Summary report, 16–26 June 2025

The 2025 mid-year meetings in Bonn were the first time parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) convened since the turbulent closing plenary in November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, that adopted the new collective quantified goal on climate finance. The widespread disappointment among developing countries with that outcome cast its shadow over the June Subsidiary Bodies’ meetings, with the adoption of the agendas held up for almost two days over a proposal by the Like-Minded Developing Countries to consider the implementation of developed countries’ climate finance obligations (Paris Agreement Article 9.1) and trade-restrictive unilateral measures in the discussions. Although this impasse was eventually resolved, it set the tone for the negotiations to come. Over two weeks, parties repeatedly clashed over the provision of means of implementation—a catch-all term that includes finance, technology transfer, and capacity building—for climate action.

Notwithstanding such challenges, parties made some advances. After years of deadlock, they advanced the consideration of arrangements for the transition of the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. Following a last-minute compromise, parties also settled on guidance for refining the list of indicators to measure progress toward the Global Goal on Adaptation. Part of that compromise was a reference to “indicators for means of implementation to measure: access, quality, and adaptation finance, including provision,” a key priority for developing countries to close the widening adaptation finance gap. 

Negotiations on science remained fraught until the very end. After intense debate, agreement was found to “take note” of the World Meteorological Organization’s State of the Global Climate 2024 and Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2025-2029 reports and that the multi-decadal estimates of current global warming are between 1.34 and 1.41°C. But several parties lamented that mere references to the 1.5°C goal seem to be a red line for some. No agreement at all was found on the technology implementation programme, with parties having different views on its contribution to implementing the decision on the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, especially regarding energy transition. 

On many issues, parties did not find a resolution per se, rather they captured progress made in Bonn to serve as a basis for further engagement at the next meeting in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. These documents have varying degrees of maturity, with some merely compiling proposals, while others already indicate potential landing zones. More than ever, these documents were replete with caveats that they “include divergent views,” “have not been agreed upon,” “do not reflect consensus,” “are not exhaustive,” “have no formal status,” “are open to revision,” and “do not prejudge parties’ views on any of the options contained therein” or “prevent parties from expressing any further views.”

The 2025 June Climate Meetings convened from 16-26 June 2025 at the World Conference Center in Bonn, Germany. It consisted of the 62nd meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), many mandated events, and a series of side events. There were 9,486 registered participants, including 3,292 party delegates, 2,393 observers, and 308 members of the media.

A Brief History of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement

The international political response to climate change began with the 1992 adoption of the UNFCCC, which sets out the basic legal framework and principles for international climate change cooperation with the aim of stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs) to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” The Convention, which entered into force on 21 March 1994, has 197 parties. 

To boost the effectiveness of the UNFCCC, parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. It commits industrialized countries and countries in transition to a market economy to achieve quantified emission reduction targets for a basket of six GHGs. The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on 16 February 2005 and has 192 parties. Its first commitment period took place from 2008 to 2012 followed by the second commitment period, 2013-2020. 

In December 2015, parties adopted the Paris Agreement. The Agreement aims to limit the global average temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, and pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. It also aims to increase parties’ ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and make financial flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Each party shall communicate, at five-year intervals, successively more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs). As later decided in 2021 in Glasgow, each NDC will last ten years, but will be updated every five years. The Agreement further sets out an Enhanced Transparency Framework (ETF) for national reporting by all parties. Collective progress toward implementing the Agreement is to be reviewed every five years through a Global Stocktake (GST). The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016. To date, 193 parties have ratified it.

Recent Highlights

Chile/Madrid: The Chile/Madrid Climate Change Conference convened from 2–13 December 2019 in Spain, under the Presidency of Chile. Delegates established the Santiago Network aimed at catalyzing technical support on loss and damage, and adopted the enhanced five-year Lima Work Programme and its Gender Action Plan (GAP). Parties also adopted three cover decisions under the Conference of the Parties (COP), the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), and the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA). On many issues, notably Article 6 and long-term finance, parties could not reach agreement. 

Glasgow: The Glasgow Climate Change Conference convened in Scotland from 31 October – 12 November 2021, following the COVID-19 pandemic-related interruption to the annual rhythm. Parties finalized the outstanding Paris Agreement rulebook issues, adopting guidelines, rules, and a work programme on Article 6 and agreeing on the format of reporting under the ETF. Parties adopted a series of three cover decisions that, for the first time, included a reference to phasing down unabated coal power and phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. They also established work programmes on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA), and on urgently scaling up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade; created a dialogue on loss and damage funding; established a process toward defining a new collective quantified goal on climate finance; and launched an annual dialogue on ocean-based climate action. 

Sharm El-Sheikh: The Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference convened in Egypt from 6–20 November 2022. For the first time, parties recognized the need for finance to respond to loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change and established a fund and funding arrangements, with details to be worked out in 2023. Key elements in the package leading to this agreement were the operationalization of the mitigation work programme (MWP) and initiating the development of a GGA framework. Parties also adopted two cover decisions, which among others: established a work programme on just transition to discuss pathways to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement; and launched a dialogue to enhance understanding of the scope of Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement (finance flow consistency), and its complementarity with Article 9 (climate finance).

Dubai: The United Arab Emirates Climate Change Conference convened in Dubai from 30 November – 11 December 2023. The major outcome was the adoption of a decision concluding the first GST under the Paris Agreement. It encourages parties to ensure their next NDCs are 1.5°C-aligned and have ambitious, economy-wide emission reduction targets, covering all GHGs, sectors, and categories. Among other things, the decision also calls on parties to contribute, in a nationally-determined manner, to global efforts on: tripling renewable energy capacity globally and doubling the global average annual rate of energy efficiency improvements by 2030; and transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly, and equitable manner, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science. 

The conference started on a high note with the adoption of a decision operationalizing the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage during the opening plenary. Parties also adopted the GGA framework, including thematic and dimensional targets, agreed on a host for the Santiago Network, operationalized the just transition work programme (JTWP); and decided to convene dialogues on mountains and on children at the Subsidiary Bodies meetings in June 2024.

Baku: The Baku Climate Change Conference convened in Azerbaijan from 11–22 November 2024. Parties adopted a new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance, replacing the previous goal of USD 100 billion per year by 2020. The NCQG sets a goal of at least USD 300 billion per year by 2035 for developing countries’ climate action from a wide variety of sources, and with developed countries taking the lead. It also calls on all actors to work together to scale up financing to developing countries for climate action from all public and private sources to at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2035. The decision also: acknowledges the need for public and grant-based resources and highly concessional finance, particularly for adaptation and responding to loss and damage, especially for those most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change and with significant capacity constraints, such as the least developed countries (LDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). Although lauded by some as heralding a new era of climate finance, the NCQG was considered insufficient by developing countries, who pointed to the trillions needed to address the gaps in climate mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. 

In Baku, parties also: advanced the operationalization of the market-based cooperative implementation of the Paris Agreement (Articles 6.2 and 6.4); extended the work programme on gender; provided guidance on defining indicators for assessing progress toward the GGA; adopted arrangements with the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage; and extended the mandate of the working group facilitating the implementation of the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform.

Report of the Meetings

The 2025 Bonn Climate Change Conference opened on Monday, 16 June 2025, but the agendas were not adopted until 17 June. Upon adoption of the agendas, SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare (Uganda) asked parties and observers to reserve their statements until the closing plenary so as to not further delay the start of negotiations, assuring them that this would not set a precedent. 

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell stressed that the 30 hours spent negotiating the agendas have been “hard and have not reflected the urgency we face.” He encouraged delegates to make swift progress across all aspects of the agendas: “We need to demonstrate to the world that climate cooperation can deliver, now more than ever.”

Procedural Matters

Adoption of the agendas: During the opening plenary on Monday, 16 June, parties debated the meeting agendas. Disagreements related to two items proposed by the LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs): on implementation of Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement (developed countries’ provision of climate finance), and on trade-restrictive unilateral measures. Parties eventually adopted the supplementary provisional agendas of the SBI and SBSTA on Tuesday, 17 June, without the proposed items, based on the understanding that: 

• the Subsidiary Bodies (SB) Chairs will hold substantive consultations on Article 9.1 and report back at SB 63 with a view for parties to determine a way forward, including potentially a standalone item on this matter; and 
• on trade-restrictive unilateral measures, related issues will be discussed in relevant agenda items, including the JTWP, and a footnote will be added to the SBs’ agenda item on the JTWP to this effect.

Organization of Work: During the meeting, contact groups convened on: just transition; response measures; non-market approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.8; arrangements for intergovernmental meetings; and administrative, financial, and institutional matters, with a spin-off group to consider the proposed budget for the Kyoto Protocol’s international transaction log for the biennium 2026–2027. 

Pointing to intersessional engagement, SBSTA Chair Ayebare reported parties’ interest in further discussions on the issue of cooperation with other international organizations and announced he would convene consultations on the matter. The consideration of the alignment between processes pertaining to the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism (TM) was deferred to SBI 64. Informal consultations convened on all other agenda items included in the adopted agendas.

SBSTA Chair Ayebare noted that no L documents would be prepared for strictly procedural conclusions, which would be read out in plenary and reflected in the meeting report.

Facilitative, Multilateral Consideration of Progress: The first working group session for the facilitative, multilateral consideration of progress took place on 21 June, followed by a reflection session on 23 June. During the closing plenary on 26 June, SBI Chair Julia Gardiner (Australia) reported that various parties found the session format inappropriate for the large number of parties and made proposals for streamlining. 

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation: The Goal of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience, and reducing vulnerability to climate change was established in Article 7 of the Paris Agreement. At CMA 3, parties launched a work programme to flesh out the GGA in more detail. At CMA 5, they established the GGA Framework that includes a range of thematic and dimensional targets for climate adaptation and resilience, and launched a technical process aimed at defining adaptation indicators. At CMA 6, it was decided that the indicators may include a manageable set of no more than 100 indicators that are globally applicable and constitute a menu that captures various contexts of adaptation.

Informal consultations convened on 18, 20, 23, 24, and 25 June, among others, and were co-facilitated by Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Zita Wilks (Gabon). On the basis of the consolidated list of indicators to track progress towards the GGA (FCCC/SB/2025/3) and a technical paper on transformational adaptation (FCCC/TP/2024/8), parties discussed: further guidance to the experts tasked with elaborating the final list of indicators; the operationalization of the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) established at CMA 6; and the notion of transformational adaptation.

