Daily report for 17 November 2025

At the outset of the second week, the Brazilian Presidency was busier than ever, conducting consultations on a host of issues, with technical-level negotiations continuing on many others, including just transition, technology, and many finance-related items.

Presidency consultations

Presidency consultations on NDCs, BTRs, Article 9.1, and UTMs: In the morning, Túlio Andrade, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 Presidency, introduced a summary note on the consultations so far and invited comments. Many Parties supported the option of having an outcome or package in the form of a “Mutirão decision.” AUSTRALIA, KENYA, PANAMA, and CANADA, among others, supported a reinvigorated Mission 1.5°C.

On the framing, the ARAB GROUP, LIKE-MINDED DEVELOPING STATES (LMDCs), AFRICAN GROUP and others supported stronger reference to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), and the ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP (EIG) and NORWAY proposed to add “in line with national circumstances.” The ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS) called for accelerated action in this decade to limit the scale and duration of an overshoot and, with NORWAY and AUSTRALIA, emphasized that every fraction of a degree above 1.5°C matters. The EIG and PANAMA suggested strengthening the reference to science. GEORGIA called for reference to the Rio Conventions. MONACO and MEXICO called for reference to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on obligations of states in respect of climate change.

The LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES (LDCs) supported a call for accelerated action in this critical decade and a roadmap to 1.5°C. The AFRICAN GROUP stated that such a roadmap should include supporting countries that have not submitted their nationally determined contributions (NDCs) to do so, as well as supporting NDC implementation, strengthening the mitigation work programme, and supporting the Consultative Group of Experts. The LMDCs opposed any concept of implementing the Global Stocktake (GST) outcomes and, with the AFRICAN GROUP, opposed any dialogue on the NDC and biennial transparency (BTR) synthesis reports.

The LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP opposed “targeting” particular sectors, such as the energy sector, and rejected references to sectoral approaches and long-term strategies. The AFRICAN GROUP and QATAR opposed linking ambition to decarbonization, with QATAR urging a focus instead on low-carbon development in the context of sustainable development. The INDEPENDENT ASSOCIATION OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (AILAC) supported exploring sectoral roadmaps provided they remain nationally determined and proposed a roadmap on nature, including forests.

AOSIS highlighted the importance of adaptation finance. The AFRICAN GROUP lamented an over-focus on mitigation and, with the LDCs and others, urged strengthened reference to adaptation and finance.

The EUROPEAN UNION (EU) questioned why every reference to accelerating ambition includes reference to support, as well as why the new collective quantified goal (NCQG) is only mentioned once in the text, with the EIG underscoring that not all actions are conditional on finance. The EIG further opposed references to Article 9.1 and to tripling adaptation finance, noting such references as an attempt to renegotiate the NCQG. They also opposed references to burden-sharing arrangements, noting these risk undermining the nationally-determined nature of the Paris Agreement. AUSTRALIA called for delivering on the NCQG, including its qualitative elements, such as enhancing access to finance to ensure it reaches the most vulnerable.

AILAC cautioned that only referencing support for conditional NDCs risks encouraging countries to submit mainly conditional NDCs, and underlined that all developing countries are entitled to support for their NDCs.

The EU opposed any process that requires Parties to report climate-related trade measures or trade-related climate measures. ARGENTINA stated that all measures, including response measures, must conform to World Trade Organization rules, with Parties striving to minimize the impact of response measures on countries, especially developing countries. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION proposed noting trade measures could have co-benefits and trade-offs. CANADA supported using existing spaces to discuss the cross-border impacts of climate measures.

The Presidency will revise the note into the format of a “Mutirão decision” and expand the current bullets into detailed text. They invited written submissions from Parties to inform this revision.

Presidency information session on kick-starting the second week: At lunchtime, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 President André Corrêa do Lago reiterated the Presidency’s commitment to transparency and providing a safe space for negotiations. Noting the opportunity to send a signal to the global community of the COP’s ability to complete its work ahead of time, Corrêa do Lago urged Parties to complete their work by the evening of Tuesday, 18 November, so that the closing plenary can be held on Wednesday, 19 November, noting the possibility of continuing until Friday, 21 November. He therefore urged Parties to “shift into taskforce mode,” and stressed that each delegation should not ask what it can take away from the process but how their countries, societies, and governments can contribute to the process of implementing the Paris Agreement.

