.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION questioned the legal status of agreements between the GEF, on the one hand, and the Secretariat, the COP, and individual countries, on the other. They stated that the GEF “will first and foremost look after its own interests,” and that states will need to align with “the political leaning of the GEF,” including on observer participation. They called for clarity on the issue of terminating the MoU and how funding would be disbursed to countries. They also called for the preparation of a document to inform discussions on the Special Fund, including regarding developed countries’ contributions, and for the GEF and implementing agencies to be present at PrepCom II.

The GEF representative underlined that the decision on the MoU is up to parties, noting all countries are members of the GEF Council.

Co-Chair Felson then opened the floor for an informal discussion on the ninth replenishment of the GEF (GEF-9), noting that replenishment discussions are ongoing. The EU and the UK welcomed the ongoing GEF work on BBNJ-related projects, including on ratification support. The UK underscored the need for the BBNJ Agreement to be properly taken into account in GEF-9. TÜRKIYE called for GEF-9 to support capacity building, transfer of marine technology, and marine science. CLAM supported adequate allocation of GEF resources for implementation of the Agreement, particularly in the first years, but expressed doubts on the PrepCom’s legal mandate to provide inputs into the GEF-9 replenishment discussions, calling for a legal ruling on this.

The GEF noted that the GEF-9 replenishment process started in December 2024 and should be completed in June 2026, with input by states and MEA Secretariats.

Next Steps: In plenary, on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair McCarthy noted support for the PrepCom to provide preliminary guidance to inform the GEF-9 replenishment process, with some seeking clarification on the PrepCom’s mandate to do so. He said the Co-Chairs will revise their aid to negotiations for PrepCom II, inviting submissions by 2 May 2025.

Modalities for the Operation of the Clearing-House Mechanism

The PrepCom discussed this issue in an Informal Working Group on Tuesday, 22 April, Wednesday, 23 April, and Thursday, 24 April. Co-Chair Felson noted discussions were expected to address clusters related to: the type, architecture, and function of the platform; the process for generating BBNJ batch identifiers; modalities to facilitate the matching of capacity-building needs with support; and terms of cooperation with IFBs. She recalled issues related to the operationalization of the CHM are not expected to be addressed by COP 1, but were identified as matters for the COP to address at an early stage. 

She pointed to the note prepared by UNDOALOS (A/AC.296/2025/6), drawing on existing CHMs and databases, inviting views on: elements required for operationalizing the CHM; elements requiring in-depth technical analysis; steps the PrepCom should take to facilitate decision making by the COP on the operationalization of the CHM, including who can design and build the CHM; and how the PrepCom can best progress work, including convening experts and stakeholders intersessionally.

The G-77/CHINA emphasized that the CHM should assist in the matching developing countries’ needs in terms of capacity building, technical assistance, and technology. They underscored the CHM’s role in addressing the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits derived from MGRs in ABNJ and highlighted the need for scientific cooperation and coordination.

Delegates emphasized the need for the platform to be accessible, user-friendly, multilingual, and interoperable with existing databases. They favored an incremental approach to setting it up, building on an initial phase focused on essential functions.

On user management, CLAM highlighted that the CHM should be open access, providing different levels of privileges to different users. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for vetting members of the public seeking access to the CHM.

On the platform, the EU suggested exploring the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to ensure multilingual access in a cost-efficient manner. The AFRICAN GROUP, AOSIS, CARICOM, and IRAN emphasized the need to offer offline access to account for the digital divide. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA suggested that the PrepCom request expert advice on the design of the platform. VIET NAM, JAPAN, and AUSTRALIA emphasized the importance of a robust search function.

On information and quality assurance, VIET NAM and the PHILIPPINES emphasized the need for standardized metadata. The PHILIPPINES, JAPAN, and AUSTRALIA called for defining clear mandates for data curation, including what steps to take, who will verify data, and based on what criteria, to ensure data credibility.

On a notification system, AOSIS, supported by the UK, called for a real-time, proximity-based alert system, providing notifications and summaries of activities taking place in ABNJ and in adjacent areas. P-SIDS called for notification parameters in terms of type of information, location, and frequency to ensure users are not overwhelmed with irrelevant information. The EU and JAPAN highlighted the importance of updates, including with regard to facilitating the consultation process related to EIAs. 