Most discussions focused on the indicator guidance, with key points of contention including: the number and structure of indicators; the inclusion of cross-cutting considerations and vulnerable groups; indicators relating to means of implementation (MoI); and the timeline for further intersessional work leading up to CMA 7. On the BAR, parties voiced different viewpoints on its function, mandate, and activities. On transformational adaptation, several countries called for this topic to be addressed under the BAR, with CANADA suggesting the BAR work toward formulating indicators specific to transformational adaptation. The AFRICAN GROUP, supported by the LDCs, INDIA, the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), and the ARAB GROUP opposed, stressing the need to address different adaptation approaches jointly and not elevate any specific approach over others.

Agreement on the indicator guidance was still pending on the meeting’s final day. While various parties supported dividing indicators into headline and sub-indicators, they held diverging views on which category should be globally applicable and which context-specific, as well as how many indicators to include in each category. The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), supported by the LDCs, proposed around 40-50 headline indicators. The EU proposed “no more than 100 globally applicable indicators, including a small number of headline indicators,” while the ARAB GROUP suggested “no more than 100 indicators, including headline globally applicable indicators and context-specific subindicators.” AUSTRALIA stressed that all 100 indicators be globally applicable to avoid a “bifurcation” in the final list and ensure that all parties can report on these indicators.

On the guidance for refining the indicators, GRUPO SUR, supported by the INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) and the EIG, called for explicitly reflecting cross-cutting considerations and vulnerable groups. AOSIS, with CANADA but opposed by the LMDCs, argued for retaining indicators on mitigation and rejected including indicators that “capture adaptation responses to risks and impacts associated with different warming scenarios.” 

On MoI, several developing countries insisted that indicators relating to official development assistance and national budgets be removed, and supported MoI indicators aligned with Articles 9, 10, 11 and 13 of the Paris Agreement. The LMDCs further suggested highlighting that support for adaptation flows from developed to developing countries. The UK, AUSTRALIA, JAPAN, and NEW ZEALAND preferred reference to “enabling factors of the implementation of adaptation action, including MoI,” with the UK stressing this is language used by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The EU said any solution on MoI would need to include: the global nature of the GGA; the architecture of Paris Agreement Article 7; and the agreement reached in Baku.

There was also divergence on the organization of intersessional work. The LMDCs urged inviting parties to the intersessional expert workshop, while AOSIS underlined the workshop should be for experts only. 

Despite lengthy discussions throughout the final day of SB 62, there was no agreement in sight. A resolution was eventually found, building on the SB Chairs’ consultations with Heads of Delegation in the evening.

During the closing plenary, BOLIVIA lamented the “bad faith” demonstrated by developed countries in attempting to block a decision on this agenda item. They highlighted that the unity of the GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) helped ensure that the decision contains the necessary language to achieve meaningful progress in the GGA discussions ahead of Belém. The EU highlighted their good faith negotiations and spirit of cooperation and expressed their satisfaction with the outcome reached in this session. INDIA identified issues with the text: inclusion of the word “all” in paragraph 13 in relation to subcomponents of the GGA targets; and in paragraph 17, lack of reference to participation of parties in the meeting of experts. 

Outcome: In their joint conclusions (FCCC/SB/2025/L.4), the SBs, among others: 

• recall guidance provided for work under the GGA work programme in previous decisions 2/CMA.5 and 3/CMA.6 relating to, among others, the targets of the GGA, the need for international adaptation support, the use of best available science, indicators for cross-cutting considerations and vulnerable groups, and indicators’ consistency with the temperature goal in Article 2 of the Paris Agreement; 
• invite the experts to reduce the consolidated list of indicator options to no more than 100, globally applicable, indicators, including, where applicable, indicators for enabling factors for the implementation of adaptation action, MoI, cross-cutting considerations, and all subcomponents of the targets; and
• note that some of the indicators in the consolidated list should be further aligned with previous guidance.

The SBs provide additional guidance to the experts for refining the indicators, to, among others:

• make the existing indicators derived from other Conventions and frameworks adaptation-specific; 
• remove indicators for measuring climate change mitigation;
• include indicators capturing adaptation responses to risks and impacts associated with different warming scenarios;
• include qualitative narratives;
• ensure sub-indicators capture various contexts of adaptation action to allow parties to choose which indicators they will report on; and
• include indicators for MoI and other factors enabling implementation of adaptation action, in particular those that measure: access, quality, and adaptation finance, including provision, in line with the Paris Agreement, to help parties address needs and gaps in implementing the global goal on adaptation.

On the timelines going forward, the SBs:

• request the organization of a hybrid expert meeting to verify that the indicators are in line with the guidance provided, peer review the indicators, and conduct quality control checks;
• invite the experts to submit their final technical report in August 2025;
• request the Secretariat to publish the final technical report and list of indicators at least three weeks before the mandated intersessional workshop between SB 62 and SB 63; and
• request the Secretariat to prepare summary reports of both the expert meeting and the workshop.

The SBs agree to continue consideration of matters related to the GGA at SB 63 on the basis of an informal note, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMA 7. 

Workshop on Adaptation Indicators: In this mandated event on 16 June, participants heard reports from eight groups of technical experts tasked with consolidating the draft list of indicators to track the thematic targets and targets related to the iterative adaptation cycle, as set out in the GGA Framework.

Special Event on Adaptation Indicators with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: A mandated event on 20 June featured a presentation on the timeline and outline of the IPCC Working Group II contribution to the seventh Assessment Report (AR7), highlighting interlinkages with the development of indicators for the GGA. 

Guidance relating to Adaptation Communications: Adaptation communications are established by Articles 7.10 and 7.11 of the Paris Agreement to increase the visibility and profile of adaptation and its balance with mitigation, strengthen adaptation action and support for developing countries, provide input to the GST, and enhance learning and understanding of adaptation needs and actions.

Discussions under this agenda item focused on parties’ experience with the application of the guidance on adaptation communications adopted at CMA 1, and the CMA’s decision to take stock of and, if necessary, revise the guidance. Informal consultations, co-facilitated by Thomas Lerenten Lelekoiten (Kenya) and Marie Wien Fjell (Norway), took place on 18, 20, 23, and 25 June. 

Reflecting on the guidance, many parties underlined the importance of fostering synergies and avoiding duplications between different reporting processes under the Paris Agreement. Parties generally agreed to extend the call for submissions on their experiences in applying the guidance and to postpone the review of guidance, but disagreed on the timelines. 

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.4), the SBI recommends a draft decision for CMA 7, which:

• recognizes the value of the supplementary guidance for voluntary use by parties in communicating information in accordance with the possible elements of an adaptation communication, and requests the Secretariat to make the guidance available in all official UN languages; and
• invites SBI 64 to continue considering the timing to: invite parties to submit further information on their experience with the application of the guidance; request the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report on the submissions; take stock of, and if necessary revise, the guidance, taking into account parties’ submissions and the synthesis report.

Review of the progress, effectiveness, and performance of the Adaptation Committee: The Adaptation Committee (AC), established in 2010, aims to promote the coherent implementation of enhanced action on adaptation. For several years, parties have not been able to conclude the review of the AC due to long-standing disagreements over the roles of the COP and CMA therein. Informal consultations on 19, 23, and 25 June, among others, were co-facilitated by Geert Fremout (Belgium) and Lina Yassin (Sudan). 

Parties highlighted the crucial role of the AC and lamented the lack of progress in relation to its review. GRUPO SUR proposed the COP adopt a substantive decision regarding the review and the CMA take note of this decision. The AFRICAN GROUP, LMDCs, and LDCs opposed, saying that the COP is exclusively mandated with conducting the review. The ARAB GROUP opposed a merely procedural solution, saying “a review without substance is not a review,” and proposed postponing the review to a yet-to-be-specified date as a “more dignified” option. 

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBSTA Chair Ayebare noted that parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SB 63 agenda.

Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability, and Adaptation: The Nairobi Work Programme was established in 2005 to assist all parties, especially developing countries, to: improve their understanding and assessment of impacts, vulnerability, and adaptation to climate change; and make informed decisions on practical adaptation actions and measures to respond to climate change on a sound scientific, technical and socio-economic basis. In informal consultations co-facilitated by Geert Fremout (Belgium) and María del Pilar Bueno (Uruguay) parties considered progress in the implementation of NWP activities and reflected on the provision of further guidance. A key point of debate was the reference to adaptation approaches, including transformational and incremental adaptation approaches.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.3), the SBSTA, among others: 

• requests the Secretariat to strengthen collaboration with diverse knowledge holders, including scientific institutions, private sector actors, Indigenous knowledge holders, and local knowledge holders;
• requests that the scope of activities under the Work Programme be inclusive of all adaptation approaches, including urgent, incremental, transformational and country-driven adaptation action; and
• emphasizes the important role of the Work Programme in contributing to the exchange of knowledge, experience, and information, and sharing of best practices pertaining to the GGA targets. 

National Adaptation Plans: NAPs were established as part of the Cancun Adaptation Framework with the objective of reducing vulnerability to the impacts of climate change by building adaptive capacity and resilience. Noting lack of progress in formulating and implementing NAPs, COP 24 embarked on a renewed push for adaptation action in collaboration with the LDC Expert Group (LEG) and the AC. 

Parties met in informal consultations co-facilitated by Antwi-Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) and Oliver Gales (Australia) on 18 and 19 June, among others, basing discussions on draft text forwarded from CMA 6. The EU underscored the importance of having NAPs in place by 2025. The G-77/CHINA welcomed the integration of NAP progress indicators in the GGA, and tabled a conference room paper (CRP) with additional subheadings for clustering. 

Outcome: The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 63 on the basis of the SBI 62 draft text with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 30.

Matters relating to LDCs: The LEG was established in 2001 to support developing countries in formulating and implementing NAPs. Its mandate has since been extended multiple times. The LEG meets twice a year to develop and review progress on the implementation of its work programme through a variety of modalities, including technical guidelines and papers, training activities, and workshops.