Mutirão mobilization for the Belém package: In the afternoon, Túlio Andrade explained that these consultations would focus on Parties’ priorities for a “Mutirão decision,” as well as key outstanding items Parties consider important for a balanced outcome from COP 30. He urged Parties to strive to conclude all work by Wednesday, 19 November, stressing this could be a legacy from Belém and “change our process forever.”

A list of items was then displayed on screen, featuring: the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA); just transition work programme (JTWP); mitigation work programme; national adaptation plans (NAPs); GST; Article 9.5 (ex ante finance reporting); 2.1c (finance flow alignment); response measures; Standing Committee on Finance; reports of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Global Environment Facility; report of and guidance to the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage; report of, and matters related to, the Adaptation Fund; technology implementation programme (TIP); and Article 13 (reporting under the enhanced transparency framework). Responding to Parties’ questions, the Presidency clarified that these consultations will not replace the technical consultations on these items, but rather seek to ensure an overall balance in the COP 30 outcome.

Parties then proceeded to provide their views on the listed items, calling for, among others:

• safeguards to ensure that the GGA indicators do not shift the burden of financing to developing countries, with the AFRICAN GROUP opposing tracking of domestic budget allocations for adaptation;
• sectoral cooperation roadmaps, with the EIG suggesting roadmaps on energy transition and forests;
• an outcome on forests, with PAPUA NEW GUINEA highlighting their intention to provide draft text on reversing global deforestation by 2030 supported with means of implementation;
• provision of fast-track funding for NAP implementation by 2030;
• mobilization of climate finance from all sources, not only public finance;
• support for all adaptation pathways, not just transformational adaptation;
• systematic integration of health into UNFCCC processes; and
• consideration of mountain priorities.

Mountains: Pedro Brancante, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 Presidency, noted consultations thus far have yielded: no consensus on a dedicated agenda item; wide support for an incremental approach to highlighting the relevance of mountains in the process; and no opposition to an annual dialogue, with different proposals for its modalities.

The MOUNTAIN GROUP, NEPAL, BHUTAN, PERU, and CHILE and supported an annual dialogue to be jointly convened by the SBs from 2026 onwards, led by two co-facilitators tasked with preparing a report thereon. They also called for establishing a joint SB agenda item, beginning at SB 64, to consider progress, challenges, and opportunities related to mountain-related climate action, consider findings from the annual dialogue, and identify actionable next steps. NEPAL and BHUTAN further suggested a call for submissions by the end of March 2026, to be synthesized by the Secretariat, which would inform considerations under the new agenda item.

Recognizing the relevance of the issue, the EU, SWITZERLAND, and JAPAN preferred to address mountains under existing workstreams, such as the research dialogue and the Nairobi work programme on adaptation, rather than a new agenda item. The EU cautioned against having an annual dialogue, noting this could open the door for calls regarding other ecosystems, but expressed support for a dialogue to be convened at SB 64. GEORGIA and LIECHTENSTEIN supported an annual dialogue to feed into the GST. On reporting, The MOUNTAIN GROUP, EU, CHILE, PERU, and NEPAL supported the development of a formal report to be presented at the next COP. 

Special needs and circumstances of Africa: Pedro Brancante invited Parties’ views. AILAC lamented the regional bias this consultation raises, especially during the first Latin American COP in over a decade. With GRUPO SUR, they cautioned against reopening this sensitive issue. They pointed to UNFCCC Article 3.2 on giving full consideration of the specific needs and special circumstances of developing countries, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and recalled that the special recognition of LDCs and small island developing states (SIDS) in the Paris Agreement was the result of careful negotiation. PAKISTAN, BHUTAN, URUGAY, and ECUADOR raised similar concerns, with PAKISTAN expressing dismay at the creation of competition amongst developing countries. SAINT LUCIA underscored that weakening the special needs and circumstances of SIDS is a red line. 

