Daily report for 18 November 2025
UN Climate Change Conference - Belém, November 2025
A host of new draft texts was released overnight, including a draft “Global Mutirão” decision on “uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change.” The Presidency pushed Parties to swiftly wrap up negotiations, but consultations convened throughout the day showed little sign of progress. Many more sessions were scheduled to take place in the evening, all the way until midnight.
Presidency Consultations
Mutirão mobilization for the Belém Package: In the afternoon, Túlio Andrade, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 Presidency, updated Parties about the intended way forward, highlighting the Presidency’s goal of “finishing work at an unprecedented pace.” He said the Presidency will receive a briefing from the ministerial pairs at 5:00 pm and technical discussions are expected to conclude by 7:00 pm, with the Co-Facilitators delivering their work to the Presidency at that time. He also requested Parties to consult with one another to agree on compromise or bridging proposals by 7:00 pm. Subsequently, he said, the three sets of information will be used to develop the final “Mutirão package.”
Cooperation with other international organizations: During Presidency consultations, chaired by Luiz de Andrade Filho, the Secretariat provided a presentation summarizing the cooperative activities of the Secretariat with UN entities and other international organizations, as per SAUDI ARABIA’s request. SAUDI ARABIA asked if the Secretariat uses any methodology to ensure engagement with organizations from different regions, noting an uneven regional representation in the report (FCCC/SBSTA/2025/INF.1). The Secretariat pointed to ongoing efforts to expand cooperation beyond the current scope in line with guidance provided at the 62nd meeting of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 62).
The COP Presidency proposed developing an informal note to organize views shared during SBSTA 62 and in Belém. Parties agreed with this proposal, with SAUDI ARABIA and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION noting that diverging views persist. COLOMBIA, LIBERIA, and PANAMA underscored the importance of ensuring the informal note strikes a balanced approach to ensure a substantive outcome at COP 30. The EU highlighted the importance of strengthening cooperation in the context of the Rio Conventions’ Joint Liaison Group.
The Presidency will prepare an informal note.
Technical-Level Negotiations
Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage: During COP/CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by José Delgado (Austria) and Daniel Lund (Fiji), the EU and the INDEPENDENT ALLIANCE OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) reported agreement found in informal informals on the text of the draft COP and CMA decisions, including deletion of the qualifier that developing countries “that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change” may submit funding requests.
Thanking all Parties for their work in reaching a compromise, the Co-Facilitators said that both texts will be forwarded to the Presidency.
Adaptation Fund: In CMP informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Koosje Beumer-van der Loo (the Netherlands) recalled that matters related to the Adaptation Fund that were considered by SBI 63 (transition, fifth review, and Board membership) are now being addressed by the Presidency, with technical-level consultations to focus on the annual report. Noting the Presidency’s accelerated mode of work, she invited views on revised draft decision text.
SWITZERLAND called for mirroring language from decision 13/CMA.6, which refers to the annual resource mobilization target of the Adaptation Fund Board of USD 300 million rather than “from a floor” of USD 300 million. They noted the target, which used to be around USD 80 million, is unrealistic and pointed to the issue of vacant seats on the Board. AILAC emphasized the pipeline of projects awaiting funding, and the ARAB GROUP recalled that the target was set with the expectations of an inflow from the share of proceeds from the Article 6.4 mechanism.
The EU and UK questioned the notion that higher project size ceilings enhance access to funding and flexibility for developing countries, noting the statement is not supported by the report. In mutual recognition of accredited entities among Funds, the ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) pointed to a bridging proposal discussed under another finance item. Parties also debated whether certain provisions on completion of work constitute micromanagement, and many called for “inviting” rather than “requesting” the Board to continue its work on direct access.
The Co-Facilitators will report the outcome of the discussion to the Presidency and urged continued engagement among Parties on outstanding matters.
Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): During CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Pacifica Achieng Ogola (Kenya), Parties continued to provide their views on draft CMA decision text. Regarding the section on reporting and infrastructure, several Parties, including the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ARAB GROUP, UK, and CHINA, supported deleting the paragraphs recalling some of the existing reporting requirements, noting these are repetitive and unnecessary. The EU stated that due to inconsistencies in Parties’ reporting, these paragraphs are necessary to clarify the requirements. SWITZERLAND called for using more specific language that clearly addresses any problems identified in Parties’ reporting.
The UK called for a space to discuss the reports of the Article 6 technical expert review, and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION supported having such discussions during the Article 6.2 Ambition Dialogue. AOSIS noted the Dialogue’s format is too formal and not conducive for such an exchange of views.
Discussions continued in informal informals.
Paris Agreement Article 6.4 (crediting mechanism): In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Kate Hancock (Australia) and Sonam Tashi (Bhutan), Parties continued to provide input to draft CMA decision text.
AILAC noted the section on methodologies and standards micro-manages the work of the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body (SBM). Several Parties agreed, expressing their willingness to see the entire section deleted, but also engaging with specific paragraphs.