Convening on, among others, 18 and 20 June, informal consultations were facilitated by Ephraim Shitima (Zambia) and Rik den Hoedt (Netherlands). The LDCs noted with “profound disappointment” that many of them continue to face barriers in accessing finance for formulating and implementing NAPs, stressing the lack of resources is “not just frustrating but demoralizing.” Parties also discussed: the report of the LEG’s 47th meeting in February 2025; the LEG’s draft updated technical guidelines for the NAP process; and LEG collaboration with other constituted bodies.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.5), the SBI, among others: 

• welcomes the LEG’s ongoing efforts in integrating a gender perspective into its work and engaging all relevant partners and stakeholders, including Indigenous Peoples and local communities;
• requests the LEG to hold additional consultations with parties on updating the technical guidelines for the NAP process; and
• notes with concern that LDCs continue to experience challenges, complexities and delays in accessing funding from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) for formulating and implementing NAPs, and requests the LEG to continue formulating recommendations on ways to address these challenges.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme: The MWP was established in 2021 to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation in this critical decade. It holds at least two global dialogues every year, as well as investment-focused events. It also provides a space for parties to discuss mitigation-related topics and adopt decisions that can guide further mitigation action in specific sectors. CMA 5 requested the SBs to consider progress in implementing the work programme at each of their sessions from SB 60 to 65, but parties were unable to conclude consideration of this matter at SB 61, and continued their discussions at this session.

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Ursula Fuentes Hutfilter (Germany) and Maesela John Kekana (South Africa), and took place on 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, and 26 June. Among other things, parties considered the creation of a digital platform to facilitate implementation of mitigation actions, as mandated by decision 2/CMA.6 (MWP), and elements of a draft decision for consideration at CMA 7.

Regarding the creation of a digital platform, AOSIS and AILAC considered this would divert attention from the MWP’s core purpose, which is to scale up mitigation ambition. AOSIS pointed to similar platforms such as the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action Registry, and underscored that the challenge for SIDS is not inability to identify projects but lack of investor interest in such projects. The EU, the EIG, the UK, and CANADA cautioned against duplicating efforts, and called for assessments of existing tools and platforms to identify gaps and ascertain whether such tools can be adapted to achieve the desired objectives. On the other hand, the AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION expressed an interest in continuing to explore the potential of the platform, including through intersessional work ahead of Belém. 

On elements of a draft CMA 7 decision, parties also could not reach agreement, disagreeing on, among other things: reference to the digital platform; whether and how to capture key findings from the global dialogues; and continuation of the MWP. AOSIS underlined that the MWP is not delivering on its mandate to scale up mitigation ambition and implementation to achieve the 1.5°C target and called on major emitters to act with urgency. AILAC lamented the lack of any substantial outcome from the five dialogues held under the MWP so far. They urged aligning the MWP with the GST outcomes, and noted the need to discuss key emission drivers. INDIA stressed the MWP is not failing and highlighted that while many developing countries already have ambitious targets they are not receiving sufficient support to achieve them. The AFRICAN GROUP, LMDCs, and ARAB GROUP emphasized the MWP must not set any new targets.

Outcome: The SBs agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 63, noting the informal note from SB 62.

Work Programme under the Framework for Non-Market Approaches referred to in Paris Agreement Article 6.8: Article 6.8 of the Paris Agreement relates to climate cooperation that does not involve any transfer or trade in the resulting mitigation outcomes among countries. It defines a framework for non-market approaches (NMAs), which aim to assist parties in the implementation of their NDCs and to promote mitigation and adaptation ambition, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. 

A contact group co-chaired by Jacqueline Ruesga (New Zealand) and Nikita Charles Hamilton (The Bahamas) considered this matter on, among others, 21 June. Parties considered, among other issues, whether to organize a dedicated session at CMA 7 to consider specific NMAs. The Secretariat also provided an update on the status of development of the NMA Platform, highlighting the recording of two NMAs and registration of 23 support providers on the platform.

Outcome: The SBSTA agreed to forward this matter to SB 63 for further consideration.

Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport: This agenda item was considered in the SBSTA opening plenary on 17 June, when the SBSTA took note of the submission of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the submission of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). It was further considered in informal consultations co-facilitated by Jakob Wiesbauer-Lenz (Austria) and Francis Mwangi (Kenya), on, among others, 18 June, during which parties heard reports from ICAO and the IMO.

Outcome: The SBSTA agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBSTA 63.

Matters relating to the operation of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): The CDM is a market mechanism established under the Kyoto Protocol. Discussions under this item focused on two main issues: the timelines and process for discontinuing or “sunsetting” the CDM; and management of the CDM’s financial resources, including transferring funds from the CDM Trust Fund to other areas. Informal consultations co-facilitated by Kate Hancock (Australia) and Alick Muvundika (Zambia) took place on, among others, 19 June.

On timelines for the “CDM sunset,” the EU, the UK, AOSIS, JAPAN, NORWAY, and NEW ZEALAND supported the earliest technically-feasible dates, while the LMDCs and AFRICAN GROUP preferred the latest possible dates. BRAZIL noted the Article 6 rules are now clear, and acknowledged the time to conclude the CDM is approaching but reserved further comments. Parties also had divergent views regarding the destination of leftover CDM Trust Fund resources, with the main options being: a transfer to the Adaptation Fund; support for Article 6-related issues; capacity building; or a combination of these.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.2), the SBSTA agrees to forward this matter to CMP 20 for consideration on the basis of the draft text prepared by the co-facilitators. The SBSTA also requests the Secretariat to provide an update, at SBSTA 63, on the status of funds available in the CDM Trust Fund and an assessment of the costs and available resources associated with different end dates for the CDM.

Loss and Damage

Joint annual report of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) and the Santiago Network: Established in 2013, the WIM is the constituted body tasked with implementing mandates related to loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme and slow-onset events, in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The WIM Executive Committee (ExCom) implements its work through a five-year rolling workplan and oversees the work of five thematic expert groups. In 2019, parties established the Santiago Network to catalyze technical assistance on loss and damage. 

At CMA 4, it was decided that the annual reports of the ExCom and Santiago Network would be considered jointly. The Santiago Network’ first annual report contains information on requests received and activities carried out, their outcomes, support and assistance delivered, as well as recommendations from its Advisory Board, taking into consideration challenges and lessons learned during the reporting period, from 7 March – 6 September 2024. Parties failed to reach consensus on the consideration of the first joint annual report at COP 29/CMA 6 and deferred the matter to SB 62. 

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Pasha Carruthers (Cook Islands) and Cornelia Jaeger (Austria) and took place on, among others, 18 and 25 June. Parties agreed to prioritize the 2024 review of the WIM and agreed that the co-facilitators prepare a short draft decision text based on elements proposed by the G-77/CHINA to welcome the work of the ExCom, Santiago Network, their respective governing bodies, and the Network’s “organizations, bodies, networks, and experts,” and take note of the joint annual report.

Outcome: In their conclusions (FCCC/SB/2025/L.1), the SBs recommend a draft decision for consideration by the appropriate body or bodies at their November 2025 sessions, which, inter alia, takes note of the joint annual report. 

2024 Review of the WIM: Under this joint SB agenda item, parties were mandated to reflect the outcome of the third review of the WIM, originally scheduled to take place at COP 29/CMA 6 in November 2024 where parties failed to reach consensus and deferred the matter to SB 62. 

Informal consultations were co-facilitated by Pasha Carruthers (Cook Islands) and Cornelia Jaeger (Austria) and took place on, among others, 18, 20, 24, and 25 June. Parties agreed to structure the draft decision text based on headings from an informal note from the meeting in Baku, and through informal informals converged around many of the provisions to be included. They reached further convergence on issues relating to: enhancing implementation; complementarity and coordination; accessibility and outreach;  addressing loss and damage in NDCs; creating a pipeline for technical assistance requests; streamlining and simplifying access to technical assistance; and the relationship with the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage. 

Divergence persisted until the end of the session over placeholders related to, among others: guidelines for national loss and damage plans; methodologies to quantify loss and damage needs and costs; scaling up finance; and a report on the state of loss and damage. A key point of contention related to the inclusion of a placeholder on the cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network’s Secretariat.

Outcome: The SBs agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 63 on the basis of the informal note from SB 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision or decisions for consideration by the appropriate body or bodies at the session(s) in November 2025.

Finance

Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund: The Adaptation Fund was established in 2001 to finance adaptation projects in developing country parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. It is financed, in part, by a share of proceeds from CDM activities. In 2016 parties decided that the Adaptation Fund shall also serve the Paris Agreement. This agenda item was considered in informal consultations on 19, 20, 21, 24, and 25 June, co-facilitated by Claire Holzer Fleming (UK) and Isatou Camara (The Gambia). 

Parties exchanged views on: the Fund’s fifth review; membership of the Fund’s Board; and arrangements for the Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement. Parties achieved progress with regard to the consideration of Trustee and secretariat arrangements. Parties also considered issues relating to the Fund Board’s composition, specifically regarding changing the terminology of “Annex I and non-Annex I parties to the Convention” to “developed and developing country parties,” respectively, in the context of the Fund’s transition to exclusively serving the Paris Agreement. Parties converged on using the terms of reference of the previous review for the fifth review, but diverged on its timing, specifically whether to delay it until the transition is complete. While AOSIS and the LDCs supported commencing the review immediately under the CMP, even if it would only be concluded under the CMA once the transition is complete, others, such as the AFRICAN GROUP and the UK, preferred undertaking the entire review under a single governing body—the CMA—after the transition. 

Outcome: The SBI continued consideration of matters relating to the membership of the Adaptation Fund Board, and additionally considered the matter of the arrangements for the Adaptation Fund to exclusively serve the Paris Agreement, as well as the initiation of the fifth review of the Adaptation Fund. The SBI agreed to continue consideration of these matters at SBI 63 on the basis of work conducted at SBI 62. The SBI noted that this work does not prejudge the number of draft decisions that parties may wish to consider on these matters.

Implementation of Paris Agreement Article 9.1: As part of the compromise reached for the adoption of the agendas on 17 June, the SB Chairs held substantive consultations on Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ finance provision commitment) on 23 June, to consider substantive elements regarding its implementation. Opening the consultations, the SB Chairs pointed to bilateral consultations with parties and noted divergent views on the need for a standalone agenda item on Article 9.1.

The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, AFRICAN GROUP, and others lamented developed countries’ lack of political will to implement their legal obligation under Paris Agreement Article 9.1 and UNFCCC Article 4.3 (provision of new and additional financial resources by developed countries). They supported a standalone item on Article 9.1, opposed by the EU, EIG, AUSTRALIA, and others. The EIG, the UK, NEW ZEALAND, and others pointed to existing finance-related agenda items that include consideration of Article 9.1, such as the Standing Committee on Finance.