On user support, delegates emphasized the importance of “the human element” behind the CHM. P-SIDS emphasized the need for regular user trainings, with the AFRICAN GROUP calling for regional workshops, online learning resources, downloadable resources, and a question and answer function. AOSIS, P-SIDS, and the AFRICAN GROUP emphasized accounting for users with different technical abilities. AUSTRALIA supported user trainings and tutorials.

On facilitating access to traditional knowledge of IPLCs, P-SIDS emphasized the need for a rights-based approach, supported by AUSTRALIA, and emphasized the role of the proposed advisory body on traditional knowledge.

On resource requirements, P-SIDS emphasized the need for sustainable financial resources to support continuous use and updating. TÜRKIYE called for further analysis on resource requirements for operationalizing the CHM. JAPAN called for reflecting on the financial needs for setting up the CHM, noting the Agreement is yet to enter into force and there is no dedicated budget yet.

On improvements to the platform, P-SIDS suggested a periodic review to assess effectiveness and identify areas for improvements, including with regard to its architecture, user-friendly design, content, interoperability, and value for end-users. CARICOM proposed that recipients of capacity building should provide feedback to the CHM. 

In terms of further information needs, delegates pointed to, among others: analyzing lessons learned from other CHMs, including on staff requirements and respecting the rights of Indigenous knowledge holders through free, prior, and informed Consent; the process for generating BBNJ batch identifiers; modalities for the expected matchmaking; terms of cooperation with IFBs, including synergies with the Cali Fund on the use of DSI; protocols for managing confidential and proprietary information and restricting access to data; and the suitable format for information on the various pillars of the Agreement, including aligning data standards.

Delegates supported establishing an open-ended group to facilitate expert advice on the design and operationalization of the CHM. They also called for a flow chart on the relationship between the CHM, Secretariat, SBs, and IFBs.

On Wednesday, 23 April, delegates reiterated support for an incremental approach to setting up the CHM. In terms of core functions to deliver on during the initial phase, AOSIS emphasized matching capacity and technology needs with available support. The EU emphasized that MGRs might be collected between the entry into force of the Agreement and the first meeting of the COP, highlighting as core functions to have in place: the sharing of information on planned activities to enable consultations for  EIAs; the reception of pre-collection notifications related to activities with respect to MGRs and DSI on MGRs of ABNJ (Agreement Article 12); and generating BBNJ batch identifiers.

AOSIS called for preparing an in-depth technical analysis to inform the design and operationalization of the CHM, including with regard to: the process for generating batch identifiers; modalities for matching capacity and technology needs with support; engagement with holders of traditional knowledge; coordination with IFBs; and resource requirements for operation of the CHM. They suggested an expert group and stakeholder consultations could assist in preparing the study. 

CLAM recalled the request to UNDOALOS to prepare a flowchart on linkages between the CHM, Secretariat, SBs, and IFBS, and, with CARICOM, called for UNDOALOS to also draft a roadmap for setting up the CHM, identifying objectives, phases, and human and financial resource needs. 

Delegates agreed on the need to seek inputs from experts and representatives and users of other CHMs, such as from the CBD, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IOC-UNESCO), and Ocean Biodiversity Information System (OBIS). CARICOM, the EU, and the UK emphasized the PrepCom should develop instructions for the experts, noting these may also proactively flag issues for the PrepCom’s consideration. The UK underscored the value of having technical experts identify existing platforms that can carry out desired functions and reflect on what new capabilities are needed, and suggested states should reflect on what they would need to support domestic implementation. The PHILIPPINES suggested conducting online regional dialogues and co-design sessions, including with a focus on individual functions of the CHM.

In terms of timeline, CLAM suggested PrepCom II could discuss the flowchart and roadmap, with a view to the expert group convening intersessionally before PrepCom III. CARICOM suggested developing instructions before PrepCom II. The UK suggested holding intersessional discussions after PrepCom I to give directions to the expert group. The PHILIPPINES suggested the expert group could be coordinated by UNDOALOS, with progress to be presented at PrepComs II and III. 

In terms of resources to support work on the CHM, CLAM noted UNDOALOS could serve to channel resources to support this work and welcomed some delegations’ indication of support. The EU noted the importance of voluntary contributions to support the development of the CHM, with the UK suggesting exploring funding by both states and others. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION questioned the PrepCom’s mandate to create expert groups and who would fund such work.

