Daily report for 24 June 2025

The Subsidiary Bodies (SBs) are now at their typical inflection point: with only two days to go, parties are doing their best to reach convergence on as many issues as possible. As usual, many debates revolved around how to capture progress made in Bonn without preempting discussions to be held in Belém.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA): In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Tina Kobilšek (Slovenia), parties reflected on a new iteration of draft text. The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) proposed, and parties agreed, to focus discussions on the skeleton of elements to be included in a draft decision for the Conference of the Parties (COP) serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) to consider in Belém.

GRUPO SUR, supported by the INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) and INDIA, highlighted a reference to the new adaptation finance goal to succeed the Glasgow pledge, including modalities to measure progress toward the new goal. The EUROPEAN UNION (EU), NORWAY, JAPAN, and CANADA opposed, with NEW ZEALAND urging “not to renegotiate the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG).”

The ARAB GROUP and LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), opposed by the UK, proposed including a preambular reference to the “principles and provisions” of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested adding a reference to the GGA Framework and its decisions. The LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) and the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) proposed exploring the development of further indicators beyond CMA 7.

On transformational adaptation, AILAC proposed addressing this item under the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and dropping it from the decision skeleton, while several parties favored referencing adaptation approaches more broadly.

Various delegates stressed the need to avoid starting from scratch in Belém, urged focusing only on the basic structure of the draft decision and avoiding listing specific sub-elements, and reminded parties of the need to swiftly conclude discussions. The EU asked for the draft elements of CMA decision text to be moved to an informal note with a disclaimer attesting to its lack of formal status.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): In SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Maesela John Kekana (South Africa) invited views on the possible creation of a digital platform to facilitate implementation of mitigation actions by enhancing collaboration.

Pointing to an information session held by Brazil on the matter, EGYPT provided their understanding of the proposal for a digital platform, highlighting: the platform will serve as a hub for existing platforms and allow for linking to any future platform, including country platforms; the initial scope can be limited to mitigation and then be scaled up over time; and the platform is not meant to replace the MWP but rather represent one of its outcomes and serve as a matchmaking tool.

EGYPT further proposed two options for the way forward: adopting SB conclusions at this session, requesting the Secretariat to map existing platforms and their functionalities, and launching the digital platform in Belém after agreeing on the needed functionalities; or, in addition to the steps in option 1, holding an intersessional workshop ahead of Belém to discuss and agree on the necessary functionalities of the platform, then launching it in Belém.

Several parties asked for clarity about the purpose and aim of the digital platform, and supported requesting the Secretariat to map existing platforms and their functionalities. Some also asked about the development costs and timeline, and suggested requesting the Secretariat to prepare a paper on this in collaboration with Brazil.

AOSIS underscored discussion of the platform should not hold up the MWP’s discussions on scaling up ambition. AILAC underlined that the platform is not a holistic response to all the gaps flagged by parties. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested functionalities for the platform, including matching finance and investment with mitigation actions and developing investable projects, and supported holding an intersessional discussion of Brazil’s proposal. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION asked how the platform would facilitate public and private finance flows. The ARAB GROUP proposed a comprehensive approach that includes adaptation activities from the start.

The co-facilitators will prepare an informal note.

Loss and Damage

2024 Review of the WIM: In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Cornelia Jaeger (Austria), AOSIS reported back on informal informals, noting that parties had arrived at a document to form the basis of discussions at COP 30. They highlighted that key additions relate to, among others:

• a placeholder for discussions on cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network Secretariat, level of administrative costs, and maximizing resources for technical assistance;
• methodologies for expert groups to quantify costs;
• the consideration of information from the Global Stocktake (GST) and an upcoming synthesis report on loss and damage information contained in the biennial transparency reports (BTRs);
• a report on the state of loss and damage; and
• language from the decision on the NCQG.

The G-77/CHINA agreed to take the text forward, underscoring it is not an agreed text. As key issues, they pointed to the location and cost-effectiveness of the Santiago Network. KENYA expressed reservations and requested time to confer with their capital, emphasizing “administrative costs cannot take over 50% of resources that are supposed to go to communities.”

The co-facilitators will report back to the SB Chairs.

Finance

Matters relating to the Adaptation Fund: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Isatou Camara (The Gambia) invited views on revised draft text.

On arrangements for the Fund’s transition, the AFRICAN GROUP, EU, and ARAB GROUP emphasized the need to ensure the World Bank continues to monetize the share of proceeds from the Clean Development Mechanism as long as they remain available. AILAC underscored the remaining assets accrued under the Kyoto Protocol include contributions by parties. AOSIS noted one of its suggestions regarding information to be provided by the Global Environment Facility is not reflected in the text, urging for this to be added.