The LMDCs, supported by the ARAB GROUP and others, proposed a work programme on the modalities for implementing Article 9.1, that covers, among others, tripling of adaptation finance, public finance support for the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage, and predictability of support. The ARAB GROUP called for space to discuss burden-sharing arrangements, standardized accounting methodologies, and transformation of budgetary processes.

The EIG, supported by ICELAND, JAPAN, and CANADA, proposed a package of three new agenda items: a CMA agenda item on implementation of Article 9; a COP agenda item on implementation of UNFCCC Article 4.3; and an SBI agenda item on finance-related matters to prepare for the COP and CMA discussions. They said these would replace all finance-related items except those relating to guidance to the operating entities of the Financial Mechanism. The EU stressed focusing on Article 9.1 will limit the scope to scale up climate finance and called for more holistic discussions under Article 9, noting the importance of finance mobilization and enabling environments.

During the SBs’ closing plenary on 26 June, SBSTA Chair Ayebare noted the SB Chairs will report on their consultations at SB 63.

Dialogue on the scope of Paris Agreement Article 2.1(c) and its complementarity with Article 9: Article 2.1(c) of the Paris Agreement sets out the overarching goal of making finance flows consistent with a pathway toward low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development, while Article 9 deals with parties’ obligations in relation to climate finance. The relationship between the two provisions has been the subject of debate. In 2022, parties established a dedicated dialogue that holds at least one workshop per year. The first workshop in 2025 convened from 17–19 June. Discussions held at the workshop will be captured in a report for consideration by CMA 7.

Global Stocktake

Procedural and logistical elements of the overall Global Stocktake process: The GST is a collective assessment of efforts and results on all areas of the Paris Agreement. It is intended to inform the development of NDCs. The first GST concluded at CMA 5 in Dubai, where parties also agreed to review their experiences to improve how future GSTs will function. As parties could not reach agreement on this matter in Baku, CMA 6 requested SB 62 to continue discussions on the basis of an informal note with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by CMA 7. 

Informal consultations co-facilitated by Kishan Kumarsingh (Trinidad and Tobago) and Patrick Spicer (Canada) took place on 18, 19, and 25 June, among others.

On sources of scientific input, AOSIS, the LDCs, the AFRICAN GROUP, AILAC, the UK, and others, opposed by the LMDCs and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, highlighted the IPCC’s role as the main source of scientific information for the GST. They supported requesting the IPCC to align the timing of its assessment reports with the GST process and opposed calls for “balancing IPCC and non-IPCC sources,” while noting the relevance of other sources. CHINA underlined the need for a diversity of scientific input. The LMDCs stressed that scientific information must include local knowledge and developing country sources.

On scope, AOSIS, AILAC, and the LDCs called for addressing loss and damage as a standalone thematic area within the GST. The GROUP OF MOUNTAIN PARTNERSHIP proposed mountains as a thematic focus. Many parties, including the AFRICAN GROUP, the EIG, MALAYSIA, CHINA, and others, preferred retaining the scope agreed at CMA 1, while allowing consideration of emerging issues. 

The EU and the UK, opposed by INDIA, TÜRKIYE, and CHINA, suggested allowing overlap between the technical and political phases of the GST.

Outcome: The SBs agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SB 63 on the basis of the draft text from SB 62, with a view to CMA 7 concluding consideration.

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5: This dialogue was established in the GST decision (1/CMA.5) adopted in 2024. At SB 60, parties began to discuss the operationalization of the dialogue, including its modalities, and strongly diverged in their views on its expected scope. Some underscored that the dialogue is established in the finance section of the GST decision, and should therefore focus on finance. Many others considered that it should track the implementation of all GST outcomes, not only finance. Accordingly, parties also debated the placement of this item on the CMA agenda, specifically whether to consider it under matters relating to finance or matters relating to the GST. 

Informal consultations co-facilitated by Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) and Patrick Spicer (Canada) were held on 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25 June. 

Divergences persisted on the scope, format, and outputs of the dialogue. On scope, the EU, LDCs, AOSIS, AUSTRALIA, and the UK called for a broad scope that spans all elements of the GST decision and reflects progress in implementing it, with AUSTRALIA and others stressing the dialogue should not be “just a talk shop.” The LMDCs emphasized the dialogue should not be a mechanism to assess collective progress, or track implementation of NDCs or the entire GST, and should instead focus on strengthening enablers and identifying disenablers such as unilateral measures that redirect financial flows away from developing countries. 

On the dialogue’s format, many parties supported holding the first session of the dialogue at CMA 7, and subsequently annually during the June SB meetings. The EU and UK also proposed holding an annual ministerial dialogue. In terms of outputs, parties debated references to reports and CMA decisions thereon.

The co-facilitators prepared several iterations of an informal note containing draft CMA decision text. However, parties were not able to agree on forwarding any single version of the informal note to SBI 63 for further consideration. The co-facilitators therefore proposed compiling two versions of the text into an overarching informal note to form the basis of discussions in Belém and parties supported this proposal. 

Outcome: The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 63 on the basis of the informal note prepared at SBI 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by CMA 7.

Reporting

Greenhouse Gas Data Interface: The GHG data interface is an online tool to facilitate access, searching, and sorting of information provided by parties. SBSTA 61 requested the Secretariat to prepare a workplan, to be presented for consideration at SBSTA 62, for further developing the GHG data interface, incorporating data and information reported by parties under the Convention, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement. Informal consultations on this matter were co-facilitated by Daniela Romano (Italy) and Fredrick Ouma (Kenya).

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.4), the SBSTA requests the Secretariat to further develop the GHG data interface using the infrastructure of the climate data hub, and to develop and publish the modules outlined in the presentation made at this session. The SBSTA also decides to consider additional modules at SBSTA 64.

Reporting from Annex I Parties to the Convention: Compilations and syntheses of biennial reports: The Secretariat prepares compilation and synthesis reports on the information reported by Annex I parties in their biennial reports. Informal consultations on this agenda item were co-facilitated by Marina Vitullo (Italy) and Tian Wang (China). Parties debated whether to simply take note of the information provided in the reports or note specific insights, including a projected increase of Annex I parties’ emissions by 0.5% between 2020 and 2030 and a slower increase in climate finance in 2017–2018 and 2019–2020.

Outcome: The SBI adopted procedural conclusions, in which it agreed to include this matter in the provisional agenda for SBI 63 on the understanding that it would be held in abeyance at that session. 

Reports on national GHG inventory data: The Secretariat prepares an annual report containing the latest information on GHG inventory data submitted by Annex I parties for consideration by the COP and its SBs. Informal consultations on this item were co-facilitated by Marina Vitullo (Italy) and Tian Wang (China). During the SBI closing plenary on Thursday, 26 June, ARGENTINA reiterated their position that the Malvinas Islands, South Sandwich Islands, and South Georgia are under illegal occupation by the UK and objected to disputed territories’ inclusion in the UK’s inventory data report. The UK objected to these claims, pointing to these territories’ right to self-determination. 

Outcome: The SBI welcomed the reports on national greenhouse gas inventory data for 1990–2021 (FCCC/SBI/2023/15) and for 1990–2022 (FCCC/SBI/2024/17/Rev.1) and took note of the information therein.

Reporting From Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention: Information contained in national communications: Informal consultations on this matter were co-facilitated by Xiang Gao (China) and Hans Kolshus (Norway). Debates centered on the need to avoid duplication of work given the scope of other reports, with some calling for concluding the consideration of this matter.

Outcome: The SBI agreed to include this matter in the SBI 63 provisional agenda on the understanding that it would be held in abeyance at that session.

Provision of financial and technical support: This item relates to the provision of support for developing countries for implementing the measurement, reporting, and verification arrangements under the Convention. Informal consultations on this item were co-facilitated by Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark) and Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) and took place on, among others, 23 June.

During the discussions, the G-77/CHINA disagreed with the idea that jointly submitting national communications and biennial transparency reports (BTRs) necessarily increases efficiency. They further: called for reflecting persistent challenges in accessing resources; supported recommending that the COP encourage the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) to consider the lessons learned from providing support to non-Annex I parties; and emphasized the need for continued consideration of this agenda item. 

AUSTRALIA and the EU highlighted the importance of references to support available to enable the transition from biennial update reports to BTRs. Urging the prioritization of discussions on BTRs and the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE), AUSTRALIA, supported by CANADA, suggested considering the item again at SB 69 and every four years thereafter.

Outcome: The SBI agreed to continue consideration thereof at SBI 63 taking into account the informal note from SBI 62.

Summary reports on the technical analysis of biennial update reports: The SBI took note of the summary reports.

Terms, Composition, and Terms of Reference of the Consultative Group of Experts: The CGE assists developing countries in their reporting. Through its decision 14/CP.26, COP 26 requested SBI 62 to initiate consideration of the extension of the CGE’s term beyond 2026, as well as the composition of the CGE and its terms of reference. Informal consultations on this item were co-facilitated by Xiang Gao (China) and Hans Kolshus (Norway) and took place on 20 and 24 June.

The G-77/CHINA emphasized the existence of the CGE should not be jeopardized by lack of agreement on a possible revision of its terms of reference. JAPAN and the UK supported an extension of the CGE until 2029, while the ARAB GROUP, LMDCs, and LDCs called for extending its term until otherwise decided by the COP, making it a permanent constituted body. The EU supported an extension until 2032. AOSIS, the EU, AUSTRALIA, and CANADA, opposed by the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs, urged updating the CGE’s composition. The EU emphasized the importance for CGE members to remain in office until their successors are elected. 

The G-77/CHINA emphasized, among others, the importance of continued support for the preparation of biennial update reports and for the CGE to support an increase in the pool of developing country experts through targeted outreach and training initiatives. 

On the CGE’s terms of reference, parties debated how to emphasize a focus on support for the transition from biennial update reports to BTRs while maintaining a mandate for the CGE to support reporting under the Convention. The UK and AUSTRALIA supported, and the G-77/CHINA opposed, that draft conclusions refer to CMA 7 considering the matter with a view to adopting a decision. The ARAB GROUP noted that the CGE serving the CMA does not mean there is a mandate for a CMA decision.

Outcome: The SBI initiated consideration of the extension of the term of the CGE after 2026, the composition of the CGE, and its terms of reference, taking into account the needs of developing countries for capacity building in relation to reporting under the Convention and the Paris Agreement, and agreed to continue consideration of these matters at SBI 63, taking into account the draft text from SBI 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30.

