Daily report for 13 November 2025

Trying to progress work before the looming conclusion of discussions under the Subsidiary Bodies on Saturday, delegates convened in various formats, sometimes adding, sometimes removing brackets in the draft texts. Negotiators working on just transition and the Global Goal on Adaptation met for several hours throughout the day.

Presidency Consultations on NDCs, BTRs, Article 9.1, and UTMs

Túlio Andrade, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 Presidency, invited Parties to participate in a “collective therapy session” to assess where the conversation currently stands.

The ARAB GROUP and AFRICAN GROUP lamented the grouping together of all four issues and reiterated their preference for separate discussions on unilateral trade-restrictive measures (UTMs), and, with the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS), on Paris Agreement Article 9.1 (developed countries’ finance provision). MEXICO underlined the discussion of finance must move beyond pledges to consider the quality of finance.

The INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) called for the consultations to incorporate a sense of urgency, consider the reality on the ground, and achieve results. NEW ZEALAND urged a solutions-oriented attitude that focuses on transparency and facilitates action. The LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs) underlined that, until Article 9.1 is implemented, developing countries will be unable to implement the climate action required of them. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION lamented that the issue of UTMs has “haunted” the negotiations for too long and warned that “killing it off” again will poison other issues and result in distrust.

CANADA emphasized the importance of trust, both among Parties and between Parties and the outside world. The UK highlighted the need for international cooperation among countries as well as national measures implemented by countries themselves. TUVALU urged achieving clear deliverables, not a procedural outcome.

The Presidency then introduced guardrails for further work, including: preserving the Paris Agreement architecture and policy cycle; constructive and respectful engagement on issues related to the four issues, meaning no finger pointing; preserving the nationally determined nature of nationally determined contributions (NDCs); and preserving the scope and mandate of the second Global Stocktake (GST-2). Parties then provided comments and suggestions on refining these guardrails.

Finance

Adaptation Fund: In the CMP/CMA contact group, Co-Chair Koosje Beumer-van der Loo (the Netherlands) invited views on draft text. TÜRKIYE, UKRAINE, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION expressed concerns over suggested changes in terminology regarding Board membership, with UKRAINE saying that Convention and Paris Agreement terminology cannot be equated, as not all Annex I countries are developed countries. 

The AFRICAN GROUP, AILAC, the ARAB GROUP, and the LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) urged focus on the institutional arrangements which need to be resolved for the Fund to monetize the share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism. The AFRICAN GROUP suggested considering the terminology issue regarding Board membership at a later stage or to send it to the Presidency for resolution at the political level. The EU, SWITZERLAND, the UK, and AUSTRALIA underscored that terminology is part of the transition package and opposed addressing the matter separately, suggesting engagement in informal informals.

The co-chairs will seek guidance from the Chair of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and relay the discussion to the Presidency. The ARAB GROUP emphasized that the consideration of institutional arrangements, on which there is convergence, should remain at the technical level. SWITZERLAND opposed splitting up the negotiation package.

Ex ante climate finance reporting (Paris Agreement Article 9.5): In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Elena Pereira (Guatemala), Parties shared views on a draft CMA decision text and made suggestions for further streamlining.

SWITZERLAND, the EU, UK, CANADA, and NORWAY called for the text to be aligned with existing decisions and not include elements outside the agenda item’s mandate. The EU, CANADA, and NORWAY cautioned against text they considered as infringing on national sovereignty, such as references to internal budget processes. They also opposed updating the types of information to be provided in the biennial communications.

AOSIS called for improving the guidance on reporting under Article 9.5 and for keeping text on requesting information that would help increase the predictability and transparency of climate finance. They noted this item is one of the primary spaces to discuss follow-up on the new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG). The ARAB GROUP underscored the need to maintain “unique ideas” in the text, saying the group would reject any new iteration that does not do so. The AFRICAN GROUP presented textual proposals on: expressing concerns about the lack of a transparency process for Article 9.5; and deciding that Article 9.5 biennial communications shall undergo a technical expert review in accordance with the Enhanced Transparency Framework rules that would also ensure consistency of reporting under Articles 9.5 (ex ante) and 9.7 (ex post).

