Daily report for 15 June 2026

While several groups appear to have hit an impasse or become bogged down in procedural difficulties, delegates seem to have reached convergence on the new host for the Climate Technology Centre. An informal meeting by the Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) highlighted different expectations as to the conduct of the second Global Stocktake (GST) under the Paris Agreement.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), delegates continued discussing the future of the MWP and suggesting possible refinements.

Parties reiterated divergent views on the MWP’s timeline. KUWAIT opposed extending the programme indefinitely beyond 2030, with EGYPT emphasizing that reference in the MWP’s mandate to “this critical decade” relates to 2021–2030. The INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) argued that reference to “this critical decade” relates to the urgency of mitigation action rather than a fixed end date, and urged Parties not to use this as an excuse to not extend the mandate beyond 2030. NEW ZEALAND stressed that the MWP should continue for as long as mitigation remains a global priority.

On the MWP’s linkages with other processes, SAMOA, BANGLADESH, and NEW ZEALAND supported grounding MWP activities in GST outcomes and findings from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). BANGLADESH said the GST outcomes should shape the MWP’s thematic priorities and that lessons learned from the MWP should inform future Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). EGYPT argued that MWP topics should not be driven by GST outcomes and opposed discussions on elements Parties could include in their NDCs.

Parties also discussed future topics and modalities of the global dialogues and investment-focused events. Many Parties highlighted the need to strengthen the implementation dimension of the MWP through, for instance, engagement with financiers, investors, implementing agencies, and project developers during the investment-focused events.

Following the Co-Facilitators’ announcement that the next step would be preparation of an informal facilitative paper, Parties debated what should be included in the paper. The LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP stressed that, given the ongoing divergence of views, the paper should only include broad headings with no substantive viewpoints. Many Parties, including AILAC, the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), EU, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, SWITZERLAND, CANADA, and others, supported preparation of a paper reflecting the full range of views expressed. The Co-Facilitators will prepare an informal facilitative paper with no formal status.

Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya) and Peer Stiansen (Norway), Parties continued consideration of the draft SBI conclusions.

On a paragraph inviting voluntary contributions to the trust fund for supplementary activities, Parties debated whether this encroaches on budgetary discussions that belong under the agenda item on administrative, financial, and institutional matters. After consultations, Parties agreed to recall paragraph 30 of Decision 19/CMA.7, in which the CMA urged Parties to provide voluntary contributions to the supplementary trust fund to support the Article 6.2 infrastructure, expert review process, and capacity-building activities.

Parties also discussed a paragraph relating to the Secretariat’s fundraising efforts for voluntary contributions, which some preferred to delete. SWITZERLAND opposed deleting the paragraph, describing it as central to the purpose of the discussions, and proposed requesting the Secretariat to “strengthen and enhance” instead of “continue” its fundraising efforts.

On a paragraph requesting the Secretariat to prepare an information note containing detailed information on the assumptions underlying the approved supplementary budget, Parties debated where the Secretariat should get the information from. The LMDCs proposed requesting the Secretariat, within its annual Article 6.2 report to the CMA, to reference relevant budgetary information already available in existing reports. They argued that a broader framing of the request could encroach on discussions taking place under the agenda item on administrative, financial, and institutional matters. The EU highlighted that the purpose of the request is to facilitate better understanding of the assumptions and that limiting the note to information already available in existing reports would not achieve this purpose.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Peter Gerard Wittoeck (Belgium) invited views on revised draft text.

The AFRICAN GROUP expressed concern at the lack of reference to tripling adaptation finance, and emphasized they cannot engage with the text on this basis. GRUPO SUR, the LMDCs, LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs), AOSIS, and AILAC also emphasized their support for its inclusion.

Parties continued to express diverging views on the composition of the technical taskforce on indicator metadata and methodologies. BRAZIL and the EU reiterated their preference for the taskforce to be expert-driven, while GRUPO SUR, the LMDCs, and ARAB GROUP restated their support for a Party-driven taskforce. AOSIS suggested establishing a policy alignment committee inside the taskforce. They noted it would not direct technical work, but rather provide policy recommendations, and suggested that this kind of composition would address concerns about Party participation. The LDCs noted their willingness to support Party engagement in the taskforce if roles are clearly defined.

Many Parties agreed that developing modalities of work without settling on the composition of the taskforce would be premature and requested the Co-Facilitators add a placeholder in the text until the composition is agreed upon.