Provision of Financial and Technical Support to Developing Countries for Reporting and Capacity Building under the Paris Agreement: Discussions on this item focused on addressing the challenges faced by developing countries in implementing the ETF. Informal consultations co-facilitated by Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) and Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark) were held on 19 and 23 June. 

Parties welcomed the work of the Secretariat on this matter. The G-77/CHINA underscored the importance of problem solving with the GEF and its implementing agencies. As textual elements for a CMA decision, the AFRICAN GROUP proposed a call for parties to provide submissions after the second BTRs and a workshop to exchange experiences. They suggested clarifying, under this item, gaps in GEF support and liaising with finance negotiators to reflect on the type of GEF guidance that would help address them. The LMDCs suggested simplifying approval processes for accessing reporting support, with AILAC suggesting standards for and enhanced coordination among the GEF implementing agencies that provide transparency support.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.6), the SBI:

• invites parties to submit, before CMA 7, reflections on certain mandated activities such as the Climate Transparency Platform, regional workshops, facilitative dialogues, summary reports, submissions and synthesis reports;
• requests the Secretariat to organize a workshop at SBI 63 for parties to reflect on the above mandated activities, with a view to considering future activities under this agenda item, including a dialogue with the GEF and its implementing agencies; and
• agrees to continue consideration of this matter at SBI 63, taking into account the preliminary list of activities in the informal note from SBI 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption at CMA 7.

Technology and Capacity Building

Alignment between the review of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and the periodic assessment of the Technology Mechanism: The SBI deferred consideration of this matter to SBI 64.

Review of the Functions of the Climate Technology Centre: The Climate Technology Centre (CTC) was established in 2010 as the implementation arm of the Technology Mechanism (TM) and has been operational since 2013. Hosted by the UN Environment Programme, it provides technology solutions, capacity building, and advice on policy, legal, and regulatory frameworks tailored to the needs of individual countries. COP 29 decided to conduct a review of the CTC’s functions and decide whether to extend its term and CMA 6 decided to participate in conducting the review and in deciding whether to extend the term. COP 29 and CMA 6 requested SBI 62 to initiate the review, with a view to COP 30 and CMA7 adopting decisions.

Informal consultations on this item convened on, among others, 19 and 25 June, and were co-facilitated by Pemy Gasela (South Africa) and Stig Svenningsen (Norway). Parties debated the definition of criteria for the host selection and whether to amend the CTC’s functions.

Outcome: The SBI agrees to continue consideration of this item at SBI 63 on the basis of the draft text from SBI 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30 and CMA 7. The SBI also agrees to consider criteria relating to selecting a host for the CTC at SBI 63 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 30 and CMA 7.

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism: This item considers the potential links, collaboration, and cooperation between the TM and the Financial Mechanism (FM). Informal consultations on, among others, 21 and 25 June, were co-facilitated by Peter Govindasamy (Singapore) and Céline Phillips (France). Parties discussed: how and whether to provide guidance to the GEF and the GCF; the need for consolidated data and a technical report on linkages between the TM and the FM; and when to continue consideration of this item.

Outcome: The SBI agreed to continue consideration of this matter at its SBI 63 based on draft text with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30.

Technology implementation programme (TIP): This new programme was established in the GST decision (1/CMA.5) to strengthen support for the implementation of technology priorities identified by developing countries and address the challenges identified in the first periodic assessment of the TM.

Informal consultations co-facilitated by Elfriede More (Austria) and Omar Alcock (Jamaica) convened on 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 25 June. Discussions proceeded on the basis of draft text from CMA 6. Disagreement emerged over the TIP’s scope and mandate. NORWAY, the EU, CANADA, the UK, and JAPAN highlighted that the TIP should respond to the outcomes of the GST, with several emphasizing the energy-related calls. CHINA and the ARAB GROUP opposed. CHILE cautioned against repeating the experiences with the MWP and objected to singling out specific paragraphs of the GST decision. Several parties urged a focus on new and emerging technologies such as: artificial intelligence; early warning systems; hydrogen; and carbon capture, utilization, and storage. BRAZIL and the EU preferred for the TIP to be “technologically agnostic.” CHINA proposed setting “strategic and quantifiable” goals for the TIP, which the EU, UK, and CANADA opposed.

Developing countries ultimately rejected the text prepared by the co-facilitators, saying that it did not adequately capture the views expressed in the room. 

During the closing plenary, speaking to all technology items, CHILE called for technology development and transfer to be placed at the forefront of climate action. The EU expressed disappointment that progress made on the TIP could not be captured.

Outcome: During the closing plenary, SBI Chair Gardiner noted that parties were unable to come to an agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, this item will be included in the SB 63 agenda.

Matters relating to Capacity Building: The 9th meeting of the Paris Committee on Capacity-building convened from 23–25 June. In informal consultations co-facilitated by Cristina Carreiras (Portugal) and Binyam Yacob Gebreyes (Ethiopia), parties discussed: initiating the fifth comprehensive review of the implementation of the capacity-building framework established under the Convention, on the basis of the terms of reference (ToR) developed at COP 29; and developing the ToR for the fifth comprehensive review under the Kyoto Protocol. 

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.2), the SBI:

• reiterates outstanding gaps and needs for capacity building in developing countries;
• notes that further efforts are needed to address current and emerging capacity-building gaps and needs related to implementing the Paris Agreement in developing countries and that parties frequently report gaps and needs in areas that are outside the current scope of the framework for capacity building in developing countries as it pertains to the Convention; and
• agrees to continue consideration of the reviews with respect to the Convention and Kyoto Protocol at SBI 63 taking into account draft text prepared by the co-facilitators, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration and adoption by COP 30 and CMP 20. 

Other Issues

Just Transition Work Programme: CMA 4 established the JTWP in recognition that sustainable and just solutions to the climate crisis must be founded on meaningful and effective social dialogue and participation of all stakeholders and that the global transition to low emissions provides opportunities and challenges for sustainable economic development and poverty eradication. The work programme organizes dialogues as well as an annual high-level ministerial event to discuss just and equitable transition pathways that include energy, socio-economic, workforce, and other dimensions. 

As part of the compromise reached for the adoption of the agendas, parties had reached an understanding that issues related to trade-restrictive unilateral measures will be discussed in relevant agenda items, including the JTWP. Discussions were undertaken in a contact group co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore) held on 18, 19, 20, 24, and 25 June. 

The ARAB GROUP highlighted measures to address and mitigate the impact of unilateral measures as a key cross-cutting issue, and said that addressing unilateral measures does not undermine progress under other elements. The AFRICAN GROUP emphasized reflecting the diversity of national priorities and development pathways, and stressed the need for international cooperation, technology transfer, and finance. The EU supported language that encourages parties to include just transition pathways in the development and implementation of their NDCs and NAPs.

As elements to contextualize the JTWP, parties suggested language on, among others: the facilitative nature of the JTWP; international cooperation and the importance of MoI; trade-restrictive unilateral measures; 1.5°C-aligned pathways; and human rights, and Indigenous Peoples as rights holders.

On key messages emerging from the dialogues held under the JTWP, parties highlighted, among others:

• the importance of facilitating access to energy and clean cooking;
• challenges related to limited access to technology and finance;
• importance of social dialogue, stakeholder engagement, and labor rights;
• challenges of transitioning away from fossil fuels and the need to focus on low-carbon development;
• the role of critical minerals;
• consideration of internally-displaced persons and the most vulnerable; and
• the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including those in voluntary isolation and no contact.

On synergies within the UNFCCC, parties identified links with adaptation discussions, as well as the MWP and the dialogue on implementing the GST outcomes, highlighting the need for coherence and international cooperation. JAPAN proposed inviting the Katowice Committee of Experts on the Impacts of the Implementation of Response Measures (KCI) to integrate elements of the JTWP into its work. On synergies across the UN system and beyond, CHINA suggested a joint event with the World Trade Organization on the impact of unilateral cross-border measures. JAPAN suggested work on implementing just transition pathways in collaboration with the International Labour Organization.

Parties debated whether to point to socio-economic opportunities associated with transitioning away from fossil fuels in the context of facilitating universal access to clean, reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy for all, which the LMDCs opposed, preferring to point to “the use of fossil fuels.”

Observer organizations also provided input to the discussions, calling for:

• reference to the need for a clear and time-bound roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels; 
• establishment of an action mechanism for just transition, that accelerates, consolidates, and achieves holistic just transition across the whole economy;
• institutional arrangements that prioritize accountability and inclusive participation of youth and other stakeholders, enable action on the ground, and ensure Indigenous Peoples’ direct access to climate finance; and
• climate policy measures that foster fair competition and unlock opportunities for all.

TRADE UNION NGOs questioned reference in the text to “workers affected by just transitions,” noting that just transition is the solution, not a problem, and if workers are affected, then it is not a just transition.

Outcome: The SBs welcomed the third hybrid-format dialogue under the work programme, and agreed to continue consideration of the JTWP implementation at SB 63, taking note of the informal note prepared at SB 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by CMA 7.

Matters relating to the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures under the Convention, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement: Discussions on “response measures” address the side-effects of climate action, especially with regard to the socio-economic consequences of mitigation measures. The Forum, established by COP 16, serves as a platform to share information, experiences, and best practices on the impact of the implementation of response measures, with a view to recommending specific action. The Forum and its KCI, which was established in 2018, currently implement a six-year work plan for 2026–2030, adopted at COP 29, alongside the Forum’s own annual workplan. 

A mandated event was held on 16 June, highlighting experiences in economic diversification, workforce transition, and response measures impact assessment. 

 Discussions were also taken up in a contact group co-chaired by Xolisa Ngwadla (Botswana) and Annela Anger-Kraavi (Estonia) on 19, 20 and 26 June. Parties expressed divergent views on the Forum’s mandate, including its consideration of matters relating to the KCI. Other key points of contention concerned discussion of unilateral trade measures and a global dialogue on response measures.

The G-77/CHINA, opposed by AUSTRALIA, CANADA, and the UK, proposed including unilateral trade measures as a fifth priority area for the Forum and KCI. The AFRICAN GROUP proposed including unilateral trade measures in the Forum’s programme. The EU opposed, indicating unwillingness to go beyond agreed language in Decision 16/CP.29 relating to cross-border impacts of measures taken to combat climate change. JAPAN identified the World Trade Organization as the appropriate forum to discuss unilateral trade measures. CANADA and the UK sought to wait for the KCI’s annual report before considering further issues to be included into the workplan. 