The co-facilitators will produce a second iteration of draft text.

Dialogue on finance flow alignment (Paris Agreement Article 2.1c): In CMA informal consultations, Co-Chair Zaheer Fakir (UAE) invited views on relevant safeguards. Delegates agreed that: Article 2.1c is to be implemented in a bottom-up, nationally-driven manner; efforts to implement Article 2.1c are complementary with, and do not substitute, commitments under Article 9; and continued consideration under the CMA should be non-prescriptive and non-punitive, without adding new burdens. 

The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) underscored: acknowledging there is no common interpretation of Article 2.1c; respecting national sovereignty, including fiscal and monetary sovereignty; and ensuring consistency with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and equity in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. The LMDCs and AFRICAN GROUP emphasized that Article 2.1c should not serve to impose UTMs, which disenable developing countries from taking climate action, with the AFRICAN GROUP calling for a space to discuss cross-border spill-over effects. The EU noted they agree with others, such as the LMDCs, that the sovereign right of each country to design its own pathway to low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development should not be called into question, and stressed there should be no finger-pointing to any Party’s domestic policies. They acknowledged others’ concerns over access barriers for countries and sectors with physical and transition risks.  

CANADA, AUSTRALIA, and NEW ZEALAND highlighted the need to avoid greenwashing and maladaptation and to address the specific circumstances of small economies. NORWAY noted further work should feed into the GST. AOSIS called for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process to define guidance and guardrails to shape finance flow consistency.

The co-facilitators will prepare draft text. 

Mitigation

Mitigation Work Programme (MWP): During SB informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ursula Fuentes (Germany) introduced an informal note and invited Parties’ views thereon.

Parties suggested deletions from, and additions to, the preambular section. The REPUBLIC OF KOREA suggested simply referencing the Paris Agreement and decision 4/CMA.4 (matters relating to the MWP).

On the proposal for a digital platform: JAPAN, AILAC, UKRAINE, and others supported no further consideration of the matter; the AFRICAN GROUP supported the option to launch the platform using the mitigation component of the Platform on non-market approaches (NMA) for matchmaking; and EGYPT called for reinserting the option of the digital platform as a hub that connects to other digital platforms.

Regarding the outcomes of the fifth and sixth global dialogues, the LMDCs and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION opposed including selective messages, while the EU, NORWAY, and others supported inclusion of key messages. On continuation of the MWP, the REPUBLIC OF KOREA and UKRAINE, opposed by the LMDCs, supported the option that includes calling for views and holding a workshop. The LDCs proposed a short paragraph simply calling for Parties’ views on the MWP’s continuation.

Paris Agreement Article 6.8 (non-market approaches): In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Jacqui Ruesga (New Zealand) and El Hadji Mbaye (Senegal) invited Parties’ views on elements for the review of the NMA work programme, noting the review itself will start at SBSTA 64.

The LMDCs suggested a survey of Article 6.8 national focal points on their experiences with the NMA Platform, which the UK supported, as well as qualitative and quantitative assessments of the work programme’s implementation. Lamenting the slow progress in registration of NMAs and calling for accelerating this process, the COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS suggested assessing the status of use of the NMA Platform and identifying improvements, if necessary.

The EU stated the text should not contain any new content, while the LMDCs called for including measures and recommendations for enhancing the work programme’s effectiveness.

The co-facilitators will prepare a draft decision text.

Adaptation

Global Goal on Adaptation: In SB informal consultations co-facilitated by Tine Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Gao Xiang (China), Parties continued to provide views on, and propose revisions to, an informal note.

AOSIS suggested including preambular references to Paris Agreement Articles 7.4 (greater mitigation reducing adaptation needs) and 9 (finance), while the LMDCs urged specific reference to Article 9.1 and the principles of the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. The EU opposed singling out individual articles.

AOSIS, supported by the EU, said that cross-cutting considerations should be addressed not as a disclaimer but in relation to data disaggregation, while the LMDCs suggested moving them to the preambular section. The EU suggested adding a disclaimer that the indicators do not give rise to “liability or compensation.”

