Summary report, 8–18 June 2026

The geopolitical backdrop against which the 2026 June Climate Meetings took place was more difficult than ever. The blockade in the Strait of Hormuz put a chokehold on global oil supply chains and led to inflationary pressures, clearly showcasing how continued fossil fuel dependency threatens many countries’ and communities’ energy security. At the same time, the World Meteorological Organization has warned that the El Niño effect will be particularly strong this year, exacerbating drought and heavy rainfall and increasing the risk of heatwaves, and that global average temperatures are likely to continue at or near record levels in the next five years.

The June meetings included the 64th meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which were tasked with picking up discussions from where they left off at the Belém Climate Change Conference in November 2025. This did not make things easy, as the Belém meeting ended on a sour note, with many Parties expressing strong disappointment over the lack of reference to fossil fuel transition in the multilaterally-agreed decisions and the way in which a set of indicators to track progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) was adopted.

Unlike in previous years, the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) managed to swiftly adopt their agendas and launch substantive negotiations on their very first day. The remainder of the meetings did not maintain this positive early momentum, however. Negotiations on the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), the GGA, the transition of the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, just transition, and research and systematic observation, were especially fraught. On many agenda items, divergences were such that Parties could not even agree to forward any document capturing progress made in Bonn to serve as a basis for continued engagement at the next session, which will convene in November 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye. 

One bright spot was Parties’ agreement to select the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) to continue serving as the host of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC), which was a key decision to ensure the continued provision of technological support to developing countries in 2027. Parties also agreed on the terms of reference for the review of the Just Transition Work Programme, outlined future steps for considering linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism, and concluded a number of review processes related to capacity-building.

The 2026 June Climate Meetings convened from 8–18 June 2026 at the World Conference Center in Bonn, Germany. There were 9,206 registered participants, including 4,198 party delegates, 2,960 observers, and 134 members of the media.

A Brief History of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out the basic legal framework and principles for international climate change cooperation with the aim of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 198 Parties. 

To boost the effectiveness of the UNFCCC, Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. It commits industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve quantified emission reduction targets for a basket of six GHGs. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and has 192 Parties. Its first commitment period took place from 2008 to 2012 followed by the second commitment period from 2013 to 2020. 

In December 2015, Parties adopted the Paris Agreement. The Agreement aims to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. It also aims to increase Parties’ ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and make financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. It provides that each Party shall communicate, at five-year intervals, successively more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs), which are at the core of the Agreement. As later decided in 2021, each NDC will last ten years, but will be updated every five years. The Agreement further sets out an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) for national reporting by all Parties. Collective progress toward implementing the Agreement is to be reviewed every five years through a Global Stocktake (GST). The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016 and currently has 195 Parties. 

Recent Highlights 

Glasgow: The Glasgow Climate Change Conference convened in Scotland from 31 October – 12 November 2021, after the COVID-19 pandemic interrupted the annual rhythm. Parties finalized the outstanding Paris Agreement rulebook issues, adopting guidelines, rules, and a work programme on Article 6 (cooperative implementation) and agreeing on the format of reporting under the ETF. Parties adopted three cover decisions that, for the first time, included a reference to phasing down unabated coal power and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They also: established work programmes on the GGA, and on urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade; created a dialogue on loss and damage funding; established a process toward defining a new collective quantified goal on climate finance; and launched an annual dialogue on ocean-based climate action. 

Sharm El-Sheikh: The Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference convened in Egypt from 6–20 November 2022. For the first time, Parties recognized the need for finance to respond to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and established a fund and funding arrangements, with details to be worked out in 2023. Key elements in the package leading to this agreement were the operationalization of the MWP and initiating the development of a GGA framework. Parties also adopted two cover decisions, which among others: established a work programme on just transition to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement; and launched a dialogue to enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement (finance flow consistency), and its complementarity with Article 9 (climate finance).

Dubai: The United Arab Emirates Climate Change Conference convened in Dubai from 30 November – 11 December 2023. The major outcome was the adoption of a decision concluding the first GST (GST 1) under the Paris Agreement. It encourages Parties to ensure their next NDCs are 1.5°C-aligned and have ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all GHGs, sectors, and categories. Among other things, the decision also calls on Parties to contribute, in a nationally-determined manner, to global efforts on: tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; and transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science. Parties also: operationalized the loss and damage fund; adopted the GGA framework, including thematic and dimensional targets; agreed on a host for the Santiago Network (a network designed to catalyze technical assistance); and operationalized the just transition work programme (JTWP).

Baku: The Baku Climate Change Conference convened in Azerbaijan from 11–22 November 2024. Parties adopted a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance, in extension of the previous goal of USD 100 billion per year by 2020. The NCQG sets a goal of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries’ climate action from a wide variety of sources, with developed countries taking the lead. It also calls on all actors to work together to scale up financing to developing countries for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. The decision also: acknowledges the need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage, especially for those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and with significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS).

In Baku, Parties also: advanced the operationalization of the market-based cooperative implementation of the Paris Agreement (Articles 6.2 and 6.4); extended the work programme on gender; provided guidance on defining indicators for assessing progress toward the GGA; adopted arrangements with the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage; and extended the mandate of the working group facilitating the implementation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

Belém: The Belém Climate Change Conference was held from 10–22 November 2025 in Belém, Brazil. The meeting gave rise to heated debates over: implementing developed countries’ finance obligations under Paris Agreement Article 9.1; unilateral trade-restrictive measures; and responding to the latest NDCs and biennial transparency reports (BTRs) to address the 1.5°C ambition and implementation gaps. Bundled consultations on these matters eventually led to the adoption of the “Mutirão” Decision. Many delegations advocated for some form of reference to fossil fuel phaseout in this context, possibly in the form of developing roadmaps. But neither this, nor provisions on halting and reversing deforestation, which also enjoyed wide support, made it into the adopted decision. The Brazilian Presidency therefore announced that it will lead an initiative to develop “roadmaps” on these issues, with outcomes to be reported at the 31st meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP 31) in 2026. 

The meeting’s closing plenary was characterized by significant turmoil, with various groups and Parties interrupting the adoption of decisions to raise points of order, voice objections, and comment on various negotiation issues, especially the MWP and the indicators for measuring progress on the GGA. Participants nevertheless applauded the adoption of the new Gender Action Plan, as well as the decision to develop a just transition mechanism. They also, among others, operationalized the Technology Implementation Programme and launched new work on finance flow alignment.

Report of the Meetings

The 2026 Bonn Climate Change Conference opened on Monday, 8 June 2026. UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell commended delegates for dedicating themselves to the sometimes-thankless task of advancing climate action and pushing past setbacks to reach agreement among nations. Cautioning against remaining entangled in fossil fuel dependency, he urged doubling down on the implementation of existing commitments. Noting calls for reforms, he underscored that it is up to Parties to collectively decide how to streamline the UNFCCC process. 

COP 31 President-Designate Murat Kurum (Türkiye) noted the simultaneous environmental and economic crises communities around the world are facing, emphasizing that these crises highlight the risks of relying on fossil fuel energy and the urgent need to accelerate the energy transition. He called on Parties to make progress on key items in Bonn to ease the workload at COP 31.

COP 31 President-Designate of Negotiations Chris Bowen (Australia) reflected on the energy crisis that has unfolded since COP 30, noting its disruption to economies, supply chains, and people globally, and called for reducing dependence on fossil fuels by enhancing electrification and the supply of clean energy. 

Parties and observers also provided opening statements.

Procedural Matters

Adoption of the Agendas: Contrary to previous years, Parties swiftly adopted the SBI’s provisional agenda (FCCC/SBI/2026/3), with the items on the compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Annex I Parties and the information contained in national communications from non-Annex I Parties held in abeyance. They also adopted the SBSTA’s provisional agenda (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/4).

Organization of Work: To speed up progress on key issues ahead of the governing body meeting, Parties agreed to defer the consideration of:

• the Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer to SBI 65;
• the second review of the functions of the Standing Committee on Finance to SBI 65;
• the review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee to SB 65; 
• the report on national GHG inventory data to SBI 65; and
• the alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism, to SBI 68.

The consideration of the remaining agenda items was assigned to contact groups and informal consultations. 

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): The MWP was established in 2021 to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade. It holds at least two global dialogues each year, as well as investment-focused events. It also provides a space for Parties to discuss mitigation-related topics and adopt decisions that can guide further mitigation action in specific sectors. In November 2022, Parties agreed that the MWP would run until the eighth meeting of the COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) in 2026, with a view to a decision on the continuation of the work programme being adopted at that session. CMA 7 (November 2025) invited submissions on opportunities, best practices, actionable solutions, challenges and barriers relevant to the MWP’s continuation, functioning, and effectiveness, with a view to an exchange of views taking place at SB 64.

At SB 64, informal consultations were co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), and took place on 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, and 18 June. During the consultations, Parties continued exchanging views on the MWP’s future direction, including its duration and scope, relationship with other UNFCCC processes, and modalities, based on, among others, guiding questions provided by the Co-Facilitators.

Parties disagreed on what should be the MWP’s scope and focus. While some Parties, including the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) and the INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC), considered it should help implement the GST outcomes, inform future GSTs and also inform NDCs, others preferred a focus primarily on support to implement NDCs. The EU identified the MWP as the only space to discuss mitigation efforts, especially how to strengthen NDCs, their alignment with 1.5°C, and implementation. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA, TUVALU, and NORWAY supported strengthening the operational link with the GST. The ARAB GROUP and LIKE-MINDED GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) opposed linking the MWP to the GST. The ARAB GROUP urged a focus on not just mitigation opportunities, but also structural barriers and solutions. EGYPT argued that MWP topics should not be driven by GST outcomes and opposed discussions on elements Parties could include in their NDCs.

On the modalities of the global dialogues and investment-focused events, delegates proposed improvements, including: multi-year thematic tracks and dedicated coverage of key sectors; a dedicated space for lessons learned and actionable solutions; and broader participation by technical experts, scientists, financiers, project developers, and other stakeholders.

Discussions on the continuation of the MWP revealed divergent views. The LDCs proposed retaining the MWP as a permanent agenda item and establishing an appropriate technical mechanism or committee to facilitate the translation of discussion into concrete action. NEW ZEALAND stressed that the MWP should continue for as long as mitigation remains a global priority. INDIA, EGYPT, KUWAIT, and the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES opposed extending the mandate of the MWP, emphasizing its focus on “this critical decade.” AILAC argued that reference to “this critical decade” relates to the urgency of mitigation action rather than a fixed end date, and urged Parties not to use this as an excuse to not extend the mandate beyond 2030.

Following the exchange of views mandated for SB 64, Parties disagreed on whether and how this exchange should be captured. Several Parties and groups, including the EU, AOSIS, AILAC, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CANADA, and SWITZERLAND, called for the Co-Facilitators to prepare an informal note capturing Parties’ views. The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP stressed that, given the ongoing divergence of views, any informal note should only include broad headings with no substantive viewpoints.

As a bridging solution, the Co-Facilitator prepared three documents: draft SB 64 conclusions; an informal note containing section headings; and the Co-Facilitators’ non-exhaustive reflection of the exchange of views at SB 64. Many Parties, including the LDCs, AILAC, AOSIS, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, and NORWAY, supported retaining all three documents and were willing to engage with them. The LMDCs, AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, and RUSSIAN FEDERATION objected to the “reflections paper,” arguing it did not adequately reflect the full range of views expressed by all Parties and also contained elements that fall outside the MWP’s mandate.

The three documents underwent several iterations, including a proposal by BRAZIL containing draft SB conclusions and an informal note, with options for either a separate section in the informal note or a separate document containing neutral descriptions of topics discussed during SB 64. 

With Parties unable to reach agreement on which documents to forward to CMA 8, the SB Chairs convened a Heads of Delegation meeting in the evening of 18 June, to try and resolve outstanding issues. Ultimately, Parties were unable to reach consensus.

During the closing plenary, AILAC, AOSIS, the EU, CHILE, LDCs, UK, LMDCs, COLOMBIA, and BRAZIL expressed their disappointment at Parties’ inability to conclude consideration of this agenda item at SB 64. AILAC underscored that while the MWP’s mandate covers both ambition and implementation, decisions have often focused on procedural matters rather than on how the MWP can contribute to accelerating ambition and action. AOSIS highlighted the MWP as the only space with a mandate to discuss mitigation ambition and implementation in a manner that complements the GST, and urged continuation of the MWP.