Regarding the G-77/CHINA’s proposal to start work on draft decision text regarding the global dialogue, the UK opposed, noting there is no mandate to start drafting decision text at SB 62.

Outcome: In their conclusions (FCCC/SB/2025/L.3), the SBs: 

• request the KCI to prioritize implementation of activities 2, 5–13 and 16–17 of the Forum and KCI workplan for 2026-2030;
• note the CRP from SB 62 and invite parties’ submissions by 30 September 2025 for consideration at SB 63; and 
• agree to continue their work at SB 63 on the basis of the CRP, taking into account the submissions, with a view to recommending a draft decision for consideration by COP 30, CMP 20, and CMA 7.

Gender: In 2014, COP 20 established the Lima work programme on gender (LWPG) to advance gender balance and integrate gender considerations under the UNFCCC to achieve gender-responsive climate policy and action. Parties established a first gender action plan (GAP) in 2017, and following a review in 2019, agreed to a five-year enhanced LWPG and its GAP, amended in 2022. After a subsequent review, COP 29 decided to extend the enhanced LWPG for 10 years and to initiate the development of a new GAP.

A three-day in-session technical workshop to facilitate the design of GAP activities was held from 16–19 June and included scene-setting presentations, followed by interactive discussions to reflect on activities in the existing action plan. Negotiations under this SBI agenda item aimed to develop key elements and activities for the new GAP to be forwarded for consideration and adoption in Belém. This matter was addressed in informal consultations, co-facilitated by Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) and Jared Huntley (Australia), which convened on 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25 June.

Many parties commended the technical workshop and stressed, among other things, that the new GAP should be: pragmatic and implementable; ambitious and action-oriented; well-resourced; intersectional; respectful of cultural values and national circumstances and priorities; and aligned with key milestones of the UNFCCC process. 

Among others, parties highlighted the following elements for the GAP: MoI; recognition of women and girls of African descent; role of men and boys in gender-responsive climate action; gender-, sex-, and age-disaggregated data; sexual and reproductive health and rights; gender-based violence; unpaid and underpaid care work; and decent work for women in green and blue economies.

The G-77/CHINA proposed a standalone priority area on MoI separate from implementation. AOSIS, supported by CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, and MEXICO, suggested highlighting Indigenous women as agents of change, and, with CANADA, MEXICO, and AUSTRALIA, sought to disambiguate references to Indigenous women from those to local communities throughout the text.

Divergences on gender terminology persisted throughout the discussions. PARAGUAY and ARGENTINA, opposed by CANADA, ICELAND, and AILAC, sought to define gender “as female and male sexes.” SAUDI ARABIA, opposed by the EU, AILAC, CANADA, UK, and BRAZIL, and supported by CHINA, called for deletion of references to “gender-diverse” people. The HOLY SEE called for language “reflective of different views on gender.”

Many parties supported intersessional work, with AILAC and the AFRICAN GROUP emphasizing support for regional groups’ participation.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.3), the SBI agrees to continue discussions at SB 63 on the basis of the informal note from SB 62, with a view to recommending a draft decision on the new GAP for adoption by COP 30, noting that in-person or hybrid technical workshops to facilitate the design of GAP activities may be held during 2025 in conjunction with other events.

Joint Work on Agriculture and Food Security: To recognize the role of agriculture in tackling and adapting to climate change, this joint work was first established in 2017. The current four-year Joint Work on Implementation of Climate Action on Agriculture and Food Security kicked off in 2022. It focuses on the preparation of an annual synthesis report on agriculture-relevant work undertaken by constituted bodies, the organization of workshops, and the development of an online portal for parties to share information on relevant projects and initiatives. Informal consultations under this item were co-facilitated by Tekini Nakidakida (Fiji) and Claudia Heidecke (Germany).

Outcome: In their conclusions (FCCC/SB/2025/L.2), the SBs, among others:

• welcome relevant reports and workshops;
• request the Secretariat to present, in the second annual synthesis report to be considered at SB 64 (June 2026), clear and specific information on how constituted bodies and financial and other entities under the Convention, as well as relevant international organizations, have taken into account decision 3/CP.27 in their work;
• request the Secretariat to synthesize in the annual synthesis report, information on, inter alia, financial allocations and needs, and challenges in and barriers to accessing support for finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building relevant to climate action on agriculture and food security, considering the vulnerability of farmers and other groups vulnerable to climate change impacts, especially small-scale farmers, Indigenous Peoples, local communities, women, youth and children, and the measures taken to address such barriers;
• welcome the Secretariat’s template for submissions to the online portal and its further development to enable submissions to be further categorized by project; and
• invite stakeholders to submit information on their activities in relation to the joint work.

Research and Systematic Observation: The annual research dialogue that convenes at the June SBSTA sessions provides a space to convey research findings and lessons learned from activities undertaken by regional and international research programmes and organizations. It also serves to discuss needs for climate change research and research-related capacity building, particularly in developing countries. 

At the 17th meeting of the Research Dialogue held on 17 June, delegates heard an update from IPCC Chair Jim Skea on AR7, and key insights from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on its State of the Global Climate 2024 report, highlighting that 2024 was the warmest year on record.

In informal consultations co-facilitated by Patricia Nying’uro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland) convened on, among others, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 23 June, parties reflected on elements to be included in draft conclusions. Parties emphasized, among other things: the need to strengthen research capacities and address research needs of developing countries; greater consideration of Indigenous knowledge, with AUSTRALIA highlighting the need to distinguish between Indigenous and local knowledge; advances in attribution science; carbon accounting frameworks; and the need for a review of how research gaps identified by SBSTA have been addressed.

Views diverged on draft decision language on: the IPCC and AR7; the WMO report; references to 1.5°C and incremental warming; and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and abatement technologies. 

The EU suggested that the SBSTA not only welcome the update by the IPCC on its ongoing work, but welcome the work itself. KUWAIT called for deleting language encouraging the IPCC to “continue providing policy-relevant and timely scientific information for relevant work under the Convention and the Paris Agreement,” with KENYA, SAUDI ARABIA and BOTSWANA preferring not to restate the IPCC’s mandate, and INDIA suggested deleting only “policy-relevant and timely.” The LDCs, AOSIS, the UK, NORWAY, JAPAN and ICELAND sought to retain the language. 

With respect to strengthening research capacity, CHINA and KUWAIT called for a broader reference to developing countries, while LDCs and AOSIS preferred retaining specific language on LDCs and SIDS. The EU, supported by the UK, proposed flagging the “limits and risks” of CDR and abatement technologies, opposed by the ARAB GROUP who “emphasized a “pressing need to maximize their potential.” 

On the State of the Global Climate 2024 report, various countries suggested SBSTA note the WMO report “with great concern,” opposed by the ARAB GROUP who cautioned against “alarmist language.” The EU, supported by the LDCs, UK, and AUSTRALIA, sought to retain IPCC language on “every increment of warming,” while INDIA cited a lack of evidence on every increment of warming having compounding effects.

Agreement was still pending on the closing day. Despite lengthy discussions in informal consultations and informal informals, it took until the mid-afternoon for parties to find a resolution. During the closing plenary, CHILE expressed deep concern about the latest scientific findings on the state of the climate, particularly the alarming impacts on the cryosphere. They underscored that advancing policy-relevant science is fundamental and stressed that science must effectively inform climate action that is ambitious, relevant, and feasible for each nation’s unique circumstances.

Outcome: In its conclusions (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.5), the SBSTA, among others:

• welcomes the update on the ongoing work of the IPCC, including the launch of work on the AR7;
• encourages the IPCC to continue providing relevant information to parties and enhancing inclusivity and regional representation in its seventh assessment cycle;
• takes note of the WMO’s State of the Global Climate 2024 and Global Annual to Decadal Climate Update 2025–2029 reports, noting the information provided on changes in the global climate system, and referencing warming estimates between 1.34 and 1.41°C;
• notes needs and gaps, including in research, and the importance of urgently aligning adaptation and mitigation actions with sustainable development, including poverty eradication, noting synergies and trade-offs based on contexts and scale of implementation;
• notes the need to strengthen research capacities in developing countries, particularly in the LDCs and SIDS;
• requests the SBSTA Chair to prepare an informal summary report of the 17th Research Dialogue, and an information note, mapping how research gaps identified since SBSTA 22 on this item are being addressed by the scientific community and present this note at the next dialogue; and
• invites parties and relevant organizations to submit their views on possible themes for the dialogue.

Annual Dialogue on Ocean and Climate Change: During the two-day event that took place on 17–18 June, participants heard key messages from the third UN Ocean Conference, including the “Blue NDC Challenge,” which calls on all countries to place the Ocean at the heart of their NDCs. Experts identified pathways for bringing ocean action into NDCs, including by preserving blue carbon ecosystems such as mangroves and seagrass, and developing marine renewable energy. They stressed the critical importance of sustainable ocean planning, technology transfer, and access to data.

Cooperation with other International Organizations: SBSTA Chair Ayebare held consultations on this item on 25 June, recalling that parties had highlighted the need to enhance synergies and cooperation among the three Rio Conventions (climate change, biodiversity, and desertification). He proposed, and many parties supported, to continue consideration of this agenda item at SBSTA 63. Several parties also suggested a call for submissions to inform the discussions and noted that cooperation should be fostered beyond the Rio Conventions.

Outcome: In its conclusions, the SBSTA: 

• takes note of the information contained in document SBSTA/2025/INF.1, noting that the collaborations should be expanded beyond the existing ones for more inclusiveness;
• agrees to continue its consideration of this matter at SBSTA 63; and
• invites submissions by 30 September 2025.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings: This agenda item considers the organization of COP 30; potential hosts for COP 31, COP 32, and COP 33; and increasing efficiency in the UNFCCC process, for which the Secretariat had prepared an information paper. A contact group co-chaired by Laurence Ahoussou (Canada) and Kristina Stege (Marshall Islands) took place on 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 26 June, among others. 

On potential hosts for future meetings, AUSTRALIA and TÜRKIYE reiterated their bids to host COP 31 and the African region reported that Nigeria has declared itself as a possible host of COP 32, but that consultations are still ongoing. With regard to host country agreements, parties discussed, among others: provisions guaranteeing the human rights of all participants, including their freedom of speech and assembly; assurances regarding the availability and affordability of accommodation and logistical spaces for all participants; and for the agreements to be made publicly accessible.