On Thursday, 24 April. CLAM, supported by CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, IRAN, UK, EU, and others, underscored that the PrepCom, through various UNGA resolutions, has the mandate to establish subsidiary bodies, including a CHM working group, to support its work.

CLAM reiterated their suggestion to convene an open-ended working group on the CHM after PrepCom II, with participation by interested states. They noted the working group would invite experts, with the group’s report to be considered at PrepCom III.

NORWAY, supported by AUSTRALIA and CANADA, favored a broad and inclusive informal open-ended advisory group to discuss relevant technical issues and give advice to the Co-Chairs. They proposed that the group would meet monthly in an online setting, commencing work after PrepCom II. They suggested that the group could be composed of 20 stakeholders, and six representatives from each UN region, with experts invited to give presentations, and the group reporting to the Co-Chairs and the Co-Chairs reporting to the PrepCom.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION said that any working group that required budgetary allocations could only be established with an UNGA resolution, but noted willingness to consider an informal group. Noting that a working group could be inefficient, the REPUBLIC OF KOREA suggested an alternative approach, requesting the Secretariat to seek input on the design and development of the CHM and share this with states. ICEL noted that the PrepCom could consider a matrix based on the results of an open call for proposals for the design and development of the CHM, including on the cost and time requirements.

SINGAPORE called for the informal group to be inclusive and open-ended, and include experts with experience in designing and operating CHMs. They requested UNDOALOS to prepare draft terms of reference for the informal group. They said these could be considered intersessionally and adopted at PrepCom II, with the group to meet between PrepCom II and PrepCom III. NEW ZEALAND supported an open ended and inclusive advisory group, with PrepCom II to define its modalities, such as size, expertise, selection of experts, and modalities for meetings. SWITZERLAND preferred a less formal expert advisory group to start work after PrepCom II and suggested conducting, in the meantime, informal online workshops on specific CHM functions to foster mutual understanding. IRAN underscored that the group to be convened needs to be open-ended, allowing for the participation of all interested states. CHINA supported clarifying the mandate and modalities of work of the group at PrepCom II, emphasizing it should be open to all states, with balanced regional representation.

The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE suggested intersessional work address technical functionalities of the CHM, the development of the batch identifiers, and the matchmaking mechanism. The INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL underscored observer participation in the working group, and stressed that intersessional meetings should be open to all stakeholders.

INDIA, supported by CANADA, proposed designating national CHM focal points. IRAN cautioned on the need for balanced progress across matters up to the PrepCom’s consideration.

AUSTRALIA supported voluntary financial contributions to support the design of the CHM. The EU asked how such contributions could be channeled to the Interim Secretariat, with UNDOALOS saying they would share the necessary information.

Co-Chair Felson underscored that the PrepCom, during its organizational meeting, agreed the Co-Chairs, in consultation with the Bureau, convene informal working groups and intersessional work. She noted support for the preparation of a flowchart and establishing some sort of group to facilitate expert input. She recalled that delegates are invited to submit written input on the matters discussed at PrepCom I, ideally by 2 May 2025. She indicated draft terms of reference for the group would be considered intersessionally, so that PrepCom II could adopt them. The modalities for this intersessional process will be communicated at a later stage, she noted.

Next Steps: In plenary on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair McCarthy said UNDOALOS will prepare a flowchart on the CHM and its relation to other IFBs and other bodies of the Agreement. He noted that the Co-Chairs will prepare draft terms of reference for a group to seek expert input on the design and operationalization of the CHM, to be considered during the intersessional period and agreed during PrepCom II, so the group can commence its work between PrepComs II and III.

Issues for Consideration at PrepCom II

On Thursday, 24 April, Co-Chair McCarthy opened the preliminary exchange of views on the issues for consideration at PrepCom II, recalling that, at the organizational meeting, UNDOALOS had been requested to prepare notes on these issues.

On arrangements to enhance cooperation and coordination with IFBs, AOSIS supported both formal and informal cooperation mechanisms, but recognized the challenges of interacting with other IFBs, welcoming further discussions at PrepCom II. CLAM, with the EU and VIET NAM, supported discussions on how parties will promote the Agreement’s objectives in their interactions with other IFBs, including through consultations. CLAM and VIET NAM noted the importance of MoUs to bolster coordination and cooperation. CLAM called for further discussions on arrangements to guarantee existing IFB participation in the establishment of ABMTs, and in enacting emergency measures, among other matters, with the EU noting the need to facilitate the participation of these bodies in COP meetings.