The AFRICAN GROUP argued that the vulnerabilities of Africa are unique and lamented the limited progress made at COP 28 and 29 on this matter. As actionable ways forward, they pointed to, among others: a CMA cover decision that recognizes the special needs and circumstances of developing countries; the submission of views on the apex of climate change in developing countries, especially Africa; and for the Secretariat to compile views from African Parties for consideration at CMA 7.

Brancante noted he will report to the COP 30 President that Parties expressed diverging views and consensus does not seem within reach. He invited delegates to participate in the special event on the matter, which will convene on Friday, 21 November. 

Cooperation with other international organizations: In consultations led by Luiz de Andrade Filho, COP 30/CMP 20/CMA 7 Presidency, COLOMBIA, the EU, UK, EIG, CANADA, PALAU, AUSTRALIA, PANAMA, and MONGOLIA supported developing an informal note that captures the views shared thus far. COLOMBIA underscored that the text should address: establishing an agenda item to facilitate regular meetings; moving from procedural to substantive discussions; allowing recommendations on how international cooperation can inform the implementation of the Paris Agreement; and improving communication among the Rio Conventions. 

SAUDI ARABIA, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, AFRICAN GROUP, IRAQ, and CHINA disagreed, noting limited time to capture views and the need for additional clarity regarding how cooperation between the Secretariat and international organizations takes place. ARGENTINA cautioned that each of the Rio Conventions has its own mandate and financial resources.

After a protracted debate, the Presidency offered to report back to Parties on next steps for additional discussions during this session.

Technical level negotiations

Green Climate Fund (GCF): In COP/CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by David Kaluba (Zambia), Parties shared views on second iterations of COP and CMA draft decision texts. For both texts, many Parties supported “welcoming” the GCF Board’s report, opposed by the ARAB GROUP that called for “noting the efforts of the Board in preparing” the report.

On a paragraph on the GCF’s partnerships, developed countries called for deleting a reference to “increased contributions from developed country Parties.”

CANADA and AILAC called for references to Indigenous Peoples in a paragraph on direct access, with AILAC also requesting referencing other vulnerable communities. CANADA, opposed by the ARAB GROUP, supported additional references to the Board’s gender action plan.

The ARAB GROUP lamented unfair treatment of Oman’s request for support for an early warning system, proposing text to prompt a response on the rationale for the rejection. 

On the CMA text, developed countries requested bracketing a paragraph referring to the NCQG decision, citing linkages to discussions under other agenda items.

The Co-Facilitators will revise the draft texts.

Fund for responding to Loss and Damage: In COP informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Daniel Lund (Fiji) invited views on draft text.

The ARAB GROUP underscored the need to recall language on all developing countries having access to the Fund’s resources and urging developed countries to continue providing support for loss and damage. Denouncing “backtracking” by developed countries, they underscored they will call for applying Rule 16 if their concerns are not addressed and will insist on having developed countries’ historical responsibility referenced in any guidance. The EU and JAPAN opposed the notion of backtracking. With the UK, they denounced the “cherry-picking” of individual elements from previous decisions and underscored their intention to implement the decision operationalizing the funding arrangement in its entirety, expressing hope that all Parties will also do so.

AOSIS urged the establishment of direct access modalities via a direct budget support mechanism. The EU suggested noting that the COP is looking forward to the Board operationalizing modalities for direct access at its next meeting. The EU said they will work with AILAC to draft language on the conversion of pledges to further the allocation of resources under the Barbados Implementation Modalities, acknowledging different national circumstances for the conversion of pledges.

The LDCs, supported by the AFRICAN GROUP and AOSIS, said the reference to the Board ensuring that its modalities and processes will avoid disproportionate bureaucratic obstacles to the access to resources should be kept separate from the issue of maintaining high fiduciary standards. The ARAB GROUP suggested referring to “fiduciary standards,” rather than high ones. 

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Adaptation Fund: In CMP informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Koosje Beumer-van der Loo (the Netherlands) invited views on draft text on the annual report of the Adaptation Fund Board.

