Daily report for 10 June 2026

After a relatively quiet start, delegates at the 2026 June Climate Meetings are now in full negotiation mode. Discussions on mitigation, science, and just transition exposed the usual fault lines between Parties. Those on the organization of the governing bodies’ upcoming session in Türkiye turned into an agenda fight.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), delegates expressed views on the effectiveness of, and possible improvements to, the MWP. The ARAB GROUP urged a focus on not just mitigation opportunities, but also structural barriers and solutions. They suggested the Secretariat can support developing countries in preparing investment-ready concept notes that meet the access requirements of global funds.

The EU identified the MWP as the only space to discuss mitigation efforts, especially how to strengthen Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), their alignment with 1.5°C, and implementation. They stressed it should complement the Global Stocktake (GST), incorporate the GST 1 outcomes, and inform GST 2. NEW ZEALAND said the MWP must facilitate action and enable Parties to go further and faster.

SWITZERLAND proposed introducing multi-year thematic tracks and dedicated coverage of key sectors. They called for strengthening peer exchange and developing a community of practice between experts and practitioners, not just negotiators. The LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) supported continuation of the MWP. They proposed retaining it as a permanent agenda item and establishing an appropriate technical mechanism or committee to facilitate translation of discussion into concrete action.

Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya) and Peer Stiansen (Norway), delegates continued reflecting on the Secretariat’s technical paper which sets out four funding options: core funding in future biennium programme budgets; supplementary funding; usage-based fees; and user fees levied on participating Parties.

The LDCs, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LLDCs), and ARAB GROUP stressed that funding arrangements should not constitute an additional burden on countries, with the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) cautioning that arrangements should not unduly prejudice the participation of small island developing states (SIDS). AOSIS highlighted that finance for capacity-building and technology would be expected to flow to, not from, developing countries. The PHILIPPINES suggested exploring the creation of a trust fund or a dedicated window for Article 6.2 within existing UNFCCC trust funds.

The COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS (CfRN) supported a combination of supplementary funding through voluntary contributions and usage-based fees. The AFRICAN GROUP said no fees should be levied on Parties that use the international registry, but can potentially be levied on private actors. The ARAB GROUP supported voluntary contributions and stressed that investments in Article 6.2 should not be at the expense of capacity-building for developing countries.

The Secretariat responded to Parties’ questions, reporting that approved expenditures for Article 6.2-related activities amount to about USD 10.7 million and that USD 2.1 million is currently available, leaving a shortfall of USD 8–9 million within the biennium 2026-2027. On projected usage and expected level of demand, they noted that 48 cooperative approaches have been submitted to the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform and 67 Parties have expressed interest in engaging with the international registry.

The Co-Facilitators will prepare an informal note that reflects Parties’ views.

Adaptation

Guidance relating to Adaptation Communications: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Marie Wien Fjell (Norway) and Thomas Lelekoitien (Kenya) recalled the mandate for SBI 64 to continue discussing the timeline of the process for taking stock of, and if necessary, revising the guidance on adaptation communications.

GRUPO SUR, supported by the LDCs and AOSIS, proposed: to issue a call for submission by Parties on their experience applying the guidance in time to consider the synthesis report thereon at SB 66 (June 2027); and for SB 68 (June 2028) to prepare draft conclusions for consideration by CMA 10 (November 2028). INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) expressed openness towards completing this review process in 2028, noting that it would: allow for responding to experiences in using the new adaptation indicators; and coincide with the update of the modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs) of the Enhanced Transparency Framework and GST 2. The EU and UK supported completing the review of the guidance after the review of the MPGs.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ephraim Mwepya Shitima (Zambia) reminded delegates of the mandate for SB 64 to initiate the stocktake of the work of the LDC Expert Group (LEG) and its terms of reference, and recommend draft decisions on this.

The LDCs, UK, EU, CANADA, and JAPAN welcomed the LEG’s work programme for 2026-2027. The ARAB GROUP and LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) preferred to “take note” of it. 