CARICOM called for clarity on whom the arrangements will be between, how cooperation will be facilitated, and how to ensure BBNJ arrangements are acceptable to IFBs. They called to discuss access, including a user-verification system, underlining that this should not be a barrier to access. The EU stressed the need to prioritize the mandatory coordination provisions, including the coordination between the BBNJ Secretariat and the Secretariats of other IFBs, and underlined the need to inform the COP of all such arrangements. They suggested establishing a mechanism for the STB to collaborate with the STBs of existing IFBs and supported building on arrangements used by existing IFBs. P-SIDS and the FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UN (FAO) underscored the importance of cooperation with RFMOs.

In terms of further work on this matter, CLAM requested a document outlining the relevant IFBs’ mandates and what cooperation would be required. For PrepCom II, the EU requested a background note containing areas of cooperation, and arrangements for MoUs between other MEAs and existing IFBs. VIET NAM called on UNDOALOS to provide a matrix on cooperation reflecting areas where there may be overlaps and duplication of efforts between the BBNJ Agreement and other bodies. They also called for further discussions on information sharing mechanisms on issues such as EIAs and ABMTs, and on a coordination body to facilitate this cooperation.

CHINA underscored the Agreement not only refers to cooperation and coordination with IFBs, but also not prejudicing their work. They called on the Co-Chairs to account for this in their revision of the draft rules of procedure. IRAN noted the need to specify modalities for cooperation, especially whether it should operate through the COP or individual SBs.

The UK, supported by AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, ICELAND, SWITZERLAND, NORWAY, and the ISA SECRETARIAT, suggested inviting IFBs to provide brief summaries of their procedures for cooperating with others, with a view to inform the preparation of a background note for PrepCom II. NEW ZEALAND suggested IFBs also provide information on their activities that might intersect with the Agreement, such as on EIAs, ABMTs, or MGRs. SRI LANKA called to identify areas of cooperation and sign MoUs with the relevant IFBs. Supported by others, the UK also encouraged states, through their engagement in IFBs of which they are parties, to call for these IFBs to respond to the invitation. NORWAY emphasized the importance of consistent messaging by states across the IFBs in which they have membership. The AFRICAN GROUP called to identify cooperation mechanisms related to MGRs, ABMTs, and EIAs.

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called on UNDOALOS to invite submissions by IFBs such as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, ISA, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, RFMOs, the International Maritime Organization, FAO, and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). The MALDIVES supported an open call for consultation with IFBs and noted the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission already has a formal mechanism for data exchange with the BBNJ Agreement. NORWAY pointed to the collective arrangement of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission as an example to consider.

JAPAN noted there may be a need to conclude individual MoUs with individual IFBs, and suggested developing a template for this. SWITZERLAND drew attention to the Bern Process on synergies between biodiversity-related conventions.

ARGENTINA underscored that this was a preliminary discussion and cautioned against intersessional work on this issue.

On reporting, AOSIS, CARICOM, and P-SIDS called for striking a balance between meaningful reporting and excessive administrative burden. AOSIS and P-SIDS called for exploring funding for SIDS to meet their reporting obligations. MALAYSIA also emphasized capacity-building support for reporting. The EU agreed on the need to find a balance between comprehensive reporting and ensuring reporting procedures are feasible for all users, and emphasized ensuring capacity building to support developing country reporting. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION considered that states have the right to determine how they implement the Agreement and opposed reporting requirements to dictate their implementation.

CARICOM and the EU called for creating reporting templates. The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized national reports should allow for a comparison across jurisdictions and called for empowering the Secretariat to compile data from these reports and assess trends. CARICOM underscored the need to synchronize reporting requirements with the frequency of COP and SB meetings and the budget cycle. P-SIDS emphasized alignment with existing reporting obligations and, with MALAYSIA, national reporting systems. The EU, MALAYSIA, and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE emphasized the use of the CHM. The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE called for reflecting on modalities for collective reporting.

The EU, supported by VIET NAM, called for the background note to draw on information from other IFBs with regard to content, format, frequency, templates, and potential follow-up to reporting.