The LDCs expressed “deep concern” at Parties’ inability to capture their progress at SB 64 and called for COP 31 to achieve a strengthened MWP that can deliver tangible results and increased ambition. The UK called for moving beyond general exchanges to identifying actionable points, stressing that a targeted and delivery-oriented MWP is essential. COLOMBIA stressed that the MWP is not just a procedural issue, and rather, that GST 1 highlighted the urgency of mitigation action to keep 1.5°C within reach.

BRAZIL noted that a positive outcome under the MWP is possible and crucial, and that continued efforts are needed to find landing zones, since the MWP is the only space dedicated to mitigation in the UNFCCC process. The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized the criticality of mitigation ambition and called on developed countries to take the lead on the MWP by facilitating the implementation of NDCs.

The LMDCs highlighted some common ground among Parties, including the desire to increase ambition and accelerate implementation, with matching support and enablers, as well as an unwillingness to reopen CMA 7 decisions. They expressed hope this common ground will contribute to progress at CMA 8. 

Outcome: The SBs could not conclude consideration of this matter and agreed to continue consideration at SB 65.

Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): Article 6.2 provides a framework of principles and guidance for Parties that wish to pursue voluntary bilateral cooperation in the implementation of their NDCs, and specifically for the trade of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes, the use of which is authorized by participating Parties, although any organization, including companies, can use the credits.

At SB 64, this issue was considered in SBI informal consultations on, among others, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 15 June, co-facilitated by Peer Stiansen (Norway) and Pacifica Achieng Ogola (Kenya).  Discussions focused on the sufficiency and stability of funding for the operation and maintenance of the Article 6.2 infrastructure, technical expert review, and capacity-building, as requested by CMA 7. Parties considered the Secretariat’s updated technical paper on funding options, which set out four options: core funding in future biennium programme budgets; supplementary funding; usage-based fees; and user fees levied on participating Parties.

Responding to questions, the Secretariat reported that approved expenditures for Article 6.2-related activities amount to about USD 10.7 million and that USD 2.1 million is currently available, leaving a shortfall of USD 8–9 million within the biennium 2026–2027. On projected usage and expected level of demand, they noted that 48 cooperative approaches have been submitted to the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform and 67 Parties have expressed interest in engaging with the international registry.

The AFRICAN GROUP supported funding through the UNFCCC core budget and suggested using supplementary funding through voluntary contributions to cover the current shortfall. AOSIS opposed funding through the core budget and supported a combination of supplementary funding through voluntary contributions, user fees, and usage-based fees, with exemptions for SIDS. The ARAB GROUP supported voluntary contributions. The EU expressed its preference for Article 6.2 to ultimately become self-financing through fees. The COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS supported a combination of supplementary funding through voluntary contributions and usage-based fees. The PHILIPPINES suggested exploring the creation of a trust fund or a dedicated window for Article 6.2 within existing UNFCCC trust funds.

Views diverged on the option of charging usage-based or user fees, with the ARAB GROUP and AILAC opposing additional burdens on participating Parties. AILAC, the LDCs, and the AFRICAN GROUP recalled that the international registry was developed to support the participation of Parties that do not have access to a registry and underscored that charging a user fee defeats this purpose. AOSIS highlighted that finance for capacity-building and technology would be expected to flow to, not from, developing countries. The LDCs stated that usage-based or user fees are not suitable for capacity-building activities that are fundamental to participation in cooperative approaches.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.2), the SBI, inter alia:

• requests its Chair to prepare an informal document, including textual proposals, informed by Parties’ views at SB 64, for consideration at SBI 65 with a view to the SBI recommending a draft decision to CMA 8;
• takes note of the significant gap in funding identified in the updated technical paper, expresses concern regarding the implementation of the Article 6.2 infrastructure and processes, and urges the Secretariat to strengthen its fundraising efforts for these activities; and
• requests the Secretariat to include, in the context of its annual report to the CMA, detailed information on the assumptions underlying the supplementary budget aligned with the distribution of activities in the updated technical paper, including information on the funds currently available, the spending to date during the current biennium, and the expected remaining spending for the current biennium.

Paris Agreement Article 6.8 (non-market approaches, NMAs): Article 6.8 defines a framework for NMAs, which aim to assist Parties in the implementation of their NDCs and to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication.

Meeting of the Glasgow Committee on Non-market Approaches (GCNMA): The GCNMA is convened by the SBSTA Chair and meets in conjunction with the two regular sessions of the SBSTA each year. The Committee held its ninth meeting (GCNMA 9) in conjunction with SBSTA 64, co-chaired by Charles Hamilton (the Bahamas) and Angela Friedrich (Austria).

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/L.1), the SBSTA, inter alia: welcomes the constructive use of a spin-off group with six group discussions at GCNMA 9; and requests the Secretariat to make use of different modalities, including quizzes, in its Article 6.8 capacity-building webinars.

The SBSTA also takes note of, inter alia:

• the information recorded on the NMA Platform since GCNMA 8 on support available for NMAs;
• the Secretariat’s update on the status of the development of the NMA Platform and its quantitative report on the activities on the NMA Platform; and
• the capacity-building activities undertaken by the Secretariat for Article 6.8 national focal points, as well as those related to the work programme delivered as part of the broader Article 6 capacity-building programme.

Review of the work programme under the framework for non-market approaches: CMA 3 requested SBSTA 64 and 65 to review the work programme under the NMA framework, including its activities, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the work programme and to make recommendations for consideration and adoption at CMA 8. CMA 7 further requested SBSTA 64 to consider ways to implement additional functionalities on the NMA Platform that would enable Parties to record the projects that they identify under the MWP. At this session, the SBSTA initiated the review of the work programme. Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Charles Hamilton (the Bahamas) and Angela Friedrich (Austria).

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/L.3), the SBSTA, inter alia, takes note of the Co-Facilitators’ informal note capturing Parties’ views at SB 64 and requests the SBSTA Chair to prepare an informal document, informed by Parties’ views at SB 64, for consideration at SBSTA 65.

Emissions from Aviation and Maritime Transport: This agenda item was considered in SBSTA informal consultations co-facilitated by Jakob Wiesbauer-Lenz (Austria) and Sonam Tashi (Bhutan) on 9 June. The INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION and INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION discussed some of their ongoing efforts in reducing emissions. 

Outcome: The SBSTA agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 65.

Shaping the COP 30 Presidency Roadmap on transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner: This COP 30 Presidency event took place on 12 June. COP 30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago presented the roadmap initiative as a tool to implement agreed goals and drew attention to the First Conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels. Túlio Andrade, COP 30 Presidency, welcomed the many submissions made by Parties and stakeholders to inform the roadmap’s development, which will be finalized by COP 31.

Global Implementation Accelerator (GIA): This mandated event took place on 12 June. The COP 30 President opened this mandated event and described the GIA as part of a “second tier” of climate multilateralism focused on accelerating implementation outside the formal negotiations. He emphasized that, unlike negotiated outcomes, implementation does not require consensus and called for mobilizing all actors and resources to strengthen resilience, accelerate climate action, and keep the 1.5°C goal within reach. 

Sally Box, incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations (Australia), said the GIA would identify and accelerate a limited number of high-impact solutions that have the potential to trigger global change, and link the selected solutions with finance, technical tools, and implementation partners. 

SOUTH AFRICA called for balanced geographical representation among the selection panel. AOSIS called for safeguards to ensure that small and vulnerable countries are not left behind. The LMDCs emphasized that the initiative should: remain Party-driven, facilitative, and voluntary; avoid policy recommendations; and address mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage in a balanced manner. The ARAB GROUP called for attention to solutions that have received less international support and momentum, including carbon capture, utilization,

Belém Mission to 1.5°C: This consultation event with Parties and non-Party stakeholders took place on 12 June. The incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations (Australia) pointed to a call for submissions to help shape the process, which will continue through 2026 with the aim of publishing a report for decision-makers prior to COP 31. The EU supported continuing this work beyond COP 31, linking it to GST 2, and urging those Parties that have yet to do so to submit new NDCs. AILAC proposed developing integrated transition roadmaps. SAUDI ARABIA stressed the voluntary nature of this initiative, stating that it is not connected to any work programme or UNFCCC constituted body. EGYPT said suggestions to link outcomes from this initiative or any component of the Action Agenda to the formal process are “not acceptable, nor are they helpful.”

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): Paris Agreement Article 7 established the goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change. At CMA 3, Parties launched a work programme to flesh out the GGA. At CMA 5 they established the GGA Framework, which includes a range of thematic and dimensional targets, and launched an expert-led process aimed at defining adaptation indicators to measure progress toward these targets. CMA 7 adopted 59 indicators. 

At SB 64, informal consultations were co-facilitated by Peter Gerard Wittoeck (Belgium) and Ricardo Delano Marshall (Barbados) and convened on, among others, 11, 13, 15, 16, and 17 June. Parties picked up the discussion on the basis of work undertaken at CMA 7, reflecting on: the establishment of a two-year policy alignment process on integrating the GGA targets and indicators into reporting; technical work on improving metadata and methodologies for the indicators, including by establishing a technical taskforce; the first phase of the “Baku Adaptation Roadmap” (BAR), focusing on the organization of two workshops per year and the preparation of a technical paper; and the development of terms of reference (ToR) for the review of the GGA Framework, including the indicators.

With regard to the GGA indicators, AOSIS and the AFRICAN GROUP called for the workstreams on policy alignment and on metadata and methodologies to support one another. The LMDCs opposed this, emphasizing the need for a two-track approach. Parties maintained diverging views as to the composition of the taskforce. GRUPO SUR, AILAC, LMDCs, the AFRICAN GROUP, and the ARAB GROUP emphasized that the taskforce should be party-driven, while the EU, NORWAY, and JAPAN preferred that the taskforce be expert-driven. Concrete proposals related to, among others: the number of taskforce members; balance between developed and developing countries; regional representation; the participation and role of constituted bodies and UN regional commissions; and the process to select experts. CANADA suggested reflecting on expected deliverables and then discussing who would be best placed to prepare these. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS called for an Indigenous Peoples’ representative on the taskforce to support the inclusion of the lived experiences, knowledge systems, and governance practices of Indigenous Peoples.

With regard to the BAR, Parties reflected on possible workshop topics and expected outputs. Developing countries supported focusing on implementation challenges and means of implementation. The ARAB GROUP supported considering adaptation according to different temperature scenarios. 

With limited time for engagement on the matter, many Parties favored taking up the development of the review ToR at SB 65.

Proposals for draft text outlining how work on the GGA shall be undertaken sparked strong disagreement. The AFRICAN GROUP, AOSIS, LDCs, GRUPO SUR, AILAC, LMDCs, and the ARAB GROUP supported references to work being implemented in accordance with the principles of the Convention and Paris Agreement. They also urged ensuring access to predictable, accessible finance to support adaptation implementation in accordance with Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ finance provision commitment) and supported explicit reference to a tripling of adaptation finance, noting that, without this significant scaling up, the GGA will remain beyond reach. The EU, UK, CANADA, and JAPAN opposed these proposals, noting that adaptation finance is already addressed under other agenda items and constituted bodies. 

On 16 June, the Co-Facilitators introduced a revised draft text and suggested Parties take it up in informal-informals. The G-77/CHINA underscored their disappointment with the revised text and urged removing the brackets around paragraphs on: the GGA being implemented in accordance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and Paris Agreement; and urging full and urgent delivery of the call for efforts to at least triple adaptation finance by 2035. The EU, supported by NORWAY, CANADA, SWITZERLAND, JAPAN, and the UK also expressed concern, calling for no-text options for two paragraphs that reference tripling of adaptation finance. 

Given persistently-diverging views, some Parties suggested focusing discussions only on paragraphs pertaining to the technical taskforce, while others preferred to work on the entire text. With Parties disagreeing on the way forward, the Co-Facilitators sought guidance from the SB Chairs, who proposed holding bilateral meetings to understand diverging views and devise next steps. In the afternoon of 17 June, Parties were presented a further revised draft text, which introduced verbatim references to previous decisions as alternative options for contentious paragraphs on finance.

On 18 June, Parties engaged in informal-informals throughout the day on the basis of the revised text. In the evening, the SB Chairs, noting that bridging proposals had not been successful, issued a revised draft text under their authority. INDIA, JAPAN, the EU, and the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG) expressed their disappointment with the text and how it was developed, but stated that, in the interest of progressing work on adaptation, they could support forwarding the text for further consideration at SB 65. GRUPO SUR and the AFRICAN GROUP requested the matter be taken up by Heads of Delegation.

Heads of Delegation met in the evening on 18 June, during the final hours of SB 64, but were also unable to reach agreement on the way forward.