On the elements for the provisional agendas for COP 30, CMP 20, and CMA 7, the LMDCs, supported by the ARAB GROUP, recalled they proposed two items for the agendas and requested the Secretariat to include their proposals in accordance with the rules of procedure. CHINA clarified that their concession at SB 62 does not extend to the provisional agendas for Belém. NEW ZEALAND, JAPAN, and others expressed concern about proposed additions to the agenda that could delay parties’ work in Belém. The AFRICAN GROUP noted their intention to propose an agenda item on the special circumstances and needs of Africa. The EU, supported by NEW ZEALAND and JAPAN, but opposed by the LMDCs, called for space on the CMA agenda to consider the NDC synthesis report and the BTRs. The EU, supported by the UK, AUSTRALIA, CANADA, and JAPAN, but opposed by the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs, requested that the dialogue on GST implementation be placed under GST matters on the CMA agenda.

On increasing efficiency in the UNFCCC process, the EIG suggested capping party delegations at 200 representatives; and requiring that items proposed for inclusion on the negotiations’ agenda be submitted by at least 30 parties from two regional groups. INDIA emphasized parties’ prerogative to propose agenda items. The ARAB GROUP opposed inviting parties to consider limiting the size of their delegations, noting this would advantage some over others. The EIG and AUSTRALIA agreed the focus should be on larger delegations, but these are not necessarily developed countries. ICELAND, supported by SOUTH AFRICA, proposed differentiating between party and party overflow in the rationalization of delegation size. Parties diverged on: clustering agenda items; multiyear and thematic programming; and the possibility to sunset the consideration of issues, such as those related to the Kyoto Protocol.

Parties also exchanged views on enhancing observer engagement. Regarding the collection of additional information on observer organizations, AUSTRALIA proposed expanding the scope to “relevant” additional information rather than limiting it to information on geographical scope. The ARAB GROUP, SOUTH AFRICA, and the LDCs opposed this, noting the purpose of such a request would be to ensure geographical balance and regional representation and questioned the rationale for an open-ended mandate to collect information. The UK suggested referencing “geographical and other information,” which could include age. CHINA, supported by the ARAB GROUP, opposed language on considering allowing observers to speak after groups of parties, before individual parties. 

The UK emphasized that the UNFCCC Secretariat must uphold freedom of assembly in the blue zone, with Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) and Youth NGOs (YOUNGOs) urging parties to require the Secretariat to not unduly restrict civil society messaging. WOMEN AND GENDER and YOUNGOs called for clarity about the complaints handling procedure and, with ENGOs, urged recognition of a disability constituency. CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK (CAN) and YOUNGOs called for measures to prevent “corporate capture” by requiring conflict of interest disclosure, with YOUNGOs pointing to measures adopted under the Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products.

Negotiations were still ongoing on the final day of the SBs. Parties debated, among others, a request by CHINA to highlight the importance of meeting participants respecting the national laws of the host country not only outside, but also inside of meeting venues. The Secretariat clarified that meeting venues are under UN jurisdiction and the responsibility of the UN, and that the Secretariat enters into agreements with host countries to specify the privileges and immunities applying in those venues. NORWAY, the LDCs, and many others opposed China’s proposed addition, underscoring that privileges and immunities are key to ensure the safety and security of all participants and that such a change could have significant implications, including beyond the UNFCCC process, possibly setting a precedent that will affect UN headquarters around the world.

Outcome: Noting the understanding that paragraph 23 (on respecting the national laws of the host country outside of UNFCCC venues) will be taken up again at SBI 63, the SBI adopted conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.7). In its conclusions, the SBI recommends that the Secretariat and hosts of future conferences and mandated events work together to:

• make logistical arrangements that facilitate the inclusive and effective participation of parties and observer organizations, including timely issuance of visas; a safe and secure venue for all; and ease of access to the venue;
• make sure that sufficient accommodation is available within a reasonable distance of the venue, and the safety and security of participants in those accommodations can be ensured;
• consider affordability measures, including flexible payment arrangements, relating to the price of accommodation; and
• consider affordability measures relating to delegation offices, the price of pavilion spaces, and services at the venue.

The SBI also: 

• notes parties’ and observer organizations’ views regarding host country agreements and requests that these agreements contain assurances with respect to the availability and affordability of accommodation and logistical space for delegations; and
• requests the Secretariat, in consultation with the conference host governments, to publish the legal text of the host country agreement on the UNFCCC website as soon as possible after entry into force, and encourages host governments to ensure that host country agreements enter into force as expeditiously as possible. 

The SBI further requests the Secretariat, subject to the availability of resources, to:

• continue implementing administrative measures to further improve the diverse and balanced participation of observer organizations across regions and constituencies in the UNFCCC process;
• collect additional information on the geographical scope of observer organizations to continue to support more balanced, equitable, and transparent approaches to improving their participation in UNFCCC sessions; and 
• continue to support freedom of speech and observer organizations’ ability to raise awareness of and contribute meaningfully to the UNFCCC process, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the Code of Conduct for UNFCCC events.

During the SBI closing plenary on 26 June, AUSTRALIA, supported by NEW ZEALAND, FRANCE, NORWAY, and SWITZERLAND, reiterated its bid to host COP 31 in close collaboration with Pacific island states. TÜRKIYE restated its bid to host COP 31 as a bridge between developed and developing countries. GERMANY, as chair of the Western European and Others Group, stated the group’s intention to nominate a candidate as soon as possible. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION stressed that any hosting offer would need to be adopted unanimously. 

Administrative, Financial, and Institutional Matters: This agenda item considered the UNFCCC programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027 (FCCC/SBI/2025/8, Add.1 and Add.2) with a view to the SBI recommending draft decisions for consideration and adoption by the governing bodies at their November 2025 sessions. Discussions were held in a contact group co-chaired by Pacifica F. Achieng Ogola (Kenya) and Georg Børsting (Norway). During the closing plenary, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION requested a written report of the implementation of the headquarters agreement to be published and considered as a separate agenda item at SBI 64.

Outcome: In its opening plenary, the SBI took note of the oral reports on the implementation of the headquarters agreement by the Secretariat and the Government of Germany and agreed to consider the matter again at SBI 66. A spin-off group convened on the international transaction log, but could not find agreement. In line with Rules 10(c) and 16 of the draft rules of procedure, the issue will be included in the agenda of SBI 63. In its conclusions (FCCC/SBI/2025/L.8), the SBI:

• recommends that COP 30 approve a core programme budget of EUR 81,516,062 for the biennium 2026–2027; and 
• recommends a draft decision for consideration and adoption at COP 30 (Add.1) and a draft decision for consideration and adoption by the CMP 20 (Add.2).

The draft COP decision, among others:

• notes the improvement of the methodology applied by the Secretariat in developing the programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027 compared with previous programme budgets, including the early engagement with parties and implementation of recommendations from the UN Board of Auditors;
• recalls its request to the Secretariat to prepare an information document after each COP session that presents activities mandated at that session and their respective cost implications for the information of parties and requests the Secretariat to produce budget documents that provide more clarity and transparency on total costs as well as the costs of activities associated with workstreams; and
• notes with appreciation the efforts of the Secretariat to implement efficiency measures and engage parties early in the development of the programme budget for the biennium 2026–2027 and requests the Secretariat to further enhance its efforts in identifying and implementing efficiency gains.

Closing Plenary

On Thursday, 26 June 2025, SBSTA Chair Ayebare opened the closing plenary.

The G-77/CHINA expressed concern over developed countries’ lack of engagement across several agenda items, particularly the TIP and response measures. They called for GGA indicators that respect national contexts and address MoI. They emphasized common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) and underscored the centrality of the Convention and the need for developed countries to fulfill their obligations under the Convention.

The EU called on the incoming Brazilian Presidency to lead all parties to a negotiated outcome that reflects the new NDC and BTR synthesis reports, demonstrates commitment, and inspires further action. They said the EU will submit a science-based 1.5°C-aligned NDC by September, showing how the EU implements the outcomes of the Global Stocktake, and underscored their commitment to deliver on the NCQG. They urged to preserve the balance achieved in Baku with regard to GGA indicators and highlighted the importance of an efficient UNFCCC process and the need for budgetary discipline.

The EIG lamented the pushback against science seen at SB 62. They urged ambitious NDCs that are collectively sufficient to achieve the 1.5°C goal. They further: urged the incoming Presidency to lead with urgency and deliver a 1.5°C action package, providing a response to the NDCs; highlighted the importance of a just transition toolbox that helps ground the 1.5°C-aligned NDCs; and stressed the WIM review must enhance global response to climate-induced loss and damage.

The LMDCs lamented developed countries’ resistance to: referencing MoI with regard to GGA indicators; clarifying how Article 9.1 will be implemented; and addressing disenablers such as unilateral trade measures. They called for injecting good faith in the process and stressed developed countries’ efforts to shift the burden of climate action onto developing countries is unacceptable and unethical.

BOLIVIA, CUBA, and VENEZUELA, members of the BOLIVARIAN ALLIANCE FOR THE PEOPLES OF OUR AMERICA (ALBA), called for political will to further the achievement of UNFCCC and Paris Agreement commitments, including by providing the necessary resources such as technology transfer and capacity building. They lamented the consequences on their countries of the imposition of unilateral coercive measures, which they consider “a crime against humanity.”

AOSIS denounced attacks on science, noting some parties seem to consider the mere mention of 1.5°C a red flag. They underscored there is no just transition without prioritization of 1.5°C, fossil fuel phase out, and access to renewable energy. They called for an action-oriented outcome on the WIM at COP 30 and underscored the need to enhance implementability, and accessible and adequate support for the GAP.

The LDCs lamented that parties are “steering away” from the 1.5°C goal, stressing that science is unequivocal. They called upon the incoming Presidency to “fix what was broken” in Baku by developing a roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion that brings about accountability, puts the most vulnerable at the center, and leads to a tripling of adaptation finance.

AILAC lamented a growing trend to weaken multilateralism for short-term economic interest and emphasized the need to defend the Paris Agreement. They highlighted human rights and a gender-responsive approach as key pillars for implementation and underscored the need for medium-term and high impact action to mobilize finance at the needed level. 

The AFRICAN GROUP expressed concern with the limited progress on technology and stressed access to affordable energy and clean cooking as a top priority, underscoring that mitigation ambition must be matched with support. They further urged predictable and quantified financial support for adaptation.