The AFRICAN GROUP, ARAB GROUP, and AILAC opposed a reference to exploring innovative financial instruments. The EU called for specifying that the approval of a new resource mobilization target from a floor of USD 300 million for 2025 is “from a greater number of contributors than in previous years.” SWITZERLAND cautioned the USD 300 million figure, underscoring the Board should set more realistic targets. The EU and UK opposed a call for developed countries to provide resources at the levels needed for the Fund to fulfil its mandate and resource mobilization target.

The EU, AILAC, and AOSIS questioned a reference to “underserved regions.” The RUSSIAN FEDERATION, ARAB GROUP, and AFRICAN GROUP opposed language urging the relevant groups to provide nominations for vacant seats on the Board, with the EU emphasizing this is not about finger pointing, but ensuring the Board has sufficient capacity to fulfill its work. AOSIS emphasized the importance of mutual recognition of accredited entities among funds, with the EU requesting more time to reflect on the notion of “functional equivalence.”

In CMA informal consultations, co-facilitated by Isatou Camara (The Gambia), the EU opposed inviting the Board to develop a strategy for the tripling of outflows (NCQG decision paragraph 16). The UK considered that having a reference to support for achieving the GGA is premature, noting ongoing discussions on indicators. 

The Co-Facilitators will streamline the draft texts.

Ex ante climate finance reporting (Paris Agreement Article 9.5): In CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Isobel Bartholomew (UK), Parties mandated the Co-Facilitators to streamline draft text, with several developing country groups underscoring the need to retain unique views. 

AOSIS, the LDCs, AILAC, and the AFRICAN GROUP noted they prepared a joint proposal for an update to the annex to decision 12/CMA.1 on the types of information to be reported under Article 9.5 biennial communications, which they will submit in writing. The UK, CANADA, and AUSTRALIA underscored the need to retain an option for no changes to the annex. The EU, UK, CANADA, and AUSTRALIA also suggested guidance on elements for Parties to consider, including information relevant to the NCQG, overcoming reporting challenges, efforts to improve access, and striking a balance between mitigation and adaptation. The AFRICAN GROUP said they may propose applying Rule 16 if the next iteration of draft text raises concerns.

In COP informal consultations, the ARAB GROUP highlighted their expectation for the COP decision to mirror the CMA decision, whereas the EU, UK, and CANADA urged continuing the practice of the COP taking note of the CMA decision.

The Co-Facilitators will streamline the draft texts. 

Dialogue on finance flow alignment (Paris Agreement Article 2.1c): In informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Zaheer Fakir (UAE) invited views on draft text.

Discussions started on safeguards. Pointing to terms such as climate justice, sectoral circumstances, and socioeconomic priorities, the EU, UK, and CANADA emphasized the need to stick to agreed language. With regard to unilateral trade-restrictive measures (UTMs), the EU noted the item on response measures is the appropriate space to address these, with CANADA also pointing to the Presidency consultations on the matter. The ARAB GROUP and LMDCs called for referring to the need to “avoid UTMs” as such, rather than avoiding their impacts.

The LDCs, AILAC, and SWITZERLAND urged addressing the timeline of future work, with AILAC and CANADA supporting reflection on possible outcomes. The LMDCs and ARAB GROUP opposed the reference to “addressing fragmentation,” noting this indicates a top-down approach. SWITZERLAND and CANADA recalled the Dialogue Co-Chairs’ recommendation on holding a high-level forum, not a ministerial dialogue, and, with others, highlighted the value of engaging with actors beyond the UNFCCC.

The EU suggested a standing platform for scaling up finance, fostering cooperation, and strengthening finance flow alignment. The ARAB GROUP stated that, if the idea of a platform is retained, it should be a platform on the implementation of Article 9.1 and its complementarity with Article 2.1c. They also opposed the preparation of an annual report and emphasized that any dialogue should feature “discussions,” not “deliberations.” AILAC expressed support for tangible outcomes. CANADA emphasized feeding into the GST. 

The Co-Facilitators will revise their draft text.