During the closing plenary, AILAC lamented the lack of progress made and argued that delaying progress on adaptation “sends the wrong political signal.” AOSIS said the outcome of the GGA is “completely unacceptable,” and stated that their trust in the process has “diminished.” PACIFIC SIDS (P-SIDS) and LDCs voiced their regret that the GGA has stalled at a time when outcomes and guidance are urgently needed.

The AFRICAN GROUP and EU expressed concern over the manner in which the GGA negotiations were conducted. The AFRICAN GROUP added that the importance of this agenda item demands a process that is transparent, inclusive, and party-driven.

The UK expressed disappointment that “despite being so close,” an agreement could not be reached. They urged Parties to move forward constructively and find a resolution at COP 31.

The ARAB GROUP highlighted that not having an outcome on the GGA “causes real delays in the real world,” and called for Parties to reflect on how they can move forward. MEXICO expressed concern about the lack of consensus on the GGA, stressing that, because of the outcome, Parties have failed vulnerable communities and ecosystems.

The LMDCs highlighted the consensus among all groups that addressing adaptation is a “profound task,” and that supporting adaptation today will enable Parties to have the capacity to advance mitigation tomorrow. GUATEMALA said the GGA cannot be achieved without corresponding means of implementation and underscored the need for accessible and predictable adaptation finance for developing countries.

Outcome: During the closing plenary, the SBI Chair and SBSTA Vice-Chair noted that Parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included on the SB 65 agenda.

Review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee: The Adaptation Committee aims to promote the coherent implementation of enhanced action on adaptation. It was established in 2010 as part of the Cancún Adaptation Framework to drive forward coherent UNFCCC action on adaptation by providing expert guidance, enhancing outreach, and supporting the implementation of the Convention and later the Paris Agreement. 

This item was deferred to SB 65 and the SB Chairs noted their intention to convene a Heads of Delegation meeting on the underlying issues that have prevented progress on this matter.

Guidance relating to Adaptation Communications: Adaptation communications are established by Articles 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement to increase the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation, strengthen adaptation action and support for developing countries, provide input to the GST, and enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions.

Discussions under this agenda item focused on parties’ experience with the application of the guidance on adaptation communications adopted at CMA 1, and the CMA’s decision to take stock of, and if necessary, revise the guidance. At SB 62 parties agreed to postpone the review of guidance, but disagreed on the timelines, and invited SB 64 to continue considering the timeline to: invite parties to submit further information on their experience with the application of the guidance; request the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions; and take stock of, and if necessary revise, the guidance, taking into account parties’ submissions and the synthesis report.

At SB 64, Co-Facilitators Marie Wien Fjell (Norway) and Thomas Lelekoitien (Kenya) convened informal consultations on, among others, 10, 11, and 15 June. Parties continued to diverge on the timing of the activities aimed at informing the stocktaking and potential revision of the guidance. GRUPO SUR, the LDCs, and AOSIS supported a timeline that includes: Parties’ submissions on their experience in applying the guidance and preparation of a synthesis report for consideration at SB 66 (June 2027); and preparation of draft conclusions by SB 68 (June 2028) for consideration by CMA 10 (November 2028). AILAC noted that such a timeline would allow Parties to include their experiences in using the new adaptation indicators and will also coincide with the update of the modalities, procedures and guidelines (MPGs) of the ETF and GST 2. The EU, UK, and JAPAN argued that consideration of revising the guidance should only take place after the review of the MPGs. The ARAB GROUP preferred a longer timeline, proposing that the Secretariat prepare the synthesis report for consideration at SBI 70 (June 2029), with draft conclusions to be considered at CMA 11 (November 2029). The LMDCs and AFRICAN GROUP emphasized that adaptation communications should not be explicitly tied to the MPG review process.

Parties also discussed a proposal for further work by the Adaptation Committee. GRUPO SUR supported: inviting the Adaptation Committee, in collaboration with the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) and LDCs Expert Group (LEG), to hold informal discussions at CMA 8 to identify opportunities for leveraging the intersections between adaptation communications and other adaptation-related reporting when integrating consideration of the GGA Framework therein; and to consider expanding the ongoing work of the Adaptation Committee, in collaboration with the CGE and the LEG, on developing recommendations on how to improve adaptation reporting to prepare recommendations on adaptation communications ahead of SBI 66 (June 2027). The ARAB GROUP, LDCs, LMDCs, and JAPAN preferred not to outline additional activities.

Outcome: The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this item at SBI 65 on the basis of the informal note from SBI 64.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs): The LEG was first established in 2001 to support developing countries in formulating and implementing National Adaptation Plans (NAPs). Its mandate has since been extended multiple times. The LEG meets twice a year to develop and review progress on the implementation of its work programme through a variety of modalities, including technical guidelines and papers, training activities, and workshops. The mandate at SB 64 was to initiate the stocktake of the LEG and its terms of reference (ToR) and recommend draft COP and CMA decisions.

Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Ephraim Shitima (Zambia) and Rik den Hoedt (the Netherlands), were convened on, among others, 10, 11, 12, 15, and 16 June. Parties discussed the LEG’s work programme for 2026–2027, the NAP Expo 2026, and the updated NAP technical guidelines developed by the LEG in 2025.

The ARAB GROUP opposed reference to the updated guidelines, stating that the LEG did not take into consideration all inputs provided by Parties. Noting that matters related to LDCs is a COP item, the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs expressed concern about the consideration of draft CMA decision text and requested the Secretariat to provide legal clarity on the matter. The Secretariat, recalling Decision 15/CP.29, clarified that the COP had invited the CMA to conduct a stocktake of the LEG’s progress, and that the SBI has a clear mandate to develop a draft CMA decision. 

In a paragraph of the draft COP decision requesting the LEG to provide technical guidance and support for navigating evolving climate finance arrangements, the LDCs called for deleting the reference to the NCQG. The ARAB GROUP preferred to delete the paragraph altogether, but supported the LDCs’ proposal. The UK, EU, CANADA, and JAPAN highlighted the relevance of the reference to the NCQG. Parties agreed to retain the reference in the draft CMA decision and remove it from the COP decision. 

The LDCs further highlighted the constraints they continue to face in implementing NAPs and called for, among others, developing adaptation investment pipelines and enhancing access to existing finance mechanisms. The ARAB GROUP called for adding references to developed countries’ financial obligations under Paris Agreement Article 9.1, as well as the impacts of unilateral trade measures on LDCs. The EU and UK said they could not accept any text with these references included.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.5), the SBI, inter alia:

• welcomes the work programme of the LEG for 2026–2027;
• notes with concern that seven adaptation proposals with technical clearance to receive funding from the LDC Fund and six medium-sized adaptation projects will not be funded in the remaining period of the eighth replenishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF-8) owing to lack of funds;
• recalls paragraph 12 of Decision 8/CP.30, in which the LEG was requested to compile from relevant reports, in collaboration with the Adaptation Committee and the Standing Committee on Finance, an overview of climate finance flows and financial support provided by developed countries to developing countries for formulating and implementing NAPs for inclusion in the 2026 report on progress in the process to formulate and implement NAPs to be prepared for consideration at SBI 65; and
• agrees to continue consideration of the stocktake of the LEG’s progress and its ToR with a focus on the evolving needs of the LDCs at SBI 65, taking into account the draft decision texts prepared at SBI 64, with a view to recommending draft decisions for consideration by COP 31 and CMA 8.

Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation (NWP): The NWP was established in 2005 to assist all Parties, especially developing countries, to: improve their understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change; and make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures to respond to climate change on a sound scientific, technical, and socioeconomic basis. Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Lina Yassin (Sudan) and Luke Millar (Australia), were held on, among others, 8, 10, and 13 June. Parties considered, among other things, the Secretariat’s report on progress in implementing activities under the NWP, which also contains an annex with an indicative workplan for 2026–2027. 

Parties diverged on whether to “welcome” or “note” progress in implementing activities under the NWP. They also diverged on whether to: “welcome” the report by the Secretariat on this matter, including the indicative NWP workplan for 2026–2027; “note” the report; or “note the efforts of the Secretariat in preparing” the report. Debates also related to, among others: reference to the NWP’s engagement with the private sector; expanding engagement with universities under the UN Climate Change Universities Partnership Programme; reference to thematic targets of the GGA Framework guiding new priority thematic areas under the NWP. 

Outcome: The SBSTA (SBSTA/2026/L.4), inter alia:

• welcomes progress in implementing activities under the NWP and notes the Secretariat’s efforts in preparing the report;
• requests the consideration of new priority thematic areas under the NWP be guided by Parties and their needs, including in relation to the thematic targets under the GGA Framework;
• notes the adaptation challenges faced in mountain regions and highlights that knowledge gaps in this context can be addressed through relevant activities under the NWP;
• requests the Secretariat to continue implementing NWP activities in a regionally balanced manner and to strengthen collaboration with NWP partner organizations and other relevant actors in addressing adaptation knowledge gaps and scaling up practical, context-specific adaptation solutions; 
• requests the Secretariat to further strengthen the engagement of universities, particularly those in developing countries; and
• recalls paragraph 11 of Decision 17/CP.19, in which developed country Parties were urged to provide support, including financial support, for the implementation of the NWP, and paragraph 12 of the same decision, in which other Parties, organizations, agencies, and NWP partner organizations were invited to provide support for the implementation of the NWP, as appropriate.

Workshop under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR): On 9 June, a mandated workshop was held that assessed how the UNFCCC’s “adaptation architecture” supports implementation of the GGA, and means of implementation for adaptation, including barriers and priority actions.

Finance

Second review of the Standing Committee on Finance (SCF): Established in 2010, the SCF provides recommendations related to a wide range of issues, including: providing draft guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism; maintaining the coherence and coordination of the operating entities; providing expert input into the review of the Financial Mechanism; and preparing a biennial overview of climate finance flows. COP 27 adopted the ToR of the second review and requested SBI 58 to initiate it with a view to adopting a decision at COP 28. However, Parties have not been able to agree on a way forward, with disagreement relating to the CMA’s role in the review. SBI 63 agreed to defer consideration of this matter to SBI 64, which deferred consideration to SBI 65.

Adaptation Fund: The Fund was established in 2001 to finance adaptation projects in developing country Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It is financed, in part, by a share of proceeds from activities under the Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). In 2016, Parties decided that the Adaptation Fund shall also serve the Paris Agreement. In 2018, they decided that it shall “exclusively serve” the Paris Agreement once the share of proceeds (SOPs) under Article 6.4 becomes available, while continuing to receive the SOPs, if available, from the Kyoto mechanisms, including the CDM.

The 20th COP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP 20) and CMA 7 requested SBI 64 to continue consideration of matters relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB), arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement and the initiation of the fifth review of the Fund, on the basis of the work undertaken at SBI 63.

SBI informal consultations on this matter were co-facilitated by Isatou Camara (The Gambia) and Koosje Beumer-van der Loo (the Netherlands) on, among others, 9, 11, and 17 June. 

With regard to the timing of the fifth review of the Fund, Parties agreed to conduct it after the transition has taken place.

The key point of contention was whether progress on the Fund’s transition to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, including arrangements to monetize the SOPs from Article 6.4 activities, should be linked to agreement on the composition of the AFB. The G-77/CHINA emphasized that the issues of transition arrangements, Board membership, and the fifth review should be treated separately, and called for a separate decision text for each issue. They urged considering the transition first in order to ensure a swift monetization of the SOPs. SWITZERLAND, the EU, UK, CANADA, and NORWAY called for addressing AFB membership as part of the transition arrangements.

The ARAB GROUP invoked Rule 34 (point of order) of the draft rules of procedure to call for the Co-Facilitators’ ruling on whether there is consensus on the text on the transition arrangements. They questioned why the draft text, which it argued enjoyed consensus, could not be forwarded despite the unresolved discussions on AFB membership. The UK and NORWAY noted that, while there are no amendments proposed to the text on transition arrangements, there is no consensus on forwarding it without text on membership. The legal counsel noted that: strictly speaking, the draft rules of procedure are applied in plenary settings, with discussions in contact groups and informal consultations being guided by these; texts are forwarded if there is consensus to do so; and, when in doubt, elected officers, such as the SBI Chair, should be consulted.

On Thursday, 18 June, the Co-Facilitators reported that no agreement had been reached in a Heads of Delegation consultation on the unresolved issues and proposed procedural conclusions that would continue consideration of AFB membership, transition arrangements, and the fifth review at SBI 65 on the basis of draft text from SBI 64. Trying to salvage progress, Parties engaged in a lengthy debate in informal consultations, touching on, among others: reference to three separate “mandates,” rather than “items”; noting only progress on the fifth review, which everyone agreed on, or also on the transition arrangements; and proposals for “constructive ambiguity” allowing different interpretations regarding the number of draft decisions under consideration. After many rounds of amendments, huddles, and intermittent calls for the SBI Chair to take up the matter, Parties eventually reached agreement on the SBI conclusions.

