Daily report for 23 June 2025

The Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) held consultations on the implementation of Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ provision of finance)—one of the issues that held up agreement on the adoption of the meeting agendas. On other issues, delegates continued their consideration of draft text.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia), parties continued discussions, following up on informal informals held on Saturday.

In the morning, several parties underscored their willingness to provide further guidance to the experts for refining the indicators. The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) highlighted, among others, revising indicators adopted from other contexts to focus on adaptation, and removing indicators relating to domestic budgeting. AUSTRALIA, with the EU, noted there would be space to negotiate specific indicators at the 7th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA 7). The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) highlighted the added value of qualitative narratives to contextualize quantitative data. BANGLADESH underscored the need for indicators on loss and damage.

In the afternoon, parties exchanged views on, among others, the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) and transformational adaptation.

Parties outlined their expectations for the BAR, revealing diverging views on its function, mandate, and activities. The INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) and GRUPO SUR emphasized the relationship between the BAR and the Global Stocktake (GST), whereas the AFRICAN GROUP and ARAB GROUP explained that they envision the BAR as a vehicle for addressing Paris Agreement Article 7.1 (GGA) holistically, going beyond the GGA Framework and the GST decision. 

CANADA, supported by the UK, proposed requesting the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report of parties’ submissions on the BAR and conduct a mapping exercise to avoid duplication and identify gaps, to be submitted before SB 64. The EU and AOSIS proposed postponing consideration of the BAR to CMA 7. Other comments related to, among others: the establishment of a new work programme; suggested topics for high-level dialogues; and alignment with other constituted bodies and processes. 

Several countries called for transformational adaptation to be addressed under the BAR, with CANADA suggesting the BAR work toward formulating indicators specific to transformational adaptation. The AFRICAN GROUP, supported by the LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs), INDIA, ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), and ARAB GROUP, stressed the need to address different adaptation approaches jointly and not elevate any specific approach over others.

With regard to the co-facilitators’ draft text on the agenda item, the EU, supported by JAPAN, CANADA, and NEW ZEALAND, preferred deleting the later section on elements of a potential decision text, pointing to lack of time to discuss it. Developing countries urged retaining it.

The co-facilitators will prepare a revised draft text on all elements considered under the agenda item.

Guidance Relating to Adaptation Communications: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Thomas Lerenten Lelekoiten (Kenya) and Marie Wien Fjell (Norway) invited reflections on a revised draft CMA decision text. 

Parties disagreed on the timelines for reviewing the guidance. GRUPO SUR and AILAC preferred 2027, to allow for the updated guidance to feed into the second GST, with AILAC also underscoring the busy agenda for 2028. The AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, AOSIS, and LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), favored 2028 to align the review with the review of the Enhanced Transparency Framework’s modalities, procedures, and guidelines (MPGs). NEW ZEALAND, with JAPAN and the EU, preferred 2029 to adequately reflect the updated MPGs in the revision of the guidance. Parties converged on the year 2028.

The LMDCs, supported by the ARAB GROUP, called for deletion of references to the GGA Framework, saying these prejudge ongoing work on the GGA. Countries also debated whether to drop the word “draft” from draft supplementary guidance for adaptation communications developed by the Adaptation Committee.

Review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee (AC): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Geert Fremout (Belgium), parties continued to express diverging views on the governance of the review of the AC. The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP reiterated their position that the review falls under the exclusive mandate of the COP. The EU, opposed by the LMDCs and ARAB GROUP, called for exploring language used under other agenda items where similar disputes have arisen. GRUPO SUR tabled a bridging proposal: a COP decision acknowledging the participation of the CMA in the review, with a separate CMA decision concluding its participation in the review. The ARAB GROUP opposed a merely procedural solution, saying “a review without substance is not a review,” and proposed postponing the review to a yet-to-be-specified date as a “more dignified” option.

Co-Facilitator Fremout asked parties to reflect on how to address the fact that the review is also included on the CMA agenda, and will consult with the SB Chairs on the way forward.

Finance

SB Chairs’ Substantive Consultations on the Implementation of Paris Agreement Article 9.1: Opening the consultations, SBI Chair Julia Gardiner and SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare pointed to bilateral consultations with parties and noted divergent views on the need for a standalone agenda item on Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ finance provision commitment).

The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, AFRICAN GROUP, and others lamented developed countries’ lack of political will to implement their legal obligation under Paris Agreement Article 9.1 and UNFCCC Article 4.3 (provision of new and additional financial resources by developed countries). They supported a standalone item on Article 9.1, opposed by the EU, EIG, AUSTRALIA, and others. The EIG, the UK, NEW ZEALAND, and others pointed to existing finance-related agenda items that include consideration of Article 9.1, such as the Standing Committee on Finance.