AOSIS called for ensuring that PrepCom II not only considers the new matters before it, but also fosters continued deliberations of the matters considered at PrepCom I. The EU noted interlinkages between discussions on rules of procedure and reporting. IRAN noted that reporting requirements is not among the list of issues to be decided upon at COP 1.

On the operationalization of other provisions related to finance, AOSIS stressed the need to operationalize SIDS’ special circumstances to ensure their meaningful participation. The AFRICAN GROUP noted their preference for a financial mechanism grounded in the principle of the common heritage of humankind.

AOSIS, with P-SIDS, noted the need for discussions on the arrangements to give effect to the Special Fund, including its capitalization and usage. The EU, with the UK, called for a discussion on the arrangements for the Special Fund, including with regard to other funds such as the Cali Fund on DSI use and the Global Biodiversity Fund. They proposed discussions on: how to operationalize contributions; how to ensure that additional contributions are easy to make; how to ensure monitoring requirements are met; and how to ensure links to the Finance Committee and the CBTMT Committee. VIET NAM emphasized discussing the Special Fund’s objective and scope, especially on capacity building, scientific research, technology transfer, and benefit-sharing, and procedures for application and approval. 

CLAM, the UK, and EU called on UNDOALOS to provide information on the management of the Voluntary Trust Fund, with CLAM underlining the importance of contributions from developed countries. 

CLAM, the EU, SINGAPORE, JAPAN, and AUSTRALIA called for discussions on assessed contributions, preferring they are based on the UN scale of assessments, with SINGAPORE and AUSTRALIA emphasizing taking account of the special circumstances of SIDS. The EU, with the UK, called on UNDOALOS to provide information on the UN scale of assessments. JAPAN called for reflecting on how the cycle of adjustments to the UN scale will affect the BBNJ budgetary process. TÜRKIYE supported developing an indicative scale of assessed contributions, noting no contribution should exceed 20% of the total and the minimum threshold should ensure broad participation. They also noted the need for clarity on the financial implications for states to join the Agreement, calling for a study based on the experience in other MEAs.

AOSIS and P-SIDS called for establishing a “BBNJ restoration and rehabilitation fund,” along the lines of the Special Fund.

AOSIS, CARICOM, P-SIDS, the EU, the AFRICAN GROUP, the UK, and AUSTRALIA called for an agenda item at PrepCom II to discuss provisional guidance for GEF-9. JAPAN considered that PrepCom II should prioritize the issues to be decided upon at COP 1, especially assessed contributions. The AFRICAN GROUP, with the UK, suggested intersessional work on finance between PrepComs II and III.

Co-Chair McCarthy thanked delegates for the constructive exchange.

Next Steps: In plenary, on Friday, 25 April, Co-Chair Felson summed up discussions. She noted delegates highlighted, among others:

• enhancing cooperation with and promoting cooperation among IFBs in a way that does not undermine them and promotes coherence, mutual supportiveness, and non-duplication; 
• the need for reciprocal mandates for IFBs to cooperate;
• developing an open-ended list of relevant IFBs, with information on their mandates and their cooperative arrangements;
• balance between ensuring meaningful reporting and avoiding administrative burden, particularly in light of varying capacity;
• capacity building and finance to support developing country reporting;
• developing standard reporting formats, drawing on experience in other MEAs, and using the CHM for reporting purposes;
• support for building on the experience of other MEAs to set up the financial mechanism and its various funds;
• effective participation of recipient countries in financial decision making;
• commencing work on the special fund, with regard to elements such as institutional arrangements, capitalization, and access modalities; 
• using the UN scale of assessment as a basis for determining parties’ assessed contributions, with possible adjustments to the range and cycle of contributions;
• seeking the GEF Council’s feedback on the draft MoU ahead of PrepCom III;
• establishing an additional fund to finance rehabilitation and ecological restoration of BBNJ; 
• discussing provisional guidance to GEF-9 at PrepCom II; and
• conducting intersessional work on finance between PrepComs II and III.