During the SBI closing plenary, CHILE underscored that the SOPs from the Article 6.4 mechanism are crucial for supporting adaptation action. Stating that procedural disputes should not delay these resources, they urged Parties to make significant progress moving forward.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.10), the SBI:

• states that it continued consideration of three separate mandates: the transition arrangements; the Fund’s fifth review; and AFB membership;
• notes that progress has been made on the matters relating to the transition arrangements and initiation of the fifth review;
• agrees to continue consideration of the three mandates at SBI 65 on the basis of the work and progress achieved at SBI 64 and the draft texts from SBI 64; and
• notes that these conclusions do not prejudge the final outcomes at SBI 65.

Dialogue on finance flow alignment: Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement sets out the overarching goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. In 2022, the CMA established a dedicated dialogue to exchange views on, and enhance understanding of, the scope of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9, which deals with Parties’ obligations in relation to climate finance. In 2023, the CMA decided to continue and strengthen the Dialogue, including with regard to the operationalization and implementation of Article 2.1(c). In 2025, the CMA decided to continue deliberations under a Dialogue on the implementation of Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9. At SB 64, a mandated event on this item took place on 9 and 10 June.

Climate Finance Work Programme: In an engagement workshop among Parties on 8 June, the Work Programme Co-Chairs Apollonia Miola (European Commission) and Yolando Velasco (the Philippines) invited views on the scope and modalities of the work programme. 

On scope, the G-77/CHINA rejected the work plan prepared by the Co-Chairs, opposing its use as the basis for discussions. They underlined that enhanced financial support through Paris Agreement Article 9.1 is the main focus of the work programme and identified other relevant issues, such as transparency and complementarity in the reporting of finance flows. 

The EU, SWITZERLAND, CANADA, JAPAN, and other developed countries stressed the work programme’s scope is climate finance, including Article 9.1 in the context of Article 9 (finance) as a whole. They therefore called for a focus on implementation of the NCQG as a fulfilment of climate finance obligations. SWITZERLAND further called for considering the contributor base and engaging with private actors. NORWAY suggested discussing how to scale up investments to align with climate goals, as well as enabling environments and capacity. 

The LDCs called for consideration of the quality of finance, particularly the proportion of grants and the balance between adaptation and mitigation finance. The ARAB GROUP suggested discussing burden sharing arrangements among developed countries. The LMDCs highlighted quality and predictability of finance flows. AOSIS called for a practical plan to enhance provision and access to finance. 

On modalities, AILAC, the ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and others said the work programme was established by the CMA and must remain a CMA agenda item to be considered at CMA 8. AILAC suggested a synthesis report of Parties’ views, for consideration at CMA 8. The ARAB GROUP called for an engagement roadmap toward CMA 8, including intersessional consultations. SWITZERLAND, NORWAY, CANADA, and others highlighted the work programme was launched at CMA 7 and that work has commenced under it, including appointment of the Co-Chairs and submission of views. They urged commencing substantive discussions.

Reporting

Greenhouse gas data interface: Under the Convention’s and Kyoto Protocol’s reporting requirements, Parties submit GHG inventories. The GHG data interface is an online tool to facilitate access, searching, and sorting the information provided by Parties. SBSTA 61 requested the Secretariat to prepare a workplan for further developing the GHG data interface, incorporating data and information reported by Parties under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. SBSTA 62 requested the Secretariat to further develop the GHG data interface using the infrastructure of the climate data hub, and to develop and publish the modules outlined in the presentation made at the session.

At SB 64, the Secretariat provided Parties with an update on progress made developing the interface, and Parties were asked to consider additional modules.

Co-Facilitators Fredrick Ouma (Kenya) and Daniela Romano (Italy) held informal consultations on, among others, 10 and 16 June. Parties expressed diverging views on what was agreed to at SB 62 regarding the development of the interface, specifically the flexible queries modules. The ARAB GROUP, supported by CHINA, stressed that the flexible queries module alters the context under which Parties agreed to submit data to the interface as they would allow users to compare Parties. The EU, UK, and NORWAY reiterated their support to retain all modules in the current interface.

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBSTA Rapporteur Rita Mishaan noted that Parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SBSTA 65 agenda.

Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports from Annex-I Parties: This item was held in abeyance. 

Report on national GHG inventory data from Annex-I Parties: With UKRAINE denouncing the inclusion of data from unlawfully occupied territories, the SBI agreed to defer consideration of the report on national GHG inventory data to SBI 65.

Information contained in national communications from Non-Annex I Parties: This item was held in abeyance. 

Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports from Non-Annex I Parties: In its opening plenary, the SBI took note of the published summary reports.

Support for non-Annex I reporting under the Convention: This item relates to the provision of support for non-Annex I Parties for implementing the measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the Convention. SBI 63 agreed that consideration of this matter, including the frequency of including this matter on the agenda for future SBI sessions, will continue at SBI 64.

SBI informal consultations on this agenda item were co-facilitated by Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) and Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark), and took place on, among others, 9 and 16 June. 

The UK noted that the reporting architecture has evolved and that BTRs are now the central reporting vehicle. Supported by the EU, they suggested that, unless there is evidence that support for national communications is insufficient, the SBI should reduce the frequency of consideration of support for reporting under the Convention in order to avoid duplication with the discussions on support for reporting under the Paris Agreement. The G-77/ CHINA cautioned that not all countries are reporting under the Paris Agreement, with the AFRICAN GROUP pointing to flexibility for LDCs and SIDS. The LMDCs and ARAB GROUP emphasized the continuing importance of support for reporting under the Convention and urged maintaining the frequency of considering this item. The UK underscored that reporting barriers are the same regardless of whether reports are prepared under the Convention or the Paris Agreement. 

Parties debated whether to agree on procedural conclusions and forward some form of text to inform further discussions at SBI 65. The G-77/CHINA opposed procedural conclusions without forwarding any text. Noting that GEF-9 is not concluded, the UK and JAPAN opposed forwarding text that includes a paragraph noting with deep concern the 27% reduction in resources for the climate focal area between GEF-8 and GEF-9. 

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBI Vice-Chair Eyad Aljubran noted that Parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SBI 65 agenda.

Support for developing country reporting under the Paris Agreement: This item relates to the provision of financial and technical support to developing countries for implementing their reporting obligations under the ETF.  

SBI informal consultations on this agenda item were co-facilitated by Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) and Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark), and took place on, among others, 9 and 16 June. During the consultations, Parties considered reports on experiences and challenges related to implementing the ETF and lessons learned from supporting activities. 

The G-77/CHINA called for using the insights on challenges and lessons learned to tailor supporting activities. Parties reflected on the type of activities that will maximize the reach and effectiveness of capacity-building activities, and a workshop to be held in November 2026. 

The AFRICAN GROUP opposed text proposing that, if additional resources are needed, developing countries may draw from their System for Transparent Allocation of Resources allocation. The UK, supported by the EIG, EU, NORWAY, and CANADA, opposed text expressing “deep concern” that the GEF-9 resources are insufficient to meet developing countries’ transparency-related needs. They noted that every project request under GEF-8 was funded and that the GEF-9 replenishment is not yet concluded. 

Owing to lack of time to sort remaining disagreements, the Co-Facilitators suggested agreeing on procedural conclusions, with discussions to continue at SBI 65, possibly taking into account the Co-Facilitators’ draft text. The UK opposed forwarding the draft text with the paragraph on concerns regarding GEF-9.

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBI Vice-Chair Aljubran noted that Parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SBI 65 agenda.

Technology 

Poznan strategic programme on technology transfer: Consideration of this item was deferred to SBI 65.

Alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the CTCN and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism: Consideration of this item was deferred to SBI 68.

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism: Linkages and collaboration between the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism were considered at SBI 60, with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption at COP 29. However, consideration was not concluded at this or subsequent SBI sessions, and COP 30 requested SBI 64 to continue consideration of this matter.

At SBI 64, informal consultations were co-facilitated by Céline Phillips (France) and Omar Alcock (Jamaica), during which Parties discussed the draft COP decision text developed at SBI 62. The AFRICAN GROUP urged Parties to find common ground, suggesting that agreement was “so close” in 2025. On 17 June, delegates were able to resolve the last remaining areas of difference, including with regard to the future consideration of this matter. The G-77/CHINA underscored that this is the first time in five years that concrete progress was made on this item, and the EU expressed hope for a similar spirit of compromise to manifest in the consideration of other agenda items.

Outcome: The SBI conclusions (FCCC/SBI/L.9) recommend a draft COP decision that, inter alia:

• welcomes collaboration between the Technology Executive Committee (TEC), CTCN, GEF, and Green Climate Fund (GCF);
• recognizes the wide range of views on successes, gaps, and challenges in relation to linkages between the Technology Mechanism and Financial Mechanism;
• recalls that the aim of elaborating these linkages is to ensure financial resources for, and scaling up action on, technology development and transfer;
• acknowledges the importance of strengthening collaboration and coordination among national designated entities for technology development and transfer, national designated authorities for the GCF, and operational focal points for the GEF;
• acknowledges that the provision of relevant capacity-building support to developing countries is essential for enhancing linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism;
• highlights the importance of the Updated Strategic Plan of the Green Climate Fund for the 2028–2031 programming cycle for the work of the Technology Mechanism;
• requests the TEC and CTCN to consider synergies and complementarities between their work and that of the GEF and the GCF and to engage with them in developing future workplans and programmes;
• encourages the CTCN to identify modalities for translating the outcomes of its technical assistance, and of technology needs assessments, into fundable projects;
• requests the Secretariat to prepare by June 2028, and update by June 2032, relevant content on progress, successes, and challenges in strengthening linkages as well as on financial support provided by the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism for implementing the outcomes of technical assistance provided by the CTCN, technology needs assessments, and technology action plans, as appropriate; and
• requests the SBI to continue to consider these linkages at SBI 70 (June 2029) and SBI 76 (2032), and to recommend draft decisions for consideration at COP 34 (November 2029) and COP 37 (November 2032), with the COP 37 draft decision addressing the continuation, effectiveness, and periodicity of future consideration of these linkages.

Host of the Climate Technology Centre: The CTC was established in 2010 as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism and has been operational since 2013. Hosted by UNEP, it provides technology solutions, capacity-building, and advice on policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks tailored to the needs of individual countries. COP 29 decided to conduct a review of the CTC’s functions and decide whether to extend its term, and CMA 6 decided to participate in conducting the review and in deciding whether to extend the term. COP 30 and CMA 7 decided to extend the term of the CTC until the end of 2041, and also decided that the process for selecting the new host of the CTC shall be launched upon the conclusion of SBI 63.

SBI informal consultations on this matter were co-facilitated by Mareer Mohamed Husny (Maldives) and Stig Svenningsen (Norway) and took place on, among others, 9, 10, 15, 16, 17, and 18 June. Discussions were based on the evaluation panel’s evaluation of proposals for hosting the CTC. Parties exchanged views on the selection of a host and elements to be addressed in a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the future host. 

Most Parties supported selecting UNEP as the new host. The G-77/CHINA also supported this, but suggested specifying that UNEP should seek a partnership with the consortium between the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as the other shortlisted candidate, as well as possibly other candidates. UNEP highlighted its commitment to partnerships and said such an agreement could be arranged after finalization of the hosting MoU, based on the added value of such partnerships. UNIDO and UNOPS highlighted their willingness to cooperate and their preference for a relevant reference to be included in the hosting MoU. 

Parties debated options for how to invite such partnerships while guaranteeing legal clarity and clear accountability. They reached agreement on 17 June, deciding, among others, to feature “collaboration, cooperation, and partnerships” in the elements to be addressed in the MoU. 

Although not disagreeing on the substance, the ARAB GROUP underscored they are not in a position to move forward on the CTC host due to unequal treatment of their group’s proposals in other technology-related negotiations. They emphasized the need for equal treatment of technology items and for the SBI Chair to find a resolution on the CTC host, the joint annual report of the TEC and CTCN, and the second period assessment of support to the Technology Mechanism. The other groups and Parties pleaded with the Arab Group not to jeopardize agreement on the CTC host. In the evening of 17 June, Parties conducted informal-informals addressing the package of technology items, reaching agreement on all matters. 