Parties continued to diverge on the list of indicators and the way forward, with the EU urging adoption of at least one indicator per sub-target of the Global Goal on Adaptation Framework at CMA 7. The AFRICAN GROUP lamented that the options in the informal note do not adequately capture their proposal and reiterated their call for a two-year “policy alignment process,” with a view to adopting a set of indicators at CMA 9. The AFRICAN GROUP and the LMDCs, opposed by AOSIS and the EU, also proposed requesting the Secretariat to prepare a technical paper on the use of indicators based on Parties’ reflections.

The LMDCs stressed the Baku Adaptation Roadmap (BAR) as the primary vehicle to further work on the indicators, while the EU warned that expanding the BAR risks further fragmenting an already fragmented adaptation agenda. AOSIS called for case studies on transformational adaptation to be considered under the BAR.

AOSIS, the AFRICAN GROUP, and the LMDCs, opposed by the EU, supported including a call for developed countries to at least triple their collective provision of adaptation finance from 2025 levels by 2030.

​​Discussions continued in the evening. The ARAB GROUP opposed adoption of the indicator list, calling it a “ship that is not yet ready to sail” and proposed that the adaptation finance goal should be half of the NCQG pledge, in the amount of USD 150 billion.

The co-facilitators will prepare draft text to inform deliberations in informal informals.

Technology 

Review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC): During SBI informal consultations co-facilitated by Duduzile Nhlegenthwa-Masina (Eswatini), the EU reported back from informal informals, highlighting productive discussions on the criteria for selecting and evaluating the CTC host. They said Parties added sections on the management plan and financial management of the host to the draft text, and agreed on transparency language. They reported that disagreement remains on language around in-kind support and potential hosts having a track record of at least USD 5 billion annual budget.

Co-Facilitator Nhlegenthwa-Masina then invited views on an annex on revised functions of the CTC. Discussions continued in informal informals. 

Linkages between the Technology Mechanism and the Financial Mechanism: In SBI informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Céline Phillips (France) and Edalmi Pinelo (Belize) invited comments on the bracketed text in the informal note from SB 62. Parties agreed to remove the brackets from a paragraph welcoming the funding provided by the Global Environment Facility and Green Climate Fund (GCF) for activities of the Climate Technology Centre and Network and recognizing the role of sustainable resource mobilization and provision. The G-77/CHINA, opposed by the EU, emphasized retaining the bracketed text on noting the need for the GCF to continue responding to the COP’s mandates in its annual report.

Delegates could not reach agreement on the remaining bracketed text. The co-facilitators will seek additional time for Parties to finalize their work, urging informal discussions in the meantime.

Technology Implementation Programme (TIP): In SBI informal consultations, co-facilitated by Elfriede More (Austria) and Omar Alcock (Jamaica), Parties continued providing their views on draft decision text. The G-77/CHINA highlighted that the text on supporting developing countries to integrate their technology priorities into national climate change policies and programmes should include language on support to develop fundable projects. They noted that while the text references “mobilizing” financial resources, there needs to be language on “provision” of predictable financial and technological support.

The UK underlined that the TIP serves the Paris Agreement only and said it should be guided by the need to support implementation of climate technologies that will help keep 1.5°C within reach. The EU called for the text to better reflect the required urgency and ambition, and, noting that the Technology Mechanism already defines “support,” preferred including that definition in this text.

Other Issues 

Just Transition Work Programme: In the SBI contact group, co-chaired by Federica Fricano (Italy) and Joseph Teo (Singapore), SOUTH AFRICA reported back from informal informals, where discussions had focused on the G-77/China proposal to establish a “Belém action mechanism.” They highlighted that some Parties expressed their preference to enhance the existing architecture, but that common ground emerged on the need to “move beyond the status quo.”