COSTA RICA opposed a blanket approval of the permanence standards in their current form, questioned the provision of a 100-year timeframe for calculating reversal risk, and supported requesting the SBM to ensure that the duration for assessing reversal risk is based on timeframes relevant for achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal.
The COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS supported requesting the SBM to continue work on developing “programmatic and sectoral approaches,” rather than “large-scale crediting programmes.”
On the transition of Clean Development Mechanism activities, the LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs), AFRICAN GROUP, and LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (LMDCs), opposed by SWITZERLAND and JAPAN, supported extending the deadline for the transition, with the AFRICAN GROUP highlighting many group members have not yet completed the needed preparatory work.
Discussions continued in the afternoon.
Global Goal on Adaptation: In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Tine Kobilšek (Slovenia) and Gao Xiang (China), Parties expressed their views on a new iteration of draft text, noting that it had become long and convoluted, and made concrete proposals for deletions and streamlining.
The EU, with AOSIS and several other Parties, stressed that language on cross-cutting considerations should be included in the main decision text rather than the preambular provisions. They proposed language aligned with the wording in paragraph 13 of decision 2/CMA.5 on what to take into account when implementing adaptation efforts, with COLOMBIA urging reference to Afro-descendant communities and CANADA to traditional and Indigenous knowledge. AILAC expressed flexibility about the placement of cross-cutting considerations. Many developed countries supported, and developing countries opposed, deleting references to the provisions and principles of the UNFCCC throughout the text, saying that this is a CMA item.
GRUPO SUR, AILAC, the EU, and LDCs, among others, urged adopting the indicator list at CMA 7 and reiterated that it cannot be viewed as a mere “knowledge product.” The AFRICAN GROUP opposed, saying the list is problematic as it includes “intrusive” indicators that track domestic policies and shifts responsibility from developed to developing countries, eroding solidarity. They reiterated their preference for adopting the final list of indicators at CMA 9. AUSTRALIA said that some proposals make the indicators seem like a “finance tracking regime” and that “the narrative that domestic resources are irrelevant is false.”
In relation to work post CMA 7, the EU supported concluding the Baku Adaptation Roadmap and establishing: a short-term process for further technical work on the indicators to conclude by SB 65; and a longer-term process aimed at adaptation implementation with a timeline of 2030. With AILAC, GRUPO SUR advocated for further technical work on the indicators to be undertaken by the Adaptation Committee but opposed further refinement of the indicators in this context. The LMDCs favored “testing” the indicators through a piloting phase, while JAPAN opposed the creation of any new processes and workstreams. The AFRICAN GROUP supported having a two-year policy alignment process to refine the indicators, alongside technical work on methodologies and metadata.
The LMDCs favored requesting the Secretariat to prepare, on the basis of Parties’ views, a technical paper on the indicators and an analysis of reported information on thematic and dimensional indicators. NEW ZEALAND proposed inviting the Secretariat to produce biennial synthesis reports on national use of the indicators, based on information contained in Biennial Transparency Reports (BTRs).
Developed countries stressed the goal of tripling adaptation finance is already being discussed elsewhere, while many developing countries supported retaining the reference in the text.
The Co-Facilitators will report back to the Presidency.
National adaptation plans (NAPs): In COP informal consultations, Co-Facilitators Antwi-Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) and Cassandra Moll (New Zealand) introduced new draft text building on productive discussions the previous day. Several Parties voiced disappointment that their views were not adequately reflected and made proposals for textual edits and insertions.
The GROUP OF 77 AND CHINA (G-77/CHINA) urged deleting references to the “private sector” and “all sources of funding” throughout the text. The EU called the text “unbalanced” and explained that while they are not against references to means of implementation, these need to be balanced with all other elements of the NAP process.
GRUPO SUR and AILAC said they cannot accept reference to the “specific needs and special circumstances of the LDCs and small island developing States” and differentiation between Parties in the context of Paris Agreement Article 7 (adaptation), and, with the EU and CANADA, urged including language on adaptation mainstreaming across national, sub-national, and local levels. AUSTRALIA, the EU, and CANADA opposed requesting the Standing Committee on Finance to include information on finance flows for NAP formulation and implementation in its biennial assessment, saying this room had no mandate to do so.
Provision of financial and technical support to developing countries for reporting and review under the Paris Agreement: During CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) and Ole-Kenneth Nielsen (Denmark), Parties reported back on informal informals, noting they progressed in their consideration of potential future activities to support developing countries in implementing the Enhanced Transparency Framework, converging on the need for such activities and reflecting on how best to structure them. They also discussed the provision of longer-term guidance on these activities, potentially in 2026.
The Co-Facilitators nudged parties to streamline the text by combining options and using brackets to highlight areas of disagreement in relation to individual activities. Discussions continued in informal informals.