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.7), the SBI:

• recommends UNEP as the CTC host;
• encourages UNEP to seek collaboration, cooperation and partnership, as appropriate, with potential partners, such as UNIDO, UNOPS and others, as relevant, with a view to leveraging the comparative advantages of these organizations;
• requests the Secretariat to prepare with UNEP, the draft hosting MoU between the COP, CMA, and UNEP on the basis of the annexed elements of an MoU, for consideration at SBI 65; and
• agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 65 on the basis of the Co-Facilitators’ draft text from SBI 64.

The annexed elements of an MoU contain sections on, among others: role and responsibilities of the COP and CMA; role and responsibilities of UNEP; role and functions of the CTCN; and financial arrangements for the CTCN. 

2025 Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN): The TEC and the CTCN prepare and submit a joint annual report to the COP and CMA on their respective activities and functions. However, since SB 63 could not conclude its work on this matter, COP 30 and CMA 7 requested SB 64 to continue considering it on the basis of the latest draft text from SBI 63.

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Ashabrick Nantege (Uganda) and Elfriede More (Austria) and convened on, among others, 15 June. Parties debated: whether to “welcome” or “note” the report and the TEC’s and CTCN’s implementation efforts and progress; text calling on Parties “in a position to do so” to provide financial support to the TEC and CTCN; and reference to the GST. 

Noting lack of agreement on the draft decisions, on 17 June, the Co-Facilitators proposed adopting procedural conclusions whereby the SBs agree to continue consideration of this matter at SB 65 on the basis of draft text from SB 64. AILAC and the ARAB GROUP called for more time. 

On Thursday, 18 June, Parties converged on recommending draft COP and CMA decisions based on agreement reached in informal-informals addressing a package of technology items. Among others, they agreed to remove from the draft CMA decision the reference to a synergistic response to the technology-related outcomes of GST 1.

Outcome: The SBs recommended draft decisions for COP 31 (SB/2026/L.3) and CMA 8 (SB/2026/L.4), which largely mirror each other and, inter alia: 

• welcome the joint annual report, welcome with appreciation the TEC’s and CTCN’s implementation efforts and progress, and welcome their enhanced coordination and collaboration;
• request the CTCN, in collaboration with the TEC, to continue organizing the regional national designated entity forums;
• encourage coordination among national designated entities with national authorities for the GCF, Adaptation Fund, and GEF focal points in implementing the outcomes of technology needs assessments and technical assistance provided by the CTCN, as well as in scaling up support for addressing nationally identified technology-related priorities;
• invite the TEC and CTCN to continue improving their monitoring and evaluation system, including improving the feedback mechanism;
• highlight the importance of the provision of financial support to the TEC and CTCN;
• note the relevance of the TEC’s key messages and recommendations and that these may inform Parties, relevant bodies under the UNFCCC process, and other stakeholders, taking into account national circumstances and priorities;
• invite the CTCN to continue to explore ways of further enhancing the provision of support to national designated entities to improve national-level coordination with regard to technology development and transfer;
• encourage the CTCN to continue mobilizing resources, including from the private sector and philanthropic entities; and 
• encourage the CTCN’s continued collaboration with the Adaptation Fund under the Fund’s Climate Innovation Accelerator programme.  

Second periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement: CMA 4 requested SBI 64 to initiate the second periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement on matters relating to technology development and transfer, with a view to it being completed at CMA 9 (November 2027).

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Pemy Gasela (South Africa) and Stephen Minas (Cyprus) on, among others, 10, 11, and 16 June. Several Parties, including the LDCs and the ARAB GROUP provided suggestions as to what the assessment should take into account. The EU and JAPAN cautioned against reopening the scope and modalities of the assessment. 

During the last scheduled informal consultations, the Co-Facilitators noted the lack of time for further engagement and proposed adopting procedural conclusions with a view to continuing discussions at SBI 65 on the basis of the current draft text. The LDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AOSIS called for more time to reach agreement on the remaining issues. NORWAY and the EU urged avoiding the application of Rule 16, emphasizing the need to at least capture progress made. The ARAB GROUP urged the Co-Facilitators to consult with the SBI Chair to secure additional time at SBI 64.

In informal consultations on Thursday, 18 June, Parties confirmed an agreement reached in informal-informals the previous evening that addressed a package of technology items. They agreed to remove the references to: the extent to which technology priorities identified by developing countries have been supported and progressed towards implementation; how the Technology Mechanism has enhanced the implementation of the technology elements of NDCs and technology needs assessments; and the extent to which the support has responded to the technology needs and priorities identified by developing countries.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.8), the SBI:

• notes it initiated the second periodic assessment as agreed in decision 1/CP.21 and in accordance with the scope of and modalities for the assessment;
• recalls that the periodic assessment should be undertaken in a transparent, inclusive, and participatory manner and that its outcomes should serve as input to the GST;
• recalls that the outcome of the periodic assessment should guide improved effectiveness and enhanced support to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement;
• requests the Secretariat to prepare an interim report on the second periodic assessment for consideration at SBI 66; and
• requests the Secretariat, in preparing the interim report, to consider: CMA decisions pertaining to the work of the Technology Mechanism; technology priorities identified by developing countries; the extent to which support has met the budget and plans of the Technology Mechanism; and documents and outcomes resulting from the third independent review of the CTCN.

Other Issues 

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): The JTWP was established in 2022 at CMA 4. It recognizes that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders, and that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication. The JTWP is implemented under the guidance of the SBs through a joint contact group convened at each of their sessions. At least two dialogues are held under the JTWP each year, as well as an annual high-level ministerial event. CMA 7 agreed to establish the just transition mechanism (JTM).

At SB 64, the contact group, co-chaired by Joseph Teo (Singapore) and Federica Fricano (Italy), had three main tasks: finalizing ToR for a review of the JTWP to take place at CMA 8 in November 2026; reflecting on the fifth dialogue under the JTWP; and advancing the operationalization of the JTM.

An initial exchange of views was held on 9 June, while on 10  and 11 June Parties focused on how to operationalize the JTM, with differing views on the mechanism’s form and function. For instance, WOMEN AND GENDER said the mechanism should be a constituted body and INDIA said the mechanism should support means of implementation, while the UK opposed creating a new constituted body or new financial mechanism. On 12 June, Parties reflected on the fifth dialogue under the JTWP.

On 13 and 15 June the focus turned to the ToR for the JTWP’s review. The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and RUSSIAN FEDERATION opposed text on the relationship between the JTWP and other relevant instruments and processes under the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, and entities of the UN system, including areas of “complementarity and coherence.” They also opposed having the review consider how improved modalities for the JTWP could inform, or be informed by, the process to operationalize the JTM. 

On 17 June, the Co-Chairs proposed a “package” of text that included: SB conclusions guiding the JTWP’s further implementation; the ToR for the JTWP review; and an “informal note” that included messages from the JTWP’s fifth dialogue, placeholders for the upcoming sixth dialogue and the JTWP review outcome, and an indicative list of elements to help operationalize the JTM.

Most Parties said they could accept the package in the spirit of compromise. However, the LMDCs wanted to amend the informal note to make it clear that it does not represent consensus, and in fact should not be the basis for future negotiations. They also objected to the ToR’s scope, preferring to limit references to linkages and complementarity. With talks seemingly deadlocked, the Co-Chairs proposed alternative language in the ToR calling for inputs to include areas of complementarity and coherence, “if any.” Parties accepted the proposal and agreed on the SB conclusions and ToR.

Outcome: In their conclusions (FCCC/SB/2026/L.2), the SBs, among others: 

• welcome the fifth dialogue;
• agree on the ToR to conduct the JTWP’s review at SB 65 (November 2026) with a view to informing the consideration of the continuation of the work programme at CMA 8;
• invite submissions on the review of the JTWP on the basis of the ToR; and
• request the Secretariat to prepare a report on the submissions, including proposals for improving the modalities of the JTWP.

The ToR outline the mandate, objectives, scope, sources of input, modalities, and expected outcome of the JTWP’s 2026 review. 

In their conclusions, the SBs note that they discussed the potential key messages emerging from the fifth dialogue and initiated discussions on the JTM’s operationalization. The SBs also agree to continue consideration at SB 65, taking note of the informal note from SB 64, and invite the SB Chairs to consider informal intersessional work prior to SB 65.

Response measures: Discussions on “response measures” address the side effects of climate action, especially the socioeconomic consequences of mitigation measures like carbon taxes or efforts to phase out fossil fuels. This matter is addressed under the UNFCCC (Article 4.8), Kyoto Protocol (Articles 2.3 and 3.14), and Paris Agreement (Article 4.15). In 2010, the COP established the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures, which serves as a platform to share information, experiences, and best practices on the impact of response measures, with a view to recommending specific actions. In 2018, the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) was established to provide direct technical support, data modeling, and research. Currently, the KCI is implementing a six-year work plan for 2026–2030. 

At SB 64, a contact group co-chaired by Veronika Skolasztika Bagi (Hungary) and Peter Govindasamy (Singapore) met on, among others, 9, 15, and 17 June, to: consider case studies in the KCI’s 2025 annual report; decide on input for the technical assessment component of GST 2, which is taking place from COP 31 to COP 33; and build awareness about analyzing and reporting on impacts of response measures. A mandated event took place on 10 June to consider the case studies on just transition, economic diversification, and impact assessment, contained in the KCI’s 2025 report. 

The G-77/CHINA emphasized that response measures must not impose a new burden on developing countries. They welcomed case studies in the KCI’s annual report, and said the input to GST 2 should assess socioeconomic impacts. They also expressed concern at significant delays in the KCI’s work. The ARAB GROUP and CHINA said response measures should not create trade barriers.

Following an exchange of views by Parties, the Co-Facilitators prepared an informal note capturing discussions at SB 64 to serve as a basis for future work. The G-77/CHINA expressed disappointment at the lack of detail in the informal note and sought to insert more details, including adding to a list of lessons learned from the case studies. The EU preferred a short, procedural text referring to the case studies. Delegates were unable to bridge the gap, and could not agree to forward the informal note to SB 65.

On the draft SB 64 conclusions, disagreement arose, in particular, over a paragraph requesting the KCI to prepare a synthesis report for the technical assessment component of GST 2. The AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, CHILE, CHINA, and some other developing countries supported inviting submissions to inform the report and for SB 65 to consider the report with a view to requesting the KCI to submit it as input to GST 2. The UK and CANADA favored simply requesting the KCI to prepare the report and submit it to GST 2 by February 2027. 

Despite further discussions until the evening of 18 June, both in informal consultations and a Heads of Delegation meeting, Parties were ultimately unable to reach agreement on the conclusions.

Outcome: The SBs could not conclude consideration of this matter at SB 64 and agreed to continue consideration at SB 65.

Dialogue on opportunities, challenges, and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade: This mandated event took place on 13 June. Opening the event, SBSTA Vice-Chair Carol Franco noted it is the first in a series of three trade dialogues to take place at SB 64, SB 66 (June 2027), and SB 68 (June 2028), with a high-level event to follow. 

After introductory presentations, Parties shared expectations for the dialogue series. The ARAB GROUP suggested fostering: corrective action to end unilateral measures; cooperative action to ensure that concerns are addressed; and remedial action, should neither correction nor cooperation be achieved. The LMDCs called for: the dialogues to operationalize Article 3.5 of the Convention (supportive and open international economic system) in a practical manner; the SB 64 dialogue to focus on mapping existing measures and gaps; the SB 66 dialogue to foster corrective and cooperative measures; and, if corrective and cooperative measures are not taken, the SB 68 dialogue to foster remedial approaches, including financial support commensurate with economic damage. 

CHINA said the dialogues should serve to: clarify indicators of a supportive and open international economic system; map relevant climate-trade measures and the dissemination of solutions; and conduct an evaluation of measures’ compliance with the Convention and Paris Agreement. BOTSWANA suggested the dialogues provide normative guidance to other actors, noting this does not always require formal decisions, as declarations also carry weight. The UK underscored the dialogue series’ non-negotiating, non-rule-setting nature.

The ARAB GROUP suggested the SB Chairs appoint Co-Chairs to guide the development of a workplan for the dialogue series. The G-77/CHINA called for a summary of each dialogue to be aggregated into the report to the high-level event. BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, INDIA, AND CHINA (BASIC) suggested the dialogue summaries deliver an account of where Parties converge and differ. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for a permanent workstream on trade within the UNFCCC process. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested a standing agenda item. CHINA supported the consideration of reports by the COP and CMA. The UK recalled the mandate for one report to be produced for the high-level event in 2028.

SB Chairs’ follow-up meeting on the Climate Change and Trade Dialogue: On 16 June, SBI Chair Julia Gardiner convened to respond to Parties’ questions on next steps, following the first Dialogue held at SB 64. She shared the Secretariat’s legal guidance that paragraph 57 of the Global Mutirão decision, which established the Dialogue series, does not provide for a report or other formal follow up from the Dialogue sessions. She noted that the Dialogue held at SB 64 was webcast and statements will be available on the Secretariat website. 