Delegates then discussed UTMs. The LMDCs lamented proliferation of UTMs such as the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), noting it will divert financial flows from developing to developed countries, hampering poverty reduction and sustainable development efforts, but is estimated to only generate a 0.1% reduction in emissions. The UK, with JAPAN, stated there is no definition of UTMs, and, with the EU, protested framing climate policies as trade measures and singling out specific Parties. The EU stressed that climate action is nationally determined and described the CBAM as a robustly designed environmental, not trade, measure aimed at addressing carbon leakage which is equally applicable to national and foreign industries. INDIA and CHINA called for a dedicated space to address UTMs. AILAC and AOSIS supported including UTMs in the decision, noting that trade and climate policies can be mutually supportive.

NORWAY, NEW ZEALAND, the UK, EU, CANADA, and JAPAN suggested streamlining the informal note’s section on means of implementation (MoI), noting a skewed balance towards finance and ongoing discussions on MoI in other rooms. LMDCs opposed deleting any text on MoI, and called for adding text on Article 9.1. The LMDCs and ARAB GROUP rejected any references to coordination with processes outside the UNFCCC. The EU and AOSIS underscored the need to keep the language on the link between just transition and limiting global temperature increase to 1.5 °C, while the LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and RUSSIAN FEDERATION called for referencing the Paris Agreement’s exact temperature goal.

 CUBA, opposed by the EU, asked to remove human rights-based approaches, stating this is not defined within the UN, and, with the AFRICAN GROUP, suggested addition of the right to development.

The co-chairs will revise the informal note and discussions continued in informal informals.

Kyoto Protocol Compliance Committee: In a CMP contact group, Co-Chairs Diane Tan (Singapore) and Ine De Meyer (Belgium) introduced the Committee’s annual report (FCCC/KP/CMP/2025/4) and invited comments on the future of the Committee. The EU suggested there is no need for further meetings of the Committee, noting the phaseout of the Clean Development Mechanism. CHINA and SAUDI ARABIA preferred to retain the option to convene future Committee meetings, with SAUDI ARABIA warning against “crippling” the Kyoto Protocol. 

Research and systematic observation: In SBSTA informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Patricia Nyinguro (Kenya) and Frank McGovern (Ireland) invited Parties to comment on a revised informal note.

Parties continued debating whether to reference the role of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the establishment of the Convention and the Paris Agreement and work thereunder. The EU, AOSIS, AUSTRALIA, BANGLADESH, the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG), and the LDCs supported this, underscoring that the best available science produced by the IPCC has been fundamental in shaping the Paris Agreement. INDIA, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, and SAUDI ARABIA disagreed, stating that explicitly referencing the IPCC sends a poor signal to the scientific community.

Parties debated a reference to an update on the IPCC’s planned efforts to enhance inclusivity, with KENYA and SAUDI ARABIA noting the need to unpack the meaning of “inclusivity.” AOSIS supported “welcoming” the IPCC’s efforts to strengthen inclusivity, with the EU preferring to “encourage” these.

AOSIS and the LDCs opposed inviting the Systematic Observations Financing Facility’s (SOFF) to consider extending its provision of support to more developing countries, highlighting that the recent rejection of proposals by small island developing states (SIDS) reflects the SOFF not prioritizing SIDS in this regard. Questioning whether this may be due to a funding issue, KENYA suggested urging Parties to enhance support to the SOFF to enable support to more developing countries.

Cooperation with other international organizations: In informal consultations, SBSTA Chair Adonia Ayebare presented a list of issues on which he sees convergence. Noting limited capacity to engage on the matter intersessionally after the first such discussion at SBSTA 62 and pointing to limited time in Belém, the ARAB GROUP suggested taking note of views expressed and agreeing to continue discussions at SBSTA 64. The EU, COLOMBIA, INDONESIA, SWITZERLAND, and others urged capturing Parties’ willingness to engage in substantive, continuous discussions on this matter, with CANADA noting flexibility as to whether discussions should take place at every session or during the June meeting only.

COLOMBIA and PARAGUAY suggested mandating the UNFCCC Secretariat to strengthen the Joint Liaison Group, noting the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) already provided such a mandate. The EU noted the value of direct engagement with representatives of international organizations and, with INDONESIA and AUSTRALIA, addressing national implementation. AUSTRALIA suggested leveraging mandated events to foster increased engagement with other international organizations.