Recognizing the constraints LDCs continue to face in implementing national adaptation plans (NAPs), the LDCs called for the urgent establishment and operationalization of a “NAP implementation alliance” that would, among others: facilitate the development of adaptation investment pipelines; provide readiness support for project implementation; and enhance access to existing financing mechanisms. The UK expressed its willingness to engage on this proposal.

The EU welcomed efforts by the LEG to integrate a gender-responsive approach into their work programme and recommended the LEG continue this work by advancing the five priority areas identified under the new Gender Action Plan. The ARAB GROUP, supported by the LMDCs, said the LEG should continue to operate strictly within the agreed mandate of the Convention and relevant decisions.

The LDCs, NORWAY, and JAPAN welcomed the updated NAP technical guidelines developed by the LEG in 2025. The ARAB GROUP opposed referencing the updated guidelines, stating the LEG did not take into consideration all inputs provided by Parties.

Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation (NWP): In SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Lina Yassin (Sudan) and Luke Millar (Australia), Parties shared their views on draft text.

The AFRICAN GROUP, GRUPO SUR, AILAC, AOSIS, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION expressed their preference for welcoming the work of the NWP and taking note of the report on NWP’s progress, while CANADA, the EU, JAPAN, and UK preferred to welcome both.

On a paragraph welcoming the engagement of the NWP with various types of actors, including private sector actors, the LMDCs, supported by the LDCs, AILAC, and ARAB GROUP, called for referring to engagement with “relevant” or “other” actors more generally. CANADA, JAPAN, and the UK emphasized retaining agreed language, noting the extent to which the private sector has been engaged in the NWP.

On expanding and strengthening engagement with universities under the UN Climate Change Universities Partnership Programme, the EU called for clarifying the cost implications of enhancing these partnerships. JAPAN stressed that any further expansion should be undertaken with due consideration of budgetary implications.

Technology 

Host of the Climate Technology Centre: SBI informal consultations were co-facilitated by Stig Svenningsen (Norway). On the choice of host, CANADA and JAPAN supported selecting the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), with JAPAN saying this would ensure continuity and institutional expertise. 

On the memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the host, the EU said details may differ depending on which host is selected, but that common elements include: purpose, roles, responsibilities, financial arrangements, dispute settlement, interpretation, and amendments. The AFRICAN GROUP said any MoU should support quantifiable action, support for developing countries, and enhanced matchmaking. 

The Co-Facilitators will prepare draft SBI conclusions, draft COP and CMA decision texts, and draft elements of a possible MoU.

Second periodic assessment of the effectiveness and adequacy of the support provided to the Technology Mechanism in supporting the implementation of the Paris Agreement: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Pemy Gasela (South Africa) and Stephen Minas (Cyprus) reminded delegates of the mandate for SBI 64 to initiate the second assessment of support to the Technology Mechanism, and invited views.

On next steps, the ARAB GROUP said SBI 64 should agree on an outcome that sets out a timeline of work. The G-77/CHINA, EU, and CANADA proposed requesting the Secretariat to prepare an interim report for Parties’ consideration at SBI 66 (June 2027), noting that the review is to be completed at CMA 9 in November 2027.

The G-77/CHINA said the assessment should take into account the revised functions of the Climate Technology Centre and national needs and inputs. The AFRICAN GROUP and CANADA said the assessment should serve as an input for GST 2.

Other Issues 

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): In the SB contact group, Co-Chair Federica Fricano (Italy) invited views on how to operationalize the just transition mechanism.

The G-77/CHINA said the mechanism should enhance international cooperation and non-debt financing, technology transfer, and capacity-building, and drew attention to the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested three stages: design (2026), institutional establishment (2027), and scaling up and reporting (2028). The LMDCs said the mechanism should not introduce obligations or reporting requirements for developing countries.

Noting funding constraints, NORWAY supported flexibility in using existing bodies. Suggesting that the new mechanism “cannot fix or solve anything that is wrong with the existing system,” they urged Parties to be “very precise about what they want the mechanism to do.” AOSIS said the mechanism could “work with” relevant bodies and COLOMBIA said it could “build on” existing bodies. SOUTH AFRICA said the mechanism must be a constituted body that drives real change. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION said the mechanism could be a “demand-driven expert network.”