The LMDCs, supported by the ARAB GROUP and others, proposed a work programme on the modalities for implementing Article 9.1, that covers, among others, tripling of adaptation finance, public finance support for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, and predictability of support. The ARAB GROUP called for space to discuss: burden-sharing arrangements; standardized accounting methodologies; and transformation of outdated budgetary processes.

The EIG, supported by ICELAND, JAPAN, and CANADA, proposed a package of three new agenda items: a CMA agenda item on implementation of Article 9; a COP agenda item on implementation of UNFCCC Article 4.3; and an SBI agenda item on finance-related matters to prepare for the COP and CMA discussions. They said these would replace all finance-related items except those relating to guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism. The EU stressed focusing on Article 9.1 will limit the scope to scale up climate finance and called for more holistic discussions under Article 9, noting the importance of finance mobilization and enabling environments.

Reporting

Compilations and Syntheses of Biennial Reports from Annex I Parties to the Convention: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Tian Wang (China) invited parties’ views on draft text, explaining it contains options for the SBI to either: take note of the information provided in the reports; or note specific insights, including a projected increase of Annex I parties’ emissions by 0.5 per cent between 2020 and 2030 and a slower increase in climate finance in 2017–2018 and 2019–2020.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Provision of Financial and Technical Support for Reporting from Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) invited views on revised draft text. The G-77/CHINA, among others: disagreed with the idea that jointly submitting national communications and biennial transparency reports (BTRs) necessarily increases efficiency; called for reflecting persistent challenges in accessing resources; supported recommending that the COP encourage the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to consider the lessons learned from providing support to non-Annex I parties; and emphasized the need for continued consideration of this agenda item. AUSTRALIA and the EU highlighted the importance of references to support available to enable the transition from biennial update reports to BTRs.

Noting overlaps, the UK suggested holding joint discussions on support for reporting under the Convention and the Paris Agreement. Urging the prioritization of discussions on BTRs and the Consultative Group of Experts, AUSTRALIA, supported by CANADA, suggested considering the item again at SB 69 and every four years thereafter.

Parties requested more time for continued engagement on the draft text at SB 62. The co-facilitators encouraged informal engagement among parties, noting they will consult the SBI Chair on the way forward.

Provision of Financial and Technical Support to Developing Countries for Reporting and Capacity Building under the Paris Agreement: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) invited views on an informal note.

The G-77/CHINA sought to proceed on the basis of this informal note, opposed by the UK, EU, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, and NORWAY, who preferred working on the basis of a “list of activities,” emphasizing that the informal note has no “formal basis” and contains many elements on GEF guidance that should be addressed under the relevant agenda item. KENYA cautioned against “putting the note into the dustbin” and starting afresh at CMA 7. The EU stressed evaluating lessons learned from previous activities before delving into a new set of activities. The LDCs stressed the activities proposed in the informal note reflect developing countries’ experiences. JAPAN requested information from the Secretariat on budgetary implications.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Other Issues

Technology Implementation Programme (TIP): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Elfriede More (Austria) and Omar Alcock (Jamaica) introduced revised draft CMA decision text. They also read out the Secretariat’s estimated budgetary implications of three options in the text for proposed activities, including events and reports.

Several parties opposed text setting out the TIP’s objectives and recalling technology challenges, noting these are already outlined in the GST decision and the periodic assessments of the Technology Mechanism, respectively. The ARAB GROUP called for deletion of references to GST outcomes and 1.5°C alignment. AOSIS stressed the TIP should be country-driven, and called for reference to the special circumstances of SIDS and LDCs and to decarbonization of technologies. NORWAY supported language on country-driven approaches and opposed reference to trade-related issues. TÜRKIYE proposed changing references to trade barriers to “non-tariff” barriers, noting this is a broader term. Several parties opposed referencing specific technologies, such as hydrogen, artificial intelligence, and early warning systems, noting this risks sidelining other technologies.

 CHINA proposed deleting encouragement for developing countries in a position to do so to make contributions to the work of the TIP on a voluntary basis, noting “countries in a position to do so” is not Convention language.

The co-facilitators will revise the text.

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Patrick Spicer (Canada) invited parties to report back from informal informals. AILAC read out a proposal on the scope of the dialogue specifying, among others, that the dialogue will consider: collective progress in implementing the GST; and the provision of finance, capacity building, and technology transfer to implement GST outcomes. The UK, EU, and AUSTRALIA expressed support, suggesting to replace “provision” with “mobilization.” The EIG, supported by the LDCs, proposed “provision and mobilization.”