The ARAB GROUP, AFRICAN GROUP, and LMDCs said this is inadequate and called for a written report capturing the discussions from the Dialogue. The EU observed that a report was mandated for this process, but only after the three Dialogues and high-level event have taken place. The UMBRELLA GROUP opposed revisiting “carefully-balanced decisions” and urged respecting the Secretariat’s interpretation. 

The PHILIPPINES asked whether anything precludes the SB Chairs from producing reports under their own authority. SBI Chair Gardiner noted the Secretariat’s advice that there is no mandate for an official report, but the SB Chairs may provide an informal record, should they so decide. Responding to a question about whether the Global Mutirão’s request for a report after the high-level event creates grounds for a new agenda item, she shared the Secretariat’s clarification that it does not, noting that Parties may, according to the draft rules of procedure, propose new agenda items. 

SBI Chair Gardiner said the SB Chairs will prepare an “informal note under their own authority and with no legal status” as a record for the incoming SB Chairs to take into account as they prepare for the next two Dialogues. 

Capacity-building: The SBI monitors implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries and countries with economies in transition (EITs). SBI 62 initiated the fifth review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework under the Convention. SBI 63 continued consideration of the fifth review and agreed to continue considering this matter at SBI 64 taking into account the draft text prepared at SBI 63 with a view to recommending a draft decision on the matter for consideration and adoption at COP 31. 

Regarding the capacity-building framework under the Kyoto Protocol, CMP 20 adopted the ToR for the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the framework and requested SBI 64 to initiate the review with a view for SBI 65 to conclude it and recommend a decision for adoption by CMP 21.

 For EITs, COP 26 requested SBI 64 to initiate a sixth review, with a view to it being concluded at COP 31, and CMP 16 requested SBI 64 to initiate a sixth review under the Kyoto Protocol, with a view to it also being concluded at COP 31.

At SBI 64, these matters were taken up in informal consultations co-facilitated by Abze Djigma (Burkina Faso) and Marie Vadronick (France) held on, among others, 11 June. 

Outcomes: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.3) on matters relating to capacity-building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, the SBI among others: notes that further efforts are needed to address current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs related to implementing the Paris Agreement in developing countries and that Parties frequently report gaps and needs in areas that are outside the current scope of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries as it pertains to the Convention; and emphasizes the importance of the Durban Forum on capacity-building as means of sharing information and lessons learned among a wide range of stakeholders under and outside the Convention and Kyoto Protocol. 

The SBI also recommended a draft COP 31 decision on the fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Convention (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.3/Add.1), which, among others: 

• recognizes that, while the objective and scope of capacity-building in developing countries as set out in decision 2/CP.7 are still relevant, current and emerging areas in the context of the Convention and Paris Agreement should also be taken into account in the further implementation of the capacity-building framework under the Convention;
• emphasizes the importance of building long-term capacity in developing countries, including by promoting strong domestic enabling environments;
• emphasizes the importance of enhanced support for improving the ability of developing country Parties to implement the capacity-building framework that promotes country ownership, making full use of existing mechanisms and avoiding duplication;
• invites Parties, as appropriate, and other stakeholders, to continue providing support to developing countries for capacity-building activities;
• requests the Secretariat to organize a one-day workshop at SBI 68 on the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of the capacity-building framework under the Convention; and
• requests the SBI to initiate the sixth comprehensive review at SBI 72 (June 2030).

The SBI also recommended a draft CMP 21 decision on the fifth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in developing countries under the Kyoto Protocol (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.3/Add.3) which, among others, decides that any future review under the Kyoto Protocol will be subject to a decision by the CMP as and when it deems necessary.

The SBI further recommended a draft COP decision (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.3/Add.2) and draft CMP decision (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.3/Add.4) on the sixth review of the implementation of the framework for capacity-building in EITs under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol, respectively. These, among others: invite Annex II Parties to the UNFCCC and other Parties, as appropriate, the GEF, and various other actors, to continue to support capacity-building in EITs; and decides that any future review for EITs shall be subject to a decision by the COP and CMP, as and when they deem necessary.  

Agriculture: During the past decade, agriculture and food security have been increasingly recognized within the UNFCCC process for their unique role and vulnerability in the context of climate change. In 2017, the COP established the “Koronivia joint work on agriculture” as an avenue for the SBs to jointly address issues related to agriculture, including through workshops and expert meetings. 

In 2022, Parties agreed to build on this by establishing the four-year “joint work on implementation of climate action on agriculture and food security.” It includes the preparation of an annual synthesis report on agriculture-relevant work undertaken by constituted bodies by the Secretariat, the organization of workshops, and the development of an online portal for Parties to share information on relevant projects and initiatives. 

 This matter was taken up in informal consultations co-facilitated by Claudia Heidecke (Germany) and UnaMay Gordon (Dominica). On 9 June, Co-Facilitator Heidecke highlighted the mandate to continue discussions based on the draft text from SB 63. She also pointed to: a workshop on systematic approaches to agriculture, food systems, and food security held at SB 62; the second annual synthesis report on work undertaken by constituted bodies, financial, and other entities under the Convention as well as relevant international organizations; and the online portal established under the joint work on agriculture and food security.

The ARAB GROUP proposed a range of additions to draft text on the workshop held at SB 62, including on: developed country subsidies, intellectual property restrictions, unilateral coercive measures, the need for grant-based finance, and mounting loss and damage. However, URUGUAY underscored the mandate is to consider the workshop report, and the EU, UK, NEW ZEALAND and other developed countries opposed taking up other issues.

After lengthy discussions, Parties found agreement on a relatively short text that does not feature key messages from the workshop. 

In the closing plenary on 18 June, the G-77/CHINA regretted a lack of substantive progress on agriculture. GRUPO SUR highlighted the importance of means of implementation. FARMERS said COP 31 should deliver clear next steps regarding the UNFCCC’s work on agriculture, and called for financial support for farmers.

Outcome: In their conclusions (SB/2026/L.1), the SBs take note of the workshop held at SB 62 and the second annual synthesis report and agree to continue consideration of the reports at SB 65. The SBs also:

• note with appreciation that Parties are increasingly including climate action on agriculture, food systems, and food security in their national plans, programmes, and policies;
• acknowledge the further development by the Secretariat of the online portal’s structure, functionalities, and accessibility; and
• invite the constituted bodies and the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism to take into account the joint work in implementing their actions and workplans.

Research and systematic observation (RSO): Article 5 of the UNFCCC calls on Parties to promote and cooperate in research, systematic observation, and the development of data archives, taking into account the needs and concerns of developing countries. 

At SBSTA 64, this matter was considered in informal consultations co-facilitated by Frank McGovern (Ireland) and Patricia Nying’uro (Kenya). On 10 June, consultations began with Parties sharing their views, and on 11 June the Co-Facilitators invited input on an “informal note,” with discussions continuing on 13 June and 16 June. 

Commenting on the informal note, developed countries and AOSIS supported text highlighting the risks raised by the latest climate science, such as in relation to the El Niño phenomenon and the dangers of overshoot past 1.5°C and passing tipping points. The ARAB GROUP and INDIA urged care and clarity in using terms like “tipping points,” which they said have definitional challenges. INDIA cautioned against miscommunicating or oversimplifying the science, while the EU expressed concern about “coordinated misinformation” and “obstruction.” CHILE and GUATEMALA called for welcoming research on “disinformation,” not just misinformation.

The EU, AOSIS, SOUTH AFRICA, and others expressed deep concern about the timelines for the preparation of the Seventh Assessment Report (AR7) by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). INDIA said the AR7 timeline is outside the SBSTA’s mandate and opposed encouraging regular updates by the IPCC.

The EU supported work on energy system transformation, particularly deep electrification, with CHILE and GUATEMALA noting gaps in knowledge on fostering resilient energy systems and supply chain management for critical minerals. SAUDI ARABIA opposed references to electrification and emphasized nationally-determined pathways. The EU suggested noting that there are more synergies than trade-offs between climate action and sustainable development, which INDIA opposed as a “blanket statement,” stating trade-offs may be distributed unevenly.

On 17 June, the Co-Facilitators introduced a new and shorter draft text. Many Parties expressed deep regret and frustration that so much time spent on the longer draft had been lost, but nevertheless engaged with the text. On Thursday, 18 June, at lunchtime the group reconvened for a final meeting. The UK proposed a “bridging proposal” to cut three paragraphs addressing the 18th meeting of the Research Dialogue, climate scenarios, and gaps and needs into one paragraph. However, a reference to “gaps” proved contentious, with INDIA, SAUDI ARABIA, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, and KENYA seeking a wider definition of “gaps” beyond just research or knowledge. These Parties also preferred to “note” rather than “welcome” the Research Dialogue. The EU, UK, AOSIS, EIG, and ICELAND opposed these proposals, with the EIG expressing regret at what they described as “an attempt to undermine the credibility of advancements in science,” while INDIA asserted that its caveats and amendments were based on “legitimate questions” and “facts.” 

In the closing plenary, the EU, JAPAN, UK, and AOSIS expressed deep disappointment at not having a more substantive outcome, with the EU criticizing efforts to create a “purposefully-misleading narrative.” INDIA challenged this “narrative,” arguing that asking questions and examining assumptions is fundamental to good science, which also needs to include equity considerations. AOSIS said “science is not negotiable” and disagreed with those wanting to “overemphasize” gaps in knowledge. P-SIDS said the science is “not contested” and “should not be redacted” in the “political space” of these negotiations.

Outcome: In its conclusions (SBSTA/2026/L.5), the SBSTA, among others:

• notes the importance of discussions under this agenda item and the role of robust Earth observations;
• notes with concern the emerging threats to the continuity of climate observations;
• notes with concern that the “natural phenomenon El Niño” is predicted against a backdrop of the observed warming trend worsens weather and climate extremes;
• notes the need to enhance efforts to promote and support the integrity of information on climate change;
• requests the SBSTA Chair to prepare an informal summary of the 18th meeting of the Research Dialogue before SBSTA 66 (June 2027);
• welcomes the information note on how research gaps identified by the SBSTA since SBSTA 22 are being addressed by the scientific community;
• welcomes the update on progress during the IPCC’s AR7 and looks forward to an agreement on the timeline for AR7;
• notes with appreciation discussion at the Research Dialogue on climate scenarios and modeling, pathways for sectoral transformation, and understanding climate risks, impacts, and tipping points; and
• notes scientific advancements, as well as knowledge and research gaps and research needs, presented at the Dialogue, and encourages the scientific community to continue advancing research to address these knowledge and research gaps and needs; and 
• invites submissions on possible themes for the next research dialogue, to be held at SBSTA 66.

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE): This workstream seeks to operationalize Convention Article 6 and Paris Agreement Article 12, on, inter alia, education, training, and public awareness. ACE focuses on six priority areas aimed at promoting sustainable, low-emissions lifestyles, attitudes, and behavior: climate change education, public awareness, training, public participation, public access to information, and international cooperation on these issues. In 2021, Parties adopted a ten-year ACE work programme, which was further refined in a four-year action plan endorsed in 2022. 

At SBI 64, Parties were mandated to initiate a midterm review of the ACE work programme to evaluate its effectiveness, identify emerging gaps and needs, and consider ways to improve it. A dialogue and technical workshop were held prior to informal consultations to discuss potential elements for a new action plan.

Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Carol Simon (Panama) and Arne Riedel Escobar (Germany), were held on, among others, 12, 15, and 17 June. Parties and observers highlighted inputs to inform the midterm review, as well as activities to be considered under the new action plan that could, among others: improve the accessibility and availability of financial and technical support for ACE implementation; support the attendance of national ACE Focal Points at relevant meetings; and provide training for teachers to provide education on sustainable development. 

Parties also discussed ways to strengthen the capacity and skills of national ACE Focal Points and ways the Secretariat can provide capacity-building opportunities, including a proposal by the G-77/CHINA for the Secretariat to organize a workshop in conjunction with Climate Week 4 in Azerbaijan.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.4), the SBI:

• welcomes the 2026 ACE Dialogue and technical workshop held to discuss potential elements for a new ACE action plan;
• agrees to continue consideration of the midterm review of the ACE work programme on the basis of the informal note prepared at SBI 64;
• invites submissions on the informal note, including proposals for strengthening existing activities and new elements by streamlining and merging current ideas in order to enhance the effectiveness of the new action;
• requests the Secretariat prepare a compilation of the submissions for consideration at SBI 65; and
• recalls activity C.1 of the current action plan on building and strengthening the capacity and skills of national ACE Focal Points, and invites the Secretariat to continue providing capacity-building opportunities for national ACE Focal Points.