On Board membership, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION proposed a new option specifying that the composition of the Board, the number of Board members, and nomination procedures are unchanged, which NEW ZEALAND, the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), and the UK opposed. The EU proposed an additional option containing the following elements: 

• the composition of the Board and the number of members remain unchanged; 
• terminology with respect to the composition of the Board is amended, such that with respect to the Board seats, the term “developed country parties” replaces “parties included in Annex I of the Convention” and “developing country parties” replaces “non-Annex I parties to the Convention”; and
• a footnote is inserted specifying that this does not alter the status of countries, nor does it prejudice further discussion on composition or views of parties in this regard.

The ARAB GROUP underscored the debate on membership should not delay the Fund’s continued operation. CHINA pointed to ongoing internal consultations on terminology.

On the fifth review, the LDCs and AOSIS called for a swift initiation. AILAC supported delaying the review for it to take place under a single governing body. The AFRICAN GROUP and ARAB GROUP noted their growing preference for delaying the review. 

Parties had a lengthy debate about how to capture progress made at SBI 62. The AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, AILAC, and CHINA supported three separate draft conclusions or, as the co-facilitators later suggested, draft conclusions with three annexes on elements for draft decisions. Emphasizing that terminology is an essential part of the Fund’s transition, the EU, EIG, NEW ZEALAND, and the UK called for capturing these issues jointly. Other proposals related to: having a separate text on the review; draft conclusions linking to the informal note; and adding a caveat on not prejudging the structure of decisions to be taken in Belém. 

The co-facilitators will revise the informal note to include the proposed insertions.

Other Issues

Terms, Composition, and Terms of Reference of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE): In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Xiang Gao (China) invited views on revised draft text. Discussions focused on the CGE’s terms of reference. Parties debated how to emphasize a focus on support for the transition from biennial update reports to BTRs while maintaining a mandate for the CGE to support reporting under the Convention, with some noting parties may withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The UK and AUSTRALIA supported, and G-77/CHINA opposed, that the draft conclusions should refer to CMA 7 considering the matter with a view to adopting a decision.

In procedural conclusions, parties agreed to continue discussions at SBI 63, taking into account the draft text from SBI 62 with a view to recommending a draft decision for adoption by COP 30.

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes, referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) introduced draft CMA decision text. AOSIS and NEPAL said the text should reference consideration of “collective” progress in implementing the GST outcomes. The EU supported the preparation of a report on each dialogue that summarizes inputs, presentations, and discussions.

The LMDCs opposed references in the text to “assessment of collective progress” and “assessment of GST outcomes,” stressing these duplicate the GST process and exceed the group’s mandate. They noted deletion of references to Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ provision of climate finance) and to disenablers, such as unilateral trade measures, and called for reinserting these references. Together with the AFRICAN GROUP, they opposed calls for a ministerial dialogue and CMA decision on the reports of the dialogues.

AUSTRALIA supported a summary of key messages of the dialogues and the preparation of a CMA decision on the dialogue reports. The UK supported holding a ministerial dialogue.

Informal consultations continued in the afternoon.

Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP): In the SB contact group co-chaired by Joseph Teo (Singapore), delegates continued providing their input on an informal note containing draft CMA decision text. The AFRICAN GROUP called for including the international dimension in the paragraph that references the “multisectoral and multidimensional nature of just transitions.” 

The INDIGENOUS PEOPLES ORGANIZATIONS called for, inter alia, reference to the need for a clear and time-bound roadmap to transition away from fossil fuels, and Indigenous Peoples’ direct access to climate finance. 

The GLOBAL CAMPAIGN TO DEMAND CLIMATE JUSTICE and CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK called for emphasis on international cooperation and just transition in critical minerals, and on further implementation of the JTWP, proposed establishing an action mechanism for just transition. WOMEN AND GENDER called for creation of a mechanism to accelerate, consolidate, and achieve holistic just transition across the whole economy. YOUTH NGOs called for institutional arrangements that prioritize accountability and inclusive participation of youth and other stakeholders and enable action on the ground.

BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY NGOs underlined the importance of addressing cross-border impacts of climate measures, and stressed that: international cooperation and coordinated measures are vital; and climate policy measures should foster fair competition and unlock opportunities for all.

TRADE UNION NGOs lamented that workers and communities are being held hostage by proxy discussions on climate finance and unilateral trade measures, and urged progress on just transition policies. They questioned reference in the text to “workers affected by just transitions,” noting that just transition is the solution, not a problem, and if workers are affected, then it is not a just transition.