Other Matters

Voluntary Trust Fund: On Thursday, 24 April, Vladimir Jares, Director, UNDOALOS, reported on the operation of the Voluntary Trust Fund, which supports developing country participation in BBNJ meetings. He noted that, for PrepCom I, 29 delegates were supported, including 19 representatives of LDCs, LLDCs, or SIDS. He welcomed contributions to the Fund received since the organizational session by: Chile, Cyprus, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, and Portugal, noting the fund has a balance of USD 218,400 as of 23 April 2025. He recalled the importance for contributors to clarify and confirm intended use of funds so that they can be correctly allocated to the BBNJ process. Emphasizing that even small contributions help to sustain the Fund and that contributions can also be made by international financial institutions, donor agencies, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, and natural and juridical persons, he encouraged delegates to bring the Fund to the attention of potential donors.

NEW ZEALAND and NORWAY announced they will soon make contributions. The EU noted its contribution is meant to also cover participation at PrepCom II and indicated that additional contributions by EU Member States are pending. Chile noted its willingness to continue contributing to the Fund. CLAM thanked all contributors.

Treaty signature and ratification: FRANCE noted that France and Costa Rica are co-hosting the UN Ocean Conference, taking place in Nice, France, in June 2025. They highlighted that the Conference will feature a special treaty ceremony on 9 June for states to sign the agreement or deposit their instrument of ratification, acceptance, or approval. FRANCE underscored that the event constitutes a unique opportunity to reaffirm the collective commitment to the BBNJ Agreement and send a strong political signal.

UNDOALOS reminded delegates that the Treaty will no longer be open for signature by the time of the annual treaty event during the UNGA’s high-level week (23-26 September 2025).

Closing Remarks

On Friday, 25 April, in plenary, the Co-Chairs welcomed the constructive exchange of views at the session, noting there are a number of areas of convergence and delegates identified areas that need to be discussed further. They recalled the liquidity crisis of the UN, inviting all in a position to do so, to make contributions to the Trust Fund and for all to exercise flexibility and contribute creative ideas to advance the PrepCom’s work. 

They shared that PrepCom III is scheduled for 23 March – 2 April 2026 and pointed to engagement with the ISA to avoid any scheduling overlap. They noted the longer intersessional time between PrepCom II and III will help accelerate work, urging delegates to narrow down options and bridge divides. 

In terms of intersessional work, they noted:

• the Co-Chairs will revise their three aids to negotiations, taking into account discussions held at PrepCom I and any additional input delegations may provide in writing before 2 May 2025;
• the Co-Chairs will produce a matrix outlining proposed rules of procedure and modalities for each subsidiary body;
• UNDOALOS will prepare a comparison of secretariat arrangements in other MEAs;
• the Co-Chairs will prepare draft terms of reference for a group to seek expert input on the CHM, to be considered intersessionally and adopted at PrepCom II; and
• UNDOALOS will prepare a flowchart of the functions of the CHM and possible linkages to institutions established under the Agreement.

Delegates expressed appreciation to the Co-Chairs and UNDOALOS for their guidance and leadership. CARICOM thanked the contributors to the Voluntary Trust Fund for assisting developing states’ participation. 

The HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE welcomed the commitment to observer participation. The INTERNATIONAL INDIAN TREATY COUNCIL underscored their availability for intersessional exchanges on modalities for Indigenous Peoples’ engagement.

CAMEROON shared they intend to sign the Agreement in the next week. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA drew attention to the 10th Our Ocean Conference taking place in Busan, Korea.

CHILE invited delegations to join the BBNJ First Movers initiative to promote the establishment of the first generation of High Seas MPAs, underlining its contribution to the Global Biodiversity Framework’s 30x30 target on Ocean protection. The EU and the HIGH SEAS ALLIANCE expressed hope that the Agreement could reach 60 ratifications in time for the UN Ocean Conference in Nice in June 2025. 

The Co-Chairs thanked each other for the great teamwork as well as UNDOALOS and everyone working behind the scenes to facilitate the PrepCom’s success. They closed the meeting at 12:08 pm.

A Brief Analysis of PrepCom I

After almost twenty years of discussions and negotiations, states achieved a breakthrough in 2023 with the adoption of the Agreement on Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ). Aiming to foster the conservation and sustainable use of BBNJ, the Agreement is structured around issues including: marine genetic resources (MGRs) and the sharing of benefits derived from the use of MGRs and related digital sequence information; area-based management tools such as marine protected areas (MPAs); environmental impact assessments; and capacity building and the transfer of marine technology. It defines general principles, monitoring and reporting obligations, consultation procedures, an institutional structure, and a financial mechanism to support implementation. 