TRADE UNION NGOS (TUNGOs) said workers, social protection, and labor rights need to be at the heart of just transition work, and urged rapid operationalization. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS said the process should be responsive to inputs from those most affected by just transition activities.

Responding to a question about the “initial interim output” document that maps relevant initiatives and processes across the UN system, the Secretariat said it was designed to assist Parties in their discussions. NORWAY and JAPAN welcomed the mapping exercise.

Technical event on case studies on just transition, economic diversification, and impact assessment: During this mandated event co-chaired by Peter Govindasamy (Singapore) and Veronika Skolasztika Bagi (Hungary), delegates heard presentations on the case studies contained in the 2025 report of the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures.

The G-77/CHINA noted that the case studies highlighted the need to recognize trade dynamics, limited fiscal space, and importance of sound economic policies. They called for future case studies to include key economic metrics such as inflation, household impacts, trade flows, fiscal space, currency risk, and loan rates. The ARAB GROUP called for analyzing the impact of climate-related trade measures on developing countries. JAPAN cautioned against duplicating work being undertaken in other spaces. CHINA stressed assessing not just impacts of response measures but also identifying how to address such impacts.

The UK suggested future studies should include a holistic cost-benefit analysis that considers the co-benefits and opportunities of climate action. NEW ZEALAND identified integration of best-case policy scenarios and modeling across different time frames as useful future elements.

Delegates also asked specific clarifying questions about the data and assumptions used in the case studies.

Greenhouse gas data interface: In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Fredrick Ouma (Kenya) invited views on draft text, which: welcomes the Secretariat’s progress in further developing the interface, as presented to SBSTA 64; requests the Secretariat to report on further progress at SBSTA 65 (November 2026); and agrees to consider additional modules at SBSTA 66 (June 2027).

The ARAB GROUP and LMDCs expressed concern regarding the update by the Secretariat, specifically with the fact that the flexible queries module would allow users to compare multiple Parties. The ARAB GROUP proposed adding a new paragraph to the effect that more than one value may not be selected within any individual parameter. The EU, NORWAY, UK, NEW ZEALAND, and JAPAN stated that the Secretariat’s presentation is an accurate reflection of what was agreed upon at SB 62 and opposed the proposed addition. The ARAB GROUP stressed that they cannot accept an outcome that allows for comparisons among Parties. 

The Co-Facilitators encouraged Parties to engage with each other informally.

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes: Dialogue Co-Facilitators Rita Mishaan (Guatemala) and Johanna Lissinger Peitz (Sweden) opened the first day of this mandated event, explaining the Dialogue provides a platform to foster shared understanding of the opportunities and challenges in implementing the outcomes of GST 1. The Secretariat highlighted that 90% of the new NDCs submitted between June 2024 and June 2026 indicated their preparation was informed by the GST 1 outcome, with 83% providing information on how this was the case.

Delegates then engaged in thematic discussions. On mitigation and response measures, they highlighted challenges including: poor understanding of, and limited attention to, non-carbon dioxide emissions; structural barriers, including high cost of capital, limited access to concessional finance, and insufficient capacity-building; unilaterally imposed measures; lack of clarity about how the UNFCCC process will track progress; and licensing delays and poor public acceptance of transition efforts.

On opportunities, delegates identified: ensuring global carbon markets align with the Paris Agreement goals; promoting both forest emission reductions and removals; ensuring climate action is clearly tied to sustainable jobs and affordability; and undertaking a just energy transition that aligns with 1.5°C.

Research and systematic observation: In SBSTA informal consultations co-facilitated by Frank McGovern (Ireland) and Patricia Nying’uro (Kenya), AOSIS highlighted the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the “home of the best available science” and noted risks and tipping points as the world goes beyond 1.5°C. The ARAB GROUP and INDIA urged care and clarity in using terms like “tipping points,” which they said have definitional challenges. INDIA cautioned against miscommunicating or oversimplifying the science, while the EU expressed concern about “coordinated misinformation” and “obstruction.”

