Daily report for 13 June 2026

The negotiations continued their course on a range of issues, including mitigation, adaptation, and research and systematic observation. A full-day event focused on the trade-climate nexus.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), delegates continued expressing their views using the Co-Facilitators’ guiding questions. Several Parties and groupwwws, including the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) and PANAMA, called for the Co-Facilitators to prepare an informal note based on Parties’ views.

Parties highlighted topic selection for the global dialogues, with the AFRICAN GROUP calling for a systematic multi-year plan, while CHINA preferred annual selection of topics. Parties proposed various topics, including on sustainable development, poverty eradication, and means of implementation.

The LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) proposed the MWP be transformed from a dialogue to a permanent mechanism that systematically supports mitigation implementation. UKRAINE suggested holding regional events. BRAZIL highlighted a missing link between national implementation of climate action and scaled-up international implementation, and proposed recording non-market approaches (NMAs) using the NMA Platform.

Arrangements for funding infrastructure, processes, and capacity-building for implementing Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): During the SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya) and Peer Stiansen (Norway), Parties provided views on an updated informal note and draft SBI conclusions.

On the updated informal note, SWITZERLAND suggested noting that, while it may reflect Parties’ views, some elements are not necessarily in line with earlier decisions by the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA).

The LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) proposed including common but differentiated responsibilities in the list of principles in the text and replacing the reference to “particularly for vulnerable developing countries” with “particularly for developing countries.” UKRAINE proposed clarifying that infrastructure users are not necessarily participating Parties by specifying “participating Parties and entities.” The EU suggested clarifying that both the database and centralized accounting and reporting platform are of general interest to the process.

On the draft conclusions, SWITZERLAND proposed amending the text to reflect the urgency of closing the funding gap. Parties also discussed the purpose, timing, and sequencing of requests for: the SBI Chair to prepare an informal document, including textual proposals, informed by Parties’ views; and the Secretariat to prepare an information note containing detailed information on the assumptions underlying the approved supplementary budget.

Parties also discussed the possibility of receiving funds from the trust fund for supplementary activities and the implications of a decision under the agenda item on administrative, financial, and institutional matters relating to limiting earmarking for specific activities. The EU noted that an Article 6.2 trust fund, similar to the Clean Development Mechanism Trust Fund, could be a way to receive voluntary contributions specifically for Article 6.2 activities.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the informal note and draft SBI conclusions.

Review of the work programme under the framework for NMAs (Paris Agreement Article 6.8): During SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Charles Hamilton (the Bahamas) and Angela Friedrich (Austria) introduced an informal note on the review of the work programme and draft SBSTA conclusions. They invited comments on whether the informal note reflects Parties’ views.

Parties made suggestions for additions to the informal note, including in relation to potential extra functionalities of the NMA platform.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ricardo Delano Marshall (Barbados) invited views on revised draft text.

The AFRICAN GROUP, AOSIS, LDCs, GRUPO SUR, INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC), LMDCs, and ARAB GROUP urged calling for a tripling of adaptation finance, noting that, without this significant scaling up, the GGA will remain beyond reach. CANADA, NORWAY, and JAPAN opposed this textual addition.

AOSIS stressed that, while they are two distinct workstreams, the work on policy alignment and under the technical taskforce should be mutually reinforcing. AOSIS, the LDCs, EU, and CANADA supported the creation of a policy alignment committee composed of Party representatives to engage with the technical taskforce. The LMDCs opposed this, emphasizing the need for a two-track approach.

Parties expressed diverging views on the composition of the technical taskforce, highlighting their preferences among various options in the draft text. The AFRICAN GROUP, AILAC, LMDCs, and ARAB GROUP said it must be party-driven. GRUPO SUR supported having 25 members, including Party representatives of the UN regional groups, representatives of various constituted bodies, and experts. The EU, NORWAY, and JAPAN preferred an expert-driven process, expressing concern that Party participation could complicate the technical work on metadata and methodologies. BRAZIL argued Party guidance in the technical taskforce would serve as an insurance against Parties renegotiating technical outputs. AOSIS supported a taskforce of experts with a steering committee composed of Party representatives. They encouraged the Co-Facilitators to streamline the proposed options.

CANADA, GRUPO SUR, and the LMDCs opposed calling for the work under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) to be responsive to potential climate overshoot. 

On adaptation indicators, BRAZIL called for the inclusion of references to the Sustainable Development Goals and Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, stating such frameworks should be drawn on with respect to metadata. The ARAB GROUP opposed including any reference to additional frameworks or indicators.

On outputs of BAR workshops, the LMDCs and AFRICAN GROUP expressed their support for requesting the Secretariat to prepare: a summary report on each workshop; an annual report; and a consolidated synthesis report integrating outcomes and key findings from all workshops and related activities. AILAC suggested the Secretariat produce an annual report.

Pointing to limited time for engagement on the matter, many Parties suggested removing the section on terms of reference (ToR) for the review of the GGA Framework, with some suggesting their further consideration at SB 65.

Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation (NWP): In SBSTA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Lina Yassin (Sudan), Parties shared their views on a revised draft text.