At the current pace of ratification, the expectation is that the first meeting of the Agreement’s Conference of the Parties (COP 1) could convene as early as late 2026. However, many elements needed for the Agreement to become truly operational are yet to be agreed upon. This is why the UN General Assembly (UNGA) decided to convene a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom), which at its organizational meeting agreed to hold three sessions until early 2026, and more if needed. 

This analysis reflects on the first session of the PrepCom, looking at the role the Commission plays in the life of the Agreement and substantive progress made during the two week-long discussions.

What the PrepCom Is and Is Not

The issues up for consideration by any PrepCom, this one included, are not residual matters by any means. They are the nuts and bolts that will determine the operation of the Agreement for years to come. The Commission is expected to pave the way for the COP to adopt its rules of procedure¾including with regard to decision making and voting rules for when consensus is elusive¾as well as the modalities for the operation of the subsidiary bodies. It is also expected to lay out funding arrangements, including with the Global Environment Facility (GEF), and facilitate a decision on the institutional setup and physical seat of the Secretariat, among other issues. While these elements will not directly lead to an improvement of the dire state of the Ocean, they will condition the long-term effectiveness of the Agreement. Once set in motion, the approach taken on any of these cannot easily be rolled back, not the least due to the costs associated with going back on such decisions.

As the newest multilateral environmental agreement (MEA), the BBNJ Agreement has the opportunity¾some might even say duty¾to build on lessons learned in other processes. For PrepCom I, the Co-Chairs prepared “aids to negotiations,” which were draft texts developed based on other MEAs. They were well received: “It walks like rules of procedure, smells like rules of procedure, quacks like rules of procedure…” noted the Federated States of Micronesia with appreciation, as this facilitated focused discussions on critical points rather than a broad exchange of views that would only “end up reinventing the wheel.”

Many times, delegates themselves shared insights gleaned from other processes, such as with regard to the number of members in other MEAs’ subsidiary bodies. In this regard, they requested the interim BBNJ Secretariat, the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (UNDOALOS), to provide a comparative overview of MEAs’ secretariat arrangements ahead of PrepCom II to inform discussions on linkages to the UN and accountability mechanisms, among others.

One thing to note is that, for now, countries are still negotiating on an equal footing, regardless of whether they are parties, signatories, or do not have the intention to ever become so. But the UNGA resolution that established the PrepCom specified that after 20 September 2025 or the date of entry into force of the Agreement, whichever comes first, only signatories and parties can contribute to the Commission’s decision making. So, in five months, non-signatories will only have observer status. Following suit on the rules of procedure in place across MEAs, decision making would then be limited to parties from COP 1 onwards and throughout the life of the Agreement. 

In that sense, the first and second sessions of the PrepCom are the last chance for some to try to steer the operationalization of the Agreement in their desired direction. This point is key to understanding the Russian Federation’s engagement at PrepCom I, which raised some eyebrows. Throughout the negotiations of the Agreement, the country arduously defended the primacy of the freedom of the high seas and the need “not to undermine” other instruments, frameworks, and bodies (IFBs). Their hard stance was a stumbling block on the way to the adoption of the Agreement by consensus, from which the Russian Federation disassociated itself.

At PrepCom I, the Russian Federation did not tire of questioning various provisions of the Agreement. While this spurred the Co-Chairs to recall, on one occasion, that the PrepCom’s negotiations are supposed to be forward-looking, the delegation, which made its non-signatory status well known, was given the floor upon every request. Trying to get a foot in the door for later stages of negotiations, they advocated that UNCLOS parties¾including BBNJ non-parties¾should be able to participate in meetings of bodies established under the Agreement and, in this respect, underlined the need for consensus-based decision making at those meetings. Seeing as the PrepCom is only set to adopt its recommendations to the COP at its third session it remains to be seen how these suggestions will be addressed.

One Step Closer to Operationalization

In terms of substance, PrepCom I covered a lot of ground. Although there was no decision making at this meeting, convergence emerged on a number of elements and discussions clarified where further debate and compromise will be needed to reach agreement by PrepCom III.

Delegates agreed that every effort should be made to reach consensus in decision making and called for this to be prominently elaborated in the COP’s rules of procedure. Looking at challenges that surfaced in other MEAs, most recently the Convention on Biological Diversity’s COP 16, they were also debating thresholds for quorum, necessary majorities should voting be required, and possible rules to allow for proxy voting.