The EU, AOSIS, SOUTH AFRICA, and others expressed deep concern about the timelines of the IPCC’s Seventh Assessment Report (AR7). INDIA said the AR7 timeline is outside the SBSTA’s mandate.

The EU and ICELAND highlighted the critical importance of early warning systems. The UK noted work integrating justice and equity in scenarios. INDIA urged strengthening developing country capacity for modeling and scenario work.

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings: In the SBI contact group, Co-Facilitators Felix Wertli (Switzerland) and Kaveh Guilanpour (Georgia) invited views on the organization of future sessions. 

 AILAC called for adding a request in the SBI 64 conclusions for the Secretariat and Presidency to include the climate finance work programme (CFWP) on the provisional agenda for CMA 8. The ARAB GROUP called for an agenda item on NAPs and, noting inconsistencies in the titles of agenda items, said the item on matters relating to the implementation of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement and its complementarity with Article 9 should include a reference to decision 11/CMA.7.

The EU called for space to discuss mitigation ambition and transparency. They also invited early reflection on which items could be addressed after the next governing body sessions and, with NORWAY, said there is no need to add an agenda item on the CFWP at this stage. NORWAY noted that work on NAPs and the CFWP is ongoing, stating that their absence from the agenda does not mean they are not important, but rather that there is no concrete negotiation mandate. The ARAB GROUP denounced the objection to considering the CFWP as a sign of bad faith. 

Parties and observers also called for, among others: timely publication of the COP 31 host country agreement; publication of the annexes to the COP 30 host country agreement; and conflict of interest procedures for Presidencies, especially with regard to commercial interests. The ASIA-PACIFIC STATES pointed to ongoing consultations about a potential host for COP 33, noting there currently is no expression of interest.

Dialogue on finance flow alignment: On the second day of this mandated event, delegates continued sharing insights on national-level implementation. Discussions related to, among others: tagging climate-relevant government expenditures; sustainable public procurement; lack of accounting of physical climate risks by credit rating agencies; accounting for climate risk in investor dispute settlements; and fostering technology transfer for adaptation. SWITZERLAND delineated how it developed a “climate alignment test” for the financial sector, which not only fostered awareness but also nudged progress among participating finance actors and informed evidence-based policy making. COLOMBIA noted it conducted an inventory of subsidies and credit incentives that may drive unsustainable agricultural production, which is detrimental to both climate and biodiversity goals.

In the afternoon, discussions touched upon the international dimension of finance flow alignment. Speakers discussed, among others: the concentration of capital in the hands of a small group of very wealthy individuals, a phenomenon that exists in both developed and developing countries; preferential borrowing conditions for “green-tagged” investments; the impact of natural disasters on country risk analyses and credit rating agencies’ failure to account for global public goods; and the distribution of welfare gains and losses associated with carbon border adjustments.

Expert dialogue on gender data: This mandated event followed up on the adoption of the new Gender Action Plan at COP 30. Experts met to map available gender- and age-disaggregated data as well as good practices and gaps in this regard, with the objective being to inform targeted interventions that enhance the effectiveness of climate action. Participants shared insights on, among others: how climate change affects care burdens; how health data can be incorporated into climate reporting, including with regard to disease burden and maternal mortality; links between extreme weather events, displacement, food insecurity, and increased rates of violence against women and girls; and gender-disaggregated insights on emissions-intensive practices.

In the Corridors

“I guess the honeymoon phase is over,” said one delegate, leaving the venue at the end of the third day of the 2026 June Climate Meetings. After two quiet days, fault lines emerged across a range of negotiation rooms.

Discussions on the organization of future sessions turned into “an early agenda fight,” with Parties disagreeing about what should be addressed at the governing bodies’ upcoming session in Türkiye. “Not much of a surprise there,” noted an observer, pointing to the disagreement over whether the climate finance work programme should make the cut. The informal consultations on the mitigation work programme and on research were no less divisive.

At the same time, the day once again underscored the convening power of the climate process. A dialogue on gender data brought together experts from a range of organizations contributing their expertise from sectors such as health and humanitarian aid. “If only we could harness that enthusiasm in other rooms,” mused a long-time negotiator.