Paris Agreement Article 6.2 (bilateral cooperative approaches): During CMA informal consultations co-facilitated by Peer Stiansen (Norway) and Pacifica Achieng Ogola (Kenya), Parties shared reflections on draft text.

On technical expert reviews, the LMDCs and the ARAB GROUP warned against “micro-managing” the experts, saying “we should leave the chefs to cook.” The EU, with the COALITION FOR RAINFOREST NATIONS (CfRN), stressed that additional information is necessary to understand the experts’ rationale and approach in identifying inconsistencies. The EU supported, and LMDCs and JAPAN opposed, a paragraph requesting the Secretariat to include a higher level of detail and disaggregation in its future reports on implementation of Article 6.2 guidance. The CfRN advocated additionally including information on environmental integrity, saying “we need to make sure the chefs follow the recipe.”

The LMDCs urged focusing on the implementation of, and capacity-building for, guidance on Article 6.2. JAPAN, supported by the AFRICAN GROUP, SWITZERLAND, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, NEW ZEALAND, and the EU, urged deletion of a reference to capacity-building under Paris Agreement Article 5.2 (forests). With the LDCs and CfRN, JAPAN also called for more clarity on the role of different international organizations involved in Article 6.2 capacity-building. The EU and CfRN, opposed by the LMDCs, requested reference to a dedicated space to discuss the reports and to clarify guidance. JAPAN proposed the creation of an Article 6.2 ambition dialogue in this respect.

In relation to the international registry, the AFRICAN GROUP proposed noting its current status “with concern,” given that many countries intend to use the international registry as their national registry, while the LMDCs suggested deleting a reference to the financial situation of the Secretariat.

SWITZERLAND identified various “logical inconsistencies” and “misrepresentations” of previous CMA decisions in the draft text and called for referencing specific decisions and using agreed text. NEW ZEALAND described “overreactions” throughout the text, noting there have only been six technical expert reviews. The ARAB GROUP, supported by the LMDCs, called for bracketing the entire text and adding an optional short text that takes note of work that occurred and requests capacity-building in the areas where inconsistencies were found.

The Co-Facilitators will revise their draft text.

National adaptation plans (NAPs): In COP informal consultations, co-facilitated by Antwi-Boasiako Amoah (Ghana) and Cassandra Moll (New Zealand), Parties provided reflections on a section of draft text dedicated to support needs.

JAPAN, supported by the EU and UK, stressed reference to enabling conditions for NAP implementation as crucial. GRUPO SUR, with AILAC and CANADA, proposed deleting a reference to the mobilization of finance. CANADA also called for, and the AFRICAN GROUP opposed, language on “inclusive governance processes.” The LDCs proposed alternative language referencing means of implementation (MoI), saying that policies imply costs and enabling conditions are thus dependent on MoI.

On the importance of platforms for information sharing, AILAC stressed that the existence of information alone does not automatically aid implementation, with the LDCs, supported by JAPAN and the UK, calling for language on capacity-building for NAP formulation and implementation.

On mainstreaming adaptation, the ARAB GROUP and LMDCs opposed, while JAPAN, CANADA, the EU, and UK supported reference to different levels of government.

The ARAB GROUP opposed singling out the development of monitoring, evaluation, and learning systems, while GRUPO SUR and the EU proposed adding a request to the Adaptation Committee and the LDC Expert Group to support the strengthening of such systems within existing mandates.

Dialogue on implementing the Global Stocktake outcomes (referred to in paragraph 97 of decision 1/CMA.5): In CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Ricardo Marshall (Barbados) invited Parties to provide their views on the scope, timeline, and outputs of the Dialogue. Main debates revolved around scope, with four main options reflected in the informal note forwarded by the SBI. 

Citing discussions during informal informals, AILAC proposed a fifth option that the dialogue should seek to identify, help accelerate, and support opportunities to implement the first GST (GST-1) decision in a nationally determined manner, recognizing the central role of the provision and mobilization of finance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer as key enablers for NDCs and NAPs.