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings: This item considers logistical elements and organization of the climate meetings. At SBI 63, Parties continued consideration of steps to increase the efficiency of the UNFCCC and agreed that the consideration will continue at SBI 64.

Discussions were undertaken in a contact group co-chaired by Kaveh Guilanpour (Georgia) and Felix Wertli (Switzerland). The contact group convened on, among others, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 17 June, and considered issues relating to planning for future sessions, increasing the efficiency of the UNFCCC process, and enhancing observer engagement.

On future sessions, the G-77/CHINA called for including the climate finance work programme on the CMA 8 agenda. The ARAB GROUP called for an agenda item on NAPs. NORWAY and SOUTH AFRICA urged a timely decision about the host of COP 33. The ASIA-PACIFIC STATES pointed to ongoing consultations on this, noting there currently is no expression of interest. The EU urged ensuring the host country agreement incorporates respect for human rights, and the EIG called for a cost control clause in the agreement. Parties and observers also called for, among others: timely publication of the COP 31 host country agreement; publication of the annexes to the COP 30 host country agreement; and conflict of interest procedures for Presidencies, especially with regard to commercial interests.

On enhancing the efficiency of the process, Parties considered a range of proposals, including clustering mandated events, more effective use of the Regional Climate Weeks, capping the number of participants at COPs, virtual consultations ahead of sessions, and agenda rationalization within existing mandates. AILAC, opposed by the ARAB GROUP, proposed an external expert review of the process. SOUTH AFRICA opposed arbitrary sunsetting or removal of agenda items. Several Parties highlighted the importance of publishing documents and concept notes in a timely manner.

Parties also debated the use of Party overflow badges and the registration of delegates. The ARAB GROUP, AFRICAN GROUP, and CHINA opposed encouraging Parties to limit the number of Party overflow delegates they register to no more than 500. The EIG, NORWAY, and NEW ZEALAND highlighted encouraging Parties to “exercise moderation” in the number of delegates. 

On observer engagement, delegates highlighted barriers including visa delays, accreditation procedures, financial constraints, accessibility challenges, and safety concerns. The DISABILITY CAUCUS, supported by the AFRICAN GROUP, COLOMBIA, and GUATEMALA, requested recognition as a full constituency and urged strengthening accessibility through measures such as sign language and accessibility information. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS and ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs called for a zero-tolerance approach to intimidation, harassment, reprisals, and violence against delegates, including after they return to their home countries. 

Parties also debated whether to continue consideration of this agenda item at SBI 65 or 66.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2026/L.6), the SBI, among others:

• requests the Secretariat to take note of Parties’ views regarding possible elements for the COP 31, CMP 21, and CMA 8 provisional agendas;
• highlights the importance of participants abiding by the Code of Conduct for UNFCCC events at all sessions and events and, without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, respecting the national laws and regulations in force in the host country;
• requests the Secretariat to publish, in consultation with the host governments of UN climate change conferences, the legal text of the host country agreement on the UNFCCC website as soon as possible after entry into force;
• urges Parties to respect and support the role of all presiding officers in guiding the UNFCCC process in an impartial, transparent, and efficient manner, and to engage constructively in proceedings to facilitate timely outcomes; 
• invites Parties and observer organizations to submit views on possible measures for improving the efficiency of the UNFCCC process and on ways to urgently address the challenges relating to the large number of applications for admission as observer organizations, and requests the Secretariat to prepare a paper on each of these issues, for consideration at SBI 66; and 
• agrees to continue consideration of increasing the efficiency of the UNFCCC process at SBI 66.

Cooperation with other international organizations: Usually, parties only take note of a Secretariat report on this matter. However, in response to Parties’ expressed interest at SBSTA 62, SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare conducted consultations on enhanced collaboration with the Rio Conventions and other international organizations. COP 30 subsequently invited Parties and observers to submit views on enhancing the inclusiveness of cooperation with other international organizations, as well as on cooperation with the other Rio Convention Secretariats, and agreed that SBSTA 64 will consider the matter further, taking into consideration those submissions.

SBSTA informal consultations on this item were co-facilitated by Sara Victoria González (Dominican Republic) and Heloïse van Houten (the Netherlands), and took place on, among others, 9, 11, 15, and 16 June. 

The EU, EIG, UK, AILAC, MONGOLIA, CANADA, and JAPAN underscored the need to enhance synergies among the Rio Conventions to, among others, increase coherence and support the effective use of limited resources. Acknowledging the challenge of synergizing separate processes and reporting systems, COLOMBIA said that enhancing synergies will assist in the implementation of all three Rio Conventions. 

The RUSSIAN FEDERATION highlighted risks such as mandate creep, duplication of work, weakened accountability, and competing priorities. CHINA cautioned against overstepping the jurisdiction of other treaties and noted the budget implications of expanding existing mandates. The ARAB GROUP underlined that cooperation among the Rio Conventions is already taking place through the Joint Liaison Group and that there is no need to expand this discussion beyond existing mandates. 

The EU suggested technical cooperation on issues relating to capacity-building, transparency, and Indigenous Peoples. The ARAB GROUP proposed cooperation on issues relating to finance and the impacts of unilateral trade measures on developing countries. 

Views diverged on the future of the agenda item. The AFRICAN GROUP and CHINA proposed continuing consideration of the matter at SBSTA 66 rather than SBSTA 65. COLOMBIA, supported by the EIG, UK, JAPAN, and NEW ZEALAND, favored continuing discussions at SBSTA 65. The ARAB GROUP, supported by the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, called for the agenda item to conclude at SBSTA 64, with the RUSSIAN FEDERATION expressing flexibility to postpone it to SBSTA 66. 

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBSTA Rapporteur Mishaan noted that Parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SBSTA 65 agenda.

Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters: The SBI took up this matter in a contact group, which developed a draft decision for COP 31 and a draft decision for CMP 21. 

Interested Parties and observers were also invited to an informational event on 12 June, where they were briefed on the financial impact of the US withdrawal from the UNFCCC. With the US currently the UNFCCC’s largest contributor, this will cut core contributions by 21%, or EUR 16.9 million, over the 2028–29 biennium.

During the closing plenary, the Secretariat also briefed Parties on the budget implications of decisions taken at SB 64, noting additional total costs of approximately EUR 90,000 in 2026 and a slightly lower amount in 2027, although these estimates are preliminary and subject to change.

Outcome: The SBI recommended draft decisions for COP 31 (SBI/2026/L.11) and CMP 21 (SBI/2026/L.12) which largely mirror each other and, inter alia:

• strongly urge Parties that have not made contributions in full to the core budget to do so without further delay;
• express concern at the high level of outstanding contributions to the core budget for the current and previous bienniums;
• express appreciation for the contributions to the trust fund for participation in the UNFCCC process and the trust fund for supplementary activities;
• urge Parties to further contribute to the trust fund for participation;
• express appreciation to Germany for its annual voluntary contribution and also its special contribution as Host Government of the Secretariat;
• invite Germany and the Secretariat to prepare a written report on Headquarters Agreement implementation for consideration at SBI 66 (June 2027);
• request the Executive Secretary to continue taking measures to recover Parties outstanding contributions to the core budget; and
• note with concern that some documents on this agenda item were not made available in a timely manner, and request them at least four weeks ahead of future sessions.

In its draft decision, the COP also requests the Secretariat to brief Parties on the budgetary implications of a budget scenario for 2028–29 that reflects a reduction in the core budget of EUR 16.9 million compared with the previous biennium, for consideration at SBI 66.

Closing Plenary

On Thursday afternoon, 18 June 2026, SBSTA Vice-Chair Franco invited closing statements from Parties and observers. At this point, the SBs had yet to adopt their conclusions, which took place later in the evening, after further informal consultations and a Head of Delegation were convened to try reaching agreement on outstanding matters relating to response measures, the MWP, and the GGA.

The G-77/CHINA expressed deep concern about progress with the GGA, urging further progress to address adaptation needs, including finance. Highlighting Paris Agreement 9.1 (financial resources from developed countries to assist developing nations with climate mitigation and adaptation) they said this must be on the agenda in Antalya. They regretted the lack of progress in the agriculture talks, but welcomed the selection of UNEP as CTC host, as well as progress on the review and implementation of the JTWP. 

The EU recognized some progress in Bonn, but said the pace is insufficient to meet the scale of the challenge. They urged a focus on keeping 1.5oC in reach and limiting overshoot, and said “we cannot allow science to be politicized or obstructed.” They highlighted the energy transition away from fossil fuels, noted trade’s role as a powerful “enabler of action,” and recognized the urgent need to scale up all sources of finance, especially for adaptation. They expressed extreme disappointment at the GGA negotiations, and also urged improvements in the negotiations process, which they said would benefit from high-level political engagement.

The EIG underscored science as both the foundation on which the UNFCCC process is built and the compass with which Parties must navigate it. They encouraged all Parties to have confidence in the IPCC process and allow scientists to carry out their work without undue interference, underscoring the IPCC as the source of the most inclusive, representative, and authoritative scientific assessments available. Stressing that science is not negotiable, the EIG urged Parties to support the timely production of the AR7 products, after which Parties can then consider the appropriate policy response.

The UMBRELLA GROUP stressed that climate action must be guided by the best available science and expressed disappointment at the lack of substantive conclusions on RSO. They also regretted that the dialogue series on how the GST informs NDCs has concluded and called for space to continue discussing NDC implementation. The UMBRELLA GROUP also reiterated their commitment to play their role in delivering on the NCQG and taking the lead in delivering on the USD 1.3 trillion in climate finance.

The MOUNTAIN GROUP said developing mountain nations and downstream communities are among the most vulnerable to the climate crisis. They highlighted that the Mountain Dialogue on Climate Change demonstrated the centrality of mountains to global climate issues and urged Parties to support the institutionalization of a mountain platform within the UNFCCC process to mainstream mountain issues.

The LMDCs stated that equity and common but differentiated responsibilities are guiding principles for implementation and that Parties should focus on overcoming challenges related to protectionism and unilateralism to address the poor ambition. They noted the implementation gap facing developing countries and stressed that adaptation is contingent on support from developed countries, but that this support is not forthcoming. They further reflected on the importance of ensuring climate science is inclusive and upholds integrity.

Noting “incremental progress” in Bonn, AOSIS expressed concern that this will not be enough for success in Antalya. They regretted that there had not been a more constructive discussion on finance and on keeping 1.5°C within reach. They also drew attention to inadequate progress on the MWP, with only a procedural outcome. They said climate action should be based on the latest and best science, and expressed disappointment at the “near-procedural conclusions” adopted on RSO. However, they welcomed the decision to name UNEP as CTC host.   

The AFRICAN GROUP said their hopes for a “shared sense of urgency and ambition” had not been met. They regretted Parties “stonewalling” on adaptation, noting “resistance” on the agreement to triple adaptation finance. Describing progress on just transition as “patchy,” they expressed concern at limited progress on the JTM. Reflecting on the Climate Change and Trade Dialogue, the AFRICAN GROUP said it was “inexplicable” that there was no agenda item to carry this issue forward to 2028, when a high-level event is scheduled. 

BASIC expressed concern about the declining financial support for developing countries and called for inclusion of the climate finance work programme in the CMA 8 agenda. They also encouraged Parties to conclude, at SB 65, the negotiations needed for the transition of the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. BASIC called for: ensuring the JTM enables access to opportunity and means of implementation; increased support to developing countries to implement mitigation action; delivery on commitments to at least triple adaptation finance; and provision of a dedicated space within the UNFCCC process to discuss trade and climate change. 

The LDCs stressed they are not looking to the UNFCCC process for promises but for action. They called for the highest climate ambition and implementation that can keep 1.5°C alive and for climate finance at the required scale. The LDCs lamented the “blatant undermining of science” at this session and condemned the lack of progress on the GGA and MWP, as well as the weak outcome on RSO. They called for COP 31 to unlock progress on issues relating to the Adaptation Fund, including its smooth transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement.

AILAC lamented negotiation tactics standing in the way of implementation and expressed regret at the reopening and dilution of previously agreed language. They argued that efforts to cast doubt on the best available science and to undermine the IPCC amounts to “obstruction.” They reiterated that science is the backbone of the climate process and that without adequate finance every pathway to address climate change “stays on paper.”

The Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs) recalled outcomes of the Third UN Conference on LLDCs and the 2024–2034 Programme of Action as a framework for addressing the unique vulnerabilities of LLDCs through climate finance, capacity-building, and technology transfer. They emphasized their regret that Parties could not reach consensus on the MWP and emphasized the need to reduce barriers to implementation.