Parties continued to diverge on whether to “welcome” or “note” progress in implementing activities under the NWP. They also diverged on whether to: “welcome” the report by the Secretariat on this matter, including the indicative NWP workplan for 2026–2027; “note” the report; or “note the efforts of the Secretariat in preparing” the report.

They also continued to diverge on whether to only refer to the NWP’s engagement with “relevant actors,” which the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs preferred, or to a specific list of actors, including private sector actors, which CANADA, JAPAN, the EU, and UK preferred, stating it is most appropriate to draw on language from the report. 

On emphasizing the role of work under the NWP in supporting the process of responding to the knowledge needs identified by Parties arising from the implementation of the GGA Framework, the ARAB GROUP called for reflecting agreed language from Decision 12/CMA.7 (GGA) and removing the reference to “addressing adaptation-related knowledge needs and facilitating the exchange of knowledge, sharing of experience, and dissemination of good practices relating to adaptation.”

Other Issues 

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): SB Contact Group Co-Chair Joseph Teo (Singapore) invited inputs on: JTWP implementation; and the ToR for the 2026 review of the JTWP. 

On JTWP implementation, GHANA highlighted the needs of informal workers, small-scale fishers, artisanal miners, and smallholder farmers. Several speakers focused on the issue of food systems addressed in the fifth dialogue under the JTWP. WOMEN AND GENDER said transforming food systems requires ending violence, discrimination, extractivism, and exploitative corporate capture. FARMERS urged access to finance, particularly for women, youth, and family farmers. ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS (ENGOs) supported food sovereignty and food security, grant-based financing, agro-ecology, and animal welfare. 

YOUTH NGOs (YOUNGO) said youth must have governance roles in the JTWP, not just observer status, as well as access to finance and technical support. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS (IPOs) also highlighted their participation in decision making. They emphasized the distinction between Indigenous Peoples and local communities, noting their respective importance. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES (LGMA) highlighted the unique role of subnational governments and potential to support a just transition, but expressed concern at lack of financing.

On the review ToR, EGYPT reported progress in informal-informals regarding the review’s mandate and objective, but noted the need for further discussions on scope, sources of input, and modalities. On the scope of the review, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION and SAUDI ARABIA preferred to delete a paragraph on the relationship between the JTWP and other processes under the Convention, Paris Agreement, and relevant UN entities. They also sought to delete the reference to a consideration of how the improved modalities of the work programme could inform or be informed by the process for the operationalization of the just transition mechanism. The EU and UK supported including previously-agreed text on integrating the outcomes of GST 1 in future work (Decision 3/CMA.5, paragraph 186).

Discussions on the ToR will continue in informal-informals. The Co-Chairs will develop draft conclusions on JTWP implementation.

Dialogue on opportunities, challenges, and barriers in relation to enhancing international cooperation related to the role of trade: SBSTA Vice-Chair Carol Franco opened this mandated event, noting it is the first in a series of three trade dialogues to take place at SB 64, SB 66 (June 2027), and SB 68 (June 2028), with a high-level event to follow. COP 30 President André Aranha Corrêa do Lago underscored this is the first dedicated consideration of trade in the climate regime and highlighted the objective to make trade work as an engine of sustainable development. SBI Chair Julia Gardiner acknowledged the deep divergences on the climate-trade nexus and expressed hope that the event will contribute to finding common ground to foster the shared goal of effective climate action.

The World Trade Organization (WTO), International Trade Centre, and UN Trade and Development made introductory presentations. Participants shared their perspectives on various issues, including:

• the role of trade in contributing to sustainable growth and energy infrastructure development;
• distribution of welfare gains and losses associated with carbon border adjustment mechanisms;
• intellectual property barriers to clean technology imports;
• high transit costs affecting small island developing states (SIDS) and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs);
• technology pools for global goods;
• reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers on green goods;
• reforming harmful subsidies, including fossil fuel subsidies;
• developing embodied emission standards;
• assessing how climate change impacts trade; and
• various existing initiatives on environment-trade and climate-trade linkages, including under the WTO, with various speakers cautioning against duplication.

In terms of expectations towards the dialogue series, the ARAB GROUP suggested fostering: corrective action to end unilateral measures; cooperative action to ensure that concerns are addressed; and remedial action, should neither correction nor cooperation be achieved. The LMDCs called for: the dialogues to operationalize Article 3.5 of the Convention (supportive and open international economic system) in a practical manner; the SB 64 dialogue to focus on mapping existing measures and gaps; the SB 66 dialogue to foster corrective and cooperative measures; and, if corrective and cooperative measures are not taken, the SB 68 dialogue to foster remedial approaches, including financial support commensurate with economic damage. 

CHINA said the dialogues should serve to: clarify indicators of a supportive and open international economic system; map relevant climate-trade measures and the dissemination of solutions; and conduct an evaluation of measures’ compliance with the Convention and Paris Agreement. BOTSWANA suggested the dialogues provide normative guidance to other actors, noting this does not always require formal decisions, as declarations also carry weight. The UK underscored the dialogue series’ non-negotiating, non-rule-setting nature.