The LMDCs expressed concern with all elements of the text, noting it duplicates the mandate of the GST. They further noted that the draft departs from the dialogue’s framing of finance, as it does not address enablement and provision. They expressed support for the dialogue to identify gaps, needs, and opportunities, in relation to enhancing the provision of adequate and concessional finance and strengthening international cooperation, including addressing disenablers to cooperation and multilateralism.

AOSIS underscored that GST-1 identifies a number of areas for course correction and that its outcomes need to be acted upon. They supported an annual dialogue until 2028, with a summary report and decision as outputs.

Provision of financial and technical support to developing countries for reporting and review under the Paris Agreement: In CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Sandra Motshwanedi (South Africa) suggested Parties move into informal informals to clear the brackets in the text forwarded by SBI 63.

The UK and EU agreed, noting their discomfort with discussing an annual cycle for activities that are yet to prove useful, and suggested mandating the Secretariat to undertake a survey for developing countries on whether and how the already completed activities improved their reporting process. The G-77/CHINA underscored that decision 18/CMA 5 already calls for CMA 7 to address future activities, and noted that discussing whether they are to take place is not a constructive way forward. AUSTRALIA, recognizing the need to support developing countries, noted it is important to understand what kinds of activities would yield the best results.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Review of the functions of the Climate Technology Centre (CTC): In COP/CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Mattias Frumerie (Sweden) invited Parties to comment on the remaining brackets in the draft decision text.

Parties agreed on language relating to the evaluation panel being “geographically balanced” and initiating the next CTC review in 2039, with a view to the COP adopting a decision in 2041.

The EU suggested inviting “countries in a position to do so” to provide support to the CTC. The ARAB GROUP, CHINA, and KENYA objected, stressing the dilution of developed countries’ obligations, and called for inviting “developed countries to provide support.” The LDCs proposed “developed countries and other parties that are in position to do so.” JAPAN, NORWAY, and the UK pointed to agreed language from decision 2/CP.17 on the CTC being funded from various sources and inviting Parties in a position to do so to support it through the provision of financial and other resources. CHILE proposed to “invite Parties to provide support.”

Technology Implementation Programme (TIP): In CMA informal consultations, Co-Facilitator Omar Alcock (Jamaica) informed Parties that ministerial pair will address: references to the Convention, GST outcomes, UTMs and intellectual property regimes, and financial support for the TIP. He asked delegates to focus on other aspects of the text forwarded by SB 63.

On mandate and objectives, the EU, AFRICAN GROUP, AILAC, AOSIS, UK, and NORWAY suggested adding keeping 1.5°C within reach. The ARAB GROUP and CHINA opposed, requesting the entire Paris Agreement temperature goal to be mentioned. The LDCs highlighted the importance of adaptation in addition to mitigation, and proposed referencing mitigation and adaptation goals as a bridging text. CHINA stressed the TIP is to implement the Paris Agreement, not GST outcomes.

On principles, the UK and the PHILIPPINES proposed recognizing the needs of vulnerable countries. The ARAB GROUP, opposed by the EU, called for addressing the needs of all developing countries. The LDCs and the EU suggested adding the empowerment of youth and children, persons with disabilities, and local communities, and the G-77/CHINA stressed the need to “draw on Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge and capacities, and Indigenous technologies.” On complementing ongoing work, the ARAB GROUP, CHINA, INDIA, and SENEGAL proposed deleting references to specific programmes, which the EU, UK, and JAPAN opposed.

On components, the EU suggested focusing on deployment, diffusion, and transfer of technology to complement ongoing work under the Technology Mechanism. The G-77/CHINA stressed covering the full technology cycle, including research and development. The EU, opposed by the G-77/CHINA, proposed removing references to strengthening national systems of innovation and supporting national designated entities.

The G-77/CHINA proposed language on removing barriers to technology access, including by the CMA recommending action to other relevant bodies and organizations. The ARAB GROUP, opposed by the EU and the UK, proposed language on addressing obstacles, including licensing, and supporting countries in identifying relevant emerging technologies such as: carbon capture, usage, and storage; carbon removal; and clean hydrogen.