GRUPO SUR observed a need for more flexibility and openness in negotiations, especially in meeting developing countries’ priorities. On agriculture, they highlighted means of implementation and pledged their readiness to work constructively in Antalya to achieve effective climate action.

The ARAB GROUP asserted that some developed countries have not honored their adaptation funding obligations and that some continue trying to reopen agreements, and expressed regret at inadequate progress on response measures. They stated their belief that multilateralism was “absent” in some discussions, and objected to what they described as “politicization” and “selectivity” on climate science.

P-SIDS expressed concern that this negotiating process is putting 1.5oC under threat, drawing attention in particular to negotiations on the MWP and RSO. Asserting that there have been “subversive efforts to undermine science,” they expressed a sincere hope that such efforts would not continue after this meeting. On finance, they said they have not been reassured in Bonn that the needed funding will flow, instead noting that Parties have “stumbled over discussions on process” and avoided substantive discussions. They also drew attention to the Pacific Pre-COP scheduled for early October 2026, and hoped for an ambitious outcome in Antalya. 

TÜRKIYE, incoming COP 31 Presidency, highlighted COP 31 as a COP of implementation, turning commitment into action, and action into results. They stated that the COP 31 Action Agenda goes beyond headlines and challenges all Parties to collectively commit to targets and practical steps to achieve those targets. Stressing that the delivery of ambitions will need a suitable stage, TÜRKIYE said COP 31 will include the provision of accessible transport and accommodation, and a sustainable, plastic-free venue. 

AUSTRALIA, incoming COP 31 Presidency of Negotiations, expressed their commitment to ensuring a transparent, inclusive, and predictable COP 31, and to working with all Parties to achieve an outcome that keeps science central and 1.5°C within reach. They urged Parties to continue to engage with one another ahead of COP 31.

BRAZIL, the COP 30 Presidency, stressed the importance of upholding the Belém Political Package and the Global Mutirão Decision. They further called for Parties to use negotiation spaces to address matters of substance and not the organization of work.

AZERBAIJAN, the COP 29 Presidency, lauded the spirit of compromise at SB 64 and progress made. They called for continued efforts to advance the Roadmap to Mission 1.5. They reflected on the NCQG and tripling of adaptation finance, expressing concern about attempts to misinterpret or dilute these previously-agreed decisions.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES welcomed the COP 31 Presidency’s resilient cities target of reducing energy consumption intensity in the building sector by at least 25% by 2035. They emphasized the value of local expertise and leadership to bridge implementation gaps.

 RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NGOs highlighted the many ways in which researchers can contribute to the process, including with regard to the GGA taskforce, the climate finance work programme, the MWP, and innovation systems that foster technological progress. 

TRADE UNION NGOs expressed concern at the lack of urgency and commitment that manifested in Bonn. They emphasized the need to respond to the needs of those on the ground, such as workers suffering from heatwaves, and denounced the dismantling of the MWP and lack of commitment to adaptation finance.

WOMEN AND GENDER lamented the “death by process, death by delay” and called on the SB Chairs and the Presidency to show political leadership. They emphasized the need for grant-based climate finance to support gender-responsive climate action.

YOUTH NGOs cautioned against jeopardizing the “legacy of the UN,” denouncing the fact that the Disability Caucus was not given speaking rights and expressing alarm at the lack of references to children across negotiation texts. They urged the COP 31 Presidency to facilitate discussions on observer participation.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs expressed concern at the lack of progress on the MWP, underscoring that it is critical to maintain a space to accelerate the implementation of the GST 1 outcome and that action from businesses depends on sustained signals in this regard. They called for the MWP to address the issue of difficult investment climates in emerging markets.

CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK lamented time lost talking about process and that progress across many rooms was blocked. They called on Parties to deliver what they have promised, not create another workshop or dialogue. GLOBAL CAMPAIGN TO DEMAND CLIMATE JUSTICE denounced that big polluters continue to write the rules of climate action and urged safeguarding civil society’s right to protest inside and outside climate conferences.

FARMERS underscored that the fuel and fertilizer crisis is putting farmers, agriculture, and food security under additional strain. They urged COP 31 to deliver progress in terms of next steps for work on agriculture within the climate process and called for financial support for farmers.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS underscored they will not accept their lands and waters becoming “sacrifice zones” for contamination associated with energy expansion and agri-business development. They called for the taskforce on adaptation indicators to engage with Indigenous Peoples.

Conclusion of the Session: After adopting their conclusions on various agenda items, the SBSTA and SBI adopted their respective draft meeting reports (FCCC/SBSTA/2026/L.2 and FCCC/SBI/2026/L.1) and the meeting was gaveled to a close at 11:37 pm on Thursday, 18 June 2026. 

A Brief Analysis of the 2026 Bonn Climate Conference

Although multilateralism has been going through a rough patch for the last few years, the geopolitical context in which the 2026 June Climate Meetings took place was arguably worse than ever. The blockade in the Strait of Hormuz has put a chokehold on global oil supply chains and led to inflationary pressures, from prices at the pump to spikes in the cost of fertilizer. Governments of different political leanings have put in place various quick fixes, but repercussions are already being felt by industries and households around the world.

At the same time, the World Meteorological Organization recently warned that the El Niño effect will be particularly strong this year, exacerbating drought and heavy rainfall and increasing the risk of heatwaves. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres said, this “will pour fuel on the fire of a warming world.”

Meanwhile, within the UN climate process, recent meetings have been beset by unprecedented levels of complexity, procedural disputes, and geopolitical divisions as countries seek to assert their interests more vigorously, while continuing to shape the future direction of the climate regime. 

This brief analysis reflects on how the June meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) fared in picking up discussions from where they left off at the Belém Climate Change Conference, while paving the way for the next meeting of the governing bodies of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement, which will be held in November 2026 in Antalya, Türkiye. 

When Trust Sinks to New Lows

There are no two ways about it: the Belém Conference ended on a sour note. Substantively, many were frustrated at the lack of reference to fossil fuel transition in the multilaterally-agreed decisions adopted at the November 2025 meeting. They see this as a step backwards compared to the outcome of the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, which calls on all Parties to contribute to global energy transition efforts. This, in combination with the half-hearted level of collective ambition manifesting in the latest round of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), raises serious doubts about the Paris Agreement’s effectiveness with regard to limiting global warming to 1.5°C. 

With regard to process, the decision on the indicators for measuring progress towards the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) left the most bitter aftertaste. This decision, which was adopted during the Belém closing plenary, gave rise to a flurry of points of order, with many Parties considering the final set of indicators unacceptable—although not for the same reasons. Developed and developing countries, for example, had different views regarding links to means of implementation. 

It was with these rather dismal memories that delegates arrived in Bonn, with trust at new lows—both with regard to the process’s effectiveness and its integrity. Debates over mandates and rules of procedure reached new heights, with the Secretariat’s legal officers in high demand in multiple contact groups and informal consultations.

“We’re suffering from mandate mania,” fretted one observer, noting that they had never seen so many arguments of this kind. For instance, India and Egypt argued against a continuation of the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP) on the grounds that its mandate was to enhance ambition and implementation “in this critical decade.” Chile pulled out a more than 20-year-old decision to remind Parties of the long-standing mandate for the SBSTA to consider research needs and communicate these to the scientific community, after this had sparked disagreements in the negotiations on research and systematic observation. 

There were heated debates not only about what various groups had been mandated to do, but also how the negotiations should proceed. The Philippines and other developing countries resorted to quoting the SBI Chair’s opening remarks to cement their point that there are “separate” mandates to consider in relation to the Adaptation Fund. Building on this, they urged moving forward with a decision on arrangements for the Fund’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement. Developed countries, on the contrary, consider that the Fund’s transition is inherently “linked” to the question of membership terminology for the Fund’s Board and that Parties therefore need to address these issues jointly.

While some of these debates were conducted in good faith and are grounded in genuinely different perspectives, some country coalitions were also seen “arguing both ways,” depending on whether the issue at hand was generally to their liking. For example, some countries were keen to see a report on the trade dialogue that took place in Bonn, even though there is no mandate for one to be produced until the end of the dialogue series in 2028. However, these same delegations were unwavering in their opposition to the preparation of a compilation of Parties’ views on the MWP, asserting that there is no mandate for such a compilation, despite this being common practice within the negotiations process.

Linked to this were repeated arguments over the rules of procedure, with multiple “points of order” raised in the group discussing the issue of response measures, to name just one. These debates became increasingly heated as the meeting advanced, prompting the Co-Facilitators to leave the session at one point in order to seek guidance from the Subsidiary Bodies’ Chairs. Meanwhile, discussions under the agenda item on research and systematic observation revealed sharp differences, with delegates clashing over who could claim to be the true custodians of scientific rigor, and who may be guilty of spreading “misinformation.”

By the meeting’s final day, Parties had repeatedly accused each other of “stonewalling” and “taking issues hostage.” In their closing statements, many lamented the tone of the discussions and how this will further damage the process down the line. Clearly, the Co-Facilitators who had to navigate the more contentious agenda items are not to be envied. “It is already impressive to see that some are still willing to take on these extremely difficult issues,” noted a delegate, pointing to the MWP, “but if Co-Facilitators are increasingly being asked to rule on points of order then who would want to do the job?” 

The situation was such that the SBI’s conclusions adopted under the agenda item on arrangements for intergovernmental meetings explicitly urge Parties to “respect and support” the role of all presiding officers in guiding the UNFCCC process. 

Searching for Solace: When Progress is Hard to Find

Possibly the biggest achievement of the meeting was that Parties agreed to select the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) as the host of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC). A failure to do so in Bonn would have jeopardized the provision of technical support to developing countries in 2027. “Considering that this effectively only extends a role that UNEP has held for several years, it is a bit of a stretch to depict this as a milestone moment, however,” noted a delegate.

Progress in other areas was even more incremental in nature. For instance, delegates agreed on the terms of reference for the review of the Just Transition Work Programme and future steps for considering linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism. They also concluded a number of review processes related to capacity-building and considered progress made under several constituted bodies and work programmes. On many issues, there were no concrete outcomes, save for agreement to continue discussions on the basis of work done in Bonn.

Despite multiple rounds of discussions in various formats over the course of the meeting, including at the level of Heads of Delegation late on the closing day, the continuation and possible future modalities of the MWP still hang in the balance, and no agreement was reached in terms of future work on the GGA. “The debate regarding the MWP remains unchanged, really,” summed up a long-time negotiator. 

With regard to the GGA, a key sticking point was Parties’ role in a yet-to-be established taskforce on metadata and methodologies for adaptation indicators. “It is not the first time we see an overengineering of GGA negotiations,” noted an observer. “And yet, the multiple rounds of feedback loops between Parties and experts were not enough to prevent the calamitous adoption of indicators in Belém.” 

Be that as it may, Parties were unable to agree on the taskforce’s composition. Progress on the GGA text was also stalled by debates around references to means of implementation. Along with urging progress on the new climate finance work programme, especially developed countries’ provision of finance, developing countries stood firm in their calls for tripling adaptation finance. Developed countries stood equally firm in rebutting such references in the GGA text. Parties could ultimately not agree on a way forward, thus delaying the launch of the taskforce until after the next session in Türkiye. 

When Parties cannot agree even to forward text from their negotiations, this means they will need to start “from scratch” the next time around. As delegates look towards Antalya, they will face this daunting prospect not just in the GGA and MWP discussions, but also in the talks on response measures, the greenhouse gas data interface, support for reporting under the Convention and Paris Agreement, and cooperation with other international organizations.

A Long and Potholed Road?

Only five months remain until delegates meet again on the Turkish Riviera, and even less before the preparatory meetings taking place in October in Fiji and Tuvalu. With so little progress achieved at the June meetings, many delegates left Bonn in poor spirits. 

Those seeking glimmers of hope, however, emphasized that the stakes are too high to lose hope just yet. Some observed that the cooperation between Türkiye and Australia appears to be working out better than what many feared upon hearing that the two countries would be sharing the Presidency. Others found comfort in the fact that, although Antalya will be an important event, it will not be as critical as meetings further down the road, when Parties are expected to review the modalities of the Paris Agreement’s Enhanced Transparency Framework or conclude the second Global Stocktake. 

“While they have had relatively little time to prepare, there is an obvious determination to succeed—if not through negotiation tracks, then at least by fostering progress through the Action Agenda,” observed one seasoned delegate. Those willing the process to bounce back from the disappointments in Bonn will also be willing the Co-Presidents to enjoy every possible success as they navigate the potholed path ahead.