AUSTRALIA, CANADA, ICELAND, ISRAEL, JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY, UKRAINE, and the UK, members of the UMBRELLA GROUP, reiterated the call for all major economies to adopt ambitious and credible NDCs guided by the GST, underlining the economic and development opportunities of climate action and that every fraction of a degree matters. They asked the incoming Presidency to ensure a space in the negotiations to reflect on collective progress and discuss opportunities for collaboration. 

GRUPO SUR highlighted adaptation as a priority area for the region, calling for a substantive outcome on the GGA. They underscored the need to close the adaptation finance gap and urged effective and predictable climate finance that considers the needs of the most vulnerable countries.

The ARAB GROUP urged developed countries to abide by their financial commitments in accordance with Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement. They highlighted the need to explore all technologically feasible possibilities for carbon sequestration and clean hydrogen. They urged just transition must be nationally-led and underscored reducing the impacts of response measures as a priority for developing countries to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals and economic prosperity.

The GROUP OF MOUNTAIN PARTNERSHIP expressed disappointment that outcomes to date lack attention to elevation-dependent warming and fragile mountain ecosystems.

INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS stressed there cannot be justice if the rights of Indigenous Peoples, including those in voluntary isolation and initial contact, are violated, lamenting displacement due to the expansion of fossil fuel production. They urged: ensuring Indigenous Peoples’ free, prior, and informed consent; adaptation indicators that acknowledge Indigenous knowledge systems and contributions; and dedicated mechanisms to operationalize Indigenous Peoples’ direct access to finance.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES underscored the need to engage with local actors and communities across all agenda items. They urged all parties to embrace reforms that respond to the needs of all communities to deal with the consequences of a 1.5°C overshoot and ensure a just transition in an urban world.

RESEARCH AND INDEPENDENT NGOs highlighted the importance of transparent, inclusive, and cooperative decision making based on best-available science, including the social sciences and Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge. They welcomed the format of the Research Dialogue, which provided insight into parties’ research needs, and expressed their readiness to help connect research to policy.

TRADE UNION NGOs called for a Belém action mechanism for just transition that, among others, provides for dialogue with workers on issues affecting them, ensures fair employment contracts for renewable energy workers, and provides the pathway for quality jobs. They urged the JTWP discussions not to be derailed by proxy fights on other issues.

WOMEN AND GENDER NGOs said there can be no climate justice without human rights. They called for moving from the “tick-box exercise” of gender sensitivity to real gender-responsiveness and emphasized the need to address extractivism, colonialism, and patriarchal structures. They expressed their concern over the increasing censorship of observers and lack of transparency in the UNFCCC process, and called for conflict of interest policies.

CHILDREN AND YOUTH NGOs expressed doubt about their constituency’s ability to attend the Belém conference due to a lack of accommodations and exclusionary prices. They called for: phase-out of fossil fuels; children- and youth-sensitive GGA indicators; and a robust conflict of interest policy that enhances accountability and transparency.

FARMERS NGOs lamented that most farmers were not involved in the preparation of the latest NDCs, stressing the need for their involvement in the implementation phase. They called for measurable GGA indicators that reflect the diversity and complexity of agriculture. They lamented that the barriers between farmers and finance are as high as ever, calling for finance that is available, accessible, and predictable for all, particularly for women, youth, and family farmers. They called for farmers to have a permanent and active observer seat on the Board of the Fund for responding to Loss and Damage.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs urged parties to offer the policy certainty and predictability needed to encourage investment. They called for removing barriers in order to unlock the USD 1.3 trillion of climate finance.

GLOBAL CAMPAIGN TO DEMAND CLIMATE JUSTICE and CAN lamented the ongoing genocide that is erasing livelihoods and ecosystems, highlighting it is being fueled by the same people that fueled the colonialism that caused the current climate crisis. They stressed that “if we want climate justice, we must end the siege and end the genocide—no climate justice under occupation.”

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell underscored that all eyes will be on COP 30 to deliver a response to the BTR and NDC synthesis reports, which will show how far we have come and how far we must go. He called on negotiators and leaders to use the intersessional period to find common ground, reminding them “this is your agenda, your process—progress here will benefit your people.” He emphasized UN cooperation as “humanity’s only means of preventing a climate-driven, global economic meltdown with terrible human costs,” underscoring “just as we have no planet B, there is no process B.”

Conclusion of the Session: The SBSTA and SBI adopted their respective draft meeting reports (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/L.1 and FCCC/SBI/2025/L.1) and the meeting was gaveled to a close at 12:18 am on Friday, 27 June 2025. 

A Brief Analysis of the 2025 June Climate Meetings

If the multilateral climate process were a communal garden, it would be one that has vastly expanded over the years. Every few months, thousands of dedicated gardeners come together to tend to this complex ecosystem—to make it flourish so all can benefit. In principle, the June meetings of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)’s Subsidiary Bodies serve to prepare the ground and plant what will hopefully be ready for harvesting by the governing bodies’ meeting later in the year. However, those who continue to depend on the “garden” for their sustenance many years into the future worry about the increasing overgrowth.

This brief analysis reflects on the 2025 June Climate Meetings, looking at what seeds delegates managed to sow, how they fared in their efforts to keep pesky weeds at bay, and what lies ahead at the 30th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC in November in Belém, Brazil.

Many Seedlings to Nurture

The climate process has evolved from a compact garden with well-defined rows on which few species grow, to a densely populated habitat for all types of creatures. Different generations and groups of gardeners have expanded the plot and planted new varieties. 

Nurtured by developing countries, various adaptation-related issues have sprouted over the years. In Bonn, attention largely focused on the development of indicators to track progress toward the Paris Agreement’s Global Goal on Adaptation to enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change. Parties debated at great length what guidance to give the technical experts tasked with refining their draft list of indicators into a manageable set for harvest in Belém. As is often the case, references to means of implementation were hotly debated, keeping delegates busy long into the night on the meeting’s last day.  

Disappointed by existing workstreams and work programmes, some gardeners have resorted to planting new ones in the hope that these would bear more fruit. Some varieties now work together symbiotically, or at least have the potential to do so, while others evidently compete for nutrients. Can the just transition work programme (JTWP) achieve what the mitigation work programme (MWP) cannot? And how would a new technology implementation programme (TIP) fit into the equation? Many countries underscored the need to implement the decision on the first Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement, especially with regard to transitioning away from fossil fuels. Yet nothing actionable emerged from the meeting. At this point, the JTWP is headed toward a dialogue series and disagreements on technology are such that some wonder whether the TIP will ever see the light of day. 

Gender negotiators had protracted debates over what exactly they want to plant. Some emphasized a binary perspective of gender, while others pushed for a more inclusive definition, the promotion of an intersectional lens, and attention to issues such as care work. Despite intense debates over the thorny question of terminology, parties and observers alike lauded the constructive engagement on the development of the new gender action plan (GAP). “At the end of the day, there are many ways such debates can be circumvented in the design of GAP activities,” noted one observer. To make sure their GAP-seedling grows, gender negotiators are planning on meeting again intersessionally.

Regardless of the agenda item, discussions in Bonn underscored that climate finance remains the much-needed fertilizer that supports the growth of strong climate action. In this regard, the meeting had to plough through some scorched earth: the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) on climate finance adopted in 2024 left developing countries dismayed and frustrated. Many consider that the USD 300 billion per year goal falls far short of providing the vital nutrients that climate action needs to flourish and yield the systemic transformation required to achieve the Paris Agreement’s temperature goal. It was therefore hardly surprising to see the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs) try to add an item to the agenda addressing the implementation of developed countries’ finance commitment (Paris Agreement Article 9.1) before the meeting started. The counter-proposal to address finance in a more holistic manner did little to assuage them. It possibly sparked even more frustration among those that believe the process’s finance ecosystem is out of balance. In any case, the dueling proposals delayed the start of negotiations by two full days—valuable time that could have been used to build common ground.

Trimming with Dull Shears

The session’s delayed opening fueled long-time debates over the efficiency and effectiveness of the process. Increasing budgetary constraints facing many countries and the UNFCCC Secretariat (as well as the UN at large) increased the pressure for the climate community to reconsider its carrying capacity. Some suggested that items proposed for inclusion on the provisional agendas should be supported by a minimum number of countries from at least two regions. Others also floated the idea of weeding out items that have served their purpose, such as those under the Kyoto Protocol that no longer have a real mandate.

Neither of these options took root in Bonn. Consultations on the organization of COP 30 revealed that we may face another agenda fight in Belém. The LMDCs, supported by other developing countries, maintain their call to address the implementation of Article 9.1 as well as unilateral trade measures. The European Union, the Environmental Integrity Group, and the Umbrella Group, on the other hand, emphasized they expect to discuss the synthesis report on nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to inspire further action.

Clearly, some weeding and pruning is needed to ensure the climate regime’s health. But the UNFCCC’s gardeners do not seem able to agree on how to trim the bushes and how to thresh harmful weeds from valuable crops. There are fears that measures aimed at enhancing the process’s efficiency will diminish its party-driven nature and place some participants at an advantage over others. This also is holding back discussions on whether to prune delegation sizes to cope with burgeoning number of participants, now numbering above 50,000. The fact that parties agreed to continue discussions on enhancing efficiency at the next session of the Subsidiary Bodies rather than to wait another year, underscores their heightened resolve to address this challenge.

Looking over the Fence

This year’s June Meetings were sandwiched between two main harvests under the Paris Agreement: the 2024 adoption of the NCQG—a thin yield to some—and the 2025 round of NDCs. The Subsidiary Bodies were not able to deal with either, at least not during the negotiations. Presidency-led consultations on the development of the roadmap to USD 1.3 trillion in climate finance, which is supposed to be presented in Belém, gave little assurance that it will produce the actionable measures that many expect. Discussions in Bonn also underscored that a number of countries have no intention of heeding the call for 1.5°C-aligned NDCs. 

Not all hope is lost, however. With NDCs slowly trickling in, the EU announcing its submission in time to be considered in the synthesis report, and China assuring it will submit its NDC in time for the COP, we may very well still see an ambitious “NDC catwalk,” as one delegate phrased it. After the twice-over withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement, major players have to readjust their strategy. It is perhaps an apt moment to have Brazil—a country with a strong diplomatic footing—in charge of tending to the process. After all, gardening is an art of patience—not all seeds will sprout immediately and not every harvest is plentiful. In climate diplomacy, as in horticulture, the key to success lies in recognizing the diversity and interdependencies that allow our shared projects to thrive.