AOSIS emphasized the dialogue should focus on collective progress in implementing the GST outcomes, not the Paris Agreement. SOUTH AFRICA stressed that the “collective” element is already “happening through existing processes” and proposed “international cooperation” as an alternative formulation to “collective progress.”

The LMDCs emphasized the dialogue should not be a mechanism to assess collective progress, or track implementation of NDCs or the entire GST. Noting Paris Agreement Article 14, which specifies that the outcome of the GST shall inform parties in updating and enhancing their actions and support and enhancing international cooperation, INDIA underlined means of implementation (MoI) as a central issue and sought assurances that the dialogue will not lead to a “new evaluation mechanism” or new targets. CHINA stressed the text should affirm the purpose of the dialogue to “facilitate the implementation of the Paris Agreement in pursuit of the Convention” and be guided by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.

CHINA emphasized that the dialogue is “just a place to exchange views” with no need for specific inputs and outputs. SAUDI ARABIA sought deletion of any reference to a report or decision on the dialogue. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA stressed the importance of a synthesis report to inform the second GST, with AILAC advocating for the CMA to consider the report. The EU underscored they want to see a “substantive outcome,” suggesting, among others, an annual dialogue and ministerial discussions.

The LMDCs emphasized that the implementation of GST outcomes is conditional upon finance, not the other way around. With the LDCs, they stressed the dialogue should not create an undue burden on parties and the Secretariat.

Gender: In SBI informal consultations, co-facilitated by Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) and Jared Huntley (Australia), discussions focused on a table with activities for the new gender action plan (GAP) contained in an informal note.

SAUDI ARABIA, supported by KUWAIT, suggested replacing “gender mainstreaming” with “strengthening gender perspectives under the UNFCCC,” opposed by the EU, AILAC, CANADA, UK, and BRAZIL. The EU cautioned against backsliding from already agreed language. SAUDI ARABIA suggested agreed language on “gender-responsiveness and gender perspectives,” opposed by AILAC, who underlined the importance of gender mainstreaming being part of the Lima Work Programme (LWP).

Other points included:

• the HOLY SEE suggested referring to “sex-”disaggregated data, rather than “gender”-disaggregated data;
• BRAZIL, AILAC, NORWAY, the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, UK, and ICELAND proposed adding reference to age-disaggregated data;
• BRAZIL, AILAC, and URUGUAY called for language on women of African descent;
• AOSIS, supported by CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, and MEXICO, suggested highlighting Indigenous women as agents of change, with CANADA, MEXICO, and AUSTRALIA seeking to disambiguate references to Indigenous women from those to local communities throughout the text;
• the EU, NORWAY, AUSTRALIA, UK, ICELAND, and CANADA underscored retaining references to engaging men and boys; and
• SAUDI ARABIA, supported by CHINA, suggested deleting references to environmental and human rights defenders.

The EU asked to clarify the role of the Secretariat with regard to the different activities. The DOMINICAN REPUBLIC asked for Secretariat guidance on budgetary and logistical constraints.

BRAZIL, AILAC, and AOSIS emphasized the importance of MoI. The AFRICAN GROUP and LDCs proposed having a separate priority area on MoI. The LDCs suggested the Standing Committee on Finance provide guidance on support for the implementation of the GAP. The EU, the UK, NORWAY, and AUSTRALIA stressed sticking to agreed language in paragraphs 17–21 of the decision on the extension of the LWP.

Joint Work on Agriculture and Food Security: In SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Tekini Nakidakida (Fiji) invited views on draft text. Parties indicated their willingness to work on the text in informal informals. Observer comments related to, among others: the importance of agro-ecology and just transition; fostering meaningful engagement with the online portal, including by the financial sector; and promoting sectoral efforts and investments in emission reductions, precision farming, and water management.

Research and Systematic Observation: In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Patricia Nying’uro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland) invited views on revised draft text. 

The EU suggested that the SBSTA not only welcome the update by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) on its ongoing work, but welcome the work itself. With regard to the SBSTA encouraging the IPCC to continue providing policy-relevant and timely scientific information for relevant work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, KENYA, SAUDI ARABIA, and BOTSWANA stressed there was no need to restate the IPCC’s mandate. INDIA proposed deleting reference to “policy-relevant and timely” scientific information.

On ongoing global warming, in particular above 1.5°C, increasing compounding effects, INDIA reminded parties that the compounding effects of warming also cause loss and damage below 1.5ºC. AOSIS, with the LDCs, called for reverting to specifying that “every increment of warming” has compounding effects. SAUDI ARABIA opposed noting “with alarm and utmost concern” the state of the climate system, and called for deleting all references to 1.5ºC in favor of broader reference to Paris Agreement temperature goals, or also referring to the 2ºC goal, opposed by the LDCs and AOSIS.