Technology Implementation Programme (TIP): In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Omar Alcock (Jamaica), SAUDI ARABIA reported on the outcomes of informal informals, stating Parties went through preambular provisions and text on mandate, objectives, and principles. The ARAB GROUP lamented that some parties raised issues being discussed by ministers. Co-Facilitator Alcock noted that all technical work on the TIP should conclude by the end of the day, and the COP Presidency explained that ministers are conducting consultations throughout the day, with combined work to be presented as part of the Belém package on Wednesday, 19 November.
Parties discussed what to address in continued informal informals. Co-Facilitator Alcock suggested they reflect on the programme’s components, topics of global dialogues, and timeline. The EU wanted to also discuss other text, on: regional dialogues; demand-driven capacity-building; and reporting on, and evaluation of, the programme. The LDCs emphasized the operationalization of the programme, suggesting dialogues could be addressed later and noting the timeline should align with the Global Stocktake cycle.
In the evening, Co-Facilitator Elfriede More (Austria) explained that input from technical-level and ministerial consultations will serve as a basis for new text, which should be posted by the next morning, with further consultations being in the Presidency’s hands. She invited delegates to relay any remaining comments and concerns.
The EU, JAPAN, and CANADA stressed that the TIP is to be implemented by the Technology Mechanism, not the SBSTA. The UK and CANADA opposed a provision for the SBSTA to elaborate monitoring and evaluation indicators for the TIP and define the concept of “fully realizing technology development and transfer,” noting it falls outside the mandate of the TIP negotiations.
The ARAB GROUP and CHINA rejected a placeholder for 1.5°C pathways in the principles section, stating that the full Paris Agreement temperature goal “is enough,” and opposed listing specific UNFCCC programmes in a component on complementing other work. The UK, CANADA, and EU stressed the need to feature the 1.5°C goal.
The G-77/CHINA called for recognizing country-driven approaches and underscored the need for language on removing barriers to technology access, including by a CMA decision that could also recommend action to other relevant bodies. JAPAN, the UK, EU, and CANADA opposed the CMA decision language as a “last minute addition,” noting it is outside the TIP’s mandate. The G-77/CHINA reminded this had been tabled at the outset of the informal consultations on the TIP at COP 30, as well as at COP 29 and SB 62, and suggested they would not agree to the text without this proposal.
Response measures: In COP/CMA/CMP informal consultations co-facilitated by Veronica Bagi (Hungary) and Diane Black-Layne (Antigua and Barbuda), Parties reported back from informal informals. The G-77/CHINA and CANADA observed that good progress had been made in the consultations throughout the day, but views still diverged on some paragraphs.
Regarding a paragraph on deciding that the Forum on the Impact of the Implementation of Response Measures identifies its activities for the subsequent year at the second regular SB session of each year and outlining the activities for SB 64 and SB 65, CANADA indicated its preference for no text and annexing a table of the activities instead, but expressed willingness to work on text for this paragraph.
On a paragraph noting with appreciation the progress of the Katowice Committee of Experts (KCI) in developing rigorous science-based approaches to addressing the social, environmental, and economic impacts of the implementation of response measures, HONDURAS stated this formulation changes the interpretation of response measures, calling for references to relevant paragraphs in the Convention and the Paris Agreement.
Discussions later reconvened in a contact group, co-chaired by Bagi and Black-Layne, with Parties expressing frustration about not being able to reach agreement despite good progress made. They agreed on the importance of agreeing to a workplan for the KCI, and suggestions were made to revert to agreed text in areas of disagreement around the scope of the Forum.
On references to co-benefits, CANADA, supported by the UK, said the goal is to maximize the positive and minimize the negative impacts of response measures, noting this is required for assessing the policies needed to reach the Paris Agreement’s goals. CHINA opposed, stating that positive impacts are “not a problem” for developing countries, but negative impacts are since they imply damages and costs.
The Co-Chairs will report to the Presidency.
In The Corridors
The release of a host of new texts in the early morning set the pace for an intense day of negotiations. The Presidency’s doubling down on its intention to adopt decisions by the following day on a wide range of controversial topics—grouped together as the Belém political package—added extra pressure.
Meetings appeared and disappeared from the schedule, and the division of labor between, and pace of progress across, political and technical negotiation tracks left many confused. Even those sitting in the Mutirão had different understandings of the process, especially with regard to the reporting back from ministerial consultations. Despite delegates’ and presiding officers’ best efforts to clean up text and identify landing grounds, agreement remained elusive on key items such as the Global Goal on Adaptation and the technology implementation programme.
The growing lines in front of the coffee stalls were tell-tale signs of the sleep deprivation afflicting all participants. Still, some were cautiously optimistic that the hasty negotiations might lead countries to find shortcuts to compromise text and send everyone home on time—or even early. “That would be a historic legacy for Belém,” noted an experienced observer, recounting that the last climate conference that finished on time took place over twenty years ago.