GRUPO SUR, the LMDCs, and AILAC expressed their support for paragraphs welcoming the initiation of the first phase of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) and outlining the BAR’s scope. BRAZIL and the EU preferred the no text option. The ARAB GROUP underscored that it could not accept text that does not include substantive elements on the BAR.

Guidance relating to Adaptation Communications: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Thomas Lelekoitien (Kenya) invited views on revised draft text.

GRUPO SUR supported: inviting the Adaptation Committee (AC), in collaboration with the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) and LDCs Expert Group (LEG), to hold an informal discussion in November 2026 to identify opportunities for leveraging the intersections between adaptation communications and other adaptation-related reporting when integrating consideration of the GGA Framework therein; and to consider expanding the ongoing work of the AC, in collaboration with the CGE and the LEG, on developing recommendations on how to improve adaptation reporting to prepare recommendations on adaptation communications ahead of SBI 66 (June 2027). The ARAB GROUP, LDCs, LMDCs, and JAPAN preferred not to outline additional activities.

Parties continued to diverge on the timing of activities aimed at informing the stocktaking, and if necessary revision, of the guidance. They requested the Co-Facilitators to prepare an informal note to serve as the basis for continued deliberations at SB 65.

Least Developed Countries (LDCs): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Rik den Hoedt (the Netherlands) invited further views on draft COP and CMA decision texts and draft SBI conclusions.

The Secretariat noted that the COP had invited the CMA to review the LEG’s progress as it relates to implementation of the Paris Agreement and, as such, that the SBI has a clear mandate to develop a draft CMA decision. 

In a paragraph of the draft COP decision requesting the LEG to provide technical guidance and support for navigating evolving climate finance arrangements, the LDCs called for deleting the reference to the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). The ARAB GROUP preferred to delete the paragraph altogether, but supported the LDCs’ proposal. CANADA, the UK, EU, and JAPAN highlighted the relevance of the reference to the NCQG.

The UK reiterated its call to delete a paragraph in the draft conclusions that notes with concern that some proposals and projects under the LDC Fund will not be funded in the eighth replenishment cycle of the Global Environment Facility (GEF-8) due to lack of funds. Upon a request for clarification, the GEF confirmed that proposals submitted to the LDC Fund have not been cleared due to funding shortages.

Technology 

Joint annual report of the Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN): During SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ashabrick Nantege (Uganda) invited Parties to consider draft COP and CMA decisions, paragraph-by-paragraph.

The EU and UKRAINE wanted to “welcome” the TEC/CTCN’s joint annual report and their implementation efforts and progress. The LDCs preferred to “note” the report and “welcome” progress.

The ARAB GROUP and LMDCs sought to delete text calling on Parties “in a position to do so” to provide financial support to the TEC and CTCN, preferring that “developed countries” be invited to provide finance. Noting that this has been a source of disagreement for several years, the G-77/CHINA suggested to “highlight the importance of” financial support more broadly.

The G-77/CHINA supported noting the relevance of the TEC’s recommendations and emphasizing the importance of “addressing broader developments in the climate and technology landscape taking into account national circumstances and priorities.” Urging a “stronger” outcome, the EU and UKRAINE preferred inviting Parties and other stakeholders to implement the TEC recommendations, as appropriate. 

Discussions will continue in informal-informals.

Host of the Climate Technology Centre: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Stig Svenningsen (Norway) invited Parties’ views regarding which shortlisted host to select. 

The G-77/CHINA supported selecting the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), but suggested specifying that the host should seek a partnership with the consortium between the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as the other shortlisted candidate, as well as possibly other candidates.

UNEP highlighted its commitment to partnerships and said such an agreement could be arranged after finalization of the hosting memorandum of understanding (MoU), based on the added value of such partnerships. UNIDO and UNOPS highlighted their willingness to cooperate and their preference for a relevant reference to be included in the hosting MoU. 

Delegates debated options for how to invite such partnership while guaranteeing legal clarity and clear accountability. They suggested, among others: adding it to the list of elements to be addressed in the MoU; a placeholder in the draft COP decision on the host; and an invitation, in the SBI conclusions, to explore areas of collaboration, consistent with the CTCN’s resource mobilization and partnership strategy.

The Co-Facilitators encouraged informal discussions among Parties, noting they will consult the SBI Chair on potentially bringing this question to the attention of Heads of Delegation. 