Discussions continued in the evening. 

Just Transition Work Programme: In the CMA contact group co-chaired by Joseph Teo (Singapore), parties reflected on a new iteration of draft text.

On the preamble, various Parties and observers opposed footnotes referencing individual country definitions of gender, warning against backsliding on agreed language and setting a “dangerous” precedent. PARAGUAY said deleting the proposed footnote would cause domestic constitutional and legal problems. The UK, CANADA, and the EU called for deleting references to the principles of the UNFCCC, including CBDR, noting this is a CMA item. The LMDCs and ARAB GROUP opposed, saying the principles provide crucial context to just transition. EGYPT cited the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, which confirmed that the Paris Agreement should be interpreted in conjunction with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.

Countries expressed divergent views on, among others: language on human rights; the rights of Indigenous Peoples; reference to transitioning away from fossil fuels; the role of transitional fuels; consideration of voluntary licensing, patent pools, and open standards in the context of technology transfer; and treatment of critical minerals, with the EIG proposing, and various Parties and observers supporting, changing this to “transition minerals.”

The G-77/CHINA urged consideration of UTMs, with the LMDCs, ARAB GROUP, and RUSSIAN FEDERATION calling on Parties to reject such measures and proposing creating space under the JTWP to discuss UTMs. Developed countries opposed, with the EU saying that international validation of response measures undertaken by Parties is outside the scope of discussions. The EU proposed addressing export restraints on raw materials that are essential to clean technology and energy, should UTMs be considered under the JTWP.

The UK, CANADA, NORWAY, and the EIG supported developing a toolbox on just transition as well as guidance on the matter for UNFCCC constituted bodies.

Discussions continued in informal informals.

Gender: In COP informal consultations co-facilitated by Carol Franco (Dominican Republic) and Jared Huntley (Australia), Parties continued to discuss proposed activities under the new gender action plan.

On age- and gender-disaggregated information, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION highlighted their preference for the text to read “information disaggregated by sex and gender.” The EUROPEAN UNION, UK, and AOSIS disagreed, emphasizing the need to stick to agreed language. NEPAL requested the inclusion of disability-disaggregated data. On enhancing the management and use of gender-disaggregated data for gender analysis to better inform the implementation of gender-responsive climate policies, INDONESIA and the RUSSIAN FEDERATION supported a “sex-responsive indicator.” 

AOSIS urged building institutional capacity to enhance the accessibility and use of gender-disaggregated data for gender analysis in national climate systems. On strengthening capacity-building efforts for governments and other stakeholders in mainstreaming gender in national climate change policies, IRAN requested a caveat that takes into account national circumstances, in addition to calling for the bracketing of language around formulating gender-responsive budgets.

On capacity-building, AOSIS underscored the need for regular training for national gender and climate change focal points. INDONESIA emphasized addressing reproductive health and rights. The ARAB GROUP disagreed, calling this a red line, and requested its deletion. NEPAL suggested addressing unpaid care work. 

In The Corridors

Ministers descending on Belém for the second week of the climate conference were greeted with a torrential tropical downpour. As delegates inside the venue shouted to make themselves heard over the deafening noise of rain hammering on the leaky roof, the floods began to rise inside the venue—both metaphorically and physically.

Determined to conclude negotiations as quickly as possible, the Presidency trialed several different formats to unite Parties. Discussions on “the big four” issues convened for close to seven hours, with convergence emerging around having a “Mutirão decision” spanning all of them. However, the “cover decision by another name,” as one observer put it, is beginning to “seriously haunt the process.” With increasingly blurred lines between the technical and political realms, the contours of the Mutirão package are not easy to grasp. 

Discussions were no more amenable to progress in many of the continued technical-level negotiations. No amount of lightning and thunder could scare Parties into submission, with countries trading jabs in conversations on gender and just transition and threatening the invocation of Rule 16 in various finance discussions. “We’ve been invoking the spirit of the Rio Earth Summit, but it doesn’t seem to have manifested,” noted one delegate, “not even to support enhanced coordination with the UNFCCC’s sister Conventions.”