The ARAB GROUP suggested the SB Chairs appoint Co-Chairs to guide the development of a workplan for the dialogue series. The G-77/CHINA called for a summary of each dialogue to be aggregated into the report to the high-level event. BRAZIL, SOUTH AFRICA, INDIA, AND CHINA (BASIC) suggested the dialogue summaries deliver an account of where Parties converge and differ. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for a permanent workstream on trade within the UNFCCC process. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested a standing agenda item. CHINA supported the consideration of reports by the COP and CMA. The UK recalled the mandate for one report to be produced for the high-level event in 2028.

Agriculture: In SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Claudia Heidecke (Germany) invited views on draft text. Parties diverged on various paragraphs related to finance and to livestock.

ENGOs said agro-industry, deforestation, and destructive corporate systems are the cause of emissions, not smallholders, pastoralists, Indigenous Peoples, or local food producers. IPOs proposed text specifically on their needs and rights, and said the text should not conflate Indigenous Peoples with other groups. FARMERS stressed their role in scaling solutions and said farmers’ rights must be at the heart of agriculture negotiations.

Discussions will continue in informal-informals.

Research and systematic observation: In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Frank McGovern (Ireland) invited views on draft text.

Emphasizing that it does not adequately reflect the discussions, AOSIS opposed further engagement with the text and requested the Co-Facilitator to prepare a new iteration. 

CHILE and GUATEMALA called for: reflecting the financial concerns compromising the work of the Global Climate Observing System and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC); welcoming research on “disinformation,” not just misinformation, and on how justice and equity concerns are applied to loss and damage quantification; and noting gaps in knowledge on fostering resilient energy systems and supply chain management for critical minerals. They also questioned the singling out of arid, semi-arid, and desert ecosystems, pointing to other vulnerable ecosystems, such as the cryosphere.

INDIA opposed encouraging regular updates by the IPCC. INDIA and SAUDI ARABIA called for referring to “differentiated,” not “differing” pathways and to tipping “points,” not tipping “elements.” SAUDI ARABIA opposed developing scenarios “for different temperature outcomes” and called for deleting the reference to some impacts projected to be higher “particularly beyond 1.5°C.” CHILE and GUATEMALA cautioned against a blanket statement on carbon dioxide removal (CDR), noting this refers to many different approaches. SAUDI ARABIA underscored the importance of advancing engineered CDR approaches.

AOSIS raised a point of order, recalling their opposition to using the draft text as a basis for discussion. Parties debated the way forward, including whether views expressed during the session would be captured in a new iteration of text. 

Responding to another point of order, the Co-Facilitators reminded participants that recordings of informal consultations are not permitted.

The Co-Facilitators will consult the SBSTA Chair on the way forward. 

COP 30 Presidency’s dialogue on enhancing transparency of participation and integrity in the UNFCCC process: COP 30 President Corrêa do Lago welcomed Parties and observers to the dialogue, noting important steps taken in recent years to improve transparency, especially regarding registration and disclosure. The Secretariat provided an update of measures implemented following the 2022 review process to strengthen observer engagement in the UNFCCC, including: listing all badge types in the list of participants; and new transparency measures applicable to observers and global climate action participants, including disclosure of affiliation and mandatory disclosure of home organization.

Delegates suggested further possible measures, including:

• transparency in the use of Party overflow badges, including how and why they are used;
• ensuring host country agreements are public and easily accessible after signature;
• predictable and equitable visa systems;
• making Parties subject to the same disclosure requirements as observers;
• mandatory disclosure of observers’ funding sources;
• disclosure of the type of organization for Party overflow badge holders;
• mandatory disclosures of conflicts of interest, beyond simply identifying affiliation;
• addressing the threat of reprisals faced by many observers, particularly Indigenous Peoples; and
• developing an accountability framework and conflict-of-interest policy for the UNFCCC process.

Regarding a conflict-of-interest policy, several delegates pointed to the example of the World Health Organization’s Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors, which states that the Organization does not engage with the tobacco industry or non-State actors that work to further the interests of the tobacco industry.

In the Corridors

Delegates spent their time hunkered down in various negotiation rooms, picking apart draft texts and providing instructions for their revision. 

“Some Parties are evidently suffering buyer’s remorse,” noted an observer in the just transition discussions. The establishment of a just transition “mechanism” may have found its way into decision text in Belém, but now Parties are debating just what it ought to be and how it would differ from the just transition “work programme” itself. Developing countries are eager for new financial support. Developed countries for their part are asking “what needs financing that cannot be financed through existing channels?”

Tension between buyers and sellers was also evident in another part of the venue, as some delegates spent their entire day in a dialogue on the role of trade. Long considered off limits within the UNFCCC process, the decision to hold a series of dialogues on the matter between 2026 and 2028 certainly “upped the ante,” as one observer put it, pointing to calls for remedial action to compensate for damages incurred from trade-restrictive measures. “Seems like someone drew inspiration from the International Court of Justice’s lingo,” opined one delegate.

As the sun finally peeked out from behind the clouds, many were happy to leave the World Conference Center to get a much-needed respite. Some were especially keen to trade in their negotiator hats for some dancing shoes at the iconic NGO party.