The co-facilitators will consult with the SB Chairs regarding the placeholder text on “cross-border impacts of climate measures, including trade impacts” to get a clearer understanding of the intention when the SB agendas were adopted. Discussions continued in informal informals.

Gender: In SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Jared Huntley (Australia), parties continued reflecting on the development of the new gender action plan (GAP). 

Referencing its national constitution, PARAGUAY, opposed by CANADA, ICELAND, and AILAC, sought to define gender “as female and male sexes.” SAUDI ARABIA, supported by CHINA, called for deleting references to “gender-diverse” people, noting this is a red line.

ICELAND preferred to keep gender references unchanged, noting they “do not support binary terms.” AILAC called for an inclusive understanding of gender as reflected in relevant decisions under the UNFCCC process, noting substantial progress on the inclusion of gender considerations since 2012.

SAUDI ARABIA called for language that allows for different interpretations of gender as applicable or according to national contexts, supported by the UNITED ARAB EMIRATES who stressed cultural sensitivities. PARAGUAY suggested qualifying any references to women and girls and gender-diverse people with “in accordance with each country’s national legislation.” The HOLY SEE called for language that is reflective of “different views on gender.”

NORWAY called for the inclusion of gender and climate change as an agenda item under the CMA, opposed by BRAZIL, who appealed to “common sense and sense of urgency,” and stressed there is “no point in going back to this argument.”

Observers lamented the absence of references to children and youth and intersectionality, emphasizing the consideration of, among others, care work and age-disaggregated data.

On the draft SBI conclusions, parties called for clarifications on the possibility to hold further workshops in 2025, with the AFRICAN GROUP suggesting this could take place alongside the Second Africa Climate Summit. Parties rejected a proposal by the co-facilitators for an intersessional call for submissions on the informal note, stressing this would be “a step back.”

The co-facilitators will revise their informal note.

Arrangements for Intergovernmental Meetings: In the SBI contact group, Co-Chairs Laurence Ahoussou (Canada) and Kristina Stege (Marshall Islands) introduced new draft text.

On increasing observer engagement, CANADA called for language on the engagement of organizations for: children and youth, Indigenous Peoples, and women and gender. The EU, supported by AUSTRALIA, proposed taking note of observers’ call to create a disability constituency. On continuing to support observer organizations’ freedom of speech and assembly, CHINA suggested adding that “such rights should be exercised in conformity with the UN Charter and UNFCCC Code of Conduct.”

Regarding the collection of additional information on observer organizations, AUSTRALIA proposed expanding the scope to “relevant” additional information rather than limiting it to information on geographical scope. The ARAB GROUP, SOUTH AFRICA, and the LDCs opposed the change, noting the purpose of this text is to ensure geographical balance and regional representation and questioned the rationale for an open-ended mandate to collect information. The UK suggested referencing “geographical and other information,” which could include age.

On text encouraging Presiding Officers to conduct “early consultations” with parties to “ensure” smooth adoption of the agendas, CHINA suggested deleting “early” and “ensure” noting their support for consultations before sessions but stating that “early” is ambiguous and there is no way to ensure smooth adoption of the agendas.

On text noting the challenges posed by the increasing scale and complexity of the UNFCCC process, several parties, including MEXICO, TANZANIA, and the UK, called for a more positive framing that acknowledges increased engagement with the process while also noting the challenges. The ARAB GROUP preferred deleting the reference.

The AFRICAN GROUP and CHINA proposed deleting a request to the Secretariat to consider publishing an information note that maps where issues would be taken up under agreed mandates for agenda items and mandated events ahead of governing and subsidiary body sessions. PANAMA, supported by the UK, preferred retaining the request but clarifying that the information note will not prejudice the prioritization of agenda items.

The co-chairs will revise the efficiency section of the text.

In the Corridors

With the finishing line of the Subsidiary Bodies’ meeting drawing closer, delegates did their best to keep their head in the game amid turbulent geopolitical news. As of now, progress remains uneven, with some issues emerging as frontrunners and others trailing behind.

One delegate commented that the gender negotiations are “the friendliest since 2019.” Another welcomed parties’ apparent openness to explore compromise. Observers begged to differ, however, pointing to backsliding on gender terminology and carve-outs for “national contexts.” In the discussions on just transition, an observer rebuffed the contention that gender-responsive approaches are “exclusive”: “That is like saying that adding a wheelchair ramp is unfair to those who use steps.”

Perspectives on progress evidently depend on one’s level of expectation from the process. The resurfacing of calls to support the technological development of non-energy uses of fossil fuels raised some eyebrows. “Given the mood in the room, we are not sure there will ever be a technology implementation programme,” worried a delegate, who however underscored they “remain hopeful.” There is still a little time to massage texts to ensure that discussions in Brazil get a head start.