There was broad agreement that the COP’s rules of procedure should also apply to subsidiary bodies, with adjustments as necessary to respect each body’s mandate. Discussions on the subsidiary bodies were not as productive as they could have been, however. Delegates spent an inordinate amount of time repeating their general views applicable to all bodies. Some put forward concrete expectations in terms of size and composition of certain bodies, but there was no engagement on these proposals. The only notable proposal in terms of specific rules was the call to ensure subsidiary bodies can submit reports and recommendations to the COP when consensus remains elusive and to ensure that dissenting views are also shared. At the end of the session, some delegates were optimistic that PrepCom II will have more focused discussions, building on the matrix the Co-Chairs will prepare to sum up the state of discussions.  

There were no big surprises on the funding of the Secretariat, COP, and subsidiary bodies. There is general support for using the UN scale of assessment as a basis for defining parties’ annual required contributions, with possible tweaks regarding the spread of the scale. Building on lessons learned, some suggested defining rules for parties in arrears to incentivize the payment of dues and building in flexibility for countries hit by disasters. They also cautiously debated expectations with regard to the preparation of budget proposals by the Secretariat and the leeway given to its head in terms of financial decision making. This aligns with the calls across MEAs for more transparency and COP oversight on budgetary matters.

Two elements stood out in discussions on arrangements with the GEF. The first is the timeline for adopting the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). This is key to ensuring the swift operationalization of the Agreement’s financial mechanism. The idea is that the PrepCom should further develop the draft MoU and get the GEF Council’s views ahead of PrepCom III. What stands out from a substantive perspective is the desire of some developing countries to define a redress mechanism of sorts to address questions regarding the GEF’s compliance with COP guidance and project-related disagreements. Unsurprisingly, they were met with calls not to micromanage the GEF, echoing tenuous debates across other MEAs.

Delegates did not make much progress on arrangements for the functioning of the Secretariat. It is a difficult knot to untie, as many questions hinge on the envisioned link between the Secretariat and the UN System. “There are definite incentives that come with that link,” shared one delegate, “but are they greater than the autonomy of a truly stand-alone institution?” The UN Environment Programme offered itself as an institutional host, noting it provides secretariat services to other biodiversity-related MEAs.

Belgium and Chile reiterated their bids to physically host the seat of the Secretariat. There was support for the PrepCom to invite formal bids from prospective host countries, with the bids to include information on the expected timeline for setting up the seat, financial support for its functioning, and provisions to facilitate developing country participation in meetings. However, there was no agreement on defining selection criteria, which some considered could bias the process. In the corridors, delegates wondered if other countries plan on throwing their hat in the ring.

As is often the case in multilateral processes, delegates got bogged down in debates over the format in which to seek expert input for the design and operationalization of the Clearing-House Mechanism (CHM). Delegates who sat through similar discussions in other MEAs are already bracing themselves for lengthy discussions among diplomats on drop-down menus and notification settings. “Time for a scrum master and a coding sprint,” suggested a seasoned observer.

PrepCom II Here We Come

Not only have delegates mandated an impressive amount of intersessional work to be carried out by the Co-Chairs and the Interim Secretariat, but they also shared food for thought regarding the matters to be addressed in August.  

Again, there were strong calls for drawing on practices of other MEAs on reporting templates and procedures, setting up funds, and cooperation arrangements. The UK reminded states that they should use their membership in other IFBs to ensure that they contribute to work under the BBNJ Agreement. “Consistency in states’ messaging is key,” underscored Norway.

The PrepCom has a long way to go to pave the way for the Agreement’s operationalization, but discussions are advancing in a constructive atmosphere. And delegates seem intent on making progress, including by putting money on the table to ensure developing country participation and ensuring the CHM can deliver on core functions in a timely manner, including generating BBNJ batch identifiers and sharing information on planned activities to enable consultations for environmental impact assessments.

PrepCom II will have ten days to address a hefty agenda. But with a collegial spirit and genuine will to achieve consensus, some observers hope that the August 2025 meeting will continue to make progress. With the UN Ocean Conference scheduled in June 2025, one observer was optimistic that it will boost delegates’ efforts towards fully operationalizing the BBNJ Agreement and enabling its swift entry into force.