SAUDI ARABIA opposed a reference to gaps in knowledge regarding science-based carbon accounting frameworks and standards that ensure environmental integrity. The EU suggested adding a reference to the role of renewable energy and synergies with adaptation and sustainable development, with SAUDI ARABIA willing to discuss merging the proposal with existing language on carbon dioxide removal.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings: In an SBI contact group co-chaired by Laurence Ahoussou (Canada), several parties emphasized that pursuing efficiency is a means to enhancing effectiveness and implementation. CANADA and NEW ZEALAND noted discussions are not aimed at changing the draft rules of procedure.

The LDCs, supported by CANADA and NEW ZEALAND, emphasized that Rule 9 of the draft rules of procedure provides the Secretariat an open mandate to draft the provisional agenda of each session in agreement with the President. The LDCs also noted that it is within the rights of the President to consult with the Bureau members, who are all Vice-Presidents.

The AFRICAN GROUP highlighted the role of the COP as the governing body of the parent treaty. Emphasizing that any streamlining of agendas must be based on a clear mandate from parties, SOUTH AFRICA suggested developing criteria, such as: avoiding duplication, improving coherence, and ensuring focus on underrepresented but critical areas.

JAPAN recommended: “sunsetting” some agenda items and mandated events, or only considering them biennially; and not creating new workstreams without an end date and review. Emphasizing challenges with regard to the “logjam” of events and overlaps with the negotiations, the LDCs suggested either calling on parties to sponsor mandated events held intersessionally or enforcing a cap on the number of in-session events. CANADA called for information on what a sensible number of in-session events would be. GEORGIA noted broad convergence that any decision on mandated events would be taken under the respective agenda items.

In the afternoon, discussions continued on future sessions and observer engagement. Executive Secretary Simon Stiell urged the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) to settle on a nomination for the COP 31 host, underscoring the need to launch logistics preparation and programmatic work. AUSTRALIA and TÜRKIYE reiterated their respective bids, with several WEOG members expressing support for Australia.

The ARAB GROUP opposed inviting parties to consider limiting the size of their delegations, noting this would advantage some over others. Underscoring their group’s delegations are already comparatively small, the LDCs suggested inviting developed countries or parties with large delegations to limit their size. The EIG and AUSTRALIA agreed the focus should be on larger delegations, but that these are not necessarily developed countries. The EIG said it would be helpful to define a threshold that parties should not exceed. ICELAND, supported by SOUTH AFRICA, proposed differentiating between party and party overflow in the rationalization of delegation size. The ARAB GROUP supported a threshold of 500 for party overflow. 

The LDCs requested clarity as to when host country agreements enter into force and, with the EU, suggested these be published upon their signature. Noting challenges with upfront payments for accommodation, the LDCs emphasized the importance of flexible payment arrangements.

CHINA, supported by the ARAB GROUP, opposed language on considering allowing observers to speak after groups of parties. The EU, opposed by the ARAB GROUP, suggested observer constituencies could speak in alternation with individual parties. The ARAB GROUP said a request for the Secretariat to collect additional information about observer organizations should pertain to their geographical scope, rather than be open-ended.

The co-facilitators will prepare draft text on efficiency and revise the other elements of the draft text.

In the Corridors

With temperatures dropping significantly from Sunday’s sweltering 35°C, some delegates from tropical countries joked that they “may need some more time to warm up today.” The ever-busy schedule and looming deadline to conclude negotiations by noon on Wednesday quickly turned up the heat. While parties already reached agreement on some issues, such as the Nairobi Work Programme, other draft texts are still rife with options and brackets. Informal informals sprouted throughout the venue to speed up progress.

The consultations on the implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (developed countries’ provision of climate finance) were especially fiery. The Chairs of the Subsidiary Bodies resorted to cutting off speakers’ microphones after their allocated speaking time had elapsed. This did not land well with some parties, who underscored the agreement was to have “substantive” consultations. But the session did not go much better from a substantive point. “The next agenda fight in Belém seems almost inevitable at this point,” sighed a tired observer.

Another question mark surfaced in discussions on future meetings: who will host COP 31? “Clearly, Türkiye is hiking the price to back down on its bid,” noted a seasoned delegate with regard to the stalemate in the Western Europe and Others Group that needs to agree on a nominee. As Executive Secretary Stiell reminded parties, an early decision on hosting arrangements is not only important for logistics purposes, but also for the Presidency’s diplomatic engagement. “Seeing the current tone of discussions, this is needed more than ever.”