Noting the suggestions are legitimate, the ARAB GROUP opposed a substantive outcome at this session but suggested inviting further submissions to inform discussions at SBSTA 64. With many others urging for more time for engagement in Belém, Chair Ayebare suggested continued discussions, noting the COP Presidency can decide on the way forward during the second week.

Arrangements for intergovernmental meetings: In an SBI contact group, Co-Chairs Kaveh Guilanpour (Georgia) and Marianne Karlsen (Norway) recalled discussions on this item at SBI 62 and pointed to already implemented measures to enhance the efficiency of the process, such as limiting speaker times. Delegates broadly agreed on elements to be included in a draft decision, such as: acknowledging past and ongoing efforts to improve the efficiency of the process; inviting Parties and presiding officers to undertake streamlining efforts; and continuing discussions at SBI 64.

The EU, supported by JAPAN, SAUDI ARABIA, and the UK, urged clustering mandated events and holding them during sessional periods as much as possible. The EU also suggested holding mandated events in hybrid or virtual format, which SAUDI ARABIA and the AFRICAN GROUP opposed, citing time zone differences and connectivity issues. The AFRICAN GROUP said the number of events reflects the shift towards implementation and, with AOSIS, urged funding them appropriately. The EU and JAPAN called for taking budgetary implications of mandated activities into account. AILAC said all mandated activities should be covered through the core budget.

The EIG urged a focus on agenda rationalization and advancing sunset clauses for agenda items that have been held in abeyance for multiple years. The LDCs said that agenda streamlining needs to be party-driven and criticized the Presidency’s decision to “throw out” some agenda items. With AUSTRALIA, they called for transparency and due notice when new agenda items are added to the provisional agendas.

NORWAY lauded the practice of making host country agreements public, urged ensuring gender balance of presiding officers, and called for improving the participation of all stakeholder groups, with the LDCs emphasizing youth and children. AILAC suggested conducting an external independent evaluation of the process, while YOUTH NGOs called for a discussion on fundamental reform elements, including majority-based decision-making and establishing a robust framework to manage conflicts of interest.

In the afternoon, parties reflected on draft text. The LDCs and AOSIS expressed disappointment at the brevity of the text, saying that it represents a step back from the detailed conclusions adopted at SBI 62, and, supported by many others, proposed recalling those conclusions. AOSIS additionally urged addressing the logistical arrangements of COP sessions to facilitate the participation of developing countries. AILAC, supported by SAUDI ARABIA, proposed referencing past submissions made by Parties under this item. The EU suggested, and SAUDI ARABIA opposed, inviting the Secretariat to consider efficiency when preparing elements for provisional agendas. CHINA urged acknowledging the party-driven nature of the process and the rules of procedure.

The AFRICAN GROUP advocated for addressing the hosting of COP 31 and 32 in the text.

The co-chairs will revise the draft text and encouraged informal discussions among parties. 

In The Corridors

With the deadline for the Subsidiary Bodies to wrap up their work fast approaching, many delegates were busy trying to clean up their negotiation texts—with varying degrees of success. A seasoned observer praised the “most productive negotiation session on national adaptation plans witnessed in recent years,” only to be disappointed by the discussions that directly followed on the Global Goal on Adaptation, where groups stuck to their original positions rather than reducing the large number of options in the draft text.

Yet other negotiation tracks remained stuck in the fledgling stage. Calls began to emerge for political intervention on matters impeding progress at the technical level, such as the terminology for referring to members of the Adaptation Fund Board. With the outcome on cooperation with other international organizations up in the air, many also hoped to see the Brazilians capitalize on the legacy of the Rio Earth Summit. 

Questions over the efficiency of the negotiating process surfaced once again. One observer called for “just pulling the plug” on items that have essentially run their course, rather than holding more and more items in abeyance or continuing to funnel resources into irrelevant institutions: “A sleeker process would ultimately increase legitimacy and help focus on what really matters.” 

Negotiations on some agenda items continued late into the night, until the “unbearably cold” air conditioning in the rooms led delegates to postpone further exchange to hopefully warmer conditions the next morning.