Other Issues 

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): SB Contact Group Co-Chair Federica Fricano (Italy) invited delegates to report back on informal-informals on the terms of reference (ToR) for the 2026 review of the JTWP. The EU reported progress on several paragraphs, including agreement to delete text stipulating that submissions for the review be “forward looking,” while noting persistent disagreement on two paragraphs relating to the review’s scope. 

The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and RUSSIAN FEDERATION reiterated their call to delete the references for the review to consider: the JTWP’s relationship with relevant processes under the UNFCCC, Paris Agreement, and relevant UN entities; and how the JTWP and the process for the operationalization of the just transition mechanism (JTM) could inform one another. The AFRICAN GROUP supported retaining text that ensures coherence between work on the JTM and JTWP.

Discussions on the ToR continued in informal-informals. The Co-Chairs will prepare an informal note on JTWP implementation and the operationalization of the JTM.

Response measures: In the SB Contact group, Co-Chair Peter Govindasamy (Singapore) invited views on a Co-Chairs’ draft text, which contains: draft SB 64 conclusions; and an informal note capturing discussions at SB 64 to serve as a basis for future work.

The G-77/CHINA expressed disappointment at the lack of detail in the informal note and said they will provide written inputs to inform a revision. The EU felt a short, procedural text is sufficient.

On the draft SB 64 conclusions, delegates discussed two options regarding inputs to the technical assessment component of GST 2. HONDURAS favored the more detailed version, which foresees the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) preparing an outline of the information to be provided to GST 2 for consideration at SB 65 (November 2026). CANADA, the UK, SWITZERLAND, and NEW ZEALAND preferred the shorter option that follows the process already agreed under Decisions 23/CMA.3 and 19/CMA.1.

Agriculture: In SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator UnaMay Gordon (Dominica) invited views on draft text on the workshop on “systemic and holistic approaches to implementation of climate action on agriculture, food systems, and food security, understanding, cooperation, and integration into plans” held at SB 62.

The ARAB GROUP proposed a range of additions, including referencing: developed country subsidies; intellectual property restrictions; unilateral coercive measures; the need for grant-based finance; and mounting loss and damage. They urged the Co-Facilitators to revise the draft text, including topics beyond those addressed in the workshop. URUGUAY underscored the mandate is to consider the workshop report. The EU and NEW ZEALAND opposed taking up other issues and, with the UK, SWITZERLAND, JAPAN, and CANADA, supported proceeding with the current text.

With Parties unable to agree on a way forward, the Co-Facilitators will consult the SB Chairs.

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Arne Riedel Escobar (Germany) invited views on an informal note outlining possible activities for the new ACE action plan. Among others, SOUTH AFRICA proposed additional activities aimed at: improving the accessibility and availability of financial and technical support for ACE implementation; and supporting the attendance of national ACE focal points at relevant meetings. The EU suggested training for teachers to provide education for sustainable development and the development of age-appropriate teaching materials. 

The Co-Facilitators will revise their informal note. 

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings: In the SBI contact group, Co-Chairs Felix Wertli (Switzerland) and Kaveh Guilanpour (Georgia) invited views on draft text, which Parties welcomed as a basis for discussions.

The ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), AILAC, NEW ZEALAND, the UK, and COLOMBIA supported continued consideration of how to enhance the efficiency of the process at SB 65 (November 2026), with AILAC suggesting the incoming Presidency conduct consultations on the matter. The AFRICAN GROUP and CHINA preferred to continue discussions at SBI 66.

The ARAB GROUP opposed outlining a list of measures aimed at enhancing: the efficiency, transparency, and inclusiveness of the UNFCCC process; and the scheduling, coordination, organization, and efficiency of mandated events. The EU, AILAC, JAPAN, NORWAY, NEW ZEALAND, the UK, and JAPAN emphasized the importance of reaching a concrete outcome on these matters at SBI 64.

NORWAY, supported by the UK and COLOMBIA, suggested calling on Parties to respect and support the role of presiding officers. The ARAB GROUP opposed an external review of the UNFCCC process. The EU and UK requested information on budgetary implications. CANADA said a call for submissions could serve to gather relevant inputs. The UK, MONACO, and CANADA supported reviewing the outcomes of mandated events, which the UAE opposed. 

The ARAB GROUP, AFRICAN GROUP, and CHINA opposed encouraging Parties to limit the number of Party overflow delegates they register to no more than 500. The EIG, NORWAY, and NEW ZEALAND highlighted encouraging Parties to “exercise moderation” in the number of delegates. CHINA suggested the SBI calls on all Parties and the Secretariat to “screen and scrutinize” the registration of Parties and Party overflows, in accordance with UNGA Resolution 2758, as well as relevant rules and requirements of United Nations meetings, to prevent “irrelevant and illegitimate personnel from sneaking into delegations and conference venues and disrupting the integrity and order of the sessions and the process of negotiation.”

Other comments related to, among others: enhancing the visibility of the procedures to report harassment and training relevant staff on how to engage safely and respectfully with youth and marginalized groups; and ensuring the availability of menstrual products, including for volunteers. The AFRICAN GROUP, COLOMBIA, and GUATEMALA supported recognizing the group for persons with disabilities as a formal UNFCCC constituency.

The Co-Chairs will prepare a new iteration of the text.

Cooperation with other international organizations: In SBSTA informal consultations co-facilitated by Sara Victoria González (Dominican Republic) and Heloïse van Houten (the Netherlands), delegates considered draft SBSTA conclusions.

Views diverged on the future of the agenda item. The AFRICAN GROUP and CHINA proposed continuing consideration of the matter at SBSTA 66 (June 2027) rather than SBSTA 65 (November 2026). COLOMBIA, supported by the EIG, UK, JAPAN, and NEW ZEALAND, favored continuing discussions at SBSTA 65. The ARAB GROUP, supported by the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, called for the agenda item to conclude at SBSTA 64, with the RUSSIAN FEDERATION expressing flexibility to postpone it to SBSTA 66.

On a paragraph outlining the focus of future consideration under this agenda item, the ARAB GROUP and RUSSIAN FEDERATION questioned the need for the proposed arrangements to facilitate information sharing on cooperating with other international organizations. They argued that Parties already have multiple opportunities to exchange views and that the proposed activities risk expanding the SBSTA’s technical mandate. CHINA sought clarification on the modalities for the outlined experience-sharing activities.

SB Chairs’ informal meeting on preparations for GST 2: SBSTA Vice-Chair Carol Franco and SBI Chair Julia Gardiner recalled that the information collection phase of GST 2 will start in November 2026, the technical assessment will start in June 2027, and the political consideration of outputs will conclude in November 2028. They indicated that they will issue guiding questions and a call for submissions in due course, and invited comments. 

In terms of guiding questions, the AFRICAN GROUP emphasized: the provision of support and how it meets needs; and quantitative information on adaptation. AOSIS highlighted loss and damage, just transition, and the Ocean. SOUTH AFRICA mentioned adaptation finance. NEW ZEALAND and CANADA emphasized addressing all Paris Agreement goals, including finance flow alignment. The LMDCs highlighted means of implementation, barriers to international cooperation, and response measures. The EIG suggested reflecting on implementation of the GST outcome.

In terms of format and timelines, AOSIS called for flexibility on having additional technical dialogues (TDs) and suggested using Regional Climate Weeks and other intersessional spaces as needed. The LDCs, AILAC, and EIG supported a third TD. The LMDCs preferred two TDs to allow for early engagement within the contact group. They also called for a more streamlined approach to conducting the TDs, not breakout groups or world café formats, and for swift publication of TD summaries. The EIG considered that the political consideration phase should commence in November 2027. The EU said the contact group should only convene after the conclusion of the technical assessment. NEPAL called for early appointment of the TD co-facilitators.

On sources of input, AOSIS, AILAC, and NEW ZEALAND underscored the need to ensure all of the IPCC’s Seventh Assessment Report feed into GST 2. The LMDCs opposed prioritizing any source of scientific input. CHINA called for balance between scientific research insights and information provided by Parties, focusing on real-world implementation rather than modeling scenarios. 

In the Corridors

While some had hoped that Parties would come back from their day off with new resolve to find compromise, mandate fights erupted across negotiation rooms.

From discussions on response measures to agriculture and several others, there were disagreements on whether Parties’ proposals go beyond what the respective groups are supposed to do. Sometimes, the delegates pushing boundaries in one group were observed angling for a tighter mandate in another, depending on whether it was what one delegate called “their pet issue.” 

With only three days to go at the June Climate Meetings, some delegates expressed concern that these disagreements could mean more items being sent to the next session in Türkiye unresolved. “We’re in danger of kicking cans down the road” warned one veteran, “but many